Determinism vs. Contingency

[Oreoracle]

(Part 1 of 2)

Let us begin with a simple thought experiment: Imagine that I am beginning to flip a coin. If I asked what the result of the coin flip would be, what would we say instinctively?

Most would say that the coin could possibly land on heads and it could possibly land on tails. However, if these people knew exactly how the coin would be released from my fingers, how it would travel through the air, and how it would eventually land, would they not have a definitive answer instead? If so, they would skip all talk of possibility. They would rather say that they know the coin will land on tails and that it would not be possible for the coin to land otherwise given how I will flip it. And if the path of the coin is determined by physical laws that would operate in the same way under the same circumstances every time, then why not say that it was determined, all along, that the coin would land on tails? The answer that the coin flip could possibly end either way is only true from our relative perspective–if we weren’t ignorant of the factors involved, we would know that possibility has nothing to do with coin flips. From the beginning, the coin will land on heads or it will not; there’s no such thing as “possibly.”

“But it wasn’t determined from the outset that the coin would land with the tails side up,” some protest, “until you chose to flip the coin in that way. You could have chosen otherwise, and the coin flip could have possibly ended differently.” Could I have chosen otherwise? Are you certain, or are you just improvising due to your ignorance as you did with the coin flip? Perhaps my choice was determined by earlier conditions just as the path of the coin was determined by my choice. For one, my desire to flip the coin to prove this point to you determined my choice, as did my physical condition. And if I weren’t intelligent enough to realize this, I suppose I wouldn’t have made the flip either, so add my genetic composition to the list. Oh, and I wouldn’t have my genetics without my parents, so add my parents, and their parents, and their parents…

And we could very well extend this reasoning all the way to the beginning of time. And is it unrealistic to believe that each set of circumstances is determined by previous circumstances? The only escape, it seems, is to believe that there are random events; that is, uncaused things that spontaneously occur. The very idea is counterintuitive, and isn’t unlike throwing your hands in the air proclaiming that something magically happened. Let’s face it: This determinism I’m speaking of is a strong possibility (no pun intended).

 

[Oreoracle]

(Part 2 of 2)

So if determinism were proven true, what would this mean for modality? It would render the whole idea of “possibility” and “contingency” suspicious. If a scientist said that a gene might mutate and it might not, we would have to assume that the result is determined and that the scientist is only making his best estimation from what awareness of the situation he has. Possibility would be recognized as a measure of our ignorance of the circumstances and their relevance to future events. If all events are determined, then this world–the actual world-- is in fact the only possible world; other worlds could not have been achieved because the circumstances from the outset couldn’t have produced them. Metaphysicians would be forced to accept that there is only one future course for the actual world, which is also the only possible world. Modality itself becomes questionable except for its utility as a mechanism in estimations.

All arguments for the existence of God that invoke modality would have to admit that descriptions such as “possible” aren’t truly accurate, but only used for their utility in estimations. An event either will occur or it will not, and after it occurs or does not, we would know that the alternative wasn’t possible from the beginning. There’s no such thing as “possible” outside of our perspective.

In short, if determinism is the case, and it seems likely, modality is nonsense contrived only for the sake of predictions, and holds no metaphysical truth to it whatsoever. Will we ever prove determinism? Perhaps not, but for as long as the truth of determinism is pending, the truth of modality is pending.

Do I expect any of this to persuade metaphysicians to stop using lousy modal arguments? Nah. But it’s worth the attempt.

 

[James_S_Saint]

When I was younger, I was amused at how I could flip a coin 3-4 feet into the air and always know which way it was going to land. I could even chose it in advance.

 

[Mystic_Banana]

(Part 2 of 2)

Do I expect any of this to persuade metaphysicians to stop using lousy modal arguments? Nah. But it’s worth the attempt.

Same as everything, though, isn’t it? All boils down to a matter of faith…anyway, assuming there is no active controlling will involved in the causality, what you end up with is essentially randomly determined outcomes, surely?

To take the whole evolution-by-chance argument, the fact of the matter is that if you reject the idea of intelligent design, you end up with the whole kit-and-caboodle being determine by whatever just happened to be there (by chance) in the first place, surely? The chain of events may be argued to be determined, but somewhere, the source of that causal flow must either be designed or random.

Of course, all this ignores the question of free will of, say, amoebas (and so on). Free will is the bugbear of causation!

 

[reggieM]

However, if these people knew exactly how the coin would be released from my fingers, how it would travel through the air, and how it would eventually land, would they not have a definitive answer instead?

If they had x-ray vision they would be unstoppable in poker games also. Even better, if they knew the answer to every mystery of the universe then they wouldn’t have to ask questions any more. If they knew all of the events that would happen in the future then they could eliminate the word “predict” and use “report” instead (as in “predict the future”).

But the fact is, they don’t have that kind of knowledge. Human knowledge is necessarily finite and limited. This is what you refer to as being “only true from our relative perspective”. The way we view the universe is from our perspective. You’re assuming that there is another perspective by which we can view the universe (the perspective that knows all of the factors that go into every coin flip, for example). But you only have the human perspective and not a god-like knowledge of all things.

Ignorance is inherent in humanity – it cannot be overcome because we are finite and contingent beings. Therefore, arguments that use probabilities are correct and necessary.

 

[Oreoracle]

If they had x-ray vision they would be unstoppable in poker games also. Even better, if they knew the answer to every mystery of the universe then they wouldn’t have to ask questions any more. If they knew all of the events that would happen in the future then they could eliminate the word “predict” and use “report” instead (as in “predict the future”).

By your sarcasm, I’m guessing you don’t typically find thought experiments useful. The point is that humans have attributed many events to God or randomness throughout history, but once people understand the natural causes of these events, they also realize that the other outcomes they’ve postulated could not have occurred given the circumstances. In other words, things couldn’t have played out differently; the events were determined. Is it so bizarre to suspect that the same may be true of, say, mutations that scientists deem random? What’s “random” or “miraculous” today will be easily understood as determined tomorrow. This trend is undeniable.

Ignorance is inherent in humanity – it cannot be overcome because we are finite and contingent beings. Therefore, arguments that use probabilities are correct and necessary.

…necessary given our limitations, perhaps, but that doesn’t make them correct. “Useful” is not the same as “correct.”

 

[NowAgnostic]

And we could very well extend this reasoning all the way to the beginning of time. And is it unrealistic to believe that each set of circumstances is determined by previous circumstances? The only escape, it seems, is to believe that there are random events; that is, uncaused things that spontaneously occur. The very idea is counterintuitive, and isn’t unlike throwing your hands in the air proclaiming that something magically happened. Let’s face it: This determinism I’m speaking of is a strong possibility (no pun intended).

It was, until modern physics and quantum mechanics came along. In QM there simply are uncaused random events, according to the standard interpretations, unless you want to adopt something bizarre like many-worlds. Furthermore, in Big Bang theory the laws of physics break down at the singularity, so it is not possible for the next moment in time to be determined by what came before.

So if determinism were proven true, what would this mean for modality? It would render the whole idea of “possibility” and “contingency” suspicious.

It would mean the concept would only apply to epistemic, but not logical or metaphysical, possibility.

Possibility would be recognized as a measure of our ignorance of the circumstances and their relevance to future events. If all events are determined, then this world–the actual world-- is in fact the only possible world; other worlds could not have been achieved because the circumstances from the outset couldn’t have produced them.

That is correct.

Metaphysicians would be forced to accept that there is only one future course for the actual world, which is also the only possible world. Modality itself becomes questionable except for its utility as a mechanism in estimations.

The concepts are still valid, but every being in that case is logically and metaphysically necessary.

All arguments for the existence of God that invoke modality would have to admit that descriptions such as “possible” aren’t truly accurate, but only used for their utility in estimations.

They are truly accurate if by “possible” is meant “epistemic possibility”.

In short, if determinism is the case, and it seems likely,

You obviously haven’t taken physics yet

Do I expect any of this to persuade metaphysicians to stop using lousy modal arguments? Nah. But it’s worth the attempt.

But if determinism is true, it is not possible that metaphysicians do otherwise than use lousy modal arguments.

 

[James_S_Saint]

But if determinism is true, it is not possible that metaphysicians do otherwise than use lousy modal arguments.

Haha… unless Determinism IS their mode, of course.

{happens to be mine, actually)

 

[tonyrey]

But if determinism is true, it is not possible that metaphysicians do otherwise than use lousy modal arguments.

Bravo! Or anyone else for that matter…

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Then again, there’s always the question:

Assume determinism is true. But couldn’t it have been otherwise?

The louses win again.

 

[James_S_Saint]

Then again, there’s always the question:

Assume determinism is true. But couldn’t it have been otherwise?

The louses win again.

Well there is probably another possible world in which determinism is necessarily contingent on indeterminate randomness.

 

[Oreoracle]

It was, until modern physics and quantum mechanics came along. In QM there simply are uncaused random events, according to the standard interpretations, unless you want to adopt something bizarre like many-worlds.

I’m not convinced that scientists know enough to claim the processes are random. If I’m not mistaken, QM is still a largely developing science, and so I would give it a few more years of “interpretation” before I come to any conclusions. The only way that you can prove an event is random is by knowing all possible causes of the event and eliminating each possibility as the cause. I don’t see how scientists could have chanced upon that knowledge. “Random process” is just a way of saying, “we don’t know enough about this process to consistently predict its results.” If not a profession of ignorance, it is simply a cop out, just like deeming a process one doesn’t understand as a “miraculous event” is a cop out.

It would mean the concept would only apply to epistemic, but not logical or metaphysical, possibility.

Whatever. “Not true” means “not true,” however you choose to say it. Either way, possibility only exists in the imagination, it seems.

You obviously haven’t taken physics yet

How does one prove that a process is random?

But if determinism is true, it is not possible that metaphysicians do otherwise than use lousy modal arguments.

No, they might change their minds because I persuade them to. “Determination” doesn’t mean that things must stay as they are, only that things won’t be able to occur without being caused by previous conditions. Though determinism as a whole is a bit counterintuitive, it truly doesn’t make sense to believe that the future course of events isn’t entirely caused by our current circumstances and those of the past. Or perhaps you guys are positing magic to solve this problem. It wouldn’t be the first time.

Then again, there’s always the question:

Assume determinism is true. But couldn’t it have been otherwise?

How does one prove that an event could have been otherwise? I would be fascinated to hear the explanation without the cheap shots. Do tell.

 

[James_S_Saint]

It was, until modern physics and quantum mechanics came along. In QM there simply are uncaused random events, according to the standard interpretations, unless you want to adopt something bizarre like many-worlds. Furthermore, in Big Bang theory the laws of physics break down at the singularity, so it is not possible for the next moment in time to be determined by what came before.

The Copenhagen interpretations (Einstein, Schrodinger,…) never accepted any uncaused anything. They explicitly stated that the QM concerns were strictly about probability, not reality. QM is applied statistics, no more than that. And the Big Bang “singularity” idea was abandon quite some time ago. A singularity is a physical impossibility. Einstein’s equations when extrapolated to infinitude imply a singularity so they thought for a while such might be the case. But it was realized that those equations do not apply at such extremes. And time did not begin with the Big Bang.

 

[Hosh]

No one will ever know! It drives me nuts that people say so faithfully that “random and unfathomable events happen”. Its called the Heisenberg uncertainty principle for a reason. All the rest that you may or may not have heard may make a lot of other theories work, and everything else fit into place, but its still fundamentally unknowable. Einstein could have been doing better things with the last 20 years of his life.

 

[James_S_Saint]

No one will ever know!

And just how to you know that?

 

[Prodigal_Son]

How does one prove that an event could have been otherwise? I would be fascinated to hear the explanation without the cheap shots. Do tell.

Well, my point – aside from just being humorous – was that the “determinism hypothesis” relies on the rationalist claim that our observations about the world lead to absolute, and not just comparative, conclusions. Very little in the history of science bears this out. We are constantly scrapping old theories, which at first were thought to be true. Perhaps we are moving closer to being able to evaluate in absolute terms, but what reason do we have to think that we’ll ever get there?

If science only yields comparative evaluations, then it is obvious that it can never yield any metaphysical truths. Even if we conclude that determinism holds in a specific domain, we have not concluded that it holds in that domain’s meta-domain. The structure of bodies might be determined (atoms), but the structure of the structure of bodies may be underdetermined (say, electrons or quanta). The determinist must hold that determinism holds all the way down – but it is impossible to know that we’ve ever reached the ultimate substance of reality. This is not a physical hypothesis, but rather a rationalist appeal to the principle of sufficient reason (or the universality of causality, or some similar principle).

 

[James_S_Saint]

Well, my point – aside from just being humorous – was that the “determinism hypothesis” relies on the rationalist claim that our observations about the world lead to absolute, and not just comparative, conclusions. Very little in the history of science bears this out. We are constantly scrapping old theories, which at first were thought to be true. Perhaps we are moving closer to being able to evaluate in absolute terms, but what reason do we have to think that we’ll ever get there?

Hmm… don’t confuse Determinism with Empiricism and Materialism.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Hmm… don’t confuse Determinism with Empiricism and Materialism.

I think the strongest argument for determinism amounts to “it stands to reason that every temporal thing has a sufficient cause” and so on. But this is a rationalist principle, a way that we expect the world to behave *before *doing science, and thus not something we can verify scientifically.

I’ll agree that the arguments for determinism make sense, given that principle. But the principle seems to assume determinism, itself. It is an inference *from *observation, but observation can never provide any evidence for it, only what Hume would call the “customary conjunction of events”.

 

[Oreoracle]

Perhaps we are moving closer to being able to evaluate in absolute terms, but what reason do we have to think that we’ll ever get there?

And I agree entirely: we’ll never know for sure if all events are determined or not, or which events are even possible until they happen, for that matter. But this takes us back to what I said in post #2: For as long as the veracity of determinism is pending, the veracity of (most of) modality is pending. Possibility is still a useful concept for predictions, but we can never be sure which events are possible and which are not until they’ve already occurred, and even then we only truly know the event is possible under identical circumstances (meaning that the event may never be possible again under circumstances that vary even slightly). It’s all just one big question mark.

 

[NowAgnostic]

I’m not convinced that scientists know enough to claim the processes are random. If I’m not mistaken, QM is still a largely developing science, and so I would give it a few more years of “interpretation” before I come to any conclusions. The only way that you can prove an event is random is by knowing all possible causes of the event and eliminating each possibility as the cause. I don’t see how scientists could have chanced upon that knowledge.

That’s an argument to ignorance. (I don’t see how scientists could have gotten that knowledge, therefore they must not have it.)

The basic foundations of QM were found in the early part of last century. It’s been around for a while. It’s been shown that quantum events cannot be determined by local hidden variables. Now this doesn’t prove that these events are random, but it makes it a justifiable claim.

If you will look at the interpretations of QM here, almost all are non-deterministic except for the many-worlds stuff and the Bohm “pilot wave” interpretation. The Bohm theory is problematic because it doesn’t have a way to incorporate relativity. The many-worlds stuff is “deterministic” only in the sense that everything that can possibly happen, does (just in different worlds).

“Random process” is just a way of saying, “we don’t know enough about this process to consistently predict its results.” If not a profession of ignorance, it is simply a cop out, just like deeming a process one doesn’t understand as a “miraculous event” is a cop out.

You’re mischaracterizing what scientists are saying as an argument to ignorance. Science always begins with ignorance about how to predict a process and doesn’t assume from that fact its unpredictability; science would never get off the ground in that case. In QM there are positive reasons to claim randomness, not just ignorance.

You’ve attempted to make an inductive (as opposed to a deductive) argument for determinism. Therefore an event that can be justifiably claimed to be random (where there is more argumentation than a simple argument to ignorance) is a defeater.

Now, if you have an a priori commitment to determinism, I can’t prove you wrong.

How does one prove that a process is random?

One can’t prove, only infer. If no causal explanation is at hand one can’t prove that it isn’t random either.

No, they might change their minds because I persuade them to. “Determination” doesn’t mean that things must stay as they are, only that things won’t be able to occur without being caused by previous conditions. Though determinism as a whole is a bit counterintuitive, it truly doesn’t make sense to believe that the future course of events isn’t entirely caused by our current circumstances and those of the past.

I will ask you to justify that claim.