Did St. Thomas Aquinas say that the ends justify the means?

[EphelDuath]

newadvent.org/summa/2018.htm#article4

The question is, “whether a human action is good or evil from its end?”

Objection three is, “good action may happen to be ordained to an evil end, as when a man gives an alms from vainglory; and conversely, an evil action may happen to be ordained to a good end, as a theft committed in order to give something to the poor. Therefore an action is not good or evil from its end.” So, the objector is saying that all that matters is intent, since an evil action resulting in good is still evil and vice versa.

St. Aquinas responds, “Nothing hinders an action that is good in one of the way mentioned above, from lacking goodness in another way… However, an action is not good simply, unless it is good in all those ways: since ‘evil results from any single defect, but good from the complete cause,’ as Dionysius says.” So does this mean that the ends justify the means for St. Thomas Aquinas? Is this one of the few times when St. Aquinas was mistaken, or do I misunderstand this question?

 

[reginacaeli]

newadvent.org/summa/2018.htm#article4

The question is, “whether a human action is good or evil from its end?”

Objection three is, “good action may happen to be ordained to an evil end, as when a man gives an alms from vainglory; and conversely, an evil action may happen to be ordained to a good end, as a theft committed in order to give something to the poor. Therefore an action is not good or evil from its end.” So, the objector is saying that all that matters is intent, since an evil action resulting in good is still evil and vice versa.

St. Aquinas responds, “Nothing hinders an action that is good in one of the way mentioned above, from lacking goodness in another way… However, an action is not good simply, unless it is good in all those ways: since ‘evil results from any single defect, but good from the complete cause,’ as Dionysius says.” So does this mean that the ends justify the means for St. Thomas Aquinas? Is this one of the few times when St. Aquinas was mistaken, or do I misunderstand this question?

You’re misunderstanding. He’s actually saying the opposite.

Read the whole article. Especially, this:

On the contrary, Boethius says (De Differ. Topic. ii) that “if the end is good, the thing is good, and if the end be evil, the thing also is evil.”

I answer that, The disposition of things as to goodness is the same as their disposition as to being. Now in some things the being does not depend on another, and in these it suffices to consider their being absolutely. But there are things the being of which depends on something else, and hence in their regard we must consider their being in its relation to the cause on which it depends. Now just as the being of a thing depends on the agent, and the form, so the goodness of a thing depends on its end. Hence in the Divine Persons, Whose goodness does not depend on another, the measure of goodness is not taken from the end. Whereas human actions, and other things, the goodness of which depends on something else, have a measure of goodness from the end on which they depend, besides that goodness which is in them absolutely.

Accordingly a fourfold goodness may be considered in a human action. First, that which, as an action, it derives from its genus; because as much as it has of action and being so much has it of goodness, as stated above (Article 1). Secondly, it has goodness according to its species; which is derived from its suitable object. Thirdly, it has goodness from its circumstances, in respect, as it were, of its accidents. Fourthly, it has goodness from its end, to which it is compared as to the cause of its goodness.

There’s a lot of philosophical language here and your eyes may glaze over.

That’s the core of his answer. The answers to the objections merely refute the claims that the end justifies the means.