MarcoPolo:
Although both of them together are parents of their child, the woman’s motherhood constitutes a special “part” in this shared parenthood, and the most demanding part. Parenthood - even though it belongs to both - is realized much more fully in the woman, especially in the prenatal period. It is the woman who “pays” directly for this shared generation, which literally absorbs the energies of her body and soul. (Mulieris Dignitatem (Dignity and Vocation of Women))
The Catechism also cites the Council of Vienne:
CCC#365 The unity of soul and body is so profound that one has to consider the soul to be the “form” of the body: i.e., it is because of its spiritual soul that the body made of matter becomes a living, human body; spirit and matter, in man, are not two natures united, but rather their union forms a single nature.
Ah.
So there is the suggestion, then, that the soul does indeed have gender?
No.
The first quote merely says that the woman has a special role in parenting, and this role “absorbs the energies of her body and soul.” It does not mean that her soul is gendered, but merely that she (as a gendered person) has a particular role that is different than differently-gendered persons.
That would be like saying that the soul is gendered by virtue of any action undertaken by a gendered person: is the soul gendered because a man plays in the NFL? is the soul gendered because a woman plays in the WNBA? Of course not: they are (1) persons who have the characteristic of ‘gender’ and (2) they perform certain acts. That does not imply that these acts cause gender to ‘bleed’ into their souls.
The second quote, in saying that “the soul is the form of the body” is to be understood from a philosophical perspective. Like any council, Vienne addressed controversies of the day; in order to understand what’s being said there, we must first understand the particular controversy and the context in which it arose.
Vienne addressed the philosophical claims of Pierre Jean Olivi, a Franciscan theologian. In his day, the writings of Aristotle were being discovered in their fullness, and were being hotly debated. One such notion was Aristotle’s philosophy of body and soul, in which he declared the soul to be the form of the body.
(One tangent: if we look at this from a non-philosophical perspective – and therefore, completely misinterpret it – we look upon the soul as a sort of homunculus: we have hands and feet and red hair (
and gender) because our soul has hands and feet and red hair and gender. However, that’s not at all what the notion of soul as ‘form’ means. Rather, it means that the actions that can be attributed to us as humans proceed from our ‘intellectual soul’ (see the
Summa Theologiae, I.76.1); it’s a claim about
why we’re human, and not about our constituent physical parts. (I’ll leave the research to you, since it would otherwise take up a whole page of posts.))
Olivi, however, didn’t like that claim: he thought that, if we said that the soul is the form of the body, we were ok – but that if we said that the
rational part of the soul was the form of the body, we’d be stuck in a paradox. (In other words, it would mean either that rational acts were physical acts – since the form gives rise to acts in the body – or that the rational soul was not the form of the body (since the rational soul did not give the body its own characteristics (immortality, etc).) See
this discussion of Olivi’s arguments.
So, the Council of Vienne is not saying what ya’ll are attempting to make it say. It’s not talking about gender correspondences between soul and body; it’s talking about
powers of rationality and what it means to say that our soul makes us human. Not physical; not gendered; but human.
One last point, since I see it’s come up again: PRmerger continues to bring up the notion of ‘ontological change’ in ordination as if it proves her point about souls being gendered. Yet again, ya’ll are conflating ‘souls’ with ‘persons’. The
person who is ordained acts in the person of Christ the Head (see CCC 1548 – it’s that service
in persona Christi Capitis that we’re talking about here!). It’s not that the person acts
in anima Christi Capitis. Rather, his person has been conformed to Christ, for the sake of service to the ordinary priesthood of believers.
All humans may receive the ontological change
to their person in the sacrament of baptism; all male humans may receive the ontological change
to their person in the sacrament of holy orders. It’s not the
soul, but the
person who is affected. (And, it is the male person who may be conformed to Christ the High Priest… not the male
soul.) In making the argument that ya’ll are making, you confuse ‘person’ and ‘soul’, and as a result, you’re making a claim about a soul that can only be made about a person.
