Determinism and free will

[jpelham]

If having a ‘soul’/‘mind’ looks exactly as if there isn’t one… why suppose one does exists?

This insight underscores the central issue, and the awkwardness of a Protestant tradition. The Christian understands free will to originate in the human soul, unless you are Calvinist (behaviorism = Calvinism - God, exactly) or kindred Protestant, whose regard for the soul/mind looks exactly as if there isn’t one. Behavioral psychology, a materialist/determinist ideology, considers the mind/soul to be a materialist epi-phenomenon, merely contingent upon the particles and fields that constitute the substance of the human body. If the soul is more than this, as the Church teaches, then actions can originate in the soul, in conjunction with, but not entirely attributable to, antecedent causes. Hence free will.

And although free will is axiomatic in the Scriptures, the verses on predestination notwithstanding (they prove only to Whom decisive credit belongs), perhaps it has nowhere else been so well stated than by Mr. Johnson: “Sir, we know our will is free, and there’s an end on’t.”
(Boswell: Life)

 

[jinminn]

This insight underscores the central issue, and the awkwardness of a Protestant tradition. The Christian understands free will to originate in the human soul… Behavioral psychology, a materialist/determinist ideology, considers the mind/soul to be a materialist epi-phenomenon, merely contingent upon the particles and fields that constitute the substance of the human body. If the soul is more than this, as the Church teaches, then actions can originate in the soul, in conjunction with, but not entirely attributable to, antecedent causes. Hence free will.

I’m neither a Protestant or Calvinist. Not that you implied that… just wanted to point it out.

I am a heavily questioning Catholic. Primarily, I suppose I just am looking for evidence of the soul/mind that falls outside the realm of theological speculation and philosophical proofs with untestable premises.

Don’t get me wrong, there are fantastic arguments out there. The problem I run into is verifying that these claims hold in reality. They all fall back on premises that just strike me as a bit odd sometimes. I presented links to some evidence above in which brain injuries are directly tied to radical changes in personality, beliefs (both political and religious), recognition of loved ones, and all kinds of memory issues.

Does this disprove the existence of immaterial minds? No.

Would it help if someone could fully function in the absence of a part of the brain typically associated with a given ability (speaking without portion x, writing without portion y, left/right side functions working without their respective portion z’s)? Absolutely.

So, evidentially, I propose that we’re left in a situation extremely similar to most other paths I’ve walked down: absence of evidence… but obviously not evidence of absence.

Does this strike anyone else as different? Should I abandon hope for physical manifestations or these phenomenon? Or will I always be constrained to trying to find loopholes in ‘all abstractions are based on objective realities we’ve experience. Since we can know about free will, we must have an experience of it’?

MindOverMatter2:

If you want to refute my argument, you have to provide a detailed way of how we can gain the concept of free will and at the same time make the meaningful distinction between freewill and determinism without first having conceptual and experiential knowledge its objective existence.

Also, as I said before, I wasn’t ever aiming to refute the existence of free well. We’re in agreement. I did not understand the argument and admit to skimming and then reading your final conclusion sentence. Thank you for spelling it out for me again. One issue… don’t we just need to have experience of one of the concepts vs. both of them? I believe this is what you are saying, however you seem to be leaning on free will as the one exists vs. determinism. Couldn’t either exist to have a concept of the other?

Can I only think of what it would be like if the sun never shone because I’ve experienced both light and dark? Or could I contemplate what it would be like without light simply because I know light?

Also, how would this work if we regressed back in time? If one always has to learn based on previous building blocks… we should arrive at a first building block, right?

Hopefully I haven’t mis-construed your argument again! Again, I’m not disputing free will. I believe, however, that you are resting on needing free will to exist to even contemplate what determinism would be and logically, I don’t think there’s any need to give preference to free will to be the one that exists. Or am I wrong?

 

[jpelham]

Tolstoy, at a time when he was revered the world over and possessed exorbitant wealth and lands, found himself without a clear reason to live. He surveyed the the whole range of academic disciplines for answers and concluded this: “The clarity and precision of these fields is inversely proportionate to their relevance human problems.” See his “Confessions.”

Mathematician Kurt Godel posited and proved a theorem that is not irrelevant: If you require a mathematical system that is ‘consistent,’ i.e., without contradictory ‘truths,’ you must accept the existence of undecidable propositions, i.e, the existence of propositions that cannot be proven true in the system. Human intelligibility and communication presuppose consistent logic, and therefore the existence of such propositions.

If you require conclusive or empirical proof of your beliefs, you will have to restrict yourself to statements concerned with phenomena of the class to which the behavior of billiard balls belongs.

 

[jinminn]

Tolstoy, at a time when he was revered the world over and possessed exorbitant wealth and lands, found himself without a clear reason to live. He surveyed the the whole range of academic disciplines for answers and concluded this: “The clarity and precision of these fields is inversely proportionate to their relevance human problems.” See his “Confessions.”

Mathematician Kurt Godel posited and proved a theorem that is not irrelevant: If you require a mathematical system that is ‘consistent,’ i.e., without contradictory ‘truths,’ you must accept the existence of undecidable propositions, i.e, the existence of propositions that cannot be proven true in the system. Human intelligibility and communication presuppose consistent logic, and therefore the existence of such propositions.

If you require conclusive or empirical proof of your beliefs, you will have to restrict yourself to statements concerned with phenomena of the class to which the behavior of billiard balls belongs.

Interesting quotes. I don’t see that supposing a physical basis for ‘intangibles’ like emotions, desire, motivation, thoughts, etc. reduces them to billiard balls, however. I do agree that one must accept that logic is sound and agree to accept things like non-contradiction for example.

Though my medium for witnessing the existence of phenomenon is that of the natural… why does this preclude god from providing it? He has created all matter, created me, performs miracles that manifest themselves in the material world…

Were a simple occurrence to be witnessed by many, namely an amputee regrowing his/her limb at the summoning of intervention in the name of Jesus and synchronized with a clap to show that the regrowing occurred upon request… I would believe.

These are all physical phenomenon: verbal/mental request for assistance, use of a sound to state a name, a clap, and the regrowing of physical flesh and bone. Yet I would conclude that this was good evidence for Jesus. Especially if it was done more than once, by different individuals who were strangers, in double blind conditions, etc.

 

[R_Daneel]

Mathematician Kurt Godel posited and proved a theorem that is not irrelevant: If you require a mathematical system that is ‘consistent,’ i.e., without contradictory ‘truths,’ you must accept the existence of undecidable propositions, i.e, the existence of propositions that cannot be proven true in the system. Human intelligibility and communication presuppose consistent logic, and therefore the existence of such propositions.

I wonder what is your point? Godel’s “incompleteness theorem” only refers to axiomatic systems. It does not apply to the actual reality, which is definitely not axiomatic.

 

[jpelham]

Interesting quotes. I don’t see that supposing a physical basis for ‘intangibles’ like emotions, desire, motivation, thoughts, etc. reduces them to billiard balls, however. I do agree that one must accept that logic is sound and agree to accept things like non-contradiction for example.

Though my medium for witnessing the existence of phenomenon is that of the natural… why does this preclude god from providing it? He has created all matter, created me, performs miracles that manifest themselves in the material world…

Were a simple occurrence to be witnessed by many, namely an amputee regrowing his/her limb at the summoning of intervention in the name of Jesus and synchronized with a clap to show that the regrowing occurred upon request… I would believe.

These are all physical phenomenon: verbal/mental request for assistance, use of a sound to state a name, a clap, and the regrowing of physical flesh and bone. Yet I would conclude that this was good evidence for Jesus. Especially if it was done more than once, by different individuals who were strangers, in double blind conditions, etc.

‘Billiard balls’ signifies the strictly materialist view of phenomenon, to include human experience, which you presuppose.

If God was not ‘precluded’ from miraculous penetration into phenomenon of Christian life in ages past, then He is not now.

A first principle of faith (an irreducible dimension of a fully living human person) is that its ‘proof texts’ - miracles - always admit of other than the dogmatic explanations, or it would not be faith but a subset of formal logic. The consolation is that reason is never forced by (Catholic) dogma to violate its own laws. -cf. Godel

It is also true that your assurance that belief will follow experimental proof has a lineage extending back to the New Testament. If you want to know the truth of Christianity, then ask God for a miracle, and I will pray with you, and pray too for the courage not to look away when it appears, nor to assume that a natural explanation could eventually be found. Miracles have never been enough, by themselves, to engender belief.

Do you know that your reply does not take account of Godel or Tolstoy?

 

[jpelham]

I wonder what is your point? Godel’s “incompleteness theorem” only refers to axiomatic systems. It does not apply to the actual reality, which is definitely not axiomatic.

First I emphasize that I am referring to human thought, intelligible thought, not ‘reality’ as a whole. I agree that it can by no means be neatly characterized as a formally axiomatic system, yet to be intelligible it must be consistent, i.e., obey the fundamental rule of non-contradiction (perhaps mental illness can be associated with an incoherence at the level of ‘axiom’?) And then, even if one’s axioms are unacknowledged, each of us, ideally, does think within an axiomatic system; or rather we approach it as we approach the ideal of perfect coherence. I mention Godel’s theorem only as a useful heuristic device. My point is that a consistent axiomatic system entails undecidable propositions, which are mathematical articles of faith; that is, man’s most logically scrupulous sphere of thought, mathematics, if it is to be coherent, must accept articles of faith.

Catholic thought, in principle, trusts in the categorical validity of reason. If you recall the Regensburg address, Pope Benedict observed that this distinguishes the Catholic mind from both Protestant and materialist thought, the latter two of which can be usefully associated with the demand for ‘completeness,’ a separation of faith and reason for the sake of a ‘dogmatic’ completeness that thwarts reason, with the result that such logically incoherent statements as ‘sola scriptura’ appear. Again, I suggest only that Godel’s theorem is more than a mathematical curiosity without relevance to *any *reality. Incidentally, Pope Benedict has also discoursed at length on the marvelous correspondence between mathematics and reality, identifying this as evidence of a common Creator.

 

[R_Daneel]

My point is that a consistent axiomatic system entails undecidable propositions, which are mathematical articles of faith; that is, man’s most logically scrupulous sphere of thought, mathematics, if it is to be coherent, must accept articles of faith.

The word “faith” is ambigous here. Mathematics is founded on axioms, and the axioms are not articles of faith. Maybe you equate “faith” with “accepting something that is not formally unproven”. The axioms are not “provable” in a formal sense, since they form the foundation of “proof” - in every deductive, axiomatic system. But there is nothing “axiomatic” is reality. We have “basic principles” which we accept as tentatively true, unless there is a good reason to doubt them. These “basic principles” are also not articles of faith.

 

[jpelham]

The word “faith” is ambigous here. Mathematics is founded on axioms, and the axioms are not articles of faith. Maybe you equate “faith” with “accepting something that is not formally unproven”. The axioms are not “provable” in a formal sense, since they form the foundation of “proof” - in every deductive, axiomatic system. But there is nothing “axiomatic” is reality. We have “basic principles” which we accept as tentatively true, unless there is a good reason to doubt them. These “basic principles” are also not articles of faith.

What you assert generally holds true for the ‘post-modern’ mind, but generally not for the Catholic mind.

 

[R_Daneel]

What you assert generally holds true for the ‘post-modern’ mind, but generally not for the Catholic mind.

Would you go into details? I am not sure what you mean. Do you say that the Catholic definion of “faith” includes the acceptance of self-evident axioms and the basic principles of physical sciences? Because if this is the case, we speak a different language.
I consider “faith” as it is stated in Hebrews 11:1 -
“Now **faith **is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.” (King James version) or
“Now **faith **is being sure of what we hope for and certain of what we do not see.” (New International version).

 

[jpelham]

…Do you say that the Catholic definion of “faith” includes the acceptance of self-evident axioms and the basic principles of physical sciences? …
I consider “faith” as it is stated in Hebrews 11:1 -
“Now **faith **is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.” (King James version) or
“Now **faith **is being sure of what we hope for and certain of what we do not see.” (New International version).

I share you Hebrews 11:1 definiton of faith. Statements of faith exist in the sphere of probablility, and one must finally embrace them without dispositive proof. We could say just that honest reason leads us, if we are concerned with exploring important human issues, to questions that reason or empirical science cannot answer, to answers that are ‘undecidable propositions.’

Please forgive my rush for now, I’ll just recommend Pope Benedicts’ Regensburg address again, which explains how the reasoning of Islam, Protestantism, and scientific materialism is unreasonably self-limited.

 

[NaturalEnquirer]

The available explanations for our apparent free will seem to be:

1. Dualism - there is an immaterial mind which somehow influences our material brains, resulting in thought/will/whatever.
2. Materialism - the brain is the bottom line, thought/will/whatever is explainable in terms of physical processes therein.

The fact that brain injury influences thought/will/whatever is consistent with both explanations, isn’t it? The materialist explanation is that a particular region of the brain is responsible for generating a particular set of thought/will/whatever, whereas the dualist would say that region of the brain is the “receptor” for a particular influence from the mind, resulting in that particular set of thought/will/whatever.

For me, the experience of free will is the tie-breaker. I sit here and think for a minute, then I choose which keys to press in order to convey that thought to the forum. My perceptions leave me with no room to doubt that something in me is making choices about which keys to press. As far as I can tell, these perceptions are shared by every single human being. This unanimity of perception seems to be something that can’t be brushed aside by the materialist.

The materialist may say that we haven’t empirically observed an immaterial mind. Well… it’s immaterial. By definition, it can only be observed through its effects.

He may say that we don’t have a physical model for the influence of an immaterial mind on a material brain. True enough. But a hundredish years ago, we had no physical model that explained the orbit of Mercury. It simply didn’t match Kepler’s predictions (due to relativistic effects). We don’t throw out the observations just because we don’t have a model – that’s the exact opposite of how science is supposed to work. Observations win. In this case, observations include a unanimous human experience of free will.

Is it possible that this perception is flawed? Sure, that is logically coherent. But if it’s true, it means that at the deepest level, we cannot trust our senses to provide us with reliable information about reality – and that’s a very scary proposition.

 

[jpelham]

“Sir, we know our will is free, and there’s an end on’t.”
(Boswell, Life)

And then the act of will, not wholly attributable to antecedent causes, involves an act of creation ex nihilo, denoting the One in Whose image we are made.

 

[wanstronian]

The available explanations for our apparent free will seem to be:

1. Dualism - there is an immaterial mind which somehow influences our material brains, resulting in thought/will/whatever.
2. Materialism - the brain is the bottom line, thought/will/whatever is explainable in terms of physical processes therein.

The fact that brain injury influences thought/will/whatever is consistent with both explanations, isn’t it? The materialist explanation is that a particular region of the brain is responsible for generating a particular set of thought/will/whatever, whereas the dualist would say that region of the brain is the “receptor” for a particular influence from the mind, resulting in that particular set of thought/will/whatever.

The trouble with the ‘receptor’ hypothesis is that it has no evidential basis. It’s just an arbitrary invention, fabricated solely to make a preconceived belief (a separate mind) fit the facts, rather than using the facts (and just the facts) to arrive at a conclusion. It’s unscientific and would be dismissed out of hand in any analagous situation outside of religion or philosophy (and should be dismissed in those fields too).

For me, the experience of free will is the tie-breaker. I sit here and think for a minute, then I choose which keys to press in order to convey that thought to the forum. My perceptions leave me with no room to doubt that something in me is making choices about which keys to press. As far as I can tell, these perceptions are shared by every single human being. This unanimity of perception seems to be something that can’t be brushed aside by the materialist.

I’m not sure a materialist would be interested in trying to ‘brush this aside.’ What would be the point - nothing you’ve said is contrary to the materialist view of free will. Your apparent decision to press certain keys is as easily explained by materialism as by dualism, and without the unnecessary burden of having to invent ghosts in the machine.

The materialist may say that we haven’t empirically observed an immaterial mind. Well… it’s immaterial. By definition, it can only be observed through its effects.

Again, its effects are most adequately explained by materialism.

He may say that we don’t have a physical model for the influence of an immaterial mind on a material brain. True enough. But a hundredish years ago, we had no physical model that explained the orbit of Mercury. It simply didn’t match Kepler’s predictions (due to relativistic effects). We don’t throw out the observations just because we don’t have a model – that’s the exact opposite of how science is supposed to work. Observations win. In this case, observations include a unanimous human experience of free will.

Well, observations on their own don’t account for much - they need to be substantiated sooner or later. Our observation of apparent free will in humans can be explained by materialism better than by dualism. We don’t have a model for dualism - but we do have a (partial) model for materialism. We know how physical changes to the brain can affect behaviour and personality. To say we don’t have a model for dualism is not to say we don’t have a model at all - it’s just a model that you prefer to ignore.

Is it possible that this perception is flawed? Sure, that is logically coherent. But if it’s true, it means that at the deepest level, we cannot trust our senses to provide us with reliable information about reality – and that’s a very scary proposition.

And we know that under certain conditions - physical damage to the brain, chemical imbalances either artificial or natural - we can’t trust our senses. However I’m confused by your implication that that if our perceptions of free will are flawed then we can’t trust our senses. Can you explain?