Defining Free Will

[John_Martin]

If C is the point of arrival, then there must be something attractive there. Otherwise, the will would never undertake the journey to C. There is sensual appetite (of two kinds, desire and courage, a.k.a. concupiscible and irascible), but also intellectual appetite (which is the will as such). The sensual appitite often clamors more strongly, which is one reason that it causes trouble when it is at odds with the “honest” (or authentic) good.

No, from the original explanation by the intellect to the will, at point C the road would be found to the destination of the Will’s question, “How do I get there?” (“back to C, where you meet the road to your union”)

 

[MrSnaith]

As I understand it, the Will is subordinate to the Intellect and Senses insofar as the Will itself is incapable of reason or perception, and can only exercise its proper function in the context of “stimuli” and knowledge (both intellectual knowledge and sense knowledge) provided by the Senses and the Intellect. Further, the Conscience is a fallible faculty that must be properly trained and honed in order to function properly, and is itself dependent upon the Intellect and (maybe?) the Will.

So my perplexity stems from the facts that if the Will can disregard the Intellect and Senses when it is performing its function, isn’t that effectively saying that it is performing in an irrational manner? That would seem to indicate a lack of any informed consent by the individual since the “informed” portion of the consent is based on Intellect. And even the Consent part, if disconnected from Intellect and therefore conscious awareness, seems like it would not by “me” consenting since “I” have no idea how to influence the decision/choice in such an irrationally-based act of the Will. And therefore it would seem that such an act of Will would be “unfree” in every way that I can imagine.

Conversely, if the Will cannot disregard the Intellect and Senses, and is essentially a 100% deterministic “function” with an “output” that is entirely dependent upon the “(name removed by moderator)uts” (e.g. knowledge, sensations, and the Intellect’s assessment of them and fallible ability to predict/correlate the choices to the Goods of the consequences of the choices), wouldn’t it be fair to say that my “freedom” of Will is dependent on my ability to provide “reliable (name removed by moderator)uts” to the choice function of the Will? And thus, if my Intellect desires the greatest Good but ends up getting “drowned out” or otherwise overridden by other factors (e.g. Impaired or deceived or faulty Senses, knowledge, etc.), that “I” am once again effectively “unfree” in such a scenario?

I really am not attempting to prove strict determinism is true. Strict determinism doesn’t feel “True” to me either. But I’m kind of stuck on understanding which (particular) faculties of “me-ness” my “freedom” resides in (according to Church teaching), and which faculties are antecedent and consequent of that faculty. Because it seems that understanding of such matters is essential to effectively “training” the Self to be able to more successful and reliable in pursuing Good and Virtue.

And while one might argue that such understanding is unnecessary, since the Church also provides us with “for dummies”-style training exercises (e.g. Prayers, virtues, etc.), I would argue that such understanding is necessary in order to fully understand the Why behind the Church’s teachings on the dignity of the human person, and even to fully understand and perfectly repent for the sins of the world, and to more fully appreciate the Goodness of God and His gift of Redemption. So pursuing such understanding seems like a very worthy task (in my mind).

I look forward to additional responses. Thanks again.

Permit me to add my thoughts on this.

You seem to be saying something like the following: You have the person, and the person has the intellectual faculty, and a subordinate extension of that faculty is the will. Thus, if the will is disobedient to the intellect, then I can know as much right as I want, and it wouldn’t make a difference, since I have no ultimate control over a faculty that is behaving irrationally and out of control. If the will is always obedient to the intellect, then there is no freedom, since my knowledge fully determines how I behave.

I would suggest that the error is in your initial presentation of the makeup of the human faculties. The intellectual faculty and the free will faculty are not in subordination to each other. The irrational appetite is in subordination to the irrational senses, but that order is not true of the intellect and will.

These are faculties of the person, but as I have defined above, free will implies free-from-causes volition. In other words, what the intellect apprehends may not necessarily be the determinant factor in the movement of the will. The person has freedom to move his will in whatever direction he chooses, despite how his intellect informs him. That is to say, both the intellect and the will are subordinate to the human person, and it is the person who exercises the use of each of these faculties, whether he chooses to do so in a coherent manner, or not.

 

[Justin_W]

Thanks to all the responders for their excellent responses so far! I’m going to try to send some additional replies later. But for now:

You seem to be saying something like the following: You have the person, and the person has the intellectual faculty, and a subordinate extension of that faculty is the will.

That last part I was not asserting, but merely attempting to ascertain.

if the will is disobedient to the intellect, then I can know as much right as I want, and it wouldn’t make a difference, since I have no ultimate control over a faculty that is behaving irrationally and out of control. If the will is always obedient to the intellect, then there is no freedom, since my knowledge fully determines how I behave.

Yes! Thank you for stating so clearly what I was so ineptly trying to express. Although I would probably qualify the use of the word “fully” to take into account factors aside from knowledge. But you nailed the essence of the idea that has been nagging me.

I would suggest that the error is in your initial presentation of the makeup of the human faculties. The intellectual faculty and the free will faculty are not in subordination to each other. The irrational appetite is in subordination to the irrational senses, but that order is not true of the intellect and will.

These are faculties of the person, but as I have defined above, free will implies free-from-causes volition. In other words, what the intellect apprehends may not necessarily be the determinant factor in the movement of the will.

OK. I’ll accept that for the moment.

The person has freedom to move his will in whatever direction he chooses, despite how his intellect informs him.

Umm…how? Isn’t reason and Rationality a fully-subordinate function of Intellect (even though both Intellect and Rationality are influenced positively or negatively by Knowledge and sensual appetites)? And therefore, aren’t actions of the Will thus Rational only to the extent that the Will subordinates/cooperates with the Intellect, and Irrational to the extent that it does not?

And what then would it mean to say that “he chooses” in the scenario where the Intellect, and Knowledge, and Rationality are all ignored/overridden by this other faculty?

I understand how I can “improve” my rational choices. E.g. I can do so via the application of extra time and effort spent: acquiring extra knowledge; rationally examining the PROs and CONs of each option; taking extra care in my attempts to predict the consequences of each choice; etc.

But in what way is a non-rational “choice” influence-able by my “self”? Because isn’t my “freedom” of choice truly “free” only to the extent that I am able to self-determine which of the possible options that “I” will “choose” (regardless of whether the chosen option ends up being an action or an inaction)?

That is to say, both the intellect and the will are subordinate to the human person, and it is the person who exercises the use of each of these faculties, whether he chooses to do so in a coherent manner, or not.

I guess it boils down to the fact that God has given each of us the ability to partially self-determine the strength and qualities of our Intellect (via study, etc.) and of our Physical attributes (via exercise, etc.). But if Will is even partially insubordinate to Intellect and/or Rationality, and (as you assert) is subordinate to this “human person”, it is still unclear to me exactly what the “human person” (Soul?) is, and whether (and how) one has any “freedom” in influencing them. It seems much more obvious that if the rest of what you say is true, then the Will and Soul may simply be a matter of “playing the hand you are dealt (presumably by God)” rather than things which one can improve via one’s own self-determined actions. And that conclusion doesn’t feel right, either.

For example, some people have both a great Intellectual and also Emotional desire to live, yet end up committing suicide anyway, because they simply feel that they have “no other choice”. Some of those people actively seek help, but the help fails. How is such an example consistent with a Free Will that is capable of “fully free” action in “any direction” without “first cause”?

Thanks again for (all) your continued assistance(s).

 

[MrSnaith]

Umm…how? Isn’t reason and Rationality a fully-subordinate function of Intellect (even though both Intellect and Rationality are influenced positively or negatively by Knowledge and sensual appetites)? And therefore, aren’t actions of the Will thus Rational only to the extent that the Will subordinates/cooperates with the Intellect, and Irrational to the extent that it does not?

Yes, reason is an act of the intellect. But the intellect isn’t the primary mover of the will, the person is. Therefore, a person may elect to act irrationally contrarily to the information of the intellect, and thus exercise his will in an irrational manner. The implication here is that people only act irrationally when they submit their will to the irrational appetites of the body.

The key distinction here is that the will doesn’t act irrationally, but the person does… by submitting their rational will to the demands of the irrational appetites of the body.

And what then would it mean to say that “he chooses” in the scenario where the Intellect, and Knowledge, and Rationality are all ignored/overridden by this other faculty?

The intellect is not overridden by the will. The intellect is overridden by sensuality, and the will is overridden by bodily appetites.

But in what way is a non-rational “choice” influence-able by my “self”? Because isn’t my “freedom” of choice truly “free” only to the extent that I am able to self-determine which of the possible options that “I” will “choose” (regardless of whether the chosen option ends up being an action or an inaction)?

It isn’t free. It is sin, and sin enslaves. The free choice is to act irrationally, but the act is an act of enslavement to the bodily appetites. You can only “improve” your rational actions by practicing the authority of the intellect and will over sensuality and bodily appetites. This is done with time and effort, and usually with the “small stuff” which is easier to achieve than the more difficult.

it is still unclear to me exactly what the “human person” (Soul?) is, and whether (and how) one has any “freedom” in influencing them.

You can’t describe “what” a person is. This is because the essence of personhood is “who,” not what. A person has certain attributes (intellect and will), but these attributes do not define the essence of personhood. The essence of personhood is the “I” which a being who is a person is able to express.

For example, some people have both a great Intellectual and also Emotional desire to live, yet end up committing suicide anyway, because they simply feel that they have “no other choice”. Some of those people actively seek help, but the help fails. How is such an example consistent with a Free Will that is capable of “fully free” action in “any direction” without “first cause”?

It isn’t consistent. That’s the point of my first post. We are not fully free any longer due to concupiscence. This is why we have to work at it. That’s the whole symbological meaning of Genesis when, after the fall, we are told that one of the consequences of the fall was that man would have to “toil” in order to make the earth produce fruit. “Adam” means earth. We are the earth, and we have to toil to produce virtue, which is right action, which is understood by the intellect and a properly directed will to the right good. That doesn’t come easy as it originally did. We are not free. We are slave to sin, to concupiscence, the inclination to sin, a direction of the will to subordinate itself to the appetites of the flesh, and a subordination of the intellect to the sensuality of the body. This is precisely the slavery that Christ came to free us from.

 

[lmelahn]

No, from the original explanation by the intellect to the will, at point C the road would be found to the destination of the Will’s question, “How do I get there?” (“back to C, where you meet the road to your union”)

OK. I think I understand what you meant now. In other words, the thing desired (the “honest” good—not the distraction at D) is the point of arrival; A, B, and C are all means to get there.

(Of course A, B, and C are also desired as useful goods, bona utilia.)

 

[John_Martin]

By the way, the object that the will (or sensitive appetite) seeks is not the “apple” perceived.
The object that the will seeks to actualize is an understanding of the self eating the apple and feeling the juice run into the mouth and some on the chin.

What the intellect or reason calls “good” and “desirable” is not the apple, but what is “good” is “the self consuming, uniting the apple to itself” - that is the object.

The object known is in the knower - the person (via reason) knows “Myself eating this apple”, even while the apple is on a tray on the table. The will is not satisfied until what is known good is actually good (when I am physically eating the apple and matching sense with understanding).

Eve did not “move her body” to actualize the eating of the fruit until she had an understanding in her mind of “herself consuming the fruit and suddenly being wise, and be like God”. That was “desirable”, “good” to her, that was the “known object in the knower”. Her will latched on and tried to make that understanding physically present and not only present in her knowing. Sadly, while she was able to match the eating part that she understood herself doing, she was not able to actualize the part about being like God.

How virtue conquers (or replaces) vice would be a next question - how the will can be consistent in regulating the passions.

What “object known in the knower”, what vision in the understanding of the self united with something would be so good that that the person would not want any contrary physical actualization? And could there be “known object in the knower” where the object united to the self is actually really present in the knower knowing, so that the will does not have to make it real materially, but it is already real and only to be reposed in (joy)?

 

[oldcelt]

By the way, the object that the will (or sensitive appetite) seeks is not the “apple” perceived.
The object that the will seeks to actualize is an understanding of the self eating the apple and feeling the juice run into the mouth and some on the chin.

What the intellect or reason calls “good” and “desirable” is not the apple, but what is “good” is “the self consuming, uniting the apple to itself” - that is the object.

The object known is in the knower - the person (via reason) knows “Myself eating this apple”, even while the apple is on a tray on the table. The will is not satisfied until what is known good is actually good (when I am physically eating the apple and matching sense with understanding).

Eve did not “move her body” to actualize the eating of the fruit until she had an understanding in her mind of “herself consuming the fruit and suddenly being wise, and be like God”. That was “desirable”, “good” to her, that was the “known object in the knower”. Her will latched on and tried to make that understanding physically present and not only present in her knowing. Sadly, while she was able to match the eating part that she understood herself doing, she was not able to actualize the part about being like God.

How virtue conquers (or replaces) vice would be a next question - how the will can be consistent in regulating the passions.

What “object known in the knower”, what vision in the understanding of the self united with something would be so good that that the person would not want any contrary physical actualization? And could there be “known object in the knower” where the object united to the self is actually really present in the knower knowing, so that the will does not have to make it real materially, but it is already real and only to be reposed in (joy)?

It is either free, or it is not. No lengthy explanation needed.

John

 

[Justin_W]

It is either free, or it is not. No lengthy explanation needed.

John

Well John, if it isn’t obvious whether it is free or not, a good explanation can be valuable in my opinion. And if the subject matter is complex, sometimes lengthy is the best we can do without sacrificing precision for ambiguity.

 

[oldcelt]

Well John, if it isn’t obvious whether it is free or not, a good explanation can be valuable in my opinion. And if the subject matter is complex, sometimes lengthy is the best we can do without sacrificing precision for ambiguity.

Then the term needs to be changed to conditional.