Do propositions exist?

[john_doran]

It isn’t absurd if the definition of truth is the correspondence of the intellect to reality. In that case, in order for there to be truth, there must be a mind.

the adequation of the intellect to the thing known is knowledge.

so what do i know if i know “it is raining”, and it is raining? what do i know if i know “the proposition ‘every even number is the sum of two primes’ is true”?

more to the point, how do you parse, “every even number is the sum of two primes”? what makes that statement true (or false)? to what do its referring terms refer?
aquinothmas:

I suppose this is as good a time as any to raise this issue. If I’m understanding the theory of propositions that you are asserting, there are two potential “truth relationships”. The first relationship is between a proposition, and reality. If the proposition corresponds to reality, then it is the bearer of “truth”. If it does not, then it is the bearer of “falsehood”. The second relationship is between our minds and propositions. If our mind has as its intentional object a true proposition, then we might say that the mind knows truth.

no. propositions are the bearers of truth values; the mind knows truth by knowing propositions that have the property of being true.

aquinothomas:

We can explain this by the definition of truth as the correspondence of the mind with reality (being). You seem to be saying that propositions are necessary in order to explain truth in possible worlds where minds do not exist. But, if truth is the correspondence of mind with reality (nothing more, and nothing less), then it’s moot to talk about truth in a world without minds.

so there’s no truths about possible worlds without minds? literally, one can say nothing true about those worlds? it’s not even true that there are no minds? it’s not true that everything in those worlds is self-identical?

if you actually believe this, then we have reached the limits of our discourse, since what you’re saying is, to me, self-evidently nonsensical.

aquinothomas:

The ancient Latin definition of what I’m talking about is adequatio rei et intellectus - an equality between mind and reality. This isn’t idealism, it’s realism, but the definition of truth is the measure of mind in accordance with reality.

A) again, that is the definition of knowledge, and simply saying that one knows only when one’s mind is equated with reality in no way decides what objects are part of the furniture of reality.

that is to say, i agree that knowledge is the adequation of mind and thing, but assert also that one of the things with which our minds can be adequated is propositions (and states of affairs, and facts, and…).

B) i consider myself a realist with regard to abstract objects: i take abstract objects to be real.

aquinothomas:

With this definition, I’m assuming that as a precondition of truth, that reality is intelligible. It seems contradictory to talk about truth apart from intelligibility. But if reality is inherently intelligible, then it was designed to be that way. And, if there is teleology, then there is a divine mind, whose knowledge is in fact creative. Therefore, it’s contradictory to speak of an intelligible universe without any minds. Because of this, we can speak of reality thus: omne ens est verum; ens et verum convertuntur - every being is true, and the true and being are interchangeable.

so what are the bearers of truth-values, again? you had at one point agreed that*** something*** needed to bear the properties of truth and falsity***/ ***now you seem to be suggesting the contrary (and decidedly empiricist) position that truth is a (triadic?) relational property between something like minds, thoughts/utterances, and the world.

which is it?

 

[john_doran]

Like I said earlier, logical being doesn’t necessarily need to refer to actually existing natural objects. Logical being is real being but not necessarily actual being. When we’re talking about an infinite number, we’re talking about a potentially infinite number of things. The set of real numbers refers to a potentiality of beings in rerum natura, not an actuality. But, that makes it no less real as a logical construct (logical being). So, a mathematical proposition can be true which utilizes an infinite set since the set refers to logical being, which is real. In that case, it can be said to correspond to reality. But, since it’s a logical construct, it is still in the mind.

so the proposition “green dragons like peanut butter” is true because it’s potentially true?

look, how can a proposition that includes, say, the denoting term “every even number” be true if that term doesn’t actually refer to anything?

i know you’re enamoured with thomistic philosophy - i spent my formative philosophical years buried in the *summa contra gentiles *and summa theologiae, and de ente et essentia - but there’s been a lot of good and true philosophy since thomas walked the earth…

aquinothomas:

It would be absurd if we were referring to actual beings, yes. But propositions about infinite sets are logical. The beings the mind makes reference to (in a purely logical sense) are no less real than actual beings, but they are entirely dependent on the created mind for existence. So, if it’s possible for an infinite number of actual beings to be combined in the manner that a mathematical proposition asserts, then the truth of the proposition can be verified.

so if it’s possible, it’s also true?

aquinothomas:

If what I’m saying about the correspondence of mind to reality as a definition of truth holds, then statements about logic and math wouldn’t even exist without minds because there would be no minds to formulate the propositions. Concerns regarding their truth or falsehood would be irrelevant. Does it really make sense to talk about logic in a world with no minds?

does it make any sense to say “it is necessarily true that 1+1=2” and “1+1=2 is not true in every possible world”?

 

[aquinothomas]

the adequation of the intellect to the thing known is knowledge.

I don’t disagree with this, but knowledge and truth are synonymous. Truth is reality in the mind. Our mind takes on the character of reality the more that we know, and thus we “grow in the truth”.

so what do i know if i know “it is raining”, and it is raining? what do i know if i know “the proposition ‘every even number is the sum of two primes’ is true”? more to the point, how do you parse, “every even number is the sum of two primes”? what makes that statement true (or false)? to what do its referring terms refer?

Terms refer to ideas; they manifest ideas. Ideas are essences abstracted from nature (I suppose they could also be supernaturally infused, but that’s another can ‘o’ worms). If we had to verbalize an essence, we would give a definition. So, there’s a definition for number, sum, prime number. Numbers fall under the ontological category of quantity, which is based on the transcendental category of unity. “Prime” is a definition of a certain kind of number, but all numbers refer back eventually to the quantification of being. We can verify the truth of the claim based on our experience (not sensory experience, necessarily, but ultimately derivative of our experience of reality).

no. propositions are the bearers of truth values; the mind knows truth by knowing propositions that have the property of being true.

What makes a proposition true? In short, how would you define truth per se?

so there’s no truths about possible worlds without minds? literally, one can say nothing true about those worlds? it’s not even true that there are no minds? it’s not true that everything in those worlds is self-identical?

I never said there can be no truths about possible worlds with no minds. First of all, if we’re talking about a possible world, then we aren’t talking about an actual world, so we can’t make a truth claim about what is actual in a possible situation, can we? We can certainly make a truth claim about what is possible. For example, it isn’t intrinsically impossible that there be a world with no minds, so it is true that it is possible that there be such a world. Secondly, there’s nothing stopping us from making truth claims about our speculations involving possible worlds. For example, I could imagine a world with green dragons with their tongues stuck to the roof of their mouths from eating too much peanut butter, and within the confines of my mind this world is real, and I can make all of the truth claims that are logically consistent about that world that I want to, which are true because my mind in its sub-creative capacity can manufacture such a world. Now, I will stay out of the insane asylum as long as I don’t purport that world to be actual. And, I can communicate the truth claims about my imaginary world to others who have no choice but to accept them concerning my possible world. I think this is one of the fundamental notions behind copyright, isn’t it? Who am I to tell Tolkien what hobbits are really like? On the other hand, if Tolkien presumes to tell me that in his world, squares are quite circular, then we have a problem, because we’re talking about a necessary definition (a tautology) that’s being compromised. It is intrinsically impossible that there be such things as square circular objects in any world.

The same seems to hold for “1 + 1 = 2”. Given what we understand about actual reality, it seems impossible that there be such a world that the transcendental of unity not be a fundamental property of being. This is true of the law of identity as well. So, I cannot conceive of a world in my mind such that “1 + 1 != 2”, because unity is a transcendental. It’s a property of all being, which I know is true, because my mind is properly conformed to actual reality. So, for any possible world that I create, a necessary property of being in that world will be unity, and thus, “1 + 1 = 2” is necessarily true, because it would be intrinsically impossible otherwise and that possible world must conform to my mind. Once again, we are back at the definition of truth being either a conformity of mind to reality (in rerum natura) or reality to mind (either the divine mind or created mind) but in either case a mind is necessary in order for truth to obtain.

 

[aquinothomas]

so the proposition “green dragons like peanut butter” is true because it’s potentially true?

The ideas and the judgment is true within the mental construct that you create, and the idea “green dragon”, with the accidental property of having an affinity for peanut butter is real in the sense that it could exist in rerum natura. But the existence of the judgment (the proposition) is entirely dependent on your mind. The proposition is an articulation of the ideas and the judgment you have formulated. And it is true according to a) the conformity of your mind to the substances from which you derived the notion of a green dragon and b) the logical nature of the judgment. Since it isn’t intrinsically impossible that green dragons exist, and that they should like peanut butter, it is true within the context of the story (the possible world) that you have manufactured - not potentially true but true because the possible world conforms to your mind. If you had made up a story about square circles liking peanut butter, or a world where 1 + 1 = 4, then we would have to question the veracity of such a world.

look, how can a proposition that includes, say, the denoting term “every even number” be true if that term doesn’t actually refer to anything?

I think I’ve already addressed this, but if not, let me know.

i know you’re enamoured with thomistic philosophy - i spent my formative philosophical years buried in the *summa contra gentiles *and summa theologiae, and de ente et essentia - but there’s been a lot of good and true philosophy since thomas walked the earth…

I hear you, and I’m not denying that. I came the other direction. I’ve been around the block with analytic philosophy, and cut my teeth on the moderns - post 19th century philosophy, with a heavy emphasis on Plantinga. After having been through that gauntlet, though, Thomism seems to jive not only as an accurate philosophy, but also with common sense. Which is one of the reasons why I’m questioning the whole notion of the existence of propositions sans minds to think them…

Let’s assume for the sake of argument that propositions exist apart from the mind, and there is an actual world where propositions are floating around with no minds to grasp them. How, then, do we explain the truth value of propositions like the following:

“I love my wife”
“That man just fell down”
“Fred likes pizza”
“The color red is my favorite color”
“The chair is to the left of the table, and the chair is to the right of the table” (assuming there are two tables with a chair in the middle)
“This ball is in the middle of this room”
“The cat walked across the room today at 5:30pm”
“That was an act of injustice”
“The rock was rolling too fast”

What is the truth value of each of these propositions in a world with no minds? Why would any or all of them be bearers of truth? Bearers of falsehood?

 

[john_doran]

I hear you, and I’m not denying that. I came the other direction. I’ve been around the block with analytic philosophy, and cut my teeth on the moderns - post 19th century philosophy, with a heavy emphasis on Plantinga. After having been through that gauntlet, though, Thomism seems to jive not only as an accurate philosophy, but also with common sense. Which is one of the reasons why I’m questioning the whole notion of the existence of propositions sans minds to think them…

plantinga actually suggests that propositions are divine thoughts…

look, i don’t deny that propositions might need to be explained as mental events of some kind - i just deny that they’re only in our minds, since that leads to all of the difficulties that i have already pointed out.

aquinothomas:

Let’s assume for the sake of argument that propositions exist apart from the mind, and there is an actual world where propositions are floating around with no minds to grasp them. How, then, do we explain the truth value of propositions like the following:

“I love my wife”
“That man just fell down”
“Fred likes pizza”
“The color red is my favorite color”
“The chair is to the left of the table, and the chair is to the right of the table” (assuming there are two tables with a chair in the middle)
“This ball is in the middle of this room”
“The cat walked across the room today at 5:30pm”
“That was an act of injustice”
“The rock was rolling too fast”

What is the truth value of each of these propositions in a world with no minds? Why would any or all of them be bearers of truth? Bearers of falsehood?

each of those sentences expresses a proposition that is false, since the propositions expressed each predicate something of the world that is not, in fact, the case.

what do you perceive as the difficulty here? i mean, the answer to he question is about as straightforward as they come…

 

[ateista]

each of those sentences expresses a proposition that is false, since the propositions expressed each predicate something of the world that is not, in fact, the case.

Those examples are unfortunate because they refer to actions or perceptions of minds. Let’s consider a few which only reflects on natural objects: “two rocks are more than one” or “a water molecule is composed of 2 hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom” or “everything is itself”. Are these true propositions in a world without minds? Or are they simply facts?

It seems to me that you do not make distinctions between facts and perceptions about facts. In a world without minds the facts are there. Propositions are not - unless you equate the two. And why should we do that?

Moreover, in a possible world with minds, where there is air and air vibrations, but the beings have no organs to percieve the vibrations there will be no “middle C” as a musical note, even though the physical vibrations corresponding to the note are present.

 

[aquinothomas]

look, i don’t deny that propositions might need to be explained as mental events of some kind - i just deny that they’re only in our minds, since that leads to all of the difficulties that i have already pointed out.

…they seem to be either expressions of our minds or the mind of God, but not independent ontological entities. Propositions seem to depend on our mind, and not the other way around. In saying that, though, I’m not saying that truth itself is dependent on our mind – truth is a correspondence between mind and actual or possible reality (with a dependency in the created mind on actual reality). The only time that truth is dependent upon a mind in all situations is with God’s mind.

Not that you are avoiding it, but you haven’t answered the question: what makes a proposition true? False? What is truth? I’m really interested to hear your answer on this.

each of those sentences expresses a proposition that is false, since the propositions expressed each predicate something of the world that is not, in fact, the case.

I completely agree with you, but it took a mind to recognize that. In my imaginary world sans minds, those situations could never obtain. My proposal is that in a world without minds, those propositions wouldn’t even exist. And, not just those propositions, but any propositions, because the order of events is that our minds “latch onto” reality, not propositions waiting to be found. Then, our mind turns around and creates propositions to describe the reality that our minds have encountered.

Those examples are unfortunate because they refer to actions or perceptions of minds. Let’s consider a few which only reflects on natural objects: “two rocks are more than one” or “a water molecule is composed of 2 hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom” or “everything is itself”. Are these true propositions in a world without minds? Or are they simply facts?

These are excellent examples, and I would never deny that there could be a possible world in which there are no minds but there are water molecules. In making that judgment, though, it’s my mind that is forming the proposition about the imaginary world, and making a truth claim based on what I understand about water (in the actual world). The proposition takes the form of “It is possible that…”. That doesn’t make it actual, but it is no less true. Ontolotical truth, however, is reality in rerum natura conforming to God’s mind, because only He can be the source of propositions which are also creative.

 

[ateista]

These are excellent examples, and I would never deny that there could be a possible world in which there are no minds but there are water molecules. In making that judgment, though, it’s my mind that is forming the proposition about the imaginary world, and making a truth claim based on what I understand about water (in the actual world). The proposition takes the form of “It is possible that…”. That doesn’t make it actual, but it is no less true. Ontolotical truth, however, is reality in rerum natura conforming to God’s mind, because only He can be the source of propositions which are also creative.

Up until the last sentence I agree with you. Since I am an atheist, the last sentence is meaningless for me.

I would like to make a “proposition”: Propositions are the expressions of our minds about

1. Reality (a water molecule is composed of… )
2. Percieved reality (God is good)
3. Abstract concepts (1 + 1 = 2)

when expressed in one form or another in a communication channel.

However, a sentence like “It was a dark and stormy night” is not a proposition, if it appears in a fully imaginary environment, like a Peanut cartoon, where Snoopy’s books habitually start with this sentence. It looks like a proposition, indeed, and it would be one, if it were uttered in the real world, about a real night.

 

[john_doran]

Those examples are unfortunate because they refer to actions or perceptions of minds. Let’s consider a few which only reflects on natural objects: “two rocks are more than one” or “a water molecule is composed of 2 hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom” or “everything is itself”. Are these true propositions in a world without minds? Or are they simply facts?

well, depending on who you ask, there is a very close relationship between propositions, facts, and states of affairs…

there are arguments for the inclusion of each in a complete ontology.

ateista:

It seems to me that you do not make distinctions between facts and perceptions about facts. In a world without minds the facts are there. Propositions are not - unless you equate the two. And why should we do that?

because truth is a property that must be a property of something; if it is a property of (contingent) minds, or some other thing that can not-exist, then there will be sometimes be no truth-bearers, and thus sometimes no truth. which is absurd.

by your lights, though, the word “fact” does precisely the same work as “truth”. for example, whereas i would say of a world without minds:

A) it is true that there are water molecules at world W;

you would say:

B) it is a fact that there are water molecules at world W.

logically, each of the above examples is of the form:

C) it is true that P;

D) it is a fact that P.

which seems to entail that, while i think that P has the property of being true, you think it has the property of being a fact. and i would hazard a guess that you would parse factuality in the same way that i parse truth, namely that P is a fact if P is the way things actually are.

either way, it would seem that some property is being predicated of some kind of thing that exists in every possible world. sort of like an abstract object.

(it’s just that i would go the further step of saying that “the proposition that “it is a fact that P” is true” is true.)
atesita:

Moreover, in a possible world with minds, where there is air and air vibrations, but the beings have no organs to percieve the vibrations there will be no “middle C” as a musical note, even though the physical vibrations corresponding to the note are present.

that’s certainly correct.

 

[john_doran]

…they seem to be either expressions of our minds or the mind of God, but not independent ontological entities.

depends on what you mean by “independent”…

propositions (and everything else) cannot exist independently of god, in the sense of have their being independently of god’s creative act.

but everything exists independently of god in the sense that those things are not identical with god.

so. if “dependence on god for existence” entails “dependent ontological entity”, then how is it that a proposition is a dependent entity, but an apple isn’t, since both are dependent on god for their existence?

i understand, of course, that the distinction is easily motivated in us: if “propositions” are just our thoughts, then the proposition “there is an apple on the table” comes into existence when we think it, and then ceases to exist when we stop; in that sense, thoughts are dependent on us in a way that the apple on the table isn’t.

but that distinction doesn’t apply to god, since, ex hypothesi, everything depends on god for its existence, such that, for any X, if god stops sustaining its being, it stops being.

but there’s a further difficulty with your position, which is that, if propositions are god’s thoughts, then there are thoughts that god has to think, e.g. ~(A&~A), modus ponens, 1+1=2. and if that’s true, then the distinction between ontological dependence and independence becomes even more vague, since god can’t stop thinking those thoughts, and they cannot, therefore, ever stop existing.

so now we have apples and thoughts, and both are dependent on god for their existence. so in what sense is the latter an independent entity, but not the former? apples exist in the manner of apples: they have extension, occupy a place, have color, taste, smell, etc.; propositions exist in the manner of thoughts: they have no place or extension or duration, and arguably no causal properties, but have the property of “truth” or “falsity”. and each will cease to exist if god stops doing something.

seems to me that propositions are just as independent as apples, or neither are…

aquinothomas:

Not that you are avoiding it, but you haven’t answered the question: what makes a proposition true? False? What is truth? I’m really interested to hear your answer on this.

a proposition P is true iff P.

 

[ateista]

well, depending on who you ask, there is a very close relationship between propositions, facts, and states of affairs…

I have no argument with this. I agree that these concepts have a lot in common.

because truth is a property that must be a property of something; if it is a property of (contingent) minds, or some other thing that can not-exist, then there will be sometimes be no truth-bearers, and thus sometimes no truth. which is absurd.

I am not sure what to make of this. I call something “true” if it is the recognition of a “fact”, as it pertains to reality, or if it follows from the axioms in an abstract construct. However, both of these presuppose a mind which is able to recognize a “fact”, or is able to conceptualize an abstract construct.

by your lights, though, the word “fact” does precisely the same work as “truth”. for example, whereas i would say of a world without minds:

A) it is true that there are water molecules at world W;

you would say:

B) it is a fact that there are water molecules at world W.

logically, each of the above examples is of the form:

C) it is true that P;

D) it is a fact that P.

which seems to entail that, while i think that P has the property of being true, you think it has the property of being a fact. and i would hazard a guess that you would parse factuality in the same way that i parse truth, namely that P is a fact if P is the way things actually are.

Is it possible, that we are banging on the same door from the same side? What I call “facts”, you call “propositions”?

(Does not really pertain to this discussion, but I recall a wonderful saying in “Car Talk”: “if a man is alone in a forest, and his wife is not there, and he says something… is he still wrong?” I had a good chuckle when I heard it.)

From the Webster:

Main Entry: 1prop·o·si·tion
Function: noun
Date: 14th century
1 a (1): **something offered for consideration or acceptance **: proposal (2): a request for sexual intercourse b: the point to be discussed or maintained in argument usually stated in sentence form near the outset c: a theorem or problem to be demonstrated or performed
2 a: an expression in language or signs of something that can be believed, doubted, or denied or is either true or false b: the objective meaning of a proposition
3: something of an indicated kind to be dealt with

If so, I would say that to me the word “proposition” does entail a communication channel, linguistic or otherwise, and a communication presupposes entities which are able to communicate, and as such they have a mind.

In other words, I differentiate between a fact (something is) and the recognition of a fact (it is true that something is). To me this is an important distinction.

either way, it would seem that some property is being predicated of some kind of thing that exists in every possible world. sort of like an abstract object.

(it’s just that i would go the further step of saying that “the proposition that “it is a fact that P” is true” is true.)

that’s certainly correct.

You lose me again. How can you agree that the musical note “middle C” does not exist in a world with beings who have no sense of hearing, and assert that “abstract objects” do exist in all possible worlds? To me this is a clear contradiction.

 

[aquinothomas]

propositions (and everything else) cannot exist independently of god, in the sense of have their being independently of god’s creative act. but everything exists independently of god in the sense that those things are not identical with god.

Agreed.

so. if “dependence on god for existence” entails “dependent ontological entity”, then how is it that a proposition is a dependent entity, but an apple isn’t, since both are dependent on god for their existence?

Well, this seems to me to be a different can ‘o’ worms because now we’re talking about causality. But, to simplify, our propositions are dependent on us in the same way that our free will is both dependent on us and dependent on the enabling power of God. If propositions are simply formulations of judgments, then they are dependent on the person in the same way the persons ideas are dependent on the person. But, the cause of the person, ontologically, is God. God gives us freedom to form our own judgments, even though the judgment is formulated (per se) by the intellect.

but that distinction doesn’t apply to god, since, ex hypothesi, everything depends on god for its existence, such that, for any X, if god stops sustaining its being, it stops being.

True, in the ontological context. If God fails to sustain me, my thoughts go away as well. But, unless you are an absolute determinist, you don’t believe that God infuses all of our thoughts into our mind, do you? As far as that is concerned, our thoughts, ideas and propositions are our own.

but there’s a further difficulty with your position, which is that, if propositions are god’s thoughts, then there are thoughts that god has to think, e.g. ~(A&~A), modus ponens, 1+1=2. and if that’s true, then the distinction between ontological dependence and independence becomes even more vague, since god can’t stop thinking those thoughts, and they cannot, therefore, ever stop existing.

Thins like the law of non-contradiction, ~(A&~A), as you put it, are self evident principles of being, they are not purely logical. We can formulate (using symbolic logic or not) the principle of contradiction just from experiencing being. So, even if God were the only being to exist, this principle would inhere. However, because God has created a world that is ontologically distinct from Himself, the law / principle holds there as well, and with any being, so the causal dependency for this ultimately rests with God, but it is an ontological, not logical dependence.

so now we have apples and thoughts, and both are dependent on god for their existence. so in what sense is the latter an independent entity, but not the former? …] seems to me that propositions are just as independent as apples, or neither are…

My problem is not with the ultimate dependence or independence of propositions per se. My argument is with propositions existing as ontolotically distinct entities from any mind. In terms of causal proximity, propositions (as we know them) seem to be effects of the following causal chain:

God → (creates man - ontological causation) → man → (creates propositions - logical causation)

a proposition P is true iff P

Would it be fair to characterize this view of truth as: “a proposition is true if and only if it corresponds to reality”? If that’s the case, then I don’t see the necessity of characterizing propositions as ontological entities distinct from our mind. Why not take out the middle man? If propositions are true if and only if they correspond to reality (what they describe obtains in the real world), then why not just accept as a sufficient explanation for truth, the correspondence of our minds to reality itself? By asserting the ontological distinctiveness of propositions, it seems to me that we assert as real beings our mental tools for dialectical reasoning. If possible worlds are in fact imaginary worlds (and it seems that it would take an insane man to propose that they are actual worlds), then we can dialectically create all of the possible worlds our heart desires, but truth in those worlds depends on our knowledge of being in the actual world, our ability to combine ideas into imaginary beings, and the correspondence of that world with our thought. The propositions that refer to that world still have as their source the human mind.

 

[aquinothomas]

well, depending on who you ask, there is a very close relationship between propositions, facts, and states of affairs…

Yes, and for some, each of these are examples of ontologically distinct entities, distinct from each other and minds.

because truth is a property that must be a property of something; if it is a property of (contingent) minds, or some other thing that can not-exist, then there will be sometimes be no truth-bearers, and thus sometimes no truth. which is absurd.

This proposition appears to be true, IMHO.

which seems to entail that, while i think that P has the property of being true, you think it has the property of being a fact. and i would hazard a guess that you would parse factuality in the same way that i parse truth, namely that P is a fact if P is the way things actually are.

On reading this, you must agree with me, then, that for a proposition to be true, it should correspond to reality. And, again (possible worlds or no), I’m wondering why we would need the extra ontologically distinct baggage to explain truth. If water is in our imaginary world, then it obtains in the same way it would obtain if it existed in the actual world. We “know” water in our imaginary world (even the imaginary world without minds), in the converse way to which we know it in the actual one. The difference being that in the possible world water corresponds to our idea of water that we know from experiencing water in the actual world.

 

[aquinothomas]

I am not sure what to make of this. I call something “true” if it is the recognition of a “fact”, as it pertains to reality, or if it follows from the axioms in an abstract construct. However, both of these presuppose a mind which is able to recognize a “fact”, or is able to conceptualize an abstract construct.

I agree with this and I would go a step further: I would equate facts with reality itself (possible or actual reality). If we didn’t have the noetic ability to recognize actual reality directly and were forced to employ ontologically distinct entities we call propositions, how could we distinguish dream states from waking states? How would we know whether or not we were under the influence of a hallucinogenic drug vs not being so? The “facts” in both instances might appear to us to be the same…

Is it possible, that we are banging on the same door from the same side? What I call “facts”, you call “propositions”?

If you would distinguish “facts” from actual reality, then it is a similar notion. Usually what we mean by “facts”, though, is the way things are in the actual world. It’s just a symbol for how we think the world actually is. And, by extension, it could be a symbol for situations in a possible world. (e.g. - It’s a fact that in The Hobbit, Bilbo found the One Ring)

(Does not really pertain to this discussion, but I recall a wonderful saying in “Car Talk”: “if a man is alone in a forest, and his wife is not there, and he says something… is he still wrong?” I had a good chuckle when I heard it.)

I love click and clack.

If so, I would say that to me the word “proposition” does entail a communication channel, linguistic or otherwise, and a communication presupposes entities which are able to communicate, and as such they have a mind.

To propose the way things are…a proposition.

In other words, I differentiate between a fact (something is) and the recognition of a fact (it is true that something is). To me this is an important distinction.

Exactly, if by “fact” you just mean the recognition of actual reality.

 

[john_doran]

Well, this seems to me to be a different can ‘o’ worms because now we’re talking about causality. But, to simplify, our propositions are dependent on us in the same way that our free will is both dependent on us and dependent on the enabling power of God.

hold on a second here: i’m not talking about propositions for us: i’m talking about propositions for god. you have consistently maintained that propositions are a function of mind, including the mind of god, and that’s the position i’m discussing, not propositions as they exist for us.

again, i am taking issue with what you say here:

aquinothomas:

…they seem to be either expressions of our minds or the mind of God, but not independent ontological entities. (emphasis mine)

sure, our thoughts and judgments depend on us for their existence in a way that, for example, my computer doesn’t. in that sense, propositions as thought by us are “dependent ontological entities” in your parlance, and computers are independent.

but the same is not true for god: since everything depends on god for its existence, then everything is also a dependent ontological entity, which puts propositions on all fours with angels, apples, and anteaters; even moreso since some of god’s thoughts are thoughts that it is impossible for him not to have…

and this is my point: even if propositions are thoughts in the mind of god (and i think they are), they are still independent ontological entities to us.

aquinothomas:

If propositions are simply formulations of judgments, then they are dependent on the person in the same way the persons ideas are dependent on the person. But, the cause of the person, ontologically, is God. God gives us freedom to form our own judgments, even though the judgment is formulated (per se) by the intellect.

see above: what about propositions as formulations of judgments by God?

aquinothomas:

Thins like the law of non-contradiction, ~(A&~A), as you put it, are self evident principles of being, they are not purely logical. We can formulate (using symbolic logic or not) the principle of contradiction just from experiencing being. So, even if God were the only being to exist, this principle would inhere. However, because God has created a world that is ontologically distinct from Himself, the law / principle holds there as well, and with any being, so the causal dependency for this ultimately rests with God, but it is an ontological, not logical dependence.

but logic is ontological: it is the structure of reason, which is a feature of mind. god’s thoughts are things, which means that his thinking about the inherent non-contradictoriness of being is itself a being: namely, a proposition.
thomasaquino:

My problem is not with the ultimate dependence or independence of propositions per se. My argument is with propositions existing as ontolotically distinct entities from any mind.

they’re not: they’re divine thoughts. but divine thoughts are abstract objects, and are the bearers of truth-values. god believes (knows) every true proposition, and no false ones.

 

[aquinothomas]

but the same is not true for god: since everything depends on god for its existence, then everything is also a dependent ontological entity, which puts propositions on all fours with angels, apples, and anteaters; even moreso since some of god’s thoughts are thoughts that it is impossible for him not to have…

If you’re saying that our propositions are the same as God’s propositions, or that we latch onto God’s propositions when we think up our own, then I disagree. Given God’s nature, though, I would also have to say that all of God’s propositions are necessary, because they proceed from His essence. This includes all propositions that pertain to God, regarding both the actual and possible worlds. Finally, while we have an ontological dependency on God, God doesn’t think our thoughts for us.

and this is my point: even if propositions are thoughts in the mind of god (and i think they are), they are still independent ontological entities to us.

And where do false propositions come from? I would contend that not only do our “collective” propositions differ from God’s, but one person’s propositions differ from another’s. I may formulate a true proposition about a situation and you formulate a false one about the exact same situation. If you’re saying that absolutely all propositions for us originate with God, then I deny that. That would eliminate the possibility for any false propositions.

Regarding this subject, our dependency on God is strictly ontological. He gives us the ability to formulate propositions by giving us an intellect and the ability to make judgments. He doesn’t formulate those judgments (propositions) for us. I may be misunderstanding your point.

see above: what about propositions as formulations of judgments by God?

God has his own ideas and judgments formulated from eternity, and all of His judgments are true. True, both of possible worlds and the actual world. And, God’s ideas (of essences), unlike our own, are creative. Our ideas are purely receptive from what exists in rerum natura.

but logic is ontological: it is the structure of reason, which is a feature of mind. god’s thoughts are things, which means that his thinking about the inherent non-contradictoriness of being is itself a being: namely, a proposition.

This seems to me to be a pretty big logical leap. How do we go from God knowing propositions to those propositions being things (beings) in their own right? Aren’t God’s thoughts identical with Himself? Also, isn’t it possible that God can know contingent things, like the true and false propositions that we will formulate?

they’re not: they’re divine thoughts. but divine thoughts are abstract objects, and are the bearers of truth-values. god believes (knows) every true proposition, and no false ones.

I agree with the part about God’s propositions all being true. But, are you saying that we gather the true propositions from God and the false ones from ourselves? In that case, are false propositions ontologically distinct from true ones?