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How can God be ultimately simple while involving three distinguishable persons?
plato.stanford.edu/entries/divine-simplicity/Where is it written anywhere that God is “ultimately simple”?
Or, for that matter, what does the word “simple” even mean?Where is it written anywhere that God is “ultimately simple”?
So you disagree with the Fourth Lateran Council, which in its first canon declared God to be “absolutely simple”?Or, for that matter, what does the word “simple” even mean?
I cannot think of ANYTHING in the physical world that could be called “simple.” Water is “simple” but also profoundly complex, and no modern physicist would claim that we really understand water. The nature of the individual hydrogen and oxygen atoms are mostly unknown, and the interaction of these atoms into the chemical molecule known as “water” are mostly unknown. We have put a man on the moon, and safely returned him to earth (in a water-splashdown), but we cannot say, with any reasonable degree of certainty, what WATER is.
If the best modern science cannot tell us what WATER is (and barely scratch the surface of such knowledge), how can we expect to understand what GOD is? Water OUGHT to be simple (and, for a long time, it was thought to be simple), but we have found that it is complex. God OUGHT to be complex - why would we expect God to be simple? And, even if God was simple, why would we expect to understand God any better than we understand water?
The problem, as I see it, is that the three persons are not equivalent. So, for example, it is correct to say that the Father begets the Son. It is not correct to say that the Son begets the Father. If they were equivalent, those two would be interchangeable.Did you even bother to read the document that you linked?
The only sense in which it speaks of the simplicity of God is in the context of all the persons of the Trinity being one in their Divine Nature. One nature, three persons. The rest of your question seems to be nothing more than and effort to try to catch people up in your twisting of out of context terms.
You have not named or cited this theologian (perhaps, if you did, we could understand your question better).I didn’t think claiming divine simplicity would be so controversial on a Catholic website, considering that it was from a Catholic theologian that I Iearned the idea.
That theologian was Edward Feser, but he was only citing Anselm and Aquinas. And part of what it means for God to be simple is that he doesn’t have parts. The idea was that if God had parts or distinguishable attributes, then God would be dependent on those parts. Then God would no longer be the metaphysically necessary being that the cosmological argument relies on.You have not named or cited this theologian (perhaps, if you did, we could understand your question better).
You ask a question based on the premise that God is “simple.” You do not define what that means. You later infer that “simple” means that, if God is a Trinity, that all three parts must be identical. That means God would really be a unity, divided into three identical parts (much as we would divide a liter of water into thirds), with no distinction between them.
I agree that this would be a more “simple” understanding of God than the Catholic Trinity. But we don’t understand WHY you suppose that God OUGHT TO BE simple in the first place, and why you suppose the three parts must be indistinguishable from each other.
You are not encountering hostility - you are encountering confusion. Help us help you by asking a better question.
Ah, that is a MUCH better question. I am familiar with Feser, but not with his outlook on this particular topic (the one book I have of his does not mention it). But I understand the philosophy.That theologian was Edward Feser, but he was only citing Anselm and Aquinas. And part of what it means for God to be simple is that he doesn’t have parts. The idea was that if God had parts or distinguishable attributes, then God would be dependent on those parts. Then God would no longer be the metaphysically necessary being that the cosmological argument relies on.
That’s why God is his attributes (no division allowed between form and substance), that’s why his attributes are all the same thing, and that’s what the trinity might violate by being non-interchangeable.
This falls into the science of ontology. Therewith a soul could discover the explanations of an uncaused cause, the context that would inhibit creation out of nothing.The statement that God is simple refers to the nature of his being.
The statement that God is simple refers to the nature of his being.
The statement does indeed fall into the realm of ontology. A human soul, is of course, limited and spiritual. God is infinite spirit. God’s intellect is omnipotent, man’s is not. The intellect of a limited human soul is not capable of infinite knowing.This falls into the science of ontology. Therewith a soul could discover the explanations of an uncaused cause, the context that would inhibit creation out of nothing.
Consider the ultimate simplicity of “God is.”How can God be ultimately simple while involving three distinguishable persons?
Then God is made of different parts (the Father and Son are different enough to avoid self-love), therefore dependent on those parts, therefore contingent and not necessary. Moreover, the Father and Son are not perfect, for each has something the other lacks (or else they’d be completely the same and one thing, not two).Ah, that is a MUCH better question. I am familiar with Feser, but not with his outlook on this particular topic (the one book I have of his does not mention it). But I understand the philosophy.
The philosophical framework is based on the “2X2 existence matrix.” An existence must be:
If an existence is “necessary,” it must logically be eternal. It must also be unchanging (if something is “necessary” and it changed, we would no longer be that necessary thing, because it changed). It cannot HAVE any property - it must BE whatever property it possesses (thus, we say that God IS love, not that God HAS love. Everyone HAS love, to one degree or another, but only God IS love).
- Possible but not Necessary (such as unicorns and us)
- Impossible and not Necessary (such as square circles)
- Impossible and necessary (a logical contradiction - no such thing is possible)
- Possible and necessary (only God can fulfill this role)
So, I understand the philosophy. But I do not understand why this is contradictory to the idea of the Divine Trinity.
In fact, I propose that, if we accept the premise that “God is love,” we MUST accept the Trinity (or, at least, the duality of the Father/Son). If God is eternal, then God existed for an eternity before Creation (and us). Was God love for that eternity (or did he “become” love once he created Creation"? If God was “love” “before” creation, then WHAT did God love? Himself???
If God loved ONLY himself “before” there was anything else to love, then God is capable ONLY of self-love (in Greek, ego). If we suppose that God ALSO loves us, that’s fine, but it is the same “love” that an artist has for his painting. It is a passing thing, and certainly did not exist before the foundation of Creation.
Love must have something to love, and perfect love is reciprocated (meaning the lover loves the beloved, and vice-versa). If “God is love” then God must HAVE an eternal presence to love, and this presence must love him in equal measure.
God is defined by love. It is not self-love. The love that the Father has for the Son (and all of us) is an entity which we call the Holy Spirit.
The above is completely contrary to Church teaching and has no logical basis.Then God is made of different parts (the Father and Son are different enough to avoid self-love), therefore dependent on those parts, therefore contingent and not necessary. Moreover, the Father and Son are not perfect, for each has something the other lacks (or else they’d be completely the same and one thing, not two).