Determinism-Indeterminism dilemma

[GaryTaylor]

You have the will to be free and choose. The purpose of choosing is the area of natural or supernatural design further to be defined, I think the conversation becomes narrow minded by not admitting Supernatural design. That’s where I’m at as I recollect. Thus making the narrow scope inadmissible as fred showed above. False argument.

 

[Bahman]

Now I agree with you that positing free will involves positing causal chains that begin with agents. What’s the problem with that?

The problem? There is the huge problem there! The main question is how do you assign freedom to what initiated from you while you certainly have no control on it? You don’t have control since the knowledge that how the initial cause initiated in agent is needed for an agent in order to have control on initial cause, but once the knowledge is there, then you are not free. In another word, you cannot be free at the same time have knowledge on how you are free.

Your statement that “Any event in the external world is caused by another event so it is determined” is question-begging, since it assumes what you are trying to prove. It assumes that there are no agent-causes, whereas that’s what I thought you were supposed to be proving.

That was initial part of my argument to prepare the second part, as the initial cause must start within agent if we want to grant freedom.

 

[GaryTaylor]

That was initial part of my argument to prepare the second part, as the initial cause must start within agent if we want to grant freedom.

Sounds like music. So for anyone freedom of choice indeed can have a cost? Lets not diminish the cost of wrong choice while attempts are made at the greater good whatever that may be in creation or outside.

 

[Counterpoint]

In looking into the free will problem recently, I’ve often come across this dilemma, and I wonder how you guys would respond to it. Basically the dilemma goes like this. Either our actions are determined, and we don’t have free will, or our actions are not determined, amd are therefore random, and we also don’t have free will.
Basically, the argument is that free will can’t be made intelligible and distinct from just a random action.

Just for the record, I never argued that free will could not be made intelligible (although I am certainly sympathetic with those who would argue that free will is ultimately incompatible with either determinism or indeterminism for reasons you have already stated above).

A deterministic or compatibilist account of free will can be made intelligible by simply postulating final causality (a teleological cause which is typically characterized, as it were, as pulling us from the future) in addition to efficient causality (a mechanical cause which is typically characterized, as it were, as pushing us from the past).

An indeterministic or libertarian account of free will can be made intelligible by simply invoking the “two-stage mode of free will.”

A two-stage model of free will separates the free stage from the will stage.

In the first stage, alternative possibilities for thought and action are generated, in part indeterministically.
In the second stage, an adequately determined will evaluates the options that have been developed.

If, on deliberation, one option for action seems best, it is selected and chosen. If no option seems good enough, and time permitting, the process can return to the further generation of alternative possibilities (“second thoughts”) before a final decision.

A two-stage model can explain how an agent could choose to do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances that preceded the first stage of the overall free will process. (source: Wikipedia: Two-stage model of free will)

Note: The two-stage model can also be used to explain compatibilist free will as well as libertarian free will by making one simple modification: The alternative possibilities for thought and action in the first stage would have to be characterized as being generated deterministically, rather than (partially) indeterministically. (I think most people would agree that the two-stage model adequately explains the decision-making process.)

 

[fred_conty]

Counterpoint quoted,

A two-stage model can explain how an agent could choose to do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances that preceded the first stage of the overall free will process. (source: Wikipedia: Two-stage model of free will)

I would respectfully disagree with this statement.

Precisely because it can’t be proven. How do we know what other factors lean on this person in his first choice are the same as in his second choice, and just exactly how do these factors incline and influence his choices? Can’t be proven. This is just an opinion and no more than that. Hard Facts and all the facts are missing and can never be obtained.

Now if the original theory that was proposed was that everything has to be indeterminate or determinate, then the above just doesn’t fit. For the push cause is indeterminate and the pull cause is determinate, which mixes up the two and is contradictory to the statement that everything has to be one or the other. Unless one agrees that indeterminate and determinate is not all there is, and that there is a third choice…undeterminate…free will.

May God bless and keep you. May God’s face shine on you. May God be kind to you and give you peace.

 

[GaryTaylor]

In the first stage, alternative possibilities for thought and action are generated, in part indeterministically.

In the second stage, an adequately determined will evaluates the options that have been developed.

A two-stage model can explain how an agent could choose to do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances that preceded the first stage of the overall free will process.

You have to choose something from doing nothing which is something, to some statistical probability of a number of that which relates to choice.

 

[fred_conty]

In the first stage, alternative possibilities for thought and action are generated, in part indeterministically.

In the second stage, an adequately determined will evaluates the options that have been developed.

A two-stage model can explain how an agent could choose to do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances that preceded the first stage of the overall free will process.

You have to choose something from doing nothing which is something, to some statistical probability of a number of that which relates to choice.

Gary you said,

A two-stage model can explain how an agent could choose to do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances that preceded the first stage of the overall free will process. (source: Wikipedia: Two-stage model of free will)

How would anyone know “in exactly the same circumstances” since we live in time, and time is change. Things vary from one moment to the next, and so it would seem impossible to say “in exactly the same circumstances”. Other thoughts, circumstances, events, could change and influence the decision process. If there is proof, then where is it, that both decisions had exactly the same circumstances? Merely repeating dosen’t offer prove.

It seems to me that there would have to be some other way than only determinate and indeterminate.

May God bless and keep you. May God’s face shine on you. May God be kind to you and give you peace.

 

[Charlemagne_III]

Could you please elaborate how we could be designed at the same time free? Could you please define what you mean with design and free?

I feel like we are in a semantic revolving door and neither of us will ever get out!

 

[CatholicSoxFan]

Thanks, Prodigal_Son

I don’t think we can know for sure whether we have free will (after all, I can’t get behind my own consciousness to see if anything is causing my choices or not), but saying that science could never say anything about free will isn’t quite right. Many people have tried to use quantum indeterminacy to open the door for free will by refuting Newtonian determinism, for example. But it’s also important to recognize that the burden of proof is on determinists here, to show that what we don’t have what we all think we have, not on libertarians to establish that we have what we all think we have.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Huh? How are we not free because we know that we are free?

Exactly, Huh is right. You would do well not to attempt to argue with such people. They are sophists. Just stick to what the Church teaches, and tell the sophists to go " pound sand. "

 

[wmw]

Determinism and indeterminism are the only operative modes of nature. Either we have very close to Newtonian physics operations or we have random quantum mechanical physics. Neither of these shows any hope of allowing a cause for free will. There is no scientific examination of nature that will lead to a basis for freedom of choice in nature. Many atheists have largely adapted to this. Because they refuse to accept anything supernatural they accept that free will only makes sense in a totally material being as the freedom to do as your neurons determine and external force is the only way to define a loss of freedom. Yet, in essence this sort of freedom is an illusion of deterministic or possibly a small bit of random physics; thus, not a true free will.

Is any science going to prove the spiritual soul? No. This is outside science’s domain. Are we willing to accept we are meaningless robots of our natural brain development and chemistry? No. I choose to live (both in the sense of being free to choose and not getting suicidal over the meaningless indirection of my life if there is no truly free choice).

This leaves everyone who believes they have any freedom of choice to also believe in the supernatural, because it takes a belief in the supernatural to have any sort of true freedom. This is as close to proving that the minimal belief in anything, Descartes’, “I think; therefore I am.”, leads directly to a belief in the supernatural.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

The problem? There is the huge problem there! The main question is how do you assign freedom to what initiated from you while you certainly have no control on it? You don’t have control since the knowledge that how the initial cause initiated in agent is needed for an agent in order to have control on initial cause, but once the knowledge is there, then you are not free. In another word, you cannot be free at the same time have knowledge on how you are free.

I don’t understand what knowledge has to do with free will. You can make a free choice without knowing that the choice is free.

Moreover, a person could have free will without anyone else knowing that the person is free. Freedom of will is a metaphysical category, not an epistemological one. Knowledge has nothing to do with it.

That was initial part of my argument to prepare the second part, as the initial cause must start within agent if we want to grant freedom.

OK, then the initial part of your argument was question-begging. In which case it doesn’t establish anything, so you might as well take it out.

Also, I do not claim that the initial cause starts “within” the agent. The initial cause IS the agent. Not some property of the agent, not some decision of the agent, none of that. The cause is the agent him or herself.

 

[Counterpoint]

Now if the original theory that was proposed was that everything has to be indeterminate or determinate, then the above just doesn’t fit. For the push cause is indeterminate and the pull cause is determinate, which mixes up the two and is contradictory to the statement that everything has to be one or the other.

Efficient causality and final causality are both determinate. That being said, Aquinas does appear to subscribe to indeterminism.

God does move the will, “since he moves every kind of thing according to the nature of the moveable thing…he also moves the will according to its condition, as indeterminately disposed to many things, not in a neccesary way” (QDM 6). (source: pp. 149-150, “Aquinas: Beginner’s Guide” by Edward Feser)

Unless one agrees that indeterminate and determinate is not all there is, and that there is a third choice…undeterminate…free will.

Unless we both agree to abide by the dictates of logic (specifically, the “law of noncontradiction”), there is no point to continue this discussion. To do so would be an exercise in futility.

 

[Counterpoint]

You have to choose something from doing nothing which is something, to some statistical probability of a number of that which relates to choice.

I find this to be completely unintelligible. That being said, if you’re going to reject the two-stage model, then the onus is upon you to furnish us with a more compelling model that explains how an agent could choose to do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Originally Posted by fred conty
Now if the original theory that was proposed was that everything has to be indeterminate or determinate, then the above just doesn’t fit. For the push cause is indeterminate and the pull cause is determinate, which mixes up the two and is contradictory to the statement that everything has to be one or the other.

Efficient causality and final causality are both determinate. That being said, Aquinas does appear to subscribe to indeterminism.

Quote:
God does move the will, “since he moves every kind of thing according to the nature of the moveable thing…he also moves the will according to its condition, as indeterminately disposed to many things, not in a neccesary way” (QDM 6). (source: pp. 149-150, “Aquinas: Beginner’s Guide” by Edward Feser)

Quote:
Originally Posted by fred conty
Unless one agrees that indeterminate and determinate is not all there is, and that there is a third choice…undeterminate…free will.

Unless we both agree to abide by the dictates of logic (specifically, the “law of noncontradiction”), there is no point to continue this discussion. To do so would be an exercise in futility.

Aquinas does not teach " indeterminism, " nor does he teach " determinism. "

What Thomas is saying is that God can and does move the will ( even the intellect in some cases ) by way on inspiration. But the will remains absolutely free all the while.
One has to read Thomas as a whole, just as one must read Scriptures as a whole.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Efficient causality and final causality are both determinate. That being said, Aquinas does appear to subscribe to indeterminism.

Please explain how Efficient causality and Final causality are determinite. I have never heard these causes as being " determinite. "

Unless we both agree to abide by the dictates of logic (specifically, the “law of noncontradiction”), there is no point to continue this discussion. To do so would be an exercise in futility.

Exactly how I view giving you an explanation for anything.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

In looking into the free will problem recently, I’ve often come across this dilemma, and I wonder how you guys would respond to it. Basically the dilemma goes like this. Either our actions are determined, and we don’t have free will, or our actions are not determined, amd are therefore random, and we also don’t have free will.
Basically, the argument is that free will can’t be made intelligible and distinct from just a random action.

There is no dilemma here. Some of our actions are determinite, such as those actions of the soul which have to do with basic bodily functions. Man’s intellect and will remain free, though God may and does " inspire " by way of coaxing either one to the truth.

There is no " randomness " or chance in the universe, period.

You have been arguing with Sophists whose whole purpose is to create doubts in your mind.

Linus2nd

 

[GaryTaylor]

I find this to be completely unintelligible. That being said, if you’re going to reject the two-stage model, then the onus is upon you to furnish us with a more compelling model that explains how an agent could choose to do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances.

I didn’t reject it, the premise is right at the point I quoted. I scanned most of the article, there’s much good work done in it. I didn’t dissect every sentence, so its possible I overlooked a stone or two. Hey the devil is always in the details.

If you choose to not act, then not acting was a choice? Yes? I can choose two roads or a third ,forth, or fifth route going home. I can choose to not take any and not go home.

Whatever choice you made, you choose, however many alternatives in your mind there are to choose from you have NO CHOICE but to choose One.

There is no random chance, its a choice regardless how many alternatives there are.

 

[orang]

Determinism and indeterminism are the only operative modes of nature. Either we have very close to Newtonian physics operations or we have random quantum mechanical physics. Neither of these shows any hope of allowing a cause for free will. There is no scientific examination of nature that will lead to a basis for freedom of choice in nature. Many atheists have largely adapted to this. Because they refuse to accept anything supernatural they accept that free will only makes sense in a totally material being as the freedom to do as your neurons determine and external force is the only way to define a loss of freedom. Yet, in essence this sort of freedom is an illusion of deterministic or possibly a small bit of random physics; thus, not a true free will.

Is any science going to prove the spiritual soul? No. This is outside science’s domain. Are we willing to accept we are meaningless robots of our natural brain development and chemistry? No. I choose to live (both in the sense of being free to choose and not getting suicidal over the meaningless indirection of my life if there is no truly free choice).

This leaves everyone who believes they have any freedom of choice to also believe in the supernatural, because it takes a belief in the supernatural to have any sort of true freedom. This is as close to proving that the minimal belief in anything, Descartes’, “I think; therefore I am.”, leads directly to a belief in the supernatural.

good reading along.

 

[GaryTaylor]

How would anyone know “in exactly the same circumstances” since we live in time, and time is change. Things vary from one moment to the next, and so it would seem impossible to say “in exactly the same circumstances”. Other thoughts, circumstances, events, could change and influence the decision process. If there is proof, then where is it, that both decisions had exactly the same circumstances? Merely repeating dosen’t offer prove.

It seems to me that there would have to be some other way than only determinate and indeterminate.

I’m not sure what your saying in regards to the quotations. Knowing comes after the choice, in which understanding also comes of how your choice served others and your own best interest, thus judgment as we are responsible for our actions.

Even if I was to bake a cake using the same recipe day after day. I know from knowledge the results of my actions, but the known, still is not known till the action is complete or the cake is finished in this case. Then the known is judged. The example was given with knowing how to make a bed, and the completed product occurring after the known which confirms the known. In other words if I asked you to make a bed. You probably know how to make a bed. There’s a few ways to accomplish this, hospital-military corners etc. Your coming back to see the finished product, the made bed which is then the known and becomes the product of known for judgment at this point through your free-choice, not from the point you knew how to make the bed but didn’t yet.

So strictly speaking you may not “know”. But your still making the choice which leads to the known thus responsibility for your action of choice in regards to others and self. Free-will.

And thoughts and other variables may indeed change the choice, but you still make a choice and not making a choice is indeed a choice.

Your last sentence though is right.