Do I understand Pope John Paul II here?

[Magnanimity]

I was recently trying to help a blogging friend of mine (a Protestant) who is trying to help his friend who is struggling to understand why homosexuality is wrong. As in, why a Christian would think it’s wrong. I tried to summarize the reasoning of Pope John Paul II in familiaris consortio, but I’m not sure I have it right. I think the argument JPII gives there is really strong, but can someone help me think through whether the following is a proper summation of his linking fecundity with the conjugal act (and the ramifications of the argument for various sexually illicit acts, like homosexuality or masturbation)? I want to make sure I understand JPII here and that my application of his reasoning is proper toward homosexuality. Here was my summation:But, one must go much further in the argument toward, what is commonly known as the “Theology of the Body,” a concept largely attributed to the theological anthropology spearheaded by Pope John Paul II. In his Apostolic Exhortation *familiaris consortio *(1981), he continues the logic of conjugal love argued for by Pope Paul VI in humanae vitae, to wit, conjugal love is, in its most basic nature, the full and mutual (ie, reciprocal) self-giving of spouses. To give everything to a spouse is to fully love that spouse. And the spouse is called to give everything in return. Now, what we are, as human persons, encompasses a lot. At least one thing it encompasses, as it is relevant to homosexuality, is fecundity. What it is to be human is to be fecund. But, what it is to be male and female (since a human is expressed in one of the two genders–there are no genderless humans) is to be fecund in a complimentary way. The man gives of himself to the woman, and the woman receives her man and gives all of herself as well–in the conjugal act.

Now, a man can give of himself physically (conjugally) to another man in some limited ways. But, those ways are not complimentary (physically speaking, to say nothing of soulfully speaking) in the same ways in which the biological expressions are complimentary between a man and a woman. (No need to get explicit here. I’m sure you’ve got the idea.) But, more to the point. To love is to give of oneself completely–body and soul. But, to give of myself completely is to give my fecundity to my mate. And the simple biological fact is that a man cannot give of his fecundity to another man, because that other cannot receive it. There is no way to unite two persons of the same gender such as to give and receive fecundity between them. So, no procreation. So, no transmission of life. So, the homosexual act itself is necessarily, in some way, an end in itself. It is instrumental for nothing. The erotic pleasure is the end. And as St. Augustine (and St. Thomas Aquinas, I might add) argue, to treat of the conjugal act as an end in itself is to fundamentally disorder it. Because to treat it as an end is not to love because to love is to give, totally and freely. But, to have the most fundamental physical act between two persons be focused on, essentially, pleasure, is to not be able to rise above the animalistic nature of the conjugal act. It is true that there are animalistic facets of the conjugal act, but homosexuality reduces it to its merely animalistic facets, since it rids itself of the mutual complimentarity of male to female sexual love, as well as takes away one of the most crucial aspects of what it is to be human–to be fecund.
What do you think? Is it hogwash? Am I on the right track? Where is it getting off course, would you say? Any commentary would be appreciated. And rip it to shreads, really, if it is bad.

 

[mosher]

You are off course when you assert that all sexual acts between persons with SSA are ordered to pleasure as an end by necessity. It could easily be argued that there is a unitive aspect as a gift of love from one to the other that is hard to argue against. To take your point (which is true and good) and simplify it you can condense it to this simple point:

Sexual activity between persons with Same Sex Attraction is intrinsically ordered to contraception as no conception is possible in such an act. This act cannot be morally acceptable as the advancement of human life is necessary for a act to be intrinsically good. Therefore, Sexual Activity between persons with Same Sex Attraction cannot be morally acceptable.

You can take an act to its furthest logical conclusion also to see if it is in accord with the Natural Moral Law. So, you say:

If all people were to exclusively practice sexual activity with members of the same sex would society survive? The answer is no as such sexual acts would in the end cause the human race to fail. Therefore, such acts are intrinsically immoral based on Natural Moral Law.

A parallel example as this would be the following:

If murder became a social norm would society survive? The answer is no as such an act becoming normative would in the end cause the human face to fail. Therefore, such an act is intrinsically immoral based on Natural Moral Law and could never be made a social norm.

 

[I_A]

I was recently trying to help a blogging friend of mine (a Protestant) who is trying to help his friend who is struggling to understand why homosexuality is wrong. As in, why a Christian would think it’s wrong. I tried to summarize the reasoning of Pope John Paul II in familiaris consortio, but I’m not sure I have it right. I think the argument JPII gives there is really strong, but can someone help me think through whether the following is a proper summation of his linking fecundity with the conjugal act (and the ramifications of the argument for various sexually illicit acts, like homosexuality or masturbation)? I want to make sure I understand JPII here and that my application of his reasoning is proper toward homosexuality. Here was my summation:But, one must go much further in the argument toward, what is commonly known as the “Theology of the Body,” a concept largely attributed to the theological anthropology spearheaded by Pope John Paul II. In his Apostolic Exhortation *familiaris consortio *(1981), he continues the logic of conjugal love argued for by Pope Paul VI in humanae vitae, to wit, conjugal love is, in its most basic nature, the full and mutual (ie, reciprocal) self-giving of spouses. To give everything to a spouse is to fully love that spouse. And the spouse is called to give everything in return. Now, what we are, as human persons, encompasses a lot. At least one thing it encompasses, as it is relevant to homosexuality, is fecundity.
Fecund means fruitful.

What it is to be human is to be fecund.
This is essential to what it meanst o be man.

But, what it is to be male and female (since a human is expressed in one of the two genders–there are no genderless humans) is to be fecund in a complimentary way.
We are not fecund in and of ourselves, we need somone different than us in order to express it.

The man gives of himself to the woman, and the woman receives her man and gives all of herself as well–in the conjugal act.
When two get married and celebrate their love it needs to be a complete self giving, all of you.
Now, a man can give of himself physically (conjugally) to another man in some limited ways. But, those ways are not complimentary (physically speaking, to say nothing of soulfully speaking) in the same ways in which the biological expressions are complimentary between a man and a woman. (No need to get explicit here. I’m sure you’ve got the idea.)
The way we’re made just doesn’t work with two of the same sex.

But, more to the point. To love is to give of oneself completely–body and soul. But, to give of myself completely is to give my fecundity to my mate.
Part of that complete self giving is giving that fruitfulness. Without it you’re not giving all of yourself.

And the simple biological fact is that a man cannot give of his fecundity to another man, because that other cannot receive it. There is no way to unite two persons of the same gender such as to give and receive fecundity between them. So, no procreation. So, no transmission of life. So, the homosexual act itself is necessarily, in some way, an end in itself. It is instrumental for nothing. The erotic pleasure is the end.
Homosexual acts boil down to erotic pleasure. There is no new life involved.

And as St. Augustine (and St. Thomas Aquinas, I might add) argue, to treat of the conjugal act as an end in itself is to fundamentally disorder it. Because to treat it as an end is not to love because to love is to give, totally and freely.
When pleasure becomes the aim it is a disorder.

But, to have the most fundamental physical act between two persons be focused on, essentially, pleasure, is to not be able to rise above the animalistic nature of the conjugal act. It is true that there are animalistic facets of the conjugal act, but homosexuality reduces it to its merely animalistic facets, since it rids itself of the mutual complimentarity of male to female sexual love, as well as takes away one of the most crucial aspects of what it is to be human–to be fecund.
This reduces man to animals.
What do you think? Is it hogwash? Am I on the right track? Where is it getting off course, would you say? Any commentary would be appreciated. And rip it to shreads, really, if it is bad.

I think it is good logic, it might be hard for people to accept though. Many in opposite sex relationships can’t accept it. Look at the proliferation of artificial birth control. It would be hard to accept because its based on the notion that the world does not revolve around me, everyone else is not here just for my pleasure.

 

[Magnanimity]

You are off course when you assert that all sexual acts between persons with SSA are ordered to pleasure as an end by necessity. It could easily be argued that there is a unitive aspect as a gift of love from one to the other that is hard to argue against.

Thank you for the (name removed by moderator)ut. I find it to be very helpful–everything that you said, really. However, I would like to linger a bit on the above quote of yours, which I have left from your reply. I think I need more clarification. I’m not sure I fully understand what you’re saying. First, the below was my original claim, to which I assume you were replying:
So, no procreation. So, no transmission of life. So, the homosexual act itself is necessarily, in some way, an end in itself. It is instrumental for nothing. The erotic pleasure is the end.
Now, I did wish to qualify the assertion, in that the homosexual conjugal act necessarily being an end in itself is only so “in some way.” That is, in a particular sense. And this sense is that the terminus is in the act itself, since there is no further creative act produced from it. That is, since procreation is impossible, the terminus is found, necessarily, within the act itself. That isn’t however to say that the act could not be expressive of something else beyond itself in other senses. (You mention love.)

However, if I understand you correctly, I don’t see how this could be so. And the reason for my not seeing it consists exactly in the definition of love–to give of oneself wholly and completely to another. However, in homosexual conjugal acts, as the argument goes, fecundity is not possibly given or received. Therefore, for a man to engage in such, he necessarily is witholding something from the other (b/c the other could never receive it in its intrinsic fecundity).

So, am I not understanding you? On the one hand, you seem to agree that fecundity being part and parcel of the conjugal act is true. And yet, you allow for a “gift of love” from one of the same sex to another. Are you not equivocating on the word “love.” To love is either as JPII argues in familiaris consortio or its something else. It would seem that as JPII argues, it would follow that without fecundity being intrinsic to the conjugal act, it just isn’t possible to give a gift of love.

Sexual activity between persons with Same Sex Attraction is intrinsically ordered to contraception as no conception is possible in such an act. This act cannot be morally acceptable as the advancement of human life is necessary for a act to be intrinsically good. Therefore, Sexual Activity between persons with Same Sex Attraction cannot be morally acceptable.

Yes, I think this is similar to my argument, although I’m trying to appeal a bit more to natural law than importing doctrine in the middle, as you’ve done in the second premise above. That is a teaching of the Church, which may or may not be self-evident to one struggling with the issue. I’m concerned with trying to flesh out the reasoning underlying that teaching–hence, the discussion of human nature necessarily involving fecundity.

Thank again. I’d love to read anything more you have to share.

 

[mosher]

Now, I did wish to qualify the assertion, in that the homosexual conjugal act necessarily being an end in itself is only so “in some way.” That is, in a particular sense. And this sense is that the terminus is in the act itself, since there is no further creative act produced from it. That is, since procreation is impossible, the terminus is found, necessarily, within the act itself. That isn’t however to say that the act could not be expressive of something else beyond itself in other senses. (You mention love.)

I understand where you are going but it may just be a problem with language. What I am referring to is when a couple with SSA argue that for them the act expresses not only the love for each other but also their unity. So, in a sense they will argue that just as a married couple that infertile still participate in the unitive aspect of the marital act that their act is analogous to that scenario. What I did was not argue from that direction effectively negating that argument. In a sense I am just killing this argument before it starts because then it is just one more thing for them to argue with absurdity.

However, if I understand you correctly, I don’t see how this could be so. And the reason for my not seeing it consists exactly in the definition of love–to give of oneself wholly and completely to another. However, in homosexual conjugal acts, as the argument goes, fecundity is not possibly given or received. Therefore, for a man to engage in such, he necessarily is witholding something from the other (b/c the other could never receive it in its intrinsic fecundity).

That is because your definition of love is flawed. Love properly defined is “to desire the highest good for the other.” Biological fecundity is not necessary to love.

So, am I not understanding you? On the one hand, you seem to agree that fecundity being part and parcel of the conjugal act is true. And yet, you allow for a “gift of love” from one of the same sex to another. Are you not equivocating on the word “love.” To love is either as JPII argues in familiaris consortio or its something else. It would seem that as JPII argues, it would follow that without fecundity being intrinsic to the conjugal act, it just isn’t possible to give a gift of love.

I think that you identify the problem. There is a difference between love and the love between husband and wife. Love is much more general than your definition and cannot include biological fecundity as the definition of love is what I gave above.

Yes, I think this is similar to my argument, although I’m trying to appeal a bit more to natural law than importing doctrine in the middle, as you’ve done in the second premise above. That is a teaching of the Church, which may or may not be self-evident to one struggling with the issue. I’m concerned with trying to flesh out the reasoning underlying that teaching–hence, the discussion of human nature necessarily involving fecundity.

Actually that argument is only from the Natural Moral Law and does not interpose anything that is strictly a matter of Catholic Doctrine. If you want to stay on the level of the Natural Moral Law then you must abandon the use of the Theology of the Body as it does not deal with strictly Natural Law issues surrounding the topic but rather relies on an exegesis of Genesis and Matthew as its foundation.

 

[Liberian]

Magnanimity,

The reason homosexuality is disordered is very simple. The sexual relationship between a husband and wife is an earthly image of the relationship between Christ and the Church in Heaven. The husband has the role of Christ and the wife has the rold of the Church. In Heaven there are not two Christs or two Churches, but one Christ and one Church. Thus on earth a homosexual relationship distorts that image and is therefore sinful.

• Liberian

 

[Magnanimity]

Again, thank you very much for the interaction. You have made me see that my argument, as stated originally, needs much more precision and specificity. I use words like “love” and am really meaning “conjugal love,” for example. You’ve been extremely helpful in this regard.

One quick question though because I think it might be helpful for me to get this down, as well. I might be confused as to what you originally meant, and it seems important. In your original reply to me above, you gave as the second premise of a sort of argument the following:

This act cannot be morally acceptable as the advancement of human life is necessary for a {conjugal?}act to be intrinsically good.

I replied by saying that your premise above seems to import too much from revelation, and therefore is not likely be self-evident to one who doesn’t necessarily share your understanding of what is God’s revelation (assuming you take God’s revelation to consist of the apostolic deposit of faith, as Dei Verbum identifies it). It seems that you replied to my assertion with the following:

Actually that argument is only from the Natural Moral Law and does not interpose anything that is strictly a matter of Catholic Doctrine.

So, if I understand your most recent reply, you take it that the 2nd premise I identified is grounded simply in Natural Moral Law? It is not dependent on Catholic revelation for (1) its being true and (2) you knowing its truth-value? If so, I would be fascinated to see how you arrive at the truth of that premise (i.e., “This act cannot be morally acceptable as the advancement of human life is necessary for a [conjugal?]act to be intrinsically good”) strictly through the Natural Law. Could you share the argument, or the beginnings of the argument if you’ve never codified it?

If you want to stay on the level of the Natural Moral Law then you must abandon the use of the Theology of the Body as it does not deal with strictly Natural Law issues surrounding the topic but rather relies on an exegesis of Genesis and Matthew as its foundation.

While I sympathize with your assertion above (a Catholic friend of mine who is finishing up his M.A. in theology reasons with me just as you do here), I’m not yet persuaded that this is true. I would like to explore just how far that essential familiaris consortio argument can be pushed just from the Natural Law and philosophy alone. At this point, I think that’s my basic project in trying to wrestle with understanding the JPII argument and apply it to specific moral situations (e.g., homosexuality).

 

[Magnanimity]

The reason homosexuality is disordered is very simple. The sexual relationship between a husband and wife is an earthly image of the relationship between Christ and the Church in Heaven. The husband has the role of Christ and the wife has the rold of the Church. In Heaven there are not two Christs or two Churches, but one Christ and one Church. Thus on earth a homosexual relationship distorts that image and is therefore sinful.

Though I know others might not agree, I actually think your argument here is a pretty good one. I recently read something similar in a book called Why Matter Matters. Ever read it? Also, your reasoning here extends over into a discussion of why only males (and not females) are best suited to be priests. You have stated the truths very succinctly, but if one sticks with them and explores their many avenues and ramifications, I think they do a lot of work.

Thank you for the response.

 

[antonius]

You can take an act to its furthest logical conclusion also to see if it is in accord with the Natural Moral Law. So, you say:

If all people were to exclusively practice sexual activity with members of the same sex would society survive? The answer is no as such sexual acts would in the end cause the human race to fail. Therefore, such acts are intrinsically immoral based on Natural Moral Law.

A parallel example as this would be the following:

If murder became a social norm would society survive? The answer is no as such an act becoming normative would in the end cause the human face to fail. Therefore, such an act is intrinsically immoral based on Natural Moral Law and could never be made a social norm.

I don’t disagree with you that homosexual actions are against the Natural Moral Law. But your line of argumentation, as stated, is dangerous ground. It could also be argued that if all people were to exclusively practice celibacy, society similarly would not survive. Therefore, celibacy becoming normative would cause the human race to fail and thus must be intrinsically immoral.

 

[mosher]

I don’t disagree with you that homosexual actions are against the Natural Moral Law. But your line of argumentation, as stated, is dangerous ground. It could also be argued that if all people were to exclusively practice celibacy, society similarly would not survive. Therefore, celibacy becoming normative would cause the human race to fail and thus must be intrinsically immoral.

This is a different case as only celibacy for the sake of the kingdom is true celibacy (perfect continence). This is an issue of revealed truth and not stemming from the Natural Moral Law as according to the Natural Moral Law it is proper for a person to enter into marriage according to the degrees of perfection. Hence the reason why Matrimony and not celibacy is necessary for Salvation per Trent. Further it is part of the reason why consecrated celibacy and th like were not elevated to the level of a Sacrament.

 

[mosher]

So, if I understand your most recent reply, you take it that the 2nd premise I identified is grounded simply in Natural Moral Law? It is not dependent on Catholic revelation for (1) its being true and (2) you knowing its truth-value? If so, I would be fascinated to see how you arrive at the truth of that premise (i.e., “This act cannot be morally acceptable as the advancement of human life is necessary for a [conjugal?]act to be intrinsically good”) strictly through the Natural Law. Could you share the argument, or the beginnings of the argument if you’ve never codified it?

This is simply a matter of the principle that a thing must be used in accord with its nature. The nature of sex at its root basis is procreation while pleasure and other effects are accidental to the act. While they are bound up with the act they are not the purpose of the act itself. This is obvious by just the biological realities. But for a thing to be good it must the ordered to the good in the most perfect way with respect to its nature as it is better to possess all perfection of the good then to lack. To lack some significant portion of the nature of a thing is by definition to be disordered. Therefore, for a thing to be good it must act in accord with its nature. But the nature of sex is ordered to procreation. Thus it is evident that for sex to be good it must be ordered to procreation.

 

[Magnanimity]

All right. Let’s have your original quote again,
“This act cannot be morally acceptable as the advancement of human life is necessary for a [conjugal?]act to be intrinsically good”
And now your attempt to justify this premise solely from the Natural Law,

This is simply a matter of the principle that a thing must be used in accord with its nature. The nature of sex at its root basis is procreation while pleasure and other effects are accidental to the act. While they are bound up with the act they are not the purpose of the act itself. This is obvious by just the biological realities. But for a thing to be good it must the ordered to the good in the most perfect way with respect to its nature as it is better to possess all perfection of the good then to lack. To lack some significant portion of the nature of a thing is by definition to be disordered. Therefore, for a thing to be good it must act in accord with its nature. But the nature of sex is ordered to procreation. Thus it is evident that for sex to be good it must be ordered to procreation.

Generally, I think this reasoning is good, so far as it goes. But, I’m not sure it does all the work you think it does. Some possible holes, it seems to me, are the following:

1. Whereas one could grant, just from Natural Law, that procreation is part and parcel of the conjugal act, this doesn’t necessarily limit every conjugal expression to necessarily be oriented toward this end. That is, suppose one says, “Well yes, the majority my conjugal behavior is oriented towards procreation, but not all of it. Why should every single act be so oriented? I accept your reasoning that the conjugal act, just in its nature, is oriented toward procreation. But, that does not confine my every single instance of conjugal love as necessarily being oriented toward that end. Sometimes I masturbate. Sometimes my wife and I engage in felatio or cunilingus. But we have 12 children! Clearly, you could not argue that we don’t understand the primary and essential nature of the conjugal act!”
   How would you reply, mosher?
2. I don’t see how you could escape the charge that your positions amounts to saying that any and all conjugal acts outside of the fertility window of a woman’s cycle, given that she is of age to conceive (ie, not too young or too old), are illicit. And therefore, on your argument above, conjugal love between a man and woman, one of whom is infertile, is “disordered.” This seems an odd ramification of your view. “Less than perfect,” OK. But, “disordered?” Lacking a perfection you think is tantamount to being disordered? That seems a hard view to defend.
3. You state, “The nature of sex at its root basis is procreation while pleasure and other effects are accidental to the act.” But, this is not self-evident, and in many ways could be said to be the very thing in dispute. You have merely asserted this and not argued for it. Moreover, how many who practice, what I’m sure you would call illicit sexual behaviors, would easily accept the premise as self-evident? How is it self-evident? Suppose I were to say just the opposite, that sexual acts are essentially oriented to self-pleasure and that procreation is accidental to those acts. After all***, all*** sexual acts are attended by pleasure. Not all sexual acts bring life as a result. Therefore, if anything seems self-evident, just from nature, it would seem to be the reverse of what you have asserted. If all such conjugal acts correspondingly are attended by pleasure, and not all such acts correspondingly lead to life, the one always accompanying the act (ie, the pleasure) has the stronger case for being said to be essential to the conjugal act. That is, necessarily what it is to be a conjugal act is to be attended by pleasure.

What do you think of these criticims? Good, bad, ugly?

 

[mosher]

1. Whereas one could grant, just from Natural Law, that procreation is part and parcel of the conjugal act, this doesn’t necessarily limit every conjugal expression to necessarily be oriented toward this end. That is, suppose one says, “Well yes, the majority my conjugal behavior is oriented towards procreation, but not all of it. Why should every single act be so oriented? I accept your reasoning that the conjugal act, just in its nature, is oriented toward procreation. But, that does not confine my every single instance of conjugal love as necessarily being oriented toward that end. Sometimes I masturbate. Sometimes my wife and I engage in felatio or cunilingus. But we have 12 children! Clearly, you could not argue that we don’t understand the primary and essential nature of the conjugal act!”
   How would you reply, mosher?

The number of children a couple has is accidental to the procreative nature of sex. Thus, the claim stated above is irrelevant to the. The fact is that ordered sexuality must be in accord with its nature which is at its root procreative. To depart from this - based on natural law - would be to render the act disordered.

1. I don’t see how you could escape the charge that your positions amounts to saying that any and all conjugal acts outside of the fertility window of a woman’s cycle, given that she is of age to conceive (ie, not too young or too old), are illicit. And therefore, on your argument above, conjugal love between a man and woman, one of whom is infertile, is “disordered.” This seems an odd ramification of your view. “Less than perfect,” OK. But, “disordered?” Lacking a perfection you think is tantamount to being disordered? That seems a hard view to defend.

Again, since we are speaking strictly about the Natural Moral Law the position is correct. Sex apart from the procreative aspect is disordered in some way but to lesser degrees based on mitigating factors. As with everything else there is a gradation and not an opposition. So, it can be said that while there is something lacking of perfection in sex past child baring years it is mitigated by the intention (which is what we are speaking of). If the intention is still ordered to life and the possibility of life then there is no defect even if there is a low probability of procreation. When there is no possibility of procreation according to Natural Moral Law there is no longer a purpose for sexual expression and thus no reason to engage in it. This serves to firms up the argument against acts of a Same Sex couple as under the natural order there is no purpose for the act. Concerning the fertility cycle there is no way to accurately know 100% what is an “off” day and even if there were it is possible to be inseminated from semen from a few days past if they were caught properly in the mucus cycle. Thus, the intention is still complete.

1. You state, “The nature of sex at its root basis is procreation while pleasure and other effects are accidental to the act.” But, this is not self-evident, and in many ways could be said to be the very thing in dispute. You have merely asserted this and not argued for it. Moreover, how many who practice, what I’m sure you would call illicit sexual behaviors, would easily accept the premise as self-evident? How is it self-evident? Suppose I were to say just the opposite, that sexual acts are essentially oriented to self-pleasure and that procreation is accidental to those acts. After all***, all*** sexual acts are attended by pleasure. Not all sexual acts bring life as a result. Therefore, if anything seems self-evident, just from nature, it would seem to be the reverse of what you have asserted. If all such conjugal acts correspondingly are attended by pleasure, and not all such acts correspondingly lead to life, the one always accompanying the act (ie, the pleasure) has the stronger case for being said to be essential to the conjugal act. That is, necessarily what it is to be a conjugal act is to be attended by pleasure.

An human act is first moral and brought about by an intention that is first willed and then completed in actuality. Now, this being the case the act in your argument has one of two ends. There is the possible end of procreation and the possible end of pleasure. Since procreation is more noble than pleasure it bares to reason that between the two given possible ends procreation is superior and thus more perfect and thus the true end of the action. This is brought about by the teleological aspect of all acts. All acts find their final end in something else that is not themselves. Therefore, the end of pleasure would be the act for the sake of the act but rather procreation gives the act an end (final cause) that is outside and more sublime than itself.

 

[Liberian]

Magnanimity,

No, actually, I haven’t read the book you mentioned.

And you are right, that succinct reasoning also extends to divorce, artificial birth control, adultery, polygamy, fornication, and probably a few other subjects that don’t come to mind right away.

• Liberian

 

[Magnanimity]

Mosher,

Some of your replies sound glorious. I feel like I’m arguing with a genuine Thomist–such grand conceptual language!

I won’t quibble too much more, as I think I’ve grasped your replies. I don’t think you’ve answered the person who says that, generally speaking, he is open to life, but wonders whether your reasoning can really confine his every specific conjugal act to be ordered to procreation. Whereas the number of children is accidental to the procreative act, it is simultaneously indicative of one’s full acceptance of the procreative nature of the conjugal act, especially if such is admitted by the person (like in my imaginary person’s response to you). It is, in this instance, completely indicative of his intentions to abide by your claims. Clearly, by intending to be open to the procreative act, this fellow is using the conjugal act in accord with its end (one of your claims), and he fully accepts your assertion, “The nature of sex at its root basis is procreation while pleasure and other effects are accidental to the act.” So, I don’t see that you have replied to his questions. He can fully accept the principles you lay down without having to be restricted to each and every conjugal act necessarily being open to procreation. He is generally and consistently over time open to procreation in the conjugal act. That was what I was trying to get you to reply to.

My challenge in the second point was to indicate that I’d like you to try to justify how “less than perfect” reduces itself, in the final anaysis, to “disorder.” I think this cannot possibly be done, even from a Thomistic perspective, if that is your inclination. Clearly, there are many examples that could be given to highlight the oddity of such a connection. For example, I know an enormous amount about my wife, including various factual details. I know the date and city of her birth. But, I do not know the hospital name, nor many of the particulars that attended her birth–the feeling of her parents, how the labor and delivery went, etc. My knowledge of her birth could be easily argued to be “less than perfect,” therefore. To have more knowledge would contribute to the perfection of my current state of knowledge of her birth. However, who could say that my knowledge is at this moment disordered because it is lacking? To lack in some perfection, which is a necessity of human nature here on Earth, is not to be disordered. I know of no one who would successfully defend such a position. To admit of a gradation of perfections is not to instantaneously be speaking of disorders. It just doesn’t follow that to not be perfect a thing is necessarily disordered.

You say, “Since procreation is more noble than pleasure…” Again, I’m with you. But, that’s because I’m Catholic and Thomistically-oriented myself. Such assertions though, while they may sound great to us and we easily accept the truth of them, I very much doubt whether they would be seen as evident to someone on the outside, and therefore unpersuasive. Is a consideration of “the nobility of an act” something that normally informs the average Joe’s thinking in such matters, you think?

Also, I think you’ve side-stepped the argument I gave and replied by giving an argument for ends and the nobility of them. I think your argument is good. I just think it also doesn’t answer the one I gave. Again, as stated, the argument is essentially,
“Suppose I were to say just the opposite, that sexual acts are essentially oriented to self-pleasure and that procreation is accidental to those acts. After all, all sexual acts are attended by pleasure. Not all sexual acts bring life as a result. Therefore, if anything seems self-evident, just from nature, it would seem to be the reverse of what you have asserted. If all such conjugal acts correspondingly are attended by pleasure, and not all such acts correspondingly lead to life, the one always accompanying the act (ie, the pleasure) has the stronger case for being said to be essential to the conjugal act.”
Of course, it’s easy to be a critic. So, I think I’ll hold off on critiquing you anymore. I need to get back to trying to hone my understanding of the sexual ethics via the JPII arguments. As I’ve said, your replies up to now have been extremely helpful in helping me to see various weaknesses in my own understanding and attempts at setting forth the arguments here. (Of course, if you reply to this particular post, I’ll gladly read it.)

 

[mosher]

Mosher,
Some of your replies sound glorious. I feel like I’m arguing with a genuine Thomist–such grand conceptual language!

Non nobis Domine!

I won’t quibble too much more, as I think I’ve grasped your replies.

Don’t worry it is in the work of synthesis (in the Platonic sense) that progress is made. I must admit that I am enjoying this discussion tremendously. More than many conversations I have had online in a long time as it is raw and basic principles applied to a very important topic of our time. Even Ann Rice who has had a major conversion does not understand this issue and she is a very intelligent woman who I would love to discuss with if given the opportunity.

I don’t think you’ve answered the person who says that, generally speaking, he is open to life, but wonders whether your reasoning can really confine his every specific conjugal act to be ordered to procreation.

I thought that I had addressed this adequately in a previous post. However, I may have made an assumption. This assumption is the nature of an act. An human act can be defined as a single instance of a willed activity. So, each and every time the couple engages in sexual activity it is a separate act each time. If sexuality has not purpose on a base natural level other than procreation then it is evident that each act to be ordered to the good must be ordered by intention to procreation. Intention does not negate reality so the intention must be followed by the physical reality of being procreative. Remember that we go from universal to particular and not the other way around. Thus if the universal is that an act as defined is the marital act and that act has no essential purpose other than biological procreation on a natural level and so for that same act to be ordered it must contain the intention of the same then each particular must resonate with this universal and not be contrary to contradictory to it.

My challenge in the second point was to indicate that I’d like you to try to justify how “less than perfect” reduces itself, in the final anaysis, to “disorder.”

I am simply looking at it from the negative description for the purpose of emphasizing the argument. The narrow definition of disorder is “not ordered to the good” thus anything that is not fully ordered to the good is in some way disordered.

Is a consideration of “the nobility of an act” something that normally informs the average Joe’s thinking in such matters, you think?

If proposed properly and put in the context of perfection and the need for perfection. Then one thing being more noble than another is self-evident such as the basic self-evident principle which is existence is more noble than non existence.

Also, I think you’ve side-stepped the argument I gave and replied by giving an argument for ends and the nobility of them.

I did not intend to side-step the argument but rather I turned it 90 degrees and answered it from a different perspective because the base argument was based on a faulty premise that led to a faulty conclusion. So, to fix the conclusion I had to address the premise and thus the argument about proper end and nobility/perfection. The conclusion is not always what needs to be challenged in an argument.

Of course, it’s easy to be a critic. So, I think I’ll hold off on critiquing you anymore. I need to get back to trying to hone my understanding of the sexual ethics via the JPII arguments. As I’ve said, your replies up to now have been extremely helpful in helping me to see various weaknesses in my own understanding and attempts at setting forth the arguments here. (Of course, if you reply to this particular post, I’ll gladly read it.)

Remember that JPII is fundamentally a Thomist many disciplines try to claim him like personalism and phenomenology etc but by his own admission he was a Thomist and perhaps a neo-Thomist of his own kind. So, it is always safe to view his works through the lens of Thomas.