Do Consequences Matter?

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I’ve always wanted to start a thread on this topic but couldn’t quite find the right way to introduce the question. But I found this today and it is perfect:

"All bad poetry springs from genuine feeling,” Oscar Wilde once remarked.

Irving Kristol took Wilde’s observation and ran with it. “The amateur’s feelings are sincere enough — why else should he be writing poetry? — but he takes the writing of poetry to be more important than the poem itself,” Kristol noted in his influential 1972 essay, “Symbolic Politics and Liberal Reform.” “For him, writing poetry is a kind of symbolic action, in which he liberates his most earnest sentiments, and it is in this impatient action and in this instant liberation that he seeks fulfillment.”

The successful poet, meanwhile, understands that good poetry is ultimately not about the experience of the author but of the reader. “He understands that a plea of sincerity is of no account in the ultimate court of literary judgment, which will look at the poem itself and simply ask: Does it work?”

“It seems to me,” Kristol wrote, “that the politics of liberal reform, in recent years, shows many of the same characteristics as amateur poetry. It has been more concerned with the kind of symbolic action that gratifies the passions of the reformer than with the efficacy of the reforms themselves.”

article.nationalreview.com/?q=MGRmZmFlMDNjYjFkNDZhMzQ1NWUxOTU0OGQxNjJlZDI=

The question is, from a moral standpoint, do consequences matter? If I intend to do good and bad results, am I good?

On the one hand, Jesus said that it is what’s in our hearts that matters most. If so, then consequences shouldn’t matter. Ignorance of consequences is blissful acquital, and who can really say what the effects of each of our actions will be?

But can we be so disinterested in consequences? Is such ignorance truly bliss?

Is there a moral duty to study the likely consequences of our actions and to act accordingly?
 
Intent is important, but it is not the only thing. If the consequences of a good action are evil and that action is avoidable and the evil consequence is forseeable, then the good intent doesn’t count for much.

For example, a pregnant woman’s doctor could give her prednisone for a particular condition. That would be a good intent, i.e. to relieve the woman of her ailment. However, the prednisone would likely cause an abortion…bad. Of course, there are complicating factors that would weigh in, and there are probably much better examples of this, but intent is not the sole thing that determines the morality of an action.

On the flip side, one can not do an evil act in order to achieve good…ever.
 
Doing good entails the looking after the consequences of the good. This is, perhaps, not spelled out in the Bible, but readily seen in our own ways. We are supposed to love others like ourselves, no? Well, let’s say I do something I think my wife will like. I will also try to make sure it is something she actually DOES like. We would not think it a very loving thing to do if I blindly buy her a big TV thinking (even truthfully) that she really wants to watch the game on Friday in High-def. Looked at another way, it may be a calling of mine to make her French Toast for breakfast, as a nice thing to do, but implicit in that duty is determining whether she actually likes the stuff. A consequence of the love we are called to have for each other is that we should actually help the person, not just try to.
 
Thanks for sharing your thoughts on this subject.

Does anyone have an idea what from the CCC would be closest to addressing this question?

Is there, for example, a moral duty to apply one’s gifts (e.g. factulties of reason and learning) or is a lack of interest in consequences inherently evil?
 
thanks for sharing your thoughts on this subject.

Does anyone have an idea what from the ccc would be closest to addressing this question?

Is there, for example, a moral duty to apply one’s gifts (e.g. Factulties of reason and learning) or is a lack of interest in consequences inherently evil?
ccc 1749-1761
 
ccc 1749-1761
Thanks, though interestingly it doesnt seem to really address the issue.

scborromeo.org/ccc/p3s1c1a4.htm

For example:

1760 A morally good act requires the goodness of its object, of its end, and of its circumstances together.

Nothing here seems to suggest that any effort to determine the likely consequences an an is required in order to determine whether the act is good.

It seems mostly concerned with arguing that “the end does not justify the means” which it repeats several places.
 
Thanks, though interestingly it doesnt seem to really address the issue.

scborromeo.org/ccc/p3s1c1a4.htm

For example:

1760 A morally good act requires the goodness of its object, of its end, and of its circumstances together.

Nothing here seems to suggest that any effort to determine the likely consequences an an is required in order to determine whether the act is good.

It seems mostly concerned with arguing that “the end does not justify the means” which it repeats several places.
I think consequences are tied to the object. Consequences are the outcome of the act.

To get to your original question, simply intending to do good does not mean the act one performs is good. The ends (intent) do not justify the means (which includes the act performed, and consequences).
 
Mind you, I’m not arguing with you. I agree with you. But I am relying on my intuition. I am having a hard time defending this view as Catholic.
I think consequences are tied to the object. Consequences are the outcome of the act.
Unfortunately, this is the nub of the original problem. You are arguing that act implies consequences, thus to choose an act necessarily entails choosing consequences and, further, that you can’t choose consequences without reasoning about them. But that is not spelled out in the CCC here.
To get to your original question, simply intending to do good does not mean the act one performs is good. The ends (intent) do not justify the means (which includes the act performed, and consequences).
I think you are stretching the usual meaning of that phrase beyond the breaking point. The usual understanding is that an evil act cannot be justified by its ends. But if a good or neutral act has evil consequences that are not the object of the act, but merely the logical consequence of it, this is a different case.
 
Mind you, I’m not arguing with you. I agree with you. But I am relying on my intuition. I am having a hard time defending this view as Catholic.

Unfortunately, this is the nub of the original problem. You are arguing that act implies consequences, thus to choose an act necessarily entails choosing consequences and, further, that you can’t choose consequences without reasoning about them. But that is not spelled out in the CCC here.

I think you are stretching the usual meaning of that phrase beyond the breaking point. The usual understanding is that an evil act cannot be justified by its ends. But if a good or neutral act has evil consequences that are not the object of the act, but merely the logical consequence of it, this is a different case.
What, precisely, are you having a hard time defending? I’m not sure I understand.

Then can you clarify what you mean by consequences, if they are not the outcomes of the act? Thanks.
 
Then can you clarify what you mean by consequences, if they are not the outcomes of the act? Thanks.
The consequences are the outcome but they are distinct from the act.

Notice 1760: “A morally good act requires the goodness of its object, of its end, and of its circumstances together.”

No mention of either outcome or consequences. You and I agree that the act should entail these but CCC doesn’t say they do.

“Object” and “end” are not (it would seem to me) the same as consequences and outcome. They imply intent, not actuality.
What, precisely, are you having a hard time defending? I’m not sure I understand.

Thus I’m having a hard time formulating a Catholic argument that one has a moral duty to determine the likely outcome or consequences of an act (where the act is not, in and of itself, evil).
In general, even if we agree that there is some moral duty to determine the likely consequences or outcome of an act how far does one have to go, how much time and effort, to determine this?
 
I don’t know why this thread was moved to Philosophy but perhaps the powers-that-be don’t regard it as a conventional question of moral theology but rather one that entails counting angels dancing on the head of a pin.
 
Jesus, said not only our actions but also our hearts-our moral dispositions that *lead *to our actions-are important.
 
Jesus, said not only our actions but also our hearts-our moral dispositions that *lead *to our actions-are important.
One might argue that a reckless disregard for the consequences/outcomes of one’s acts, is an immoral disposition of the heart. But I don’t find anything of this sort spelled out clearly in the CCC.

By contrast, this is clearly established in criminal law though, even there, the standard is that of a “reasonable man” and there is no legal duty to learn in most areas of law (exceptions being professions and the like, a doctor has a legal duty to learn about medicine).
 
The consequences are the outcome but they are distinct from the act.

Notice 1760: “A morally good act requires the goodness of its object, of its end, and of its circumstances together.”

No mention of either outcome or consequences. You and I agree that the act should entail these but CCC doesn’t say they do.

“Object” and “end” are not (it would seem to me) the same as consequences and outcome. They imply intent, not actuality.
What, precisely, are you having a hard time defending? I’m not sure I understand.

Thus I’m having a hard time formulating a Catholic argument that one has a moral duty to determine the likely outcome or consequences of an act (where the act is not, in and of itself, evil).
Maybe an example would help? If you could provide one, that distinguishes consequences apart from act/object, intent/end, and circumstances?

As the CCC describes, and as you note, traditional Catholic moral theology says a moral evaluation consists of the three: object, intent, and circumstances. So if consequences are indeed independent of these three then it seems they need not be considered when simply evaluating the morality of a given action.
 
Maybe an example would help? If you could provide one, that distinguishes consequences apart from act/object, intent/end, and circumstances?
Probably any example of what is legally termed “criminal negligence” would suffice though the subject is far broader than that.

For example, say I’m a doctor and I have a surgery tomorrow that entails a procedure I’ve never performed. I could A) study up on the procedure this evening, or B) go to a ballgame and enjoy myself.

Or suppose I am not a doctor but I come upon a car accident and I begin to perform medical procedures on the victims beyond what a “reasonable person” would do.

On the broader front:

Suppose, simply, that I have the potential to be a great doctor but instead I party at school and take a job as a cook at Dennys.

Or suppose that I express an opinion on a subject (e.g. medicine or public policy) and I shush those who attempt to contradict my opinion with facts, refusing to entertain the possibility that I might not have an accurate understanding.
As the CCC describes, and as you note, traditional Catholic moral theology says a moral evaluation consists of the three: object, intent, and circumstances. So if consequences are indeed independent of these three then it seems they need not be considered when simply evaluating the morality of a given action.
In all of these cases, one could argue that the circumstances and act together entail the consequences but in no case is it clear. Short of a general principle that one has a moral duty to make some effort to determine the likely consequences of acts in given circumstances I don’t see how they could be considered sinful.

If so, this has interesting implications for the concept of sin (and, by extension, God’s will).

In some cultures there is a moral impetus toward the pursuit of excellence (e.g. in medicine). In others, something else (e.g. hedonism or spiritual contemplation).
 
Probably any example of what is legally termed “criminal negligence” would suffice though the subject is far broader than that.

For example, say I’m a doctor and I have a surgery tomorrow that entails a procedure I’ve never performed. I could A) study up on the procedure this evening, or B) go to a ballgame and enjoy myself.
Not prudent, but not sinful. I didn’t see any consequences in this example. What was the outcome of the surgery? What are the moral action, intent, and circumstances?
Or suppose I am not a doctor but I come upon a car accident and I begin to perform medical procedures on the victims beyond what a “reasonable person” would do.
That seems like a good thing to do. Again, I don’t see where consequences are noted.
On the broader front:

Suppose, simply, that I have the potential to be a great doctor but instead I party at school and take a job as a cook at Dennys.
Denny’s needs cooks. Did partying CAUSE you not to become a great doctor? Or did you just decide you’d rather party than study? Maybe not prudent, but not a priori sinful. Again, what act is being evaluated here, what is the intent, and what are the circumstances?
Or suppose that I express an opinion on a subject (e.g. medicine or public policy) and I shush those who attempt to contradict my opinion with facts, refusing to entertain the possibility that I might not have an accurate understanding.
Rude, perhaps, ignorant, perhaps, but I don’t see how it’s immoral. And again I’m not understanding where the “consequences” fit into this scenario.
 
Not prudent, but not sinful. I didn’t see any consequences in this example. What was the outcome of the surgery? What are the moral action, intent, and circumstances?
Patient dies on the table. Patient dies in the street, etc. (Obviously that is not the necessary consequence but it is far more likely given the circumstances and acts.)
Denny’s needs cooks. Did partying CAUSE you not to become a great doctor? Or did you just decide you’d rather party than study? Maybe not prudent, but not a priori sinful. Again, what act is being evaluated here, what is the intent, and what are the circumstances?
It would probably be most accurate to say that the person would prefer to party and take a job at Denny’s than study and become a doctor.
Rude, perhaps, ignorant, perhaps, but I don’t see how it’s immoral. And again I’m not understanding where the “consequences” fit into this scenario.
It sounds like you are interpteting the CCC as not requiring any effort to determine the likely consequences of one’s acts, which is how I read the CCC.

The closest thing I can think of is the Parable of the Talents which implies that God expects us to make the best use of our talents.
 
Patient dies on the table. Patient dies in the street, etc. (Obviously that is not the necessary consequence but it is far more likely given the circumstances and acts.)

It would probably be most accurate to say that the person would prefer to party and take a job at Denny’s than study and become a doctor.

It sounds like you are interpteting the CCC as not requiring any effort to determine the likely consequences of one’s acts, which is how I read the CCC.

The closest thing I can think of is the Parable of the Talents which implies that God expects us to make the best use of our talents.
Ah. Perhaps then this is more about the formation of conscience, not the morality of acts.

In that case I’d refer to CCC 1786-1802
 
Ah. Perhaps then this is more about the formation of conscience, not the morality of acts. In that case I’d refer to CCC 1786-1802
I think that is a little closer but still not quite it. Perhaps you could say that the lazy med student has a malformed conscience but that’s pretty round-about. (And certainly the same issues arise in the are of the formation of conscience but it is only a subset as this is about the formation of understanding the world and the conequence of acts.)

Where would you say that the Parable of the Talents is expressed in CCC?
 
i think that is a little closer but still not quite it. Perhaps you could say that the lazy med student has a malformed conscience but that’s pretty round-about. (and certainly the same issues arise in the are of the formation of conscience but it is only a subset as this is about the formation of understanding the world and the conequence of acts.)

where would you say that the parable of the talents is expressed in ccc?
546, 1936-1937
 
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