Do numbers exist?

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I have no idea what you mean by the word “perfect”. Why do you insist on the word “relation”, when “abstraction” is satisfactory?
Ah, “perfect”! I wanted to respond to this first, then I forgot. It is because I am not “perfect”.🙂

So, supposedly, we abstract a concept like “circle” from some “real life object”. I have that concept; but there is no “real life object” for which I have verified that it complies with the definition (or concept) of a circle. Some objects that I know are more or less circular (they are not “perfect” circles), but it is possible to detect some deviation from the definition in all of them. How did I abstract the concept from them if it does not represent what is there? We could think that it does, but that there are some other features (the deviations from the definition) that are left behind in the abstraction process. Besides, somehow we would be filling the gaps left by the deviations, which is a difficult task. Another way of looking at it is that there is a lot of complexity in “real life objects”, and when we know them our cognitive act is a simplification process. In that sense, it could be understood as an abstraction process too: we are eliminating all the complexities to get the concept. But that is an equally difficult task. Actually, it is exactly the same task but interpreted in a different way.

The concept of circle is this relation “y2 + x2 <= r2”. I don’t think I am abstracting it from anywhere. That is why I prefer not to use the word “abstraction” in the context of ideas.
 
So far I’ve just talked about mathematical objects in general, not just numbers. But if you take the existence of sets for granted and assume some commonly used axioms of most versions of set theory, then the non-negative integers can be constructed. The idea is basically to think of each number as the set of all finite sets that have the same size. The trick is to capture the notion of size without evoking numbers in the first place.

The Axiom of the Empty Set asserts the existence of the empty set { }, the set with no elements. If a set exists, the set containing that set also exists. Thus the set containing the empty set {{ }} exists, as does {{{ }}} and so forth. These are distinct objects in set theory even though that may seem odd. The most controversial axiom we need to accept is the Axiom of Infinity, which says that there exists a set S that contains all sets we can build this way. Explicitly, S = {{ },{{ }},{{{ }}},…}. The elements of sets aren’t ordered, but I did write this one in a suggestive order. Let’s call the subset containing just the “first” element of S A0, the subset containing the first and second elements A1, the subset containing the first, second, and third elements A2 and so forth. The Axiom of Power Sets says that the set of all subsets of any given set (its power set) exists. Note that T = {A0,A1,A2,…} is a subset of this power set.

Intuitively, T is important because its first element contains no elements, its second element contains one element, its third contains two elements, and so forth.

Now we want a way of comparing size without using numbers. Two sets have the same size if their elements can be put in one-to-one correspondence. A rule that determines such a correspondence is called a bijection. Formally, we start with any two sets P and Q and construct their Cartesian product PXQ, the set of all ordered pairs such that the first element is from P and the second from Q. Any subset of PXQ is called a relation between P and Q. Specifically, we want a relation so that for any x in P, there is exactly one element y in Q so that (x,y) is in PXQ and for any y in Q there is exactly one element x in P so that (x,y) is in PXQ.

A set is called finite if there exists a bijection between that set and one of the elements of T. Let’s call the set of all finite sets F.

Next we consider another type of relation called an equivalence relation, but this is only defined for Cartesian products of a set with itself. An equivalence relation on P is a subset of PXP so that for any elements x, y, and z in P, (x,x) is in PXP, (y,x) is in PXP if (x,y) is in PXP, and (x,z) is in PXP if both (x,y) and (y,z) are in PXP. These properties are called reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity, respectively. You can rewrite (x,y) as x = y for convenience. For example, the usual equality of numbers is an equivalence relation since for any numbers x, y, and z we have x = x, y = x if x = y, and x = z if x = y and y = z.

If two elements are paired together by an equivalence relation then we call them (shockingly) equivalent, and the set of all elements of P equivalent to a given element is called an equivalence class. It can be shown that equivalence relations partition sets; that is, every element of P lies in exactly one equivalence class. We can define an equivalence relation on F, the set of all finite sets, as follows: For any elements x and y in F, x = y if there exists a bijection between x and y. This effectively sorts all finite sets based on their size. All sets that have a bijection with A1 will belong to the same equivalence class, and we call this equivalence class the number 2. So “2” is just the name we give to the set of all sets that have as many elements as A1.

You can continue to build arithmetic and larger number systems by using set operations from here. The only catch is that some mathematicians (though a small minority) do not accept versions of set theory that allow for uncountable sets, so you can’t build the real numbers, the complex numbers, etc., in this way.
 
Yes, abstractions of the abstractions; and there could also be abstractions of the abstractions of the abstractions… But what do you abstract from the physical beings or from other abstractions?

Now, as I said before: if numbers are abstractions, then we abstract them from somewhere. It could be from the physical things, but then numbers would have a physical existence, which you deny. How is it that “abstraction” is a satisfactory word to you?
I’m not sure I follow you. There may be many flying physical objects that we call ducks. But, that doesn’t mean that the word ‘duck’ has a physical existence. Nor, does it mean the form of a duck exists apart from ducks in any way other than an abstraction in our mind.
 
I’m not sure I follow you. There may be many flying physical objects that we call ducks. But, that doesn’t mean that the word ‘duck’ has a physical existence. Nor, does it mean the form of a duck exists apart from ducks in any way other than an abstraction in our mind.
Well, the word “duck” does have a physical existence, independent of those animals which we call ducks. Fleeting when it is pronounced, more permanent when it is written.

And, if there is an abstraction in our mind, then we abstracted it from the duck. Therefore, the concept is there (somehow). You should not be surprised, because this is consistent with the aristotelian Thomist philosophy, which you follow.
 
So far I’ve just talked about mathematical objects in general, not just numbers. But if you take the existence of sets for granted and assume some commonly used axioms of most versions of set theory, then the non-negative integers can be constructed. The idea is basically to think of each number as the set of all finite sets that have the same size. The trick is to capture the notion of size without evoking numbers in the first place.

The Axiom of the Empty Set asserts the existence of the empty set { }, the set with no elements. If a set exists, the set containing that set also exists. Thus the set containing the empty set {{ }} exists, as does {{{ }}} and so forth. These are distinct objects in set theory even though that may seem odd. The most controversial axiom we need to accept is the Axiom of Infinity, which says that there exists a set S that contains all sets we can build this way. Explicitly, S = {{ },{{ }},{{{ }}},…}. The elements of sets aren’t ordered, but I did write this one in a suggestive order. Let’s call the subset containing just the “first” element of S A0, the subset containing the first and second elements A1, the subset containing the first, second, and third elements A2 and so forth. The Axiom of Power Sets says that the set of all subsets of any given set (its power set) exists. Note that T = {A0,A1,A2,…} is a subset of this power set.

Intuitively, T is important because its first element contains no elements, its second element contains one element, its third contains two elements, and so forth.

Now we want a way of comparing size without using numbers. Two sets have the same size if their elements can be put in one-to-one correspondence. A rule that determines such a correspondence is called a bijection. Formally, we start with any two sets P and Q and construct their Cartesian product PXQ, the set of all ordered pairs such that the first element is from P and the second from Q. Any subset of PXQ is called a relation between P and Q. Specifically, we want a relation so that for any x in P, there is exactly one element y in Q so that (x,y) is in PXQ and for any y in Q there is exactly one element x in P so that (x,y) is in PXQ.

A set is called finite if there exists a bijection between that set and one of the elements of T. Let’s call the set of all finite sets F.

Next we consider another type of relation called an equivalence relation, but this is only defined for Cartesian products of a set with itself. An equivalence relation on P is a subset of PXP so that for any elements x, y, and z in P, (x,x) is in PXP, (y,x) is in PXP if (x,y) is in PXP, and (x,z) is in PXP if both (x,y) and (y,z) are in PXP. These properties are called reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity, respectively. You can rewrite (x,y) as x = y for convenience. For example, the usual equality of numbers is an equivalence relation since for any numbers x, y, and z we have x = x, y = x if x = y, and x = z if x = y and y = z.

If two elements are paired together by an equivalence relation then we call them (shockingly) equivalent, and the set of all elements of P equivalent to a given element is called an equivalence class. It can be shown that equivalence relations partition sets; that is, every element of P lies in exactly one equivalence class. We can define an equivalence relation on F, the set of all finite sets, as follows: For any elements x and y in F, x = y if there exists a bijection between x and y. This effectively sorts all finite sets based on their size. All sets that have a bijection with A1 will belong to the same equivalence class, and we call this equivalence class the number 2. So “2” is just the name we give to the set of all sets that have as many elements as A1.

You can continue to build arithmetic and larger number systems by using set operations from here. The only catch is that some mathematicians (though a small minority) do not accept versions of set theory that allow for uncountable sets, so you can’t build the real numbers, the complex numbers, etc., in this way.
You can read a precise definition of infinite sets in Richard Dedekind’s “The nature and meaning of numbers”, definition #64.

I wanted to ask you: what do you understand when those mathematicians that you have read say:

“The empty set exists”
“The set that contains the empty set exists”
“The power set of a set exists”

Also, if when they are working with those entities they find that they have certain properties and at a given moment they say: “these are what we knew as ‘numbers’”, what do they mean: that numbers exist? I guess so, because if they don’t, it would be a contradiction.
 
Well, the word “duck” does have a physical existence, independent of those animals which we call ducks. Fleeting when it is pronounced, more permanent when it is written.
Ha, ha. Now you are quibbling about words.Or should I say quacking about ducks.😉
And, if there is an abstraction in our mind, then we abstracted it from the duck. Therefore, the concept is there (somehow). You should not be surprised, because this is consistent with the aristotelian Thomist philosophy, which you follow.
I’m still studying it. But yes, according to Feser’s Aquinas the form of a thing exists in the thing itself as well as an abstraction in one’s mind. He does not however think that the form of things exists on its own. Like for instance that the form of ducks exist on its own. Plato on the other hand believed that there was the world of the forms (or universals) and the world of particular things. The world of the forms is a higher reality that is more real than the world of particular things which was the lower reality, the world you and I live in. Aristotle rejected a lot of Plato including the idea that all the forms of things actually exist in a higher world of forms. He didn’t accept for instance that numbers actually exist on their own.

Plato believed that everything that exists in this world has a form that exists in the higher world. At least, until one of his critics pointed something out to him. The critic pointed out a pile of cow manure and said does this mean there is a perfect pile of cow manure in the world of the forms. Of course Plato did not accept that there is a perfect pile of cow manure in the forms. So he had to amend his belief to a more limited number of things that existed in the forms.
 
Does this question encompass irrational numbers? For example the square root of 2 is not quantifiable with rational numbers. Neither is the square root of -1. The ratio of the diameter of a circle to its circumference cannot be expressed by numbers.

These relationships exist but they cannot be expressed by numbers.

Geometrical concepts are able to avoid using numbers.
 
tonyrey;13932292:
The point I am making is that numbers are objective features of reality which existed before man appeared on earth. They are intangible but factors that cannot be ignored - like facts of which the truth is composed.
👍

If numbers were not objective, why would E=mc2 make any sense?
But nowhere in the actual phenomena will you find any numbers or equations. No photon knows the speed of light or that it must move at that speed. No piece of matter knows its mass or how to multiply it by the speed of light squared. You’ll only find the numbers and equations in human theories.
 
You can read a precise definition of infinite sets in Richard Dedekind’s “The nature and meaning of numbers”, definition #64.
Oh, thanks. I know there are different definitions and my definition of “finite” in the last post is not quite standard, but it is equivalent to the usual definition. Usually one already has the natural numbers under their belt and then defines a finite set as one for which there is a bijection from the set to [n] = {1,2,3,…,n} for some natural number n. A set is just called infinite if it is not finite.
I wanted to ask you: what do you understand when those mathematicians that you have read say:
Before I address these, I’ll give you a similar question to consider. Clearly we all understand what the words we are using in this discussion mean. Most words are referents to abstract or concrete objects and this is often taken as their “meaning”. My question for you is what the word “than” means and what this suggests about the existence of the word. If you look up its definition, it is not defined as a referent, but rather by its function in the language.

You could argue perhaps that “than” really doesn’t mean anything but just facilitates meaning by letting us construct sentences which are meaningful. Math is similar I think. Mathematical models are meaningful in that we treat them as referents (even if we aren’t realists who believe some physical object is out there to be modeled). It turns out that it’s easier to use the models if we base them on sets that play convenient roles. The sets needn’t have meaning in their own right. They just need to play their role.

So to directly address one of your questions, I would say asserting the existence of the empty set is much like asserting the existence of the word “nothingness”. Some philosophers take issue with the concept, but that’s okay. Everyone agree that the word’s existence in our language is useful.
Also, if when they are working with those entities they find that they have certain properties and at a given moment they say: “these are what we knew as ‘numbers’”, what do they mean: that numbers exist? I guess so, because if they don’t, it would be a contradiction.
This is an interesting question and I don’t have a very articulate answer as of yet. Humans certainly begin with intuitive ideas about quantification, but from what I’ve read, historians consider our intuition weak. It has been hypothesized that early humans had great difficulty counting past 2 for example. Perhaps what we’ve done here is put counting on a more firm footing by constructing the natural numbers in the way I described. The hope is that sets will be considered more elementary than the numbers used to build them. Much of our language assumes the existence of sets at least implicitly, but very little of our language requires counting beyond distinguishing 0 from 1 and 1 from many. So perhaps this is the case,

To address the question more directly and stop rambling, the most common use of the natural numbers to this day is for counting. Early humans, I have read, counted with “word equations”, e.g., “2 sticks added to a pile of 3 sticks makes 5 sticks”. It’s interesting that it took humans so long to transition from that approach to simply saying “2 plus 3 is 5”. The difference between the two is that the latter equation can be seen as a model for the former where we forget the irrelevant detail that the objects being counted are sticks. Note that in our construction of the natural numbers that we never had to specify what types of elements were in the finite sets. Two finite sets are, for the purposes of that construction, equivalent as long as they are the same size. This captures the idea that you might as well be counting cars if you’re counting sticks.

Also, we used one-to-one correspondence in the construction. Early humans were believed to count on their fingers often like toddlers today. This form of counting is nothing more than creating a one-to-one correspondence from the elements of the set you’re counting to your fingers.

So as abstract as the construction seems, it agree with many of the uses and mechanisms used for counting and does so in an unambiguous way.
 
I have an interesting question about mah.** Are the possible fields of mathematics infinite?** Or can intelligent creatures finally reach a point where all math is known :confused:
 
But nowhere in the actual phenomena will you find any numbers or equations. No photon knows the speed of light or that it must move at that speed. No piece of matter knows its mass or how to multiply it by the speed of light squared. You’ll only find the numbers and equations in human theories.
Whether a photon knows the speed of light is irrelevant. The facts about the physical universe existed, exist and will exist regardless of whether there was, is and will be human activity. We don’t invent them but discover them like other features of reality.
 
Does this question encompass irrational numbers? For example the square root of 2 is not quantifiable with rational numbers. Neither is the square root of -1. The ratio of the diameter of a circle to its circumference cannot be expressed by numbers.

These relationships exist but they cannot be expressed by numbers.

Geometrical concepts are able to avoid using numbers.
They can be and are expressed by numbers as fractions! That doesn’t imply that numbers cease to be valid, accurate or uninformative. Without them the amazing success of science wouldn’t have been possible.
 
Number are abstractions, not actual objects. In the ancient times “counting” went: “one”, “two”, “many”. Some primitive tribes are still on that level. Conceptualizing “zero” and “negative integers” was HUGE achievement. It took thousands of years to achieve that. Fractions were not that hard, almost everyone was able to conceptualize “half” an apple.

But to answer the OP, yes, numbers exist, but only as abstractions, not as ontological entities. Just like other concepts, like literature. If, by some misfortune, the Sun went supernova and burned up the whole Solar System all the information about Hamlet, of the Ninth Symphony would be gone.
abstractions – that was my thought as well.

When the subject drifts to infinity (numerically), there are a couple of very smart mathematicians who have somehow, independently, made a linkage of finite math to infinite math – recently. So, “infinity” in numbers is a farther step into this realm of abstraction.
 
I tend to the view that numbers are an abstraction. However, numbers exist in the mind of God who created them. It’s interesting how the Fibonacci sequence of numbers is found in nature, even in the atoms themselves.

theguardian.com/science/2003/jan/16/science.research1

And

m.phys.org/news/2010-01-golden-ratio-quantum-world.html
I agree but abstractions are no less real than physical objects. We cannot perceive them with the senses but it doesn’t imply they are imaginary. Our knowledge is composed not of things but facts which are intangible. Words and numbers are symbols without which we couldn’t develop our understanding of reality or communicate except at a very primitive level. Both logic and language are based on syntax which expresses relationships between persons, between things and between persons and things.
 
. . . abstractions are no less real than physical objects. We cannot perceive them with the senses but it doesn’t imply they are imaginary. Our knowledge is composed not of things but facts which are intangible. Words and numbers are symbols without which we couldn’t develop our understanding of reality or communicate except at a very primitive level. Both logic and language are based on syntax which expresses relationships between persons, between things and between persons and things.
👍

The knower is fathomless mystery as is the known which reason and ultimately love reveal. We reflect the Triune Reality from whom we originate and to whom we return, growing in Christ through the grace of the Holy Spirit.

I can imagine all the atheists groaning and tuning out. But hey, this is a Catholic forum and we should keep this real. God is everywhere and in everything.
 
Ha, ha. Now you are quibbling about words.Or should I say quacking about ducks.😉
It was just a joke, my friend. I am quite sure you did not mean what I objected.
I’m still studying it. But yes, according to Feser’s Aquinas the form of a thing exists in the thing itself as well as an abstraction in one’s mind. He does not however think that the form of things exists on its own. Like for instance that the form of ducks exist on its own. Plato on the other hand believed that there was the world of the forms (or universals) and the world of particular things. The world of the forms is a higher reality that is more real than the world of particular things which was the lower reality, the world you and I live in. Aristotle rejected a lot of Plato including the idea that all the forms of things actually exist in a higher world of forms. He didn’t accept for instance that numbers actually exist on their own.

Plato believed that everything that exists in this world has a form that exists in the higher world. At least, until one of his critics pointed something out to him. The critic pointed out a pile of cow manure and said does this mean there is a perfect pile of cow manure in the world of the forms. Of course Plato did not accept that there is a perfect pile of cow manure in the forms. So he had to amend his belief to a more limited number of things that existed in the forms.
Do you really believe that for Plato the existence of ideas in the Topos Uranus was the relevant thing? In his youth, he had learned from Socrates that concepts are what they are whether you like it or not. They don’t depend on you. You can disappear and they will remain the same. On the other hand, this world is the realm of change and appearance. Given these facts, how would you explain the necessity and universality of concepts? How would you explain that if you are a rational thinking man, concepts rule upon you? Wouldn’t you be tempted to say that concepts (or ideas) are more real than you, and more real than the changing objects of your experience? Let those who think on manure and other things similar to it spend their time on what they can. Plato was a philosopher! He didn’t need any correction from such rude men, did him?

As for Aristotle, Plato’s great disciple, wasn’t “form” one of the main concepts in his Physics? Doesn’t “form”, together with “matter”, constitute a substance, according to him? And if so, aren’t forms real and, therefore, existing things? Don’t forms actualize our intellect, which is in potency and passive in relation to them? Is in the aristotelian philosophy something which is in act less real than something which is in potency? Of course forms have an extra-mental existence for Aristotle!

But are numbers a certain kind of forms, or ideas? Nor Plato nor Aristotle affirmed that. It has been a matter of discussion since then. What do you say?
 
Oh, thanks. I know there are different definitions and my definition of “finite” in the last post is not quite standard, but it is equivalent to the usual definition. Usually one already has the natural numbers under their belt and then defines a finite set as one for which there is a bijection from the set to [n] = {1,2,3,…,n} for some natural number n. A set is just called infinite if it is not finite.
No problem. I suggested Dedekind’s definition because you mentioned that the notion of an infinite set could be controversial. It seems to me that Dedekind’s definition is very clear. And it is interesting to notice that he first defines infinite sets and then finite sets. Also, his definition of infinite sets is a condition to be able to define natural numbers afterwards.
Before I address these, I’ll give you a similar question to consider …]

…] So to directly address one of your questions, I would say asserting the existence of the empty set is much like asserting the existence of the word “nothingness”. Some philosophers take issue with the concept, but that’s okay. Everyone agree that the word’s existence in our language is useful.
Well, don’t press me much but I think that a word like “than” partially expresses a relation and is demanding a qualification and the elements which it intends to relate.

As for the existence of the empty set, I really wasn’t questioning “how can it be said that the empty set exists if it is empty?”, but instead “what do mathematicians mean when they establish as an axiom that the empty set exists?” I don’t know if I am clear. Dedekind does not use the empty set to develop his explanation of numbers, but he uses sets and certain relations. And he also feels the necessity at a given moment to say that certain “object” exists. This object is used during the exposition to tell us what numbers are. Still, if I remember well, he says that we create numbers, and perhaps you will feel that he is right because you can see how he is building them; however you might remember that he is using “existing” building blocks. You don’t create something when you use existing building blocks. I tend to think that he would be authorized to say that all numbers, except what we call “one”, are built, or created, but “one” is different. This must have a different mode of existence.
This is an interesting question and I don’t have a very articulate answer as of yet. Humans certainly begin with intuitive ideas about quantification, but from what I’ve read, historians consider our intuition weak. It has been hypothesized that early humans had great difficulty counting past 2 for example. Perhaps what we’ve done here is put counting on a more firm footing by constructing the natural numbers in the way I described. The hope is that sets will be considered more elementary than the numbers used to build them. Much of our language assumes the existence of sets at least implicitly, but very little of our language requires counting beyond distinguishing 0 from 1 and 1 from many. So perhaps this is the case,

To address the question more directly and stop rambling, the most common use of the natural numbers to this day is for counting. Early humans, I have read, counted with “word equations”, e.g., “2 sticks added to a pile of 3 sticks makes 5 sticks”. It’s interesting that it took humans so long to transition from that approach to simply saying “2 plus 3 is 5”. The difference between the two is that the latter equation can be seen as a model for the former where we forget the irrelevant detail that the objects being counted are sticks. Note that in our construction of the natural numbers that we never had to specify what types of elements were in the finite sets. Two finite sets are, for the purposes of that construction, equivalent as long as they are the same size. This captures the idea that you might as well be counting cars if you’re counting sticks.

Also, we used one-to-one correspondence in the construction. Early humans were believed to count on their fingers often like toddlers today. This form of counting is nothing more than creating a one-to-one correspondence from the elements of the set you’re counting to your fingers.

So as abstract as the construction seems, it agree with many of the uses and mechanisms used for counting and does so in an unambiguous way.
I still remember an experience I had during my first years in the school. They taught me “the arabic numbers”, as usual. Then I learned to use them for counting, and then how to do some of the arithmetic operations. So, one day they also taught me “the roman numbers”, and I learned what I supposed they wanted me to learn. They went on with “the Mayan numbers”, and one of those days I suddenly had the unpleasant impression that so far I just had been learning the husk, but that there was “something” behind it which remained mysterious to me: that “something” were the numbers, not the symbols and the rules to operate with the symbols (the husk), but the numbers. At that age I really could not say all this. It was just an unpleasant feeling, and the only thing I was able to tell to my teacher was “I don’t know the numbers”, and she smiled, because she knew I was good.
 
Has the question been posed as to what kinds of numbers are being examined?
I. Real Numbers
  1. Natural Numbers 1,2,3,4,5,…
  2. Whole Numbers 0,1,2,3,4,5…
  3. Integers …-5,-4,-3,-2,-1,0,1,2,3,4,5…
  4. Rational Numbers 1/2, 1/3, 1/4, 3/7, 5/9
  5. Irrational Numbers sqrt(2), and ratio of circumference to diameter of a circle(pi)
    These can never be designated exactly by using rational
    numbers.
II. Imaginary Numbers (sqrt -1)

If one is counting objects, then natural numbers are used.
If one accepts that zero is a number, then whole numbers are used.
In the case of integers, a negative concept is useful in reference to zero. How can one have less than zero of something? So direction is also implied.
Fractions made up of integers are not whole or integers, but they still are real numbers.

In the case of imaginary numbers, they have been invented for certain engineering applications. So they do not exist.
 
Whether a photon knows the speed of light is irrelevant. The facts about the physical universe existed, exist and will exist regardless of whether there was, is and will be human activity. We don’t invent them but discover them like other features of reality.
Sure, we can agree that when a tree falls it vibrates the air whether or not there’s anyone to hear, whether or not humans even exist (some would argue with that but we two can agree).

But none of those facts about the physical universe contain numbers (or equations). The phenomena just happen, without any calculations, without any numbers, without any knowledge of what they are supposed to do. They just do it. Aristotle might say it’s in their nature. But numbers are not part of their nature. Are numbers even part of human nature? Seems spooky if the values of Pi and the square root of -1 were in the nature of cave dwellers. Where then can numbers have an independent existence? Do they somehow preexist God, or are they part of creation, which no phenomena need or use?

I’m just saying that whatever position we take is arguable, there’s no open and shut case.
 
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