Do we really have free will? Why doesn't God stop evil?

[Portofino]

Well, you might agree that we can easily name a few instances in life where it seems like we don’t have free will. If you stick your hand in a pot of boiling water, do you have any real control over as to whether you immediately pull it or not? Certainly, you may be tempted to attribute your inevitable reaction to ‘instinct,’ but I don’t see how this isn’t still a question of free will. For that matter, do you have any choice as to whether you understand the sentence you’re reading right now? Could you choose not to understand that sentence, or this one? What if you read the word “Elephant” right now? Do you have any choice as to whether a picture of an elephant appears in your mind when you do?

It seems apparent to me that, at the very, very least, there are times in life when we don’t have the ability to choose what we choose. So given that, what are the implications for having “free will” in general? What is more likely, that we are gifted by the gods a ‘selective free will,’ applicable at certain times in life, but not others? OR, that even the moments in life where we appear to demonstrate real free will are simply illusory?

You are right – even in our experience, there are times when we realize that we were never quite as free, as we had believed.

I can give an obvious example, having to do with a dog, not a person. I knew of someone whose dog was afraid of all male visitors. As his owner explained, it was *because * the dog had had an abusive male owner, as a puppy. Whether this was the case with the dog or not, explanations such as this certainly apply to human beings as well – for example, the woman who no longer trusts men, after having been raped.

The worst case scenario is when the individual is not aware of the ways in which his perceptions – and reactions – are being influenced. One may try to repress a painful childhood memory, for example, and not be aware of how significantly that experience has influenced one’s behavior (for example, a humiliating experience that has prompted one to avoid similar experiences of that type).

I think the philosopher Spinoza spoke of a provisional or “soft” freedom, which was in becoming *aware *of the ways in which our behavior has been determined. This approach to better understanding the determinants of one’s behavior – the ways in which one has been influenced or “controlled” – does show that, in an important sense, freedom is not a given, but an achievement.

This insight into the underlying motives of one’s behavior can be extremely subtle – and the more subtle, perhaps, the more fallible – but is, nevertheless, valid. Take, for example, a patient who tries to understand why he avoids close or intimate relationships. He may not understand his own emotions. Through self-knowledge and memory, he realizes – for example – how devastating the death of his father had been to him, when he was a child (which was the case of actor Anthony Perkins). Perkins had come to the realization that, on some level, he was *afraid *of intimacy, because he didn’t want to lose someone – unpredictably and without warning – in the way he had lost his father.

Again, these more subtle manifestations of self-knowledge that can be doubted or even ridiculed – again, the more subtle, the more fallible-- but there can be truth in them.

So yes, I certainly see that there are ways in which we are very much influenced in our behavior – including in racism or prejudice, if we grew up in a household where everyone around us had fed us negative stereotypes, and reinforced them.

A Protestant can make the same realization about his attitude towards Catholics, saying “when I was a child, Catholics were the enemy”, or vice versa.

So, paradoxically, understanding the underlying causes of one’s attitudes, and of the motives of one’s behavior, enables one to experience freedom as an achievement, not a given. To understand all of the ways in which one is determined – or influenced – is, ironically, empowering. Self-knowledge becomes an important key to freedom.

 

[Peter_Plato]

I think the philosopher Spinoza spoke of a provisional or “soft” freedom, which was in becoming *aware *of the ways in which our behavior has been determined. This approach to better understanding the determinants of one’s behavior – the ways in which one has been influenced or “controlled” – does show that, in an important sense, freedom is not a given, but an achievement.

This insight into the underlying motives of one’s behavior can be extremely subtle – and the more subtle, perhaps, the more fallible – but is, nevertheless, valid. Take, for example, a patient who tries to understand why he avoids close or intimate relationships. He may not understand his own emotions. Through self-knowledge and memory, he realizes – for example – how devastating the death of his father had been to him, when he was a child (which was the case of actor Anthony Perkins). Perkins had come to the realization that, on some level, he was *afraid *of intimacy, because he didn’t want to lose someone – unpredictably and without warning – in the way he had lost his father.

Again, these more subtle manifestations of self-knowledge that can be doubted or even ridiculed – again, the more subtle, the more fallible-- but there can be truth in them.

So yes, I certainly see that there are ways in which we are very much influenced in our behavior – including in racism or prejudice, if we grew up in a household where everyone around us had fed us negative stereotypes, and reinforced them.

A Protestant can make the same realization about his attitude towards Catholics, saying “when I was a child, Catholics were the enemy”, or vice versa.

So, paradoxically, understanding the underlying causes of one’s attitudes, and of the motives of one’s behavior, enables one to experience freedom as an achievement, not a given. To understand all of the ways in which one is determined – or influenced – is, ironically, empowering. Self-knowledge becomes an important key to freedom.

Thanks again for your clarity, Portofino.

No one said that freedom of choice is necessarily easy. I have heard it said that perhaps relatively few people actually demonstrate freedom of the will. That would be a reason why some merely dismiss the idea completely, i.e., because these individuals do not have (or have not developed) the capacity for truly unencumbered choice. They may not accept the possibility because for them it is not a possibility.

Your point about self-knowledge could be a crucial element in this. For individuals who have developed the faculty of reason to the point that autonomy is more or less the operative principle, free will is (paradoxically) undeniable. However, for others constrained by addictions, appetites, or strong emotive forces, freedom of choice may seem an impossible illusion.

 

[Peter_Plato]

It seems apparent to me that, at the very, very least, there are times in life when we don’t have the ability to choose what we choose. So given that, what are the implications for having “free will” in general? What is more likely, that we are gifted by the gods a ‘selective free will,’ applicable at certain times in life, but not others? OR, that even the moments in life where we appear to demonstrate real free will are simply illusory?

There are certain physical constraints that are determined by the material nature of our “bodily” existence, but that may be true without concluding that every aspect of our choices is completely constrained.

I have heard an analogy made between free agency and being a driver in a car (see link below).

It may appear, to an alien visitor watching cars on a busy road that certain constraints apply to the vehicles (red lights, traffic flow, friction, inertia, momentum, etc.). The alien could conclude that the cars are all physically determined in their courses of action, but the alien would be completely missing the fact that an independent and autonomous controller (the driver) actually has some measure of freedom from the physical laws of nature that contrain the movement of the vehicle. The controller “managing” the vehicle from the inside may “abide” by the constraints, but is not necessarily determined by them. Starting, stopping, turning, accelerating, etc. are all under the control of the driver, independently of the laws of physics and momentum that constrain the vehicle itself.

The alien may have the impression that the cars on the road are simply mechanical contraptions that operate strictly within a causal order, but by making that determination, the alien would be completely missing the fact that each car (human body) is actually controlled by an independent agent (free will) despite the physical constaints within which the driver (or will) operates.

It may appear that the light turning red causes the cars to stop, but that is only so because a completely different set of “considerations” rather than constraints come into play. A driver could “choose” to run the red light, but has determined that to not be such a good idea. The idea may now serve to “constrain” the driver in the way that the alien thought the red light actually did, but the idea of avoiding collisions does not causally constrain the driver, it only appears to.

Trent Horn, on the following Catholic Answers podcast develops this “car” analogy to free will in far greater detail (start at about timecode 45:00).

catholic.com/radio/shows/open-forum-for-atheists-7537

 

[Giants]

You are right – even in our experience, there are times when we realize that we were never quite as free, as we had believed.

I can give an obvious example, having to do with a dog, not a person. I knew of someone whose dog was afraid of all male visitors. As his owner explained, it was *because * the dog had had an abusive male owner, as a puppy. Whether this was the case with the dog or not, explanations such as this certainly apply to human beings as well – for example, the woman who no longer trusts men, after having been raped.

The worst case scenario is when the individual is not aware of the ways in which his perceptions – and reactions – are being influenced. One may try to repress a painful childhood memory, for example, and not be aware of how significantly that experience has influenced one’s behavior (for example, a humiliating experience that has prompted one to avoid similar experiences of that type).

I think the philosopher Spinoza spoke of a provisional or “soft” freedom, which was in becoming *aware *of the ways in which our behavior has been determined. This approach to better understanding the determinants of one’s behavior – the ways in which one has been influenced or “controlled” – does show that, in an important sense, freedom is not a given, but an achievement.

This insight into the underlying motives of one’s behavior can be extremely subtle – and the more subtle, perhaps, the more fallible – but is, nevertheless, valid. Take, for example, a patient who tries to understand why he avoids close or intimate relationships. He may not understand his own emotions. Through self-knowledge and memory, he realizes – for example – how devastating the death of his father had been to him, when he was a child (which was the case of actor Anthony Perkins). Perkins had come to the realization that, on some level, he was *afraid *of intimacy, because he didn’t want to lose someone – unpredictably and without warning – in the way he had lost his father.

Again, these more subtle manifestations of self-knowledge that can be doubted or even ridiculed – again, the more subtle, the more fallible-- but there can be truth in them.

So yes, I certainly see that there are ways in which we are very much influenced in our behavior – including in racism or prejudice, if we grew up in a household where everyone around us had fed us negative stereotypes, and reinforced them.

A Protestant can make the same realization about his attitude towards Catholics, saying “when I was a child, Catholics were the enemy”, or vice versa.

So, paradoxically, understanding the underlying causes of one’s attitudes, and of the motives of one’s behavior, enables one to experience freedom as an achievement, not a given. To understand all of the ways in which one is determined – or influenced – is, ironically, empowering. Self-knowledge becomes an important key to freedom.

This is all true enough - I just think it’s not the sort of “freedom” we’re really discussing here. This is more of an abstract, emotionally-loaded sense of the word. Perfectly fine, as far as it goes - but I don’t think it can successfully be laid onto an understanding of free will.

In the same way that one doesn’t become emotionally stunted without certain experiences and prior causes they had no hand in choosing to begin with, one cannot overcome being emotionally stunted with having similar prior causes influencing them the other way. If someone had literally spent every day of their entire life through today being beaten and abused by others, and had never - not even once - experienced something that might lead them to experience trust, or seen it demonstrated to someone else, could that person wake up tomorrow and exhibit trust in their fellow man? Quite honestly, I don’t see how it’s possible. Maybe after a long period of time, they could learn that, but that’s the whole point - it needs to be learned.

The rape victim had a traumatic experience, and may not trust men for a long time, but if she ever overcomes that, it will be an achievement ‘won’ through prior unchosen causes, just as was her mistrust in the first place.

 

[Giants]

There are certain physical constraints that are determined by the material nature of our “bodily” existence, but that may be true without concluding that every aspect of our choices is completely constrained.

In principle, it’s fine to believe in a selective sort of free will. I only remarked that it seemed necessarily problematic for people of certain religions (I have no idea what flavor of theist you are, if you are).

I have heard an analogy made between free agency and being a driver in a car (see link below).

It may appear, to an alien visitor watching cars on a busy road that certain constraints apply to the vehicles (red lights, traffic flow, friction, inertia, momentum, etc.). The alien could conclude that the cars are all physically determined in their courses of action, but the alien would be completely missing the fact that an independent and autonomous controller (the driver) actually has some measure of freedom from the physical laws of nature that contrain the movement of the vehicle. The controller “managing” the vehicle from the inside may “abide” by the constraints, but is not necessarily determined by them. Starting, stopping, turning, accelerating, etc. are all under the control of the driver, independently of the laws of physics and momentum that constrain the vehicle itself.

The alien may have the impression that the cars on the road are simply mechanical contraptions that operate strictly within a causal order, but by making that determination, the alien would be completely missing the fact that each car (human body) is actually controlled by an independent agent (free will) despite the physical constaints within which the driver (or will) operates.

It may appear that the light turning red causes the cars to stop, but that is only so because a completely different set of “considerations” rather than constraints come into play. A driver could “choose” to run the red light, but has determined that to not be such a good idea. The idea may now serve to “constrain” the driver in the way that the alien thought the red light actually did, but the idea of avoiding collisions does not causally constrain the driver, it only appears to.

The idea of avoiding harm is perhaps one of the most basic in-born trait that human beings possess. I remember reading or hearing that it’s one of the few things that healthy babies know without needing it to be taught to them - how to be afraid of possible sources of harm. Certainly, there are people in the world who demonstrate a notable lack of fear in normally frightening situations - racecar drivers and psychopaths come to mind, but such people can easily have their behavior traced to certain differences/abnormalities in brain structure/chemistry - which are not the sort of causal factors that can be authored by the person in question.

To me, it all comes back to where are you getting your free will from? At this moment, you are the sum of your genetics (which you had no hand in choosing), your upbringing (which you had no hand in choosing), and your other life experiences (which you had no hand in choosing). You, in turn, are claiming there’s an extra piece of you that allows you to act independently of your first three factors. Where is this coming from?

 

[Peter_Plato]

To me, it all comes back to where are you getting your free will from? At this moment, you are the sum of your genetics (which you had no hand in choosing), your upbringing (which you had no hand in choosing), and your other life experiences (which you had no hand in choosing). You, in turn, are claiming there’s an extra piece of you that allows you to act independently of your first three factors. Where is this coming from?

This is the crucial question.

Going back to the driver/car analogy: all of the so called “external features” (genetics, natural causal order, physical laws, etc.) are constraints on us just as the functionality of the car, traffic patterns, road systems, etc. are constraints on the driver of the car, that does not mean the driver is reducible to the combined network of all those limiting factors. The frustration that the driver feels with those constraints is precisely what could be looked to as evidence that the driver has, at times, “a different mind” about how things “should” be. Pragmatically speaking, the driver should take into account all those factors if s/he knows what’s best for them, but the mere fact that the driver can run red lights or go off-road is evidence of something like a free-will.

David Chalmers (see this video) refers to your question as the “hard problem” of consciousness. Many of the functional (what we do) aspects of the human mind are traceable to physiological mechanisms, but the subjective (who I am) is not. Your question, then is central to this problem of subjective identity.

Obviously, third person, objective, explanations will always fall short because these target functional connections, i.e., x happens because of y, and cannot explain why I, in a subjective sense, experience both x and y.

Where does this “I” come from? Only one possibility. It is not theological speculation that proposed God’s introduction of himself to Moses as, “I Am Who Am.” God was saying something about himself to Moses. Absolute Self-actualization is another way of stating “I Am beyond all possibility of constraint” or I Am because I Am and for no other reason. Our own self-consciousness is an “image” or reflection of God’s total and eternal self-actualization. Analogically, the Sun produces its own light, as God is unconstrained and Self-actualizing Identity, but the moon (human consciousness) can only reflect light (subjective awareness). We cannot “produce” or give rise to our own consciousness, but my strong suspicion is that our sense of freedom is an intuition of our “connection” with God.

We have free will to the extent that we participate in the absolute unconstrained creativity of God. To the extent that we don’t we become more completely constrained by the causal order. This is also why I suspect that free will is more like a capacity or a state to be achieved rather than merely a “given” of human existence. This is also why some people feel they don’t have free will (because they in fact at that time don’t) and others feel they do (because they do).

 

[Giants]

This is the crucial question.

Going back to the driver/car analogy: all of the so called “external features” (genetics, natural causal order, physical laws, etc.) are constraints on us just as the functionality of the car, traffic patterns, road systems, etc. are constraints on the driver of the car, that does not mean the driver is reducible to the combined network of all those limiting factors. The frustration that the driver feels with those constraints is precisely what could be looked to as evidence that the driver has, at times, “a different mind” about how things “should” be. Pragmatically speaking, the driver should take into account all those factors if s/he knows what’s best for them, but the mere fact that the driver can run red lights or go off-road is evidence of something like a free-will.

David Chalmers (see this video) refers to your question as the “hard problem” of consciousness. Many of the functional (what we do) aspects of the human mind are traceable to physiological mechanisms, but the subjective (who I am) is not. Your question, then is central to this problem of subjective identity.

Obviously, third person, objective, explanations will always fall short because these target functional connections, i.e., x happens because of y, and cannot explain why I, in a subjective sense, experience both x and y.

Where does this “I” come from? Only one possibility. It is not theological speculation that proposed God’s introduction of himself to Moses as, “I Am Who Am.” God was saying something about himself to Moses. Absolute Self-actualization is another way of stating “I Am beyond all possibility of constraint” or I Am because I Am and for no other reason. Our own self-consciousness is an “image” or reflection of God’s total and eternal self-actualization. Analogically, the Sun produces its own light, as God is unconstrained and Self-actualizing Identity, but the moon (human consciousness) can only reflect light (subjective awareness). We cannot “produce” or give rise to our own consciousness, but my strong suspicion is that our sense of freedom is an intuition of our “connection” with God.

We have free will to the extent that we participate in the absolute unconstrained creativity of God. To the extent that we don’t we become more completely constrained by the causal order. This is also why I suspect that free will is more like a capacity or a state to be achieved rather than merely a “given” of human existence. This is also why some people feel they don’t have free will (because they in fact at that time don’t) and others feel they do (because they do).

Other than through gaps reasoning, I don’t quite see how Chalmers (or anyone else) can support the assertion that the “self” is something that exists independently of the brain and its physiological processes. While he would be correct to assert that science can’t really explain consciousness (much less brain-independent consciousness), it would not seem parsimonious to assume, in the absence of an explanation, that we each have a layer of consciousness that does not depend on brain activity to exist, but with which we can experience reality unburdened by our brain’s ‘limiting factors.’

To take on the driver analogy, I would simply ask why is any particular feeling, or impulse, or action by the driver in the car evidence of a “different mind?” The driver stops at the red light, but he would rather blaze through it, but in turn resists the impulse to do that. I don’t see why any of these are evidence of a free will at work:

Why does the driver stop in the first place? Because he knows it’s against the law to not stop at red lights. Or he sees traffic or people already crossing the intersection, and he knows it would be unsafe (for him and for them) to cross himself. Does he have a choice as to whether he knows what the law is? Could he un-know it if he wanted to? Could he un-know the possible legal consequences of breaking the law if he wanted to? If he cares about his own well-being (or that of others), could he freely choose to un-care about that?

And if follows: If he blazes through the intersection, consequences be damned, then why? Maybe he wants to see how much chaos and carnage he’ll cause. Maybe, from his perspective, his whole day has been one long exercise of just waiting in line, and he’s sick of it. Does he have control over any of this, going in?

But wait, maybe he’s extremely tired and frustrated and wants to get home, but let’s not go crazy here. There’s no sense killing somebody, or getting killed yourself, or getting pulled over by the cops, just to shave a minute or so off your commute. So he shows restraint, and everybody wins. Could he have freely chosen to restrain himself if that sort of behavior hadn’t been modeled to him at some point in the past? Did he have any choice as to whether it was modeled to him?

And so it goes. The truth is, for every choice we have to make, we are awash in influences stemming from our genes, our upbringing, and our other experiences. These influences frequently, and I would say always - contradict each other. I want to get home, but I don’t want to kill people to get there quicker. The point is, we don’t choose any of these competing influences, and we certain can’t take credit for having freely chosen the option we end up choosing.

And needless to say, attributing this ability to freely choose what we choose to the unfalsfiable existence of a God-head, doesn’t make the argument any stronger.

 

[Peter_Plato]

Other than through gaps reasoning, I don’t quite see how Chalmers (or anyone else) can support the assertion that the “self” is something that exists independently of the brain and its physiological processes. While he would be correct to assert that science can’t really explain consciousness (much less brain-independent consciousness), it would not seem parsimonious to assume, in the absence of an explanation, that we each have a layer of consciousness that does not depend on brain activity to exist, but with which we can experience reality unburdened by our brain’s ‘limiting factors.’

The evidence that self can exist independently of the brain is becoming available because of medical advances. Human beings can be maintained in “brain dead” states for longer periods of time during treatment or while undergoing surgery.

Gary Habermas cites several cases of individuals who were brain dead or comatose for up to three days but were able to describe events and experiences that happened to them while in these states. These occurrences have been written up in medical journals and confirmed by very reputable medical specialists. This is very strong confirmation that consciousness is not reducible to physiological or chemical processes and can exist independently of the brain.

A link to a video by Habermas who details a number of cases is below. He has also written at least one book on evidence from such cases of life after death.

The entire video is very informative on the issue of consciousness and life after death or near death experiences and adds strong support to the “hard problem” of consciousness.

The first of two interesting and baffling stories starts at timecode 26:22, where a little girl who has been comatose in a hospital bed for three days after drowning (18 minutes under water), but is able to describe events in the emergency room and at home, miles away, that she witnessed while comatose and brain dead. She correctly reported the activities of all the members of her family over several hours.

The second case begins at 36:35 and relates the story of a woman who suffered a brain aneurysm and had to be medically “killed” for about an hour while surgery was done. A team of about a dozen medical personnel worked on her while she was medically brain dead. After surgery she correctly provided six specific “points” of evidence that she could not possibly have experienced through physical sensory means because her body was not functioning at the time and are corroborated by the medical personnel.

youtube.com/watch?v=skGf_vsthl8&sns=em

One way to “explain away” these cases is simply to deny that they are credible. The quality of the medical practitioners who witnessed the events argues against that. Assuming that these incidents are veridical, how can the experiences be explained except by accepting that consciousness is not dependent upon nor arises from physical processes?

 

[Giants]

If we’re going to assume, a priori, that these incidents are veridical, then we have nothing further to discuss. So, short of that, it appears we have no choice but to examine the different elements, from the patient, to the doctors, to the 3rd person accounts, to the evidence being presented - all as a way to judge the plausibility of the truth claims.

First, Habermas: It’s worth pointing out that he is not a neuroscientist, nor a medical doctor, nor any sort of vocational scientist. Obviously, you don’t necessarily need to be any of those things to evaluate NDEs (as I’m about to demonstrate), but it might help me take him a bit more seriously as a credible source of information. As it happens, what Habermas is is an evangelical Christian apologist who counts himself (and is counted) as among the foremost experts on the resurrection of Jesus Christ.

But to leave aside his resume and focus on his talk. I watched it from beginning to end, and I heard him say a number of curious things that, frankly, didn’t shore up my confidence in his argument.

Once he gets passed the softer cases of death that did not include the reported cessation of brain activity, he gets to the harder cases where his patients were “brain dead” for extended periods of time. I put “brain dead” in quotes for a couple of reasons. For starters, you put it in quotes to begin with. And secondly, to hear Habermas talk about it, I never got the sense he had a firm intellectual grasp on the concept of brain death, or how one would find out if one was brain dead or not. In one breath, he talks about EEGs reporting non-existent brain activity, and implies that there’s numerous cases of this. In the next, he concedes that EEGs aren’t even that commonly used on patients. So which is it, exactly? Notwithstanding this, it bears mentioning that it’s possible for brain activity to be present, but so low as to avoid detection, even by an EEG.

Another example is Habermas’s use of the word “comatose.” To the extent that this word has a hard medical definition, it simply means being in a coma. Being in a coma does not mean, or even necessarily imply, a cessation of brain activity. Beyond that, the word is often employed colloquially to describe patients who are simply unresponsive to a certain level of stimulus. Hearing Habermas talk, it’s difficult to know whether he understands this distinction, or even finds it worth clarifying.

Other points of note. Earlier on in the talk, Habermas mentions a cardiologist in Denver who reportedly had, in the course of his career, some 2300 patients nearly die on him, of whom 1600 came back and reported having an NDE. We never get this cardiologist’s name, only that he had a pacemaker named after him - and that the catalogue of these reports was assembled and maintained, not by him, but by his assistant, a pastor (also unnamed).

Two doctors singled out by Habermas in his talk (the Tennessee doctor and Dr. Melvin Morse) are described as former “agnostics.” Again - difficult to understand just what he thinks that means, but I noticed he tripped up once and nearly described someone as “atheistic” before he caught himself and corrected it to “agnostic.” This suggests he’s perfectly aware of the distinction between being an agnostic and being an atheist. At the risk of stating the obvious - on the subject of God’s existence, everyone of minimal intellectual honesty is an agnostic. Nobody can honestly claim to know that God exists or doesn’t exist. Whether he’s willing to admit it or not, Gary Habermas is an agnostic. An agnostic Christian, to be sure, but still an agnostic. Just as I’m agnostic atheist. Assuming that the Tennesee doctor and Morse were actually agnostics, I’m a bit curious as to what Habermas believes this fact suggests.

More on the Tennesee doctor (with the ‘7 heart attacks patient’): I wasn’t sure why he mentioned this case at all. His patients has several heart attacks. Upon briefly being resuscitated, the patient exclaims that he’s in hell, and begs the doctor for help. When the man is completely revived the next day, he can’t remember experiencing anything like what he says he experienced the day before. So essentially, it’s a failed NDE that we’re being asked to take as evidence to the truth of NDEs.

The girl in Idaho who was underwater for 19 minutes: I’ll have more to say about this in a general sense later on, but for now, I want to focus on Melvin Morse, the pediatrician who was apparently on call when this girl was brought in to the ER. Firstly, Habermas somewhat mischaracterizes his credentials - calling him a “brain specialist pediatric doctor.” Morse’s specialties are actually in pediatrics and neuro-oncology (in other words, brain neoplasms, like cysts, abscesses and cancers). I don’t consider this a trivial distinction, but even if you do, the question falls back to Habermas and whether he does. Does he not understand the difference between being a loosely defined “brain specialist” and a neuro-oncologist? Does he, again, not think the distinction is worth mentioning to his audience? And if he doesn’t, why not be totally upfront about it and let the facts stand on their own?

Further worth mentioning - Morse has spent much of the last 30 years publishing on NDEs from the position that they are 100% legit, and he’s currently awaiting trial for allegedly “waterboarding” his 11-year old step-daughter. It’s been speculated that, he did this either as a disciplinary measure, or as a method for “researching” NDE. I’m happy to consider this a non sequitur and move on, but as long as I’m being asked to evaluate these people, I don’t think I could honestly let it pass without mention.

Continued in next post

 

[Giants]

Continued from previous post:

And moving on - the brain aneurysm case: This is the “Pam Reynolds case,” oft-cited in NDE and para-psychology circles. Again, I wouldn’t know this from Habermas’s talk - he goes out of his way to avoid mentioning the woman’s name - I don’t know why. But anyway, Sam Harris - an atheist who has published a good deal on matters of brain-independent consciousness, and someone I’d argue is more open to possibilities of this than most atheists, recently referenced the Reynold’s case on his blog (in a pretty lopsided debunking of the NDE claims of Dr. Eben Alexander). Here is Harris’s take on this, in brief:

What is needed to establish the mind’s independence from the brain is a case in which a person has an experience—of anything—without associated brain activity. From time to time, someone will claim that a specific NDE meets this criterion. One of the most celebrated cases in the literature involves a woman, Pam Reynolds, who underwent a procedure known as “hypothermic cardiac arrest,” in which her core body temperature was brought down to 60 degrees, her heart was stopped, and blood flow to her brain was suspended so that a large aneurysm in her basilar artery could be surgically repaired. Reynolds reports having had a classic NDE, complete with an awareness of the details of her surgery. Her story has several problems, however. The events in the world that Reynolds reports having perceived during her NDE occurred either before she was “clinically dead” or after blood circulation had been restored to her brain. In other words, despite the extraordinary details of the procedure, we have every reason to believe that Reynolds’s brain was functioning when she had her experiences. The case also wasn’t published until several years after it occurred, and its author, Dr. Michael Sabom, is a born-again Christian who had been working for decades to substantiate the otherworldly significance of the NDE. The possibility that experimenter bias, witness tampering, and false memories intruded into this best-of-all-recorded cases is excruciatingly obvious.

samharris.org/blog/item/science-on-the-brink-of-death

And I frankly think that Harris’s point about the odds of experimenter bias, witness tampering, and false memories could stand for each of these NDE cases. And his first point may be the most critical of all. A case of a young girl who was able to re-count details of events in her own home, while she lay comatose in a hospital bed, would be extraordinary enough on its own. But unless we can confirm, beyond a doubt, that these experiences happened in the total absence of brain activity, we simply can’t allow them to stand as compelling evidence that consciousness can survive the death of the brain.

Quite apart from Habermas’s talk, there are other things to say about alleged NDEs. The first that one hears precious little (and certainly no attempt at an explanation) about the uncountable number of people who’ve very nearly died, but been revived and claim to have experienced nothing at all. The fact is, if NDEs are real, the cases where they aren’t experienced matter just as much as the cases where they are. As it stands, the people who insist that NDE are real haven’t even taken a swing at that, as far as I can tell. A proper scientific mindset all but demands that they do just that.

Another point rarely addressed by NDE proponents is the unusual variety in the detail and character of individual NDEs. A few words should be spared for this set of cases. In the Sam Harris blog entry above, Harris notes that Dr. Alexander’s account of the afterlife in his newly released, best-selling book, is incompatible with the account of the 4-year old boy who also claims to have experienced it, and whose own best-selling book is being unseated by Alexander’s. Also incompatible are the reported after-death states of North Indians and South Indians. To his credit, Habermas actually concedes there is significant variety between individuals’ experiences. He just doesn’t appear to consider these differences all that compelling, or illustrative of anything.

Frankly, I think there’s a bias here among proponents of NDE that’s helping to wag the dog. Whether they be devout Christians, or soft Christian/theists, or whatever, the idea of a life that exists beyond death is one that has great appeal. But the reason that similar charge can’t be laid at my feet is because I, too, see the appeal in an afterlife. I don’t think it exists, but that’s not the same as saying I’m happy that my consciousness will, one day, blink out of existence, and me with it. To me, it’s the evidence that rules, and if there was evidence compelling enough to change my mind, it would be changed. But I submit that it’s the bias toward the existence of an afterlife that’s clouding the judgment of those who promote the legitimacy of NDE.

 

[Peter_Plato]

…A case of a young girl who was able to re-count details of events in her own home, while she lay comatose in a hospital bed, would be extraordinary enough on its own. But unless we can confirm, beyond a doubt, that these experiences happened in the total absence of brain activity, we simply can’t allow them to stand as compelling evidence that consciousness can survive the death of the brain.

Thank you for being so thorough and taking the time to find additional angles to the stories. I accept the possibilities that you bring up as casting some doubt on the strength of the claims.

The one problem, though, with your version of the young drowning victim, is that even if some brain activity were shown to be present, that is not sufficient to render impotent the fact that she was able to recount events that were going on quite a distance from where she lay in her hospital bed in a comatose state. How did she collect the information that allowed her to recount the specific details of what went on in her home? Yes, there may have been household routines that she was familiar with that could have provided clues, but her claim wasn’t merely that she knew those details, it was that she traveled there and witnessed them. In the least, the story does bear out the merit of further investigation into her claims.

As to why NDE are only claimed in some and not all cases of near death trauma, that is an open question and does nothing to argue against the veridicality of those that do have experiences.

I think Habermas is on the right track with this. Careful recording of details in each reported experience and checking out the possibility of other explanations is an absolute requirement for accepting claims. However, where alternative explanations are absent and claims are established beyond doubt, there is no reason to deny that an individual in a brain dead state who is able to relate a large number of verifiable claims about events they could not possibly have had physical access to should be considered, at least, as prima facie evidence for consciousness having something more than a strictly neurophysiological explanation.

 

[steve_b]

I want to begin my discussion of the question above by focusing on Mother Teresa. She was a wonderful woman who did great things for the poor. Her decision to act in such a way likely owed a great deal to the external environment to which she was exposed. I don’t know much about her life, but I do know that she was born into the Catholic faith, and was likely raised to see helping the less fortunate members of society as a good thing.

This, for me, raises the question of how much of her life we can attribute to her exercising her will. After all, it is likely that if she had been born to secular parents she would have lived a different life, and we never would have known of her great example. Do we have free will, or are we restricted by the environment in which we are born and raised?

If our environment does play a significant role in our development, why did God not alter the environment of Hitler, Stalin, or any other person who commits atrocity? We can put it even more simply:

Why does God allow children to be raped or murdered? What makes preserving one’s free will superior to a child’s well-being?

If we don’t have free will, why did God create a world in which we are determined to act wickedly?

because wickedness exists, does it mean we are determined to be wicked, anymore than because holiness exists, does it mean we are determined to be holy. Wickedness and holiness are choices. That’s why we have heaven & hell. Not just heaven alone or not just hell alone. Both exist. That’s also why we have the scriptures that say

Dt 30: 19 I call heaven and earth to witness against you this day, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and curse; therefore choose life, that you and your descendants may live, 20 loving the LORD your God, obeying his voice, and cleaving to him; for that means life to you and length of days, that you may dwell in the land which the LORD swore to your fathers, to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, to give them."

Every day, we have choices to make.

 

[Giants]

Thank you for being so thorough and taking the time to find additional angles to the stories. I accept the possibilities that you bring up as casting some doubt on the strength of the claims.

The one problem, though, with your version of the young drowning victim, is that even if some brain activity were shown to be present, that is not sufficient to render impotent the fact that she was able to recount events that were going on quite a distance from where she lay in her hospital bed in a comatose state. How did she collect the information that allowed her to recount the specific details of what went on in her home? Yes, there may have been household routines that she was familiar with that could have provided clues, but her claim wasn’t merely that she knew those details, it was that she traveled there and witnessed them. In the least, the story does bear out the merit of further investigation into her claims.

I agree - the reported specificity of her claims is interesting, and her case deserves further investigation. But the only reason I’d concede that is because the account I’ve heard so far (from Habermas) is so broad-stroked. My suspicion is that if I heard a truly objective version of these events, even if left things open to question, I’d be much less interested in following up with a further investigation.

Also, the problem is, as a practical matter, how would one investigate such a thing? The near-drowning happened in 1982. The girl in question would now be in her late 30s. Habermas called her ‘Katie’ in his talk, but that was likely a pseudonym given to protect her privacy. Melvin Morse would certainly know her true identity, but he’s probably busy trying to stay out of prison.

Aside from talking to her (should we ever track her down), we would also try to question the other doctors involved in her case, and her family members (if still living). Was she raised in a more religious home, or a more secular one? Did she have an active imagination? How soon after she was revived did she start talking?

As to why NDE are only claimed in some and not all cases of near death trauma, that is an open question and does nothing to argue against the veridicality of those that do have experiences.

I disagree. I wouldn’t call it a knockdown argument, exactly, but it’s like the point I made about the varied experiences that people have in their NDEs. Dr. Eben Alexander talked about taking a ride on a psychadelic butterfly. The 4-year old whose NDE became the basis of the best-selling book “Heaven Is For Real” claims he saw Jesus riding a rainbow horse and that kids are required to do homework in heaven. It seems reasonable to assume that, in a reality where consciousness can survive beyond death, a given species of animal wouldn’t report quite such a variation as have been reported.

The deeper point stands I believe - nobody who thinks NDEs are legit think that the number of people who report not having them merits even some basic intellectual curiosity, or appear to recognize the potential implications this has on their belief. At best, it warrents a collective shrug. Notwithstanding the truth claims and the data supporting them - this approach and mindset is profoundly anti-scientific.

I think Habermas is on the right track with this. Careful recording of details in each reported experience and checking out the possibility of other explanations is an absolute requirement for accepting claims. However, where alternative explanations are absent and claims are established beyond doubt, there is no reason to deny that an individual in a brain dead state who is able to relate a large number of verifiable claims about events they could not possibly have had physical access to should be considered, at least, as prima facie evidence for consciousness having something more than a strictly neurophysiological explanation.

This is all fine, in principle. However, I remain unconvinced that Habermas even knows what “brain dead” really means. He talks about EEGs without apparently understanding their technological limitations, while also conceding that they aren’t even commonly administered tests in the first place. “Brain death” is medically defined as the irreversible end of all brain activity. If the “Katie” drowning story is true as Habermas describes it - this is not just evidence of brain-free consciousness. It’s evidence of legitimate miracle taking place - a human being coming back from full-on brain death to resume a normal life. That Habermas, a Christian apologist, doesn’t seize on this fact and exploit it for all that it would be worth, tells me, again, that he doesn’t quite have a firm grasp of what it means to be “brain dead.” Yet, he’s perfectly comfortable throwing the term around as though he were an authoritative source on the subject.

 

[Portofino]

I agree - the reported specificity of her claims is interesting, and her case deserves further investigation. But the only reason I’d concede that is because the account I’ve heard so far (from Habermas) is so broad-stroked. My suspicion is that if I heard a truly objective version of these events, even if left things open to question, I’d be much less interested in following up with a further investigation.

It’s certainly not unfair to have a very demanding burden of proof.

If one has had a Near Death Experience first hand, then the burden of proof – rightly or wrongly – might be reduced significantly Of course, it cannot be ruled out that one is not mistaken, even about something one has directly experienced.

As for myself, I can hardly believe that hypnosis is something real, as it seems almost paranormal, in itself. Hypnosis being an altered state of consciousness, it is not all that far from the phenomenon of “channeling.”

I think that people who have had “paranormal” experiences tend to anchor their authenticity – again, rightly or wrongly – in more tangible or sensuous differences in their perception, that they’ve never experienced before or since. For example, one might smell a particular scent, during the experience. Or one might feel a peculiar warmth; or a peculiar coldness; or a peculiar tingling. These are physiological cues that seems to reinforce the idea that whatever one is experiencing, it is indeed “out of the ordinary.”

For example, there is an interesting article about a visit in which Jung had “spooked” a skeptical and positivistic Freud, as regards the reality of paranormal phenomena (ironically, a Freud who had no problem in accepting the altered state of consciousness known as hypnosis, and who spent so much of his professional life in interpreting the altered state of consciousness of dreams).

As with what I described above, Jung experienced a tangible physiological clue that something was “out of the ordinary” – in this case, a sensation of intense heat in his diaphragm. This physical sensation helped to anchor his experience, it seems (perhaps, convincing him that the fact that something was indeed out of the ordinary, was not just in his imagination).

psychologytoday.com/blog/untangling-lifes-complexities/201109/jungs-explosive-visit-freud

William James and Carl Jung come to mind as two scientifically-minded individuals (in the broadest sense of the word) who were open to the experience of the paranormal.

 

[Giants]

It’s certainly not unfair to have a very demanding burden of proof.

If one has had a Near Death Experience first hand, then the burden of proof – rightly or wrongly – might be reduced significantly Of course, it cannot be ruled out that one is not mistaken, even about something one has directly experienced.

As for myself, I can hardly believe that hypnosis is something real, as it seems almost paranormal, in itself. Hypnosis being an altered state of consciousness, it is not all that far from the phenomenon of “channeling.”

I think that people who have had “paranormal” experiences tend to anchor their authenticity – again, rightly or wrongly – in more tangible or sensuous differences in their perception, that they’ve never experienced before or since. For example, one might smell a particular scent, during the experience. Or one might feel a peculiar warmth; or a peculiar coldness; or a peculiar tingling. These are physiological cues that seems to reinforce the idea that whatever one is experiencing, it is indeed “out of the ordinary.”

For example, there is an interesting article about a visit in which Jung had “spooked” a skeptical and positivistic Freud, as regards the reality of paranormal phenomena (ironically, a Freud who had no problem in accepting the altered state of consciousness known as hypnosis, and who spent so much of his professional life in interpreting the altered state of consciousness of dreams).

As with what I described above, Jung experienced a tangible physiological clue that something was “out of the ordinary” – in this case, a sensation of intense heat in his diaphragm. This physical sensation helped to anchor his experience, it seems (perhaps, convincing him that the fact that something was indeed out of the ordinary, was not just in his imagination).

psychologytoday.com/blog/untangling-lifes-complexities/201109/jungs-explosive-visit-freud

William James and Carl Jung come to mind as two scientifically-minded individuals (in the broadest sense of the word) who were open to the experience of the paranormal.

People who recreationally use psychadelic drugs also report having truly phenonemal, senuous experiences. DMT users, in particular, have reported experiences that, at times, could be lifted right out of an NDE catalogue.

It depends on what one means by being “open” the experience of the paranormal. You can be subject to all manner of transformative experiences while being on the brink of death, or on drugs, or while meditating. There’s nothing scientific about dismissing the claim that an experience was had. Where one should be properly skeptical is when people take such experiences and attempt to conclude unjustified things about the nature of reality.

Hypnosis seems perfectly legit to me. I don’t have much to go on here, except that I’ve seen it done, at a public event in college, and nothing about it seemed staged or phony. I don’t understand the purported mechanism of it, though - I keep meaning to research it.

 

[kingpomba]

Why does God allow children to be raped or murdered? What makes preserving one’s free will superior to a child’s well-being?

If we don’t have free will, why did God create a world in which we are determined to act wickedly?

I find this one of the most interesting problems in philosophy of religion and probably by miles one of the best arguments against the existence of the Abrahamic God.

That’s something that gets me too. I might understand how allowing free-will to exist might be for the greater good (as in Gain from free will - Loss from suffering = +) but when that free will is used in evil to violate or suppress someone elses free will anyway, isn’t it a bit of a moot point? Not many rape victims willed to have those horrible acts occur, they were denied from exercising their free will.

What i find a more telling objection is this. Some people (Deists, etc) argue its God never intervenes in this world or that it is actually impossible. It just might be it’s metaphysically impossible for God to interfere in free will because it would *“break” *free will. I think Deists might be able to defend that view.

However, in the bible, God quite clearly intervenes numerous times and ***denies ***people their free will.

The story of the Pharaoh is a good one. Pharaoh quite clearly willed to harm the Jewish people and continue to do so with no foreseeable end. That was he free willed decision. We know how God **intervened **and he killed a lot of Pharaoh’s men to prevent the massacre of the Jewish people, in the process, he interfered in Pharaoh’s free will.

So, it’s absurd to say that God can’t sometimes interfere in peoples free will without somehow ***breaking ***the concept of free will.

If God intervened to save the Jewish people in the time of the Pharaoh, which we are supposedly told is true, where was he in Auschwitz?

Well, you might agree that we can easily name a few instances in life where it seems like we don’t have free will. If you stick your hand in a pot of boiling water, do you have any real control over as to whether you immediately pull it or not?

This is called a reflex arc.

The signal doesn’t even reach your brain before you pull your hand away. The reflexes in your body act to pull your hand away before you even feel the sensation of heat (that takes longer to get to your brain).

Since the brain is the seat of free will (if it does exist) we can say this question is exempt from being argued about in the debate over free will.

 

[Peter_Plato]

However, in the bible, God quite clearly intervenes numerous times and ***denies ***people their free will.

The story of the Pharaoh is a good one. Pharaoh quite clearly willed to harm the Jewish people and continue to do so with no foreseeable end. That was he free willed decision. We know how God **intervened **and he killed a lot of Pharaoh’s men to prevent the massacre of the Jewish people, in the process, he interfered in Pharaoh’s free will.

So, it’s absurd to say that God can’t sometimes interfere in peoples free will without somehow ***breaking ***the concept of free will.

There is a difference between interfering with the choices that someone makes and denying their free will.

God definitely intervened and negated the outcomes of choices made by Pharaoh, but those choices where, in fact, Pharaoh’s to freely make.

Free will is the capacity to make choices, it is not the choices being made. There is a difference.

Free will is the autonomy that distinguishes the “self” from everything else. The fundamental property that actually permits each person to have an individual identity. It is the essential underpinning for being a self. If someone were to take away your free will, they would, at the same time take away your identity,

In interfering with Pharaoh, God thwarted outcomes that Pharaoh willed, but in order to take away his free will, God would have had to actually change the functional will within Pharaoh from where those choices came. God didn’t tamper with or limit Pharaoh’s faculty (will) by which he made choices, God merely changed the outcomes that Pharaoh expected to result from his choices. He sent frogs to cover the land, but he didn’t change Pharaoh into a frog with a hampered capacity to make choices. Big difference.

 

[Peter_Plato]

That’s something that gets me too. I might understand how allowing free-will to exist might be for the greater good (as in Gain from free will - Loss from suffering = +) but when that free will is used in evil to violate or suppress someone elses free will anyway, isn’t it a bit of a moot point? Not many rape victims willed to have those horrible acts occur, they were denied from exercising their free will.

What if allowing free will is precisely what is required to allow each person to have a subjective identity, to be the individual person they are?

It would seem to be a mighty important concession in that case and perhaps even warrant the allowance of a measure of evil because without it subjective self-awareness in persons would not exist.

 

[kingpomba]

There is a difference between interfering with the choices that someone makes and denying their free will.

God definitely intervened and negated the outcomes of choices made by Pharaoh, but those choices where, in fact, Pharaoh’s to freely make.

Free will is the capacity to make choices, it is not the choices being made. There is a difference.

No matter what semantic distinction you want to make, it’s clear God can interfere in the process of free will.

Is free will really free if divine intervention is preventing you from **actualizing **your will, which you otherwise would have been able to sans intervention?

Free actions can only occur as being chosen by someone using their free will.

Free actions are the outcome of your free will, it is how your use of free will is displayed to the world.

We can be semantic but free actions are the practical outcome of free will. God denied people their free action.

Either way, that was not the crux of my argument. I was merely trying to make the case that it is not metaphysically impossible or illogical according to the scripture for God to interfere in peoples choices.

Some **deists **believe miracles or intervention would be **impossible **due to the effects they might have on nature or metaphysics. I was just merely trying to prove this simply isn’t the case.

If God can intervene to stop Pharaoh or to wipe out whole villages, there is no metaphysical barrier towards him stopping the holocaust, yet, he did not. That leads to the question of Why? Why did he choose not to act, even though he very well could of?

Again, **my main and pretty much only point i’m trying to make is that it’s quite obvious it isn’t metaphysically impossible for God to interfere **to prevent evil, free will won’t “break” you even seem to have proved this yourself. He just chooses not to. This pretty kills the free will defense.

free agent is he that can do as he will, and forbear as he will, and that *liberty is the absence of external impediments" * and Hume “is the power of acting or of not acting, according to the determination of the will: that is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may.… This hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to everyone who is not a prisoner and in chains.”]

What if allowing free will is precisely what is required to allow each person to have a subjective identity, to be the individual person they are?

It would seem to be a mighty important concession in that case and perhaps even warrant the allowance of a measure of evil because without it subjective self-awareness in persons would not exist.

We can’t prove or reason either way.

Animals don’t have free will but they certainly have a sense of self, they know they are distinct from other things.

Drawing on my background in biology, a few animals can pass the mirror test, they recognise that it is themselves in the mirror and not some other animal.

 

[Peter_Plato]

No matter what semantic distinction you want to make, it’s clear God can interfere in the process of free will.

Is free will really free if divine intervention is preventing you from **actualizing **your will, which you otherwise would have been able to sans intervention?

Free actions can only occur as being chosen by someone using their free will.

Free actions are the outcome of your free will, it is how your use of free will is displayed to the world.

We can be semantic but free actions are the practical outcome of free will. God denied people their free action.

Taking away some of the available options is not the same as taking away the “will” by which any options are decided.

Either way, that was not the crux of my argument. I was merely trying to make the case that it is not metaphysically impossible or illogical according to the scripture for God to interfere in peoples choices.

Some **deists **believe miracles or intervention would be **impossible **due to the effects they might have on nature or metaphysics. I was just merely trying to prove this simply isn’t the case.

If God can intervene to stop Pharaoh or to wipe out whole villages, there is no metaphysical barrier towards him stopping the holocaust, yet, he did not. That leads to the question of Why? Why did he choose not to act, even though he very well could of?

Again, **my main and pretty much only point i’m trying to make is that it’s quite obvious it isn’t metaphysically impossible for God to interfere **to prevent evil, free will won’t “break” you even seem to have proved this yourself. He just chooses not to. This pretty kills the free will defense.

free agent is he that can do as he will, and forbear as he will, and that *liberty is the absence of external impediments" * and Hume “is the power of acting or of not acting, according to the determination of the will: that is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may.… This hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to everyone who is not a prisoner and in chains.”]

This is all beside the point. You were arguing that God could take away free will and therefore evil without compromising the integrity of human beings.

My counter to your point is that it is true only if free will is not integral to what makes each individual a unique person. If taking away free will annihilates the person’s very identity as an individual then taking away free will does matter. In order for your argument to hold, you would have to prove that God could rescind free will without taking away an individual’s identity.

You have not done that because your argument is about controlling options not about God actually taking away personal volitional autonomy.

We can’t prove or reason either way.

Animals don’t have free will but they certainly have a sense of self, they know they are distinct from other things.

Drawing on my background in biology, a few animals can pass the mirror test, they recognise that it is themselves in the mirror and not some other animal.

Granted these animals recognize “something” familiar, but that may be just a function of categorizing and memory. It doesn’t mean they are recognizing a “self” or have subjective self-awareness when, in fact, they may only be recognizing a familiar body form.

A computer “recognizes” you when you login or use fingerprint or iris recognition technology and it responds uniquely to the set of parameters it has defined as you. Mirror test may be a highly complex version of those technologies, but utilizing a large number of neural cues. Any animal must locate itself in space when it responds to threats or stimuli from the environment. The mirror test may just be tapping into a similar **or highly refined **set of these neural functions. That need not entail subjective consciousness.

Complex responses can be done “blindly” and without conscious awareness. The condition of blind sightedness in humans proves this. In some conditions of blindness, the conscious subject is not aware of perceptual data available to the brain, so such a person can walk into a room and unconsciously avoid all furniture and obstacles. So complex responses to the environment may occur without a subjective presence.