Sorry, I feel I did not answer your request, but this is all I could put together.
Apologies for my delayed response, you packed a lot of information into a relatively short amount of space. I believe that we’ve taken this conversation as far as it can be taken (insofar as the four points you just addressed) given the nature of the communication.
I do have to say you are the first theist I have seen who readily accepts the claim that if “supernatural events” could be demonstrated to have an effect on our physical world, the scientific method would take them into account and they’d become part of our natural understanding of the world. This is the exact same argument I have used and have seen skeptics such as Michael Shermer use to refute false accusations regarding scientism. I feel that we are in agreement that it is dubious to apply the current state of science to proof about attributes of God that are purely metaphysical (though this is exactly what many theologians do, William Lane Craig being one example), and that science can quite rightly be applied to empirical claims.
I feel the only point we still have a strong disagreement about is Russell’s intended use of the teapot analogy. In that regard, I still think that he intended it, at least in part, to apply to specific religious claims and dogmas pertaining to the world. Here is a quote from his 1952 article (also quoted in the Wikipedia summary):
“Many orthodox people speak as though it were the business of
sceptics to disprove received dogmas rather than of dogmatists to
prove them. This is, of course, a mistake. If I were to suggest that
between the Earth and Mars there is a china teapot revolving about
the sun in an elliptical orbit, nobody would be able to disprove my
assertion provided I were careful to add that the teapot is too small
to be revealed even by our most powerful telescopes. But if I were
to go on to say that, since my assertion cannot be disproved, it is
intolerable presumption on the part of human reason to doubt it, I
should rightly be thought to be talking nonsense.”
He clearly did not accept the metaphysical proposition about a personal creator of the universe on the grounds that it lacked evidence as well. But to avoid talking in circles, I think we’ve also both established a high degree of agreement that invoking purely fideistic claims to write public policy and try to compel others to agree with a point of view, is not a defensible stance and on this and other larger points I think we’ve each explained our stance as well as could possibly be done here.