Didn't Kant invalidate the five ways of Aquinas?

[Asimis]

Wasn’t his critique a decisive blow to them with his claims about idealism and a priori categories?

What are the common answers to this?

 

[davidv]

Wasn’t his critique a decisive blow to them with his claims about idealism and a priori categories?

What are the common answers to this?

How do Kant’s claims disprove any of the premises of the five ways or show that the logic in them is faulty?

Unless the above can be proven, the five ways have not been invalidated.

 

[Asimis]

How do Kant’s claims disprove any of the premises of the five ways or show that the logic in them is faulty?

Unless the above can be proven, the five ways have not been invalidated.

If I am understanding Kant right, the causal relationship upon which all five ways depend are not things that exist in reality but are rather categories of the mind which we impose on reality, thus it is wrong to conclude to a first cause from them. For instance motion is not something that exist in reality but a produce of the mind, so in essence it is not true that one thing moves another.

 

[davidv]

If I am understanding Kant right, the causal relationship upon which all five ways depend are not things that exist in reality but are rather categories of the mind which we impose on reality, thus it is wrong to conclude to a first cause from them.

Did Kant prove his claim that these things (by the way, what are these things?) don’t exist in reality?

 

[Acapiteadcalcem]

If I am understanding Kant right, the causal relationship upon which all five ways depend are not things that exist in reality but are rather categories of the mind which we impose on reality, thus it is wrong to conclude to a first cause from them. For instance motion is not something that exist in reality but a produce of the mind, so in essence it is not true that one thing moves another.

Kant actually confused ontological arguments and the (so-called) cosmological argument, thinking that the latter was based on a logical/ontological equivocation of the term ‘existence’. In fact, Kant has misread the five ways; St Thomas begins from an a posteriori premise (one rooted in observation) and not in any a priori understanding of the word ‘existence’ (which is what St Anselm and Descartes do–at least according to Kant’s critique).

 

[Asimis]

Did Kant prove his claim that these things (by the way, what are these things?) don’t exist in reality?

Apparently he did, otherwise Christian apologist wouldn’t have resorted to possible worlds semantics as a solution.

 

[Pfaffenhoffen]

Wasn’t his critique a decisive blow to them with his claims about idealism and a priori categories?

What are the common answers to this?

Kant’s theories are kant’s theories.

The theory that there is an a priori supposition for everything it is just like that: a theory.
If ti would eliminate some theories a posteriori, the same Kant presuposes that a presuposition persuposes a firm ground where to stand. And this ground must be necessary, otherwise it would not be ground, so it is God.

I love St Anselm’s theory more than any other, though I find the teleogogical proofs very agressive.

The various thinkers either empasize the subjectivity or the objectivity, so eitheer their proof of the existance of God sees God from the inside or from the outside of the subject.

Kant had yet to prove that apriorism (english good?) overtakes aposteriorism.

 

[Asimis]

Kant actually confused ontological arguments and the (so-called) cosmological argument, thinking that the latter was based on a logical/ontological equivocation of the term ‘existence’. In fact, Kant has misread the five ways; St Thomas begins from an a posteriori premise (one rooted in observation) and not in any a priori understanding of the word ‘existence’ (which is what St Anselm and Descartes do–at least according to Kant’s critique).

I see, do you know of any article that explains how and why Kant misread the five ways as you claim?

 

[Acapiteadcalcem]

Hi Asimis;

I see, do you know of any article that explains how and why Kant misread the five ways as you claim?

Look at what Kant himself says in the Critique of Pure Reason: “The pure cosmological proof demonstrates the existence of a necessary being, but at the same time leaves it quite unsettled, **whether this being is the world itself, or quite distinct from it. **To establish the truth of the latter view, principles are requisite, which are not cosmological and do not proceed in the series of phenomena. We should require to introduce into our proof conceptions of contingent beings—regarded merely as objects of the understanding, and also a principle which enables us to connect these, by means of mere conceptions, with a necessary being. But the proper place for all such arguments is a transcendent philosophy, which has unhappily not yet been established.” (Observations on the 4th Antinomy).

Kant thinks, as did a number of Enlightenment philosophers, that ‘necessary being’ is an a priori term (in the way that Descartes’ used it in his version of the ontological argument) which precludes any possibility of denial. They were not aware that in scholastic philosophy, ‘necessary’ is not a purely a priori term and that it possesses equivocal application, and can be applied a posteriori.

A number of authors have pointed out this weakness in Kant’s treatment of the argument, but you can find a good summary of it here at Stanford:
plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmological-argument/

Hope this helps…

 

[Earnest_Bunbury]

It would seem that Kant is wrong from the start if Aquinas’ “the object known is in the knower” is correct. The subject-object separation, the denial of formal and final causality and the denial of universals comes from the Cartesian, Francis Bacon desire for “mastery and domination of nature”.

This scientific method rightly applied to material reality is a failure as a philosophy and it is made a philosophy when formal and final causality is not applied to the findings of science. Kant’s extension of the scientific method as a philosophy has led to the errors we see in theology today, since philosophy is the handmaid of theology. Nominalism, evolutionism, materialism, and scientism are proofs of the error, at the beginning, of the denial of formal and final causality. When this is applied to the five ways, cannot but bring error since it is in error itself.

 

[Asimis]

Hi Asimis;

Look at what Kant himself says in the Critique of Pure Reason: “The pure cosmological proof demonstrates the existence of a necessary being, but at the same time leaves it quite unsettled, **whether this being is the world itself, or quite distinct from it. **To establish the truth of the latter view, principles are requisite, which are not cosmological and do not proceed in the series of phenomena. We should require to introduce into our proof conceptions of contingent beings—regarded merely as objects of the understanding, and also a principle which enables us to connect these, by means of mere conceptions, with a necessary being. But the proper place for all such arguments is a transcendent philosophy, which has unhappily not yet been established.” (Observations on the 4th Antinomy).

Kant thinks, as did a number of Enlightenment philosophers, that ‘necessary being’ is an a priori term (in the way that Descartes’ used it in his version of the ontological argument) which precludes any possibility of denial. They were not aware that in scholastic philosophy, ‘necessary’ is not a purely a priori term and that it possesses equivocal application, and can be applied a posteriori.

A number of authors have pointed out this weakness in Kant’s treatment of the argument, but you can find a good summary of it here at Stanford:
plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmological-argument/

Hope this helps…

Ok, but it seems that the answers to Kant sort of grant his point that “we should require to introduce into our proof conceptions of contingent beings”. For instance the Stanford article you linked to states:

“In short, defenders of the cosmological argument defend the Causal Principle (or alternatively Principle of Sufficient Reason), but limit its application to contingent beings”

But isn’t that the very thing Kant says that one is forced to do, which in turn is not quite valid?

 

[Shike]

Wasn’t his critique a decisive blow to them with his claims about idealism and a priori categories?

What are the common answers to this?

From what I understand in this matter, which isn’t very much, one would only accept Kant’s critique unless one accepted his overall metaphysical picture–which is pretty wack and not well defended.

His two main arguments for his overall picture is the argument from antinomies and his analysis of knowledge (which follows the standard and faulty modern empiricism). Am I right or am I missing a huge argument of his?

Oh, and I remember learning way back that Kant didn’t have very good translations of Aquinas… I think he got his knowledge of Aquinas from Wolf, which altogether was not very good. It is apparent because, if I remember rightly, Kant conflated Aquinas as presenting an ontological argument instead of a cosmological.

But either way, Kant’s overall metaphysical picture is enough to chuck out Aquinas’ arguments… and a whole lot of babies…

 

[Asimis]

From what I understand in this matter, which isn’t very much, one would only accept Kant’s critique unless one accepted his overall metaphysical picture–which is pretty wack and not well defended.

But wan’t it the critiques that lead him to the adoption of his metaphysical picture?

 

[Shike]

But wan’t it the critiques that lead him to the adoption of his metaphysical picture?

When you say ‘critiques’, are you talking about his books? I wasn’t. I was talking about his critique of Aquinas’ arguments. It seems to me that his critique of Aquinas’ arguments are based upon his metaphysical picture rather than the other way around.

 

[Acapiteadcalcem]

Ok, but it seems that the answers to Kant sort of grant his point that “we should require to introduce into our proof conceptions of contingent beings”. For instance the Stanford article you linked to states:

“In short, defenders of the cosmological argument defend the Causal Principle (or alternatively Principle of Sufficient Reason), but limit its application to contingent beings”

But isn’t that the very thing Kant says that one is forced to do, which in turn is not quite valid?

It’s a good point you raise, but I would say that given the disagreement over the way in which ‘necessary’ and ‘contingent’ terms are applied, one couldn’t claim that Kant ‘invalidated’ the five ways but rather gave a critique of them. It would seem to me (tell me if you disagree) that one has to subscribe to Kant’s definition of necessary vs contingent or analytic vs synthetic in order to access his critique (and, by the way, you could also argue that Kant’s use of the analytic/synthetic distinction is neither analytic nor synthetic itself!).

Your quote from the Stanford article is a good summary of the issue I think. There is, I believe, a misreading by Kant—and many others today—of Aquinas’ five ways which adds to the confusion. For example, I’d like to call upon a causal distinction made by Fr. Frederick Copleston SJ. He argues (and I think rightly) that Aquinas uses the term ‘cause’ in reference to God as being a cause ‘in esse’ while a great many commentators read into his use the term cause ‘in fieri’. A cause in fieri is a cause at the beginning of a chain; the first domino that knocks all the others down. A cause in fieri can disappear once the sequence is kicked off (just as our parents can die after we are brought into existence). In contrast is the cause in esse, which must always be present, outside of the closed system, in order for the effect to exist. So a shadow of a tree, for example, is contingent on the tree in esse for its existence. Take away the tree, you take away the effect. Even if the shadow were eternal, it would be eternally dependent on the eternal tree in esse in order to exist. This reading of Aquinas, which is supported by the primary texts, does not limit the use of cause to contingent things. But it is a very different sort of contingent being from the one Kant has in mind which seems to be contingent cause in fieri. I should add that reading cause in the five ways in fieri leads to a very deistic view of God, which Aquinas dismisses—but which Kant seems to fall prey to.

In a nutshell, while you could engage Kant in a discussion of the five ways, I think he comes nowhere near delivering the knockout punch! They conceive of two different kinds of God, I think and hence two classes of cause. Enlightenment thinkers typically reduced all concepts of causation to efficient causation in fieri, because that was the fashion of the day given the emergence of the natural sciences.