When the primary objective of punishment is set aside it must always be for a greater reason, not a lesser one like a secondary objective.
snip
Setting aside the primary objective in order to protect the innocent is acceptable; setting it aside because it is (claimed) not to be necessary to achieve a secondary objective is sacrificing a higher objective for an irrelevancy.
Ender
So true. It is immoral, both secularly and in religion, to punish someone because it defends society. The primary foundation must be that the wrongdoer committed the crime and is sanctioned based upon the nature of the crime. Everything else must be secondary, no matter how important.
The complaint that this Catechism has removed just retribution (and therefore, balance, redress, correction, etc.) from punishment is based upon the reality that 2267 has allowed an improper and inaccurate evaluation of secular penal standards to dominate over both just retribution or “The primary scope of the penalty is to redress the disorder caused by the offense” (2266) and Genesis 9:6.
While the first sections of this chapter (through 2266) detail the importance of retribution, the later section (2267) provides little time for justice, which must dominate the utilitarian aspect of protection. The Church miscalculates in 2267 and fails to realize the rational reality that innocents are more protected when murderers are executed, even though the Church enforces that reality within 2265.
“While punishment does serve the purpose of protecting society, it also and “primarily” serves the function of manifesting the transcendent, divine order of justice–an order which the state executes by divine delegation.” " . . . it may be argued that such a conception of punishment, rooted in the restoration of moral balance, always presupposes an awareness of the superordinate dignity of the common good as defined by transcendent moral truths." (5)
“Yet the presence of two purposes–retributive and medicinal justice–ought not obscure the priority of assigning punishment proportionate to the crime (just retribution) insofar as the limited jurisdiction of human justice allows. The end is not punishment, but rather the manifestation of a divine norm of retributive justice, which entails proportionate equality vis-à-vis the crime.” “The medicinal goal is not tantamount merely to stopping future evildoing, but rather entails manifesting the truth of the divine order of justice both to the criminal and to society at large. This means that mere stopping of further disorder is insufficient to constitute the full medicinal character of justice, which purpose alike and primarily entails the manifestation of the truth. Thus this foundational sense of the medicinality of penalty is retained even when others drop away.” (6)
Justice is the soul of sanction.
All other results - protection, safety and deterrence - although beneficial and desired, are a result of sanction, not the reasons for it.
Rehabilitation/redress/correction/redemption/expiation have a foundation in just retribution, but depend upon the free will choice of the criminal who we hope will, by grace, avail themselves of those choices.
- “Evangelium Vitae, St. Thomas Aquinas and the Death Penalty”, p 519, Steven A. Long, The Thomist, 63 (1999): 511-552
- ibid, p 522