Dissecting Arguments Against Free Will

[prodigalson2011]

I would like to address the inherent flaws and distortions present in some popular arguments against free will:

Why Free Will is Impossible

1. Causality, or Cause and Effect. Because everything has a cause, every human choice manifests a causal regression stretching at least as far back as the Big Bang, or about 13.7 billion years.

This argument rests on the assumption that the intellect is subject to this causal chain. Essentially, the conclusion is already assumed in the premise, rendering this argument invalid.

1a. Even if true randomness were possible in the strongest sense of “uncaused” at the quantum level, (it is not, quantum uncertainty notwithstanding) random decisions are certainly not freely willed, as the notion is commonly and academically understood.

This argument makes the false distinction that all events must necessarily be either determined or random. The entire point of free will is that our choices are neither random nor materially determined. Attempting to disprove something by excluding it from the discussion doesn’t amount to an argument.

1. Our Unconscious. Because the data upon which we base decisions is located in our unconscious (it must be, because we could not store all of that data in our conscious mind at any given moment) then that data must only be accessible to our unconscious, wherein must therefore also reside our brain’s decision making.

This is perhaps the most absurd argument I have ever heard presented in dismissal of free will. I daresay it is self-evident that the data which we use to make our decisions is accessible to the conscious mind. For instance, if I am deciding whether to wear capri shorts or sweatpants, I certainly have access to the “data” in my mind relevant to the decision at hand: what time of year is it? Is the weather warm or cool? Will I be inside or outside? If I will be inside, will the building be well heated?

The simplest analogy would be opening a book and searching for particular pieces of information therein, the unconscious being the closed book and the conscious mind being the person reading the book. If we were to follow this argument through to its logical conclusion: a) rational discourse would be impossible b) no one would consciously remember anything.

How to disprove ANY free will
argument in 2 easy steps

1.  Ask the free will believer to give an example of a choice they consider to be freely willed.

2.  Ask the free will believer to say whether or not that choice was caused.

Congratulations; you’ve won!

If the free will believer says the choice was caused, the causal regression makes free will impossible.

If one believes in free will, one believes the choice was willed, not caused. This is a rather inane and totally inept argument that repeats the same fallacy of exclusion explored in the beginning of my critique.

If the free will believer says the choice was uncaused, that would mean the choice was random. Random thoughts are not what we mean when we say we believe a thought is freely willed.

You can easily apply this two-step refutation to any, and all, free will arguments. Be kind.

Again, that false either/or distinction. Cutting someone out of a picture does not amount to an alteration of their historical presence, and eliminating an undesired idea from an argument does not amount to making an argument against it. If this is what we as theists/free will believers are up against, I don’t think we have much to worry about.

On a side note, I found this article rather interesting and quite relevant.

 

[ASimon]

On what grounds do you say that intellect is not part of the causal chain?

 

[prodigalson2011]

On what grounds do you say that intellect is not part of the causal chain?

On the grounds of logic. If intellect were strictly part of a causal chain one should reasonably expect thought to be (somewhat) linear. But the fact is that I can freely (yep, freely) go from thinking about a serious philosophical argument to rainbows and unicorns to baseball (yes, I’m going to say it) at will. Intellect cannot be scientifically shown to be on either side of causality, but logic and reason lean much further in favor of its causal independence. So you might say that I argue that it is not on the same grounds that others argue that it is, only the ground’s much more solid on my side of the fence.

 

[Touchstone]

I would like to address the inherent flaws and distortions present in some popular arguments against free will:

This argument rests on the assumption that the intellect is subject to this causal chain. Essentially, the conclusion is already assumed in the premise, rendering this argument invalid.

Yes, but of necessity. It’s not an argument, per se, but rather a tautology; any “choice” necessarily reifies a state change in the universe, else it’s not a choice. It therefore, by definition of change, has an imputed “cause” or antecedent, a dynamic of some kind or another that we call “free will” that catalyzes a later state B (“chosen”) from an earlier state A(“not chosen”).

“Random” is just a catch all term that we apply to causes and dynamics that don’t fit a recognizable pattern, purpose or plan. “Random” decay events in radioactive isotopes are just as “caused” and “causal” as anything else, but the mechanism of the particular timing of individual events remains opaque to us.

That means that “random” by definition exhausts all the remaining possibilities, in the same way “unknown” would for “known” in terms of some discrete state we might consider.

This argument makes the false distinction that all events must necessarily be either determined or random. The entire point of free will is that our choices are neither random nor materially determined. Attempting to disprove something by excluding it from the discussion doesn’t amount to an argument.

There is a material change, unquestionably; the brain’s electron’s take on different patterns, and all manner of other downstream physical effects may obtain – the batter swings the bat at an incoming pitch as the result of his “choice” to make an atempt at this pitch.

This means that material effects are entailed, no matter what superstitions we might entertain about the provenance of the choice. Random “choices” are just as materially determined, just as materially reified – “material” is the only basis we have for any of the terms you use “random”, “choice’”… “causal” itself is a material concept. We have perfectly no experience or evidence to consider in non-material senses of those terms. They aren’t even coherent terms without material semantics grounding them.

At best, this complaint, then, is crying foul a being forced to maintain coherence in your terms.

If you don’t think that’s the case, then consider supplying an example of a ‘change’ or ‘choice’ that is immaterial, and how we determine that it is a choice and that it is immaterial.

This is perhaps the most absurd argument I have ever heard presented in dismissal of free will. I daresay it is self-evident that the data which we use to make our decisions is accessible to the conscious mind. For instance, if I am deciding whether to wear capri shorts or sweatpants, I certainly have access to the “data” in my mind relevant to the decision at hand: what time of year is it? Is the weather warm or cool? Will I be inside or outside? If I will be inside, will the building be well heated?

That’s a simpleton’s view of the human brain and its mental activity. We don’t need to dispense with our notion of consciousness to understand and observe the powerful role our subconscious mental activity plays in cognition, and particularly with respect to choice making.

See, for example, the seminal work of en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Libet in the early 1980s, regarding the observed dynamics of the subconscious and conscious in decision-making. That really just opened the door; in the past 30 years we have accumulated a large storehouse of research that demonstrates empirically that the subconscious plays a central and prior role in many of our choice making processes over our conscious deliberations.

This objection can only hold as “absurd” for readers who aren’t even passingly familiar with cognitive science in the past few decades.

You’re certainly right that we have the strong intuition that we are consciously deciding what we have decided. But it’s a transcendental problem, an illusion borne of the nature of subconscious thought. We don’t “think” the subconscious is doing the work, because, IT’S A SUBCONSCIOUS PROCESS. Fortunately, in the modern era we have instruments and tools that enable science to shine a light on many of our illusions and mistakes borne of our intuitions. This is a good example of that.

The simplest analogy would be opening a book and searching for particular pieces of information therein, the unconscious being the closed book and the conscious mind being the person reading the book. If we were to follow this argument through to its logical conclusion: a) rational discourse would be impossible b) no one would consciously remember anything.

No, it’s not all or nothing. In many cases (and if you read the literature on this, this pattern runs through much of it), what is contrasted is our subconscious choice making versus our conscious choice making. We may consciously overrule what our subconscious choice making would have indicated. We may consciously choose it, unaware of the subconscious prompt that is the predicate for our conscious decision. Science does not invalidate the presence or role of conscious decision-making (although it hasn’t helped to support any notion of “free will” in the religious/libertarian sense). Instead, the role of the subsconscious has been discovered and tested as part of the overall process.

If one believes in free will, one believes the choice was willed, not caused.

Willing IS a cause, by definition. It is the introduction of state changes in the world. Actively. It is entailed by the terms you use, yourself. We war against this because we are superstitiously uncomfortable with the implications it brings. But the terms we use do not and cannot support an “uncaused caused”, here.

I do agree, though, that believing in “free will” in sense you seem to advance here, entails belief in choices as ‘uncaused causes’.

This is a rather inane and totally inept argument that repeats the same fallacy of exclusion explored in the beginning of my critique.

Only if you think logical contradictions should not be unfairly excluded from our reasoning!

Again, that false either/or distinction. Cutting someone out of a picture does not amount to an alteration of their historical presence, and eliminating an undesired idea from an argument does not amount to making an argument against it. If this is what we as theists/free will believers are up against, I don’t think we have much to worry about.

You’ve taken up your sword against the Law of Non-Contradiction, here. Swing away.

-TS

 

[ASimon]

On the grounds of logic. If intellect were strictly part of a causal chain one should reasonably expect thought to be (somewhat) linear. But the fact is that I can freely (yep, freely) go from thinking about a serious philosophical argument to rainbows and unicorns to baseball (yes, I’m going to say it) at will. Intellect cannot be scientifically shown to be on either side of causality, but logic and reason lean much further in favor of its causal independence. So I would say I argue that it is not on the same grounds that others argue that it is, only the ground’s much more solid on my side of the fence.

Logic actually dictates something else to me. It dictates that since intellect is, like consciousness, a process or an outcome that is strictly contingent on having a working brain, and a given brain is part of the Causal Chain, than that makes intellect part of the Causal Chain. But I realize that this syllogism comes burdened with assumptions that most supernaturalists reject out of hand.

Honestly, most arguments against free will are not designed with you in mind. They’re more built for secularists who still believe in some version of free will, but aren’t willing to make unjustified assumptions about the nature of neurological processes.

But in any event, I believe the mistake you’re making here is the assumption that your superficially non-linear thoughts are, actually, non-linear. True, we may not be able to account for connections between concepts like philosophy, unicorns, rainbows, or baseball, but this does not mean that such connections, for you, don’t exist. Your unconscious mind does exist, though, and by definition, you cannot access it. So to assume that these concepts are truly unrelated seems also unjustified.

But a simple experiment might in order. Take a moment, lock yourself in a room, close the windows, turn off the music, get as close to complete silence (lack of stimulus) as you can manage it. Sit down on the floor, or in a comfortable chair, close your eyes, and just breathe. Then, all you need to do is focus on your breathing, and not allow your mind to wander away from this task. Now, this will have to remain on the honor system, but my point is, if you really have free will, this should prove trivially easy to do and maintain indefinitely.

 

[prodigalson2011]

Yes, but of necessity. It’s not an argument, per se, but rather a tautology; any “choice” necessarily reifies a state change in the universe, else it’s not a choice. It therefore, by definition of change, has an imputed “cause” or antecedent, a dynamic of some kind or another that we call “free will” that catalyzes a later state B (“chosen”) from an earlier state A(“not chosen”).

It is not of necessity that we assume the intellect is subject to the causal chain in the same blind manner as inanimate matter. Yes, it is somewhat subject to it in the sense that our ability to make choices is dependent upon the changeability of ourselves and environment, but it is taking a yard when given an inch to place the mind in the same field as a rock.

“Random” is just a catch all term that we apply to causes and dynamics that don’t fit a recognizable pattern, purpose or plan. “Random” decay events in radioactive isotopes are just as “caused” and “causal” as anything else, but the mechanism of the particular timing of individual events remains opaque to us.

Funny you should mention that, as many quantum physicists suggest that radioactive decay and other quantum phenomena refute causality. I don’t necessarily agree with them; I have actually discussed this issue recently and to repeat what I said then, “At this point, it amounts to little more than a confession of bafflement.” If one were to assume they were right though, it would put a pretty big dent in the materialist argument. But I digress. The important point to be made here is that relegating the world of the mind to the world of isotopes is a fallacy of equivocation.

That means that “random” by definition exhausts all the remaining possibilities, in the same way “unknown” would for “known” in terms of some discrete state we might consider.

“Random” is an incredibly ineffective and misleading term with which to cover “all remaining possibilities.” It leaves, in fact, only one possibility. It is essentially rigging the deck. However, you’ve conveniently provided the better and more accurate term to cover “all the remaining possibilities”… “unknown.” The mysterious. That which is beyond total comprehension. Materialists’ kryptonite.

There is a material change, unquestionably; the brain’s electron’s take on different patterns, and all manner of other downstream physical effects may obtain – the batter swings the bat at an incoming pitch as the result of his “choice” to make an atempt at this pitch.

This means that material effects are entailed, no matter what superstitions we might entertain about the provenance of the choice. Random “choices” are just as materially determined, just as materially reified – “material” is the only basis we have for any of the terms you use “random”, “choice’”… “causal” itself is a material concept. We have perfectly no experience or evidence to consider in non-material senses of those terms. They aren’t even coherent terms without material semantics grounding them.

At best, this complaint, then, is crying foul a being forced to maintain coherence in your terms.

Of course material effects are entailed. Being as we are undeniably physical creatures, of course our choices will have material effects. However, material effects do not equate to material causes. There is no stronger evidence to support the claim that the firing of neurons makes the mind (and its choices) than to claim that the mind makes the neurons fire. Either one is equally unscientific. Again, such designations are relegated to the realm of philosophy.

If you don’t think that’s the case, then consider supplying an example of a ‘change’ or ‘choice’ that is immaterial, and how we determine that it is a choice and that it is immaterial.

This is a false dichotomy. Just because something is assumed to be immaterial does not mean that its effects do not extend into the material realm. In fact, it is a basic supposition of the free will argument that it does. The difference in the two philosophies is the point of origin.

That’s a simpleton’s view of the human brain and its mental activity. We don’t need to dispense with our notion of consciousness to understand and observe the powerful role our subconscious mental activity plays in cognition, and particularly with respect to choice making.

See, for example, the seminal work of en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Libet in the early 1980s, regarding the observed dynamics of the subconscious and conscious in decision-making. That really just opened the door; in the past 30 years we have accumulated a large storehouse of research that demonstrates empirically that the subconscious plays a central and prior role in many of our choice making processes over our conscious deliberations.

I’m familiar with Libet, and he has been extensively criticized (see the article linked in my OP.) And among his critics are some prominent materialists; here’s what Dan Dennett had to say about his work:

“Suppose Libet knows that your readiness potential peaked at second 6,810 of the experimental trial, and the clock dot was straight down (which is what you reported you saw) at millisecond 7,005. How many milliseconds should he have to add to this number to get the time you were conscious of it? The light gets from your clock face to your eyeball almost instantaneously, but the path of the signals from retina through lateral geniculate nucleus to striate cortex takes 5 to 10 milliseconds — a paltry fraction of the 300 milliseconds offset, but how much longer does it take them to get to you. (Or are you located in the striate cortex?) The visual signals have to be processed before they arrive at wherever they need to arrive for you to make a conscious decision of simultaneity. Libet’s method presupposes, in short, that we can locate the intersection of two trajectories: • the rising-to-consciousness of signals representing the decision to flick • the rising to consciousness of signals representing successive clock-face orientations so that these events occur side-by-side as it were in place where their simultaneity can be noted.”

Or W.R. Klemm, PhD (Professor of Neuroscience):

"In a paper published in Advances in Cognitive Psychology, I challenge the whole series of experiments performed since the 1980s purported to show that intentions, choices, and decisions are made subconsciously, with conscious mind being informed after the fact. These experiments do not test what they are intended to test and are misinterpreted to support the view of illusory free will.

My criticisms focus on three main points: 1) timing of when a free-will event occurred requires introspection, and other research shows that introspective estimates of event timing are not accurate, 2) simple finger movements may be performed without much conscious thought and certainly not representative of the conscious decisions and choices required in high-speed conversation or situations where the subconscious mind cannot know ahead of time what to do, and 3) the brain activity measures have been primitive and incomplete.

I point out 12 categories of what I regard as flawed thinking about free will. Some of the more obvious issues that many scientists have glossed over include:

Decisions are not often instantaneous (certainly not on a scale of a fraction of a second).
Conscious realization that a decision has been made is delayed from the actual decision, and these may be two distinct processes.
Decision making is not the only mental process going on in such tasks.
Some willed action, as when first learning to play a musical instrument or touch type must be freely willed because the subconscious mind cannot know ahead of time what to do.
Free-will experiments have relied too much on awareness of actions and time estimation of accuracy.
Extrapolating from such simple experiments to all mental life is not justified.
Conflicting data and interpretations have been ignored.

A basic problem is that scientists do not yet have a good independent brain-function measure of the conscious generation of intentions, choices, or decisions. Without such a measure, it is not possible to measure the time at which a willed action occurs."

 

[prodigalson2011]

This objection can only hold as “absurd” for readers who aren’t even passingly familiar with cognitive science in the past few decades.

It holds as absurd when one doesn’t think that the conclusions of some prominent cognitive scientists in the past few decades are as conclusive as they would like one to think.

You’re certainly right that we have the strong intuition that we are consciously deciding what we have decided. But it’s a transcendental problem, an illusion borne of the nature of subconscious thought. We don’t “think” the subconscious is doing the work, because, IT’S A SUBCONSCIOUS PROCESS. Fortunately, in the modern era we have instruments and tools that enable science to shine a light on many of our illusions and mistakes borne of our intuitions. This is a good example of that.

It is a poor example of that. I contend that free will is not a scientific question and that attempts to address it through materialistic inquiry are doomed to the error of eisegesis. These scientists are not making scientific analyses, they are engaging in philosophy, and erroneously at that.

No, it’s not all or nothing. In many cases (and if you read the literature on this, this pattern runs through much of it), what is contrasted is our subconscious choice making versus our conscious choice making. We may consciously overrule what our subconscious choice making would have indicated. We may consciously choose it, unaware of the subconscious prompt that is the predicate for our conscious decision. Science does not invalidate the presence or role of conscious decision-making (although it hasn’t helped to support any notion of “free will” in the religious/libertarian sense). Instead, the role of the subsconscious has been discovered and tested as part of the overall process.

It would be more accurate to say the subconscious has been assumed and inserted into the tests.

Willing IS a cause, by definition. It is the introduction of state changes in the world. Actively. It is entailed by the terms you use, yourself. We war against this because we are superstitiously uncomfortable with the implications it brings. But the terms we use do not and cannot support an “uncaused caused”, here.

Indeed, willing CAUSES things, but it cannot be shown that the will itself is CAUSED by anything external to itself. This is either a misunderstanding or misrepresentation of my point. I’ll assume the former.

I do agree, though, that believing in “free will” in sense you seem to advance here, entails belief in choices as ‘uncaused causes’.

Only if you think logical contradictions should not be unfairly excluded from our reasoning!

It is not a logical contradiction. The seeming contradiction arises from the limited materialistic perspective.

You’ve taken up your sword against the Law of Non-Contradiction, here. Swing away.

Show me where I’ve made two contradictory statements.

 

[Touchstone]

It holds as absurd when one doesn’t think that the conclusions of some prominent cognitive scientists in the past few decades are as conclusive as they would like one to think.

Even these sceintists are wrong, and the data misinterpreted, somehow, it’s not absurd, not nearly. It’s precisely as absurd as any mechanical/natural process. Our intuitions indicate that a rock is “really solid, all the way through”, when in fact, the solid rocks we have, are, like everything else, almost completely empty space. Once we have instruments and models that produce data, we are being ignorant in relying solely on our uninformed and intransigent intuitions.

It is a poor example of that. I contend that free will is not a scientific question and that attempts to address it through materialistic inquiry are doomed to the error of eisegesis. These scientists are not making scientific analyses, they are engaging in philosophy, and erroneously at that.

Science is philosophy. It’s a philosophy with a rigorous and systematic epistemology. Performative, accountable philosophy, in other words. Why would you dismiss free will, a priori, as beyond the domain of scientific inquiry? Manifestly, our choices have local, physical ramifications, and measure, observable dynamics. That is, phenomonologically, it does not appear to be anything more than vanilla physics, if complex physics in terms of scope (lots of trillions of neurons makes modeling a scaling problem for our current technology).

It would be more accurate to say the subconscious has been assumed and inserted into the tests.

The tests cannot insert a new layer of consciousness. These are observations and measurements of the brain at work. And what we see, over and over, are mental processes are are objectively, instrumentally demonstrable as efficacious in our responses, and which are also totally opaque to our conscious processing.

Science works from hypotheses, so you would be right to say we (provisionally) assume there’s a subconscious layer of cognition, and work our experiments from there. But the hypothesis doesn’t reify the neurons, or their interactions; if the assumption is not correct, the model will break down empirically, and predictions and tests will fail. The tests confirm the hypothesis, over and over and over and over: much of our decision-making obtains in our subconscious.

Indeed, willing CAUSES things, but it cannot be shown that the will itself is CAUSED by anything external to itself. This is either a misunderstanding or misrepresentation of my point. I’ll assume the former.

I said in my previous post that you are positing the uncaused cause. It’s not contestable that the will causes things: it must or it cannot be a will at all, in the first place. All I need to do here is get you to confirm this, that in your view, each and every will is an uncaused cause.

It is not a logical contradiction. The seeming contradiction arises from the limited materialistic perspective.

One must posit an uncaused cause, and in fact a casual myriad of uncaused causes – not just every will as an uncaused cause, but EVERY “CHOICE” as an uncaused cause, not even related to other features of some supposed “immaterial will” – never mind the stolen concept problems that inhere in that for now (“will”, “cause”, “attribute”, etc. all being incoherent in non-material terms).

Show me where I’ve made two contradictory statements.

Indeed, willing CAUSES things, but it cannot be shown that the will itself is CAUSED by anything external to itself.

Dead to rights.

-TS

 

[Aelred_Minor]

Does freedom of the will really mean freedom from all causation whatsoever, even causation from the First Cause?

At the very least, I do not think the Catholic Faith obliges us to believe so.

 

[tonyrey]

Science is philosophy. It’s a philosophy with a rigorous and systematic epistemology. Performative, accountable philosophy, in other words.

I would just like to interject that science cannot possibly be philosophy because it is based on metascientific principles - which were established by the philosophy of science…

BTW Welcome back!

 

[ASimon]

Does freedom of the will really mean freedom from all causation whatsoever, even causation from the First Cause?

It seems to me that free will would have to mean this.

 

[Aelred_Minor]

It seems to me that free will would have to mean this.

Why?

(I’m mainly just encouraging discussion here. My own theology is something more or less along the lines of Thomism, though, which essentially considers the will free in the sense that God alone can move it.)

 

[Touchstone]

I would just like to interject that science cannot possibly be philosophy because it is based on metascientific principles - which were established by the philosophy of science…

BTW Welcome back!

I don’t think that represents a problem. The meta-science that grounds the scientific enterprise – for example, the assumption that our sensory experiences reflect the actual state of the extra-mental world with sufficient fidelity to render the world around us intelligible to some degree – is pure philosophy.

Philosophy of science is philosophy… hence the name.

Nice to be back, thank you for the welcome.

-TS

 

[Aelred_Minor]

I would just like to interject that science cannot possibly be philosophy because it is based on metascientific principles - which were established by the philosophy of science…

BTW Welcome back!

I am very intrigued by this statement, which I admit I do not understand. The term “metascientific” is new to me.

Please indulge my ignorance by a more in-depth response, new thread, or private message, if it is convenient.

 

[ASimon]

Why?

(I’m mainly just encouraging discussion here. My own theology is something more or less along the lines of Thomism, though, which essentially considers the will free in the sense that God alone can move it.)

We might just be talking past each other here, hence the possible confusion. My point was that if a First Cause was causing our behavior and choices, I don’t see how the result could be considered “free will.” Which is one of the reasons I argue that we don’t have free will, and that God couldn’t give us this capacity even if there was a God to give us this capacity.

 

[Touchstone]

I am very intrigued by this statement, which I admit I do not understand. The term “metascientific” is new to me.

Please indulge my ignorance by a more in-depth response, new thread, or private message, if it is convenient.

Science depends on a necessary set of assumptions to get off the ground. These assumptions are “metaphysical” or “meta-scientific”. They are assumed, not demonstrated and so are enabling, but not scientific per se. The idea that evidence gathered by our senses reflects extra-mental reality is itself not demonstrated by judging the evidence. - that would be circular reasoning or infinite regress.

Those minimal bootstrapping assumptions are philosophy, but not science itself. They are transcendental to science, so we call them “metaphysical” or “meta-scientific”. Any epistemology needs enabling axioms to get off the ground, and silence depends, chiefly, on two:

1. evidence garnered through the senses reflects extra mental reality
2. extra mental reality is comprehensible, intelligible to some degree (performative models of reality can be built based on empirical analysis)

-TS

 

[tonyrey]

We might just be talking past each other here, hence the possible confusion. My point was that if a First Cause was causing our behavior and choices, I don’t see how the result could be considered “free will.” Which is one of the reasons I argue that we don’t have free will, and that God couldn’t give us this capacity even if there was a God to give us this capacity.

Power can be shared!

 

[prodigalson2011]

Logic actually dictates something else to me. It dictates that since intellect is, like consciousness, a process or an outcome that is strictly contingent on having a working brain, and a given brain is part of the Causal Chain, than that makes intellect part of the Causal Chain. But I realize that this syllogism comes burdened with assumptions that most supernaturalists reject out of hand.

I wouldn’t say supernaturalists reject them out of hand. They are rejected on philosophical grounds, in the same way they are accepted on the other end of the spectrum. That intellect is contingent on having a working brain is an assumption. A reasonable assumption, but an assumption nonetheless. As I told another forum member in a different thread, we all mix our philosophy with our science; no one is unbiased.

Honestly, most arguments against free will are not designed with you in mind. They’re more built for secularists who still believe in some version of free will, but aren’t willing to make unjustified assumptions about the nature of neurological processes.

It seems to me that any materialistic assumption is just as unjustified as a supernatural one, as the gap between verifiable data and the personal nature of the experience is unfathomably wide. This gap can only be closed (or at least shrunk) with the help of philosophy, and most specifically metaphysics. Any discussion of free will, for example, immediately falls into the realm of metaphysics. All science can tell us is that the brain does this or that and the body subsequently does this or that. Agency is not a question that can be addressed scientifically (I’ll elaborate in a reply to Touchstone later.)

But in any event, I believe the mistake you’re making here is the assumption that your superficially non-linear thoughts are, actually, non-linear. True, we may not be able to account for connections between concepts like philosophy, unicorns, rainbows, or baseball, but this does not mean that such connections, for you, don’t exist. Your unconscious mind does exist, though, and by definition, you cannot access it. So to assume that these concepts are truly unrelated seems also unjustified.

The “unconscious mind” can be used to denote a variety of things, and there is no firm consensus on what exactly it is, nor its role in the human mind. Neither the mind nor any theoretical “unconscious mind” can be directly observed; we can only watch its shadows. Hence the metaphysical nature of such discussions. In any case, I contend it is a further stretch to think the extreme malleability of my thought is deterministic than to assume that I am free, to the degree of my knowledge, to think about what I choose. Science doesn’t support you any more than it does me in this case.

But a simple experiment might in order. Take a moment, lock yourself in a room, close the windows, turn off the music, get as close to complete silence (lack of stimulus) as you can manage it. Sit down on the floor, or in a comfortable chair, close your eyes, and just breathe. Then, all you need to do is focus on your breathing, and not allow your mind to wander away from this task. Now, this will have to remain on the honor system, but my point is, if you really have free will, this should prove trivially easy to do and maintain indefinitely.

I assume you are suggesting that the difficulty of suspending the internal dialogue somehow indicates a lack of free will. However, free will does not mean that everything is easy to do. It means that we can decide and attempt to do it. Success is not a necessity. No reasonable theory of free will suggests that we can control every single thought that pops into our head. It means that we can reason through them and decide whether to pursue or reject those thoughts. I would really like to expound on this particular area, but I have to get up very early and really must get to bed. To be continued.

 

[kentcara2003]

It seems to me that free will would have to mean this.

Just lending my thoughts here.

I’ve read Grace by Garrigou Lagrange OP. Very good exposition on grace and how it is related to free will.

the gist of it as far as I can conclude: “God is the source of all good. Free will is a good. therefore God is the source of free will.”

As catholics, we hold that God is the source of our free will. He moves us to good without destroying our freedom BUT RATHER HE IS THE SOURCE OF OUR FREEDOM IN GOOD.

AS IN OUR LITURGY,…In Heaven , God crowns HIs own gifts…

One of the conclusion, we must hold to is that all the good, whether temporal or spiritual, comes from God as its source. and any failure is attributed to the failure of man as because of the FALL ,we can fail without God, as a defective cause, but not without the permission of God, as nothing escapes his causality.

GOD IS THE SOURCE OF OUR FREEDOM. HE RULES US WITHOUR DESTROYING OUR FREEDOM. (THIS IS THOMIST WHICH IN THE BOOK THE CHURCH HAS ADVOCATE AS TRUE)

God bless
Kentcara2003 (3rd Order SSCC)