Determinism-Indeterminism dilemma

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In looking into the free will problem recently, I’ve often come across this dilemma, and I wonder how you guys would respond to it. Basically the dilemma goes like this. Either our actions are determined, and we don’t have free will, or our actions are not determined, amd are therefore random, and we also don’t have free will.
Basically, the argument is that free will can’t be made intelligible and distinct from just a random action.
 
In looking into the free will problem recently, I’ve often come across this dilemma, and I wonder how you guys would respond to it. Basically the dilemma goes like this. Either our actions are determined, and we don’t have free will, or our actions are not determined, amd are therefore random, and we also don’t have free will.
Basically, the argument is that free will can’t be made intelligible and distinct from just a random action.
Could you please explain me how we could know how we are free in our decision meanwhile being free to perform a decision? Knowledge=Constraint. Knowledge on how our will is free means no free will.
 
Could you please explain me how we could know how we are free in our decision meanwhile being free to perform a decision? Knowledge=Constraint. Knowledge on how our will is free means no free will.
Huh? How are we not free because we know that we are free? 🤷
 
In looking into the free will problem recently, I’ve often come across this dilemma, and I wonder how you guys would respond to it. Basically the dilemma goes like this. Either our actions are determined, and we don’t have free will, or our actions are not determined, amd are therefore random, and we also don’t have free will.
Basically, the argument is that free will can’t be made intelligible and distinct from just a random action.
All our acts are done from necessity or from design. There’s no such thing as a random act.
 
All our acts are done from necessity or from design. There’s no such thing as a random act.
I would argue even against that. I would be much pleasant for me to accept that my act is the result of randomness rather than design or necessity. By first you accept that you are not free and by second you accept you are not free as well.
 
I would argue even against that. I would be much pleasant for me to accept that my act is the result of randomness rather than design or necessity. By first you accept that you are not free and by second you accept you are not free as well.
I thought about that, I was thinking if we take randomness, chance and choice, I think we can reduce it to choice. I would contend from that our will is subject to our freedom, the freedom to seek to obtain the greater good. I believe we include but surpass genetics at this point and have no choice but return to the theological virtues of faith, hope, love and charity.
 
I would argue even against that. I would be much pleasant for me to accept that my act is the result of randomness rather than design or necessity. By first you accept that you are not free and by second you accept you are not free as well.
Acts designed are freely designed. How are we slaves to freely designing? :confused:
 
In looking into the free will problem recently, I’ve often come across this dilemma, and I wonder how you guys would respond to it. Basically the dilemma goes like this. Either our actions are determined, and we don’t have free will, or our actions are not determined, amd are therefore random, and we also don’t have free will.
Basically, the argument is that free will can’t be made intelligible and distinct from just a random action.
Our actions are determined. They are determined by us.

This is the clear answer to the dilemma.
 
I would argue even against that. I would be much pleasant for me to accept that my act is the result of randomness rather than design or necessity. By first you accept that you are not free and by second you accept you are not free as well.
False. Your action can be the result of YOUR design.
 
False. Your action can be the result of YOUR design.
Once the design is there then you are not free. This we can agree upon. Couldn’t? The question is how do you do the design? Are you free in that or it is the result of some constraint so called knowledge?
 
Once the design is there then you are not free. This we can agree upon. Couldn’t? The question is how do you do the design? Are you free in that or it is the result of some constraint so called knowledge?
The design is a free action, initiated by me, determined by me.

The hypothesis is that a free action is free. The dilemma posed in the OP assumes that there is a logical opposition between “determined” and “free”. But there is no such opposition. Free actions are ALWAYS determined.

There is an opposition between free and externally determined. So here are your two possible arguments:

Argument #1:

(1) Either an action is determined or it is not determined.
(2) If it is determined, then it is not free.
(3) If it is not determined, then it is not free.
Therefore, it is not free.

In Argument #1, the 2nd premise is false, since an action can be determined by the agent. (To assume otherwise is to beg the question).

Argument #2

(1) Either an action is externally determined or it is not determined.
(2) If it is externally determined, then it is not free.
(3) If it is not determined, then it is not free.
Therefore, it is not free.

In Argument #2, the 1st premise is false, since an action could be internally determined.
 
The question is how do you do the design? Are you free in that
No doubt, I think the terminology of natural design and supernatural design arrived. Course here, what some would call natural, would deny the supernatural design.

But freedom to this point appears established and there’s still the unknown greater collective good undefined.
 
The design is a free action, initiated by me, determined by me.

The hypothesis is that a free action is free. The dilemma posed in the OP assumes that there is a logical opposition between “determined” and “free”. But there is no such opposition. Free actions are ALWAYS determined.

There is an opposition between free and externally determined. So here are your two possible arguments:

Argument #1:

(1) Either an action is determined or it is not determined.
(2) If it is determined, then it is not free.
(3) If it is not determined, then it is not free.
Therefore, it is not free.

In Argument #1, the 2nd premise is false, since an action can be determined by the agent. (To assume otherwise is to beg the question).

Argument #2

(1) Either an action is externally determined or it is not determined.
(2) If it is externally determined, then it is not free.
(3) If it is not determined, then it is not free.
Therefore, it is not free.

In Argument #2, the 1st premise is false, since an action could be internally determined.
What do you mean with internally determined? Any event in the external world is caused by another event so it is determined. The chain of causality either has to break or start within an agent if we want to accept that we could cause something irrespective of external cause. My question is then how and based on what circumstances this initial internal cause does happen?
 
The design is a free action, initiated by me, determined by me.

The hypothesis is that a free action is free. The dilemma posed in the OP assumes that there is a logical opposition between “determined” and “free”. But there is no such opposition. Free actions are ALWAYS determined.

There is an opposition between free and externally determined. So here are your two possible arguments:

Argument #1:

(1) Either an action is determined or it is not determined.
(2) If it is determined, then it is not free.
(3) If it is not determined, then it is not free.
Therefore, it is not free.

In Argument #1, the 2nd premise is false, since an action can be determined by the agent. (To assume otherwise is to beg the question).

Argument #2

(1) Either an action is externally determined or it is not determined.
(2) If it is externally determined, then it is not free.
(3) If it is not determined, then it is not free.
Therefore, it is not free.

In Argument #2, the 1st premise is false, since an action could be internally determined.
Counterpoint, has said about the same thing in another thread.
There are only two options here: either everything is determined or not.
If everything is determined, then this implies every event or act that occurs could not have been otherwise.
If everything is not determined, then this implies that some (not all) events or acts could have been otherwise only due to some element of pure chance or randomness.
Free will must be compatible with either determinism or indeterminism.
And regardless how you define it, the moral implications are exactly the same. Why? Because I can be held no more responsible for an act that ultimately reduces to pure chance than for an act that was completely predetermined and could not have been otherwise. (The bottom line is that the “free will” argument does not alleviate God of any culpability.)
From his argument, if it were true, he would be right.

But the point is, freewill does not fit into either of these. The reason is that “determined” means that everything has to act only in one way given a set a circumstances. And “indetermined” means that chance, that is, without reason, dictates what will happen.

But it is known in science that there is no room for chance. Everything we know works from cause to effect, and if it didn’t then science would be worthless.

So that leaves us only with determination which we see in science. Now if it is said that everything works from determination then that means that man too would be determined in everything he did without chance for any exception.

And to say that man was not determined would be hard to prove scientifically since every little factor of influence leaning on a man would have to be seen in one singular act. And then this same exact act with the same factors of influence would have to be compared to see whether the outcome would be the same. It would be easier to make elephants fly. So since there is no way to do this, then what it comes down to is opinion and not proof.

However there is the idea that universally man himself does not accept the idea of determinism for everything. Because this universal idea holds that man is accountable for what he does and rejects the idea that man has no control over his own actions. Although this is not testtube science, it is sociological emperical science. So from this, there must be freedom in the conduct of man which is only possible if he is indetermined in another way…that of free choice, or “undetermined”. I think to say otherwise man would have to trash his judicial and legislative systems.

May God bless and keep you. May God’s face shine on you. May God be kind to you and give you peace.
 
What do you mean with internally determined? Any event in the external world is caused by another event so it is determined. The chain of causality either has to break or start within an agent if we want to accept that we could cause something irrespective of external cause. My question is then how and based on what circumstances this initial internal cause does happen?
Let’s get some ground rules clear here. You are arguing that free will is impossible. You are entitled to clarify what I mean by “free will”, but you don’t have any need to interrogate me about what the circumstances of an initial internal cause are. For suppose you were trying to prove to me that there was no such thing as a nuclear reaction. Surely I would not need to know how nuclear reactions work in order to deny your proof that they don’t exist.

A thing may exist even though some guy named Prodigal Son can’t explain how it exists. 😛

Now I agree with you that positing free will involves positing causal chains that begin with agents. What’s the problem with that?

Your statement that “Any event in the external world is caused by another event so it is determined” is question-begging, since it assumes what you are trying to prove. It assumes that there are no agent-causes, whereas that’s what I thought you were supposed to be proving.
 
And to say that man was not determined would be hard to prove scientifically since every little factor of influence leaning on a man would have to be seen in one singular act. And then this same exact act with the same factors of influence would have to be compared to see whether the outcome would be the same. It would be easier to make elephants fly. So since there is no way to do this, then what it comes down to is opinion and not proof.
You’re right that free will couldn’t be scientifically proven. But you assume that there is no such thing as a philosophical/metaphysical proof. Many philosophers (e.g. that Aquinas dude) would disagree with you.
 
You guys are loosing me, I thought we established the will is subject to its freedom to choose? I think the problem is a few of us have been following this conversation on a few threads which touch on this point we arrived at.
 
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