Doctrine of Double Effect counter example?

[MalteseFalcon]

Thought experiment:

“Suppose, for instance, that there are five patients in a hospital whose lives could be saved by the manufacture of a certain gas, but that this inevitably releases lethal fumes into the room of another patient whom for some reason we are unable to move. His death, being of no use to us, is clearly a side effect, and not directly intended.”-Philipa Foot The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect.

Philipa says the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) allows us to manufacture the gas, thus killing an innocent person (death unwilled, and does not cause the good), but as this is false the DDE must be wrong. How does the production of the gas fail the DDE?

 

[Michael_Mayo]

An action that is good in itself that has two effects–an intended and otherwise not reasonably attainable good effect, and an unintended yet foreseen evil effect–is licit, provided there is a due proportion between the intended good and the permitted evil.

In the case you provide ther eis not “due proportion”.
•The foreseen beneficial effects must be equal to or greater than the foreseen harmful effects (the proportionate judgment);

ascensionhealth.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=81rinciple-of-double-effect&Itemid=171

cuf.org/FileDownloads/doubleeffect.pdf

 

[Ender]

An action that is good in itself that has two effects–an intended and otherwise not reasonably attainable good effect, and an unintended yet foreseen evil effect–is licit, provided there is a due proportion between the intended good and the permitted evil.

In the case you provide ther eis not “due proportion”.
•The foreseen beneficial effects must be equal to or greater than the foreseen harmful effects (the proportionate judgment);

ascensionhealth.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=81rinciple-of-double-effect&Itemid=171

cuf.org/FileDownloads/doubleeffect.pdf

When I read the example in the OP I assumed that the Principle of Double Effect did not apply and that saving the lives of the five did not excuse the death of the one. Now I’m not so sure. Regarding your assertion that there is not due proportion, I don’t think that is true.

Your second citation, applying the principle to a woman with an ectopic pregnancy, states: *“The good end of saving the mother’s life is proportionate to the unintended evil side effect, that of the unborn child’s death.” *If the saving of one life is proportionate to the loss of another then surely the saving of five is proportionate to the loss of one.

I remain unconvinced that the PDE allows the manufacture of the gas but I don’t think we have yet discovered why it does not.

Ender

 

[Prodigal_Son]

I remain unconvinced that the PDE allows the manufacture of the gas but I don’t think we have yet discovered why it does not.

Here’s the interesting question to me: suppose we were to change the case, and say that the person in the other room is going to die anyway within the next two months, and is basically in a coma. This makes the case parallel situations like ectopic pregnancy, which the PDE is classically applied to. Does this change our intuitions? Should it?

 

[dmar198]

Thought experiment:

“Suppose, for instance, that there are five patients in a hospital whose lives could be saved by the manufacture of a certain gas, but that this inevitably releases lethal fumes into the room of another patient whom for some reason we are unable to move. His death, being of no use to us, is clearly a side effect, and not directly intended.”-Philipa Foot The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect.

Philipa says the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) allows us to manufacture the gas, thus killing an innocent person (death unwilled, and does not cause the good), but as this is false the DDE must be wrong. How does the production of the gas fail the DDE?

 

[Michael_Mayo]

When I read the example in the OP I assumed that the Principle of Double Effect did not apply and that saving the lives of the five did not excuse the death of the one. Now I’m not so sure. Regarding your assertion that there is not due proportion, I don’t think that is true.

Your second citation, applying the principle to a woman with an ectopic pregnancy, states: *“The good end of saving the mother’s life is proportionate to the unintended evil side effect, that of the unborn child’s death.” *If the saving of one life is proportionate to the loss of another then surely the saving of five is proportionate to the loss of one.

I remain unconvinced that the PDE allows the manufacture of the gas but I don’t think we have yet discovered why it does not.

Ender

With the ectopic pregnancy a fine distinction is made between “scooping” and “excising the tube”. Scooping, being too direct on the embryo and excising being less direct.

The gas would be too direct and why could it not be diverted?

 

[christus_vincit]

Thought experiment:

“Suppose, for instance, that there are five patients in a hospital whose lives could be saved by the manufacture of a certain gas, but that this inevitably releases lethal fumes into the room of another patient whom for some reason we are unable to move. His death, being of no use to us, is clearly a side effect, and not directly intended.”-Philipa Foot The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect.

Philipa says the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) allows us to manufacture the gas, thus killing an innocent person (death unwilled, and does not cause the good), but as this is false the DDE must be wrong. How does the production of the gas fail the DDE?

Lets say we change the number of lives the gas will save from 5 to 5,000, or even 50,000. The gas still results in the death of only 1. Does this change how we view this scenario? Is the principle of double effect dependent on the number of lives that will be saved? I don’t think it is, because if we look at the scenario in this manner, we become utilitarians.

The focus has to remain on the consequence of the action - namely, that an innocent person will die as a direct result of the gas being pumped into the room full of people. Can such a “side-effect” ever be tolerated under this circumstances? From a principled standpoint, I would say no.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Lets say we change the number of lives the gas will save from 5 to 5,000, or even 50,000. The gas still results in the death of only 1. Does this change how we view this scenario? Is the principle of double effect dependent on the number of lives that will be saved? I don’t think it is, because if we look at the scenario in this manner, we become utilitarians.

The focus has to remain on the consequence of the action - namely, that an innocent person will die as a direct result of the gas being pumped into the room full of people. Can such a “side-effect” ever be tolerated under this circumstances? From a principled standpoint, I would say no.

But, in the case of a ectopic pregnancy, an innocent person will die as a direct result, too. So that can’t be the whole story, unless procedures to end ectopic pregnancies are morally wrong.

 

[RedFox0456]

The problem is the two situations are not truly analogous. There is a patient in another room. Why can’t he leave the room? We recognize it’s wrong because in this particular decision we are forcing someone to die who doesn’t really have to.

 

[Ender]

Here’s the interesting question to me: suppose we were to change the case, and say that the person in the other room is going to die anyway within the next two months, and is basically in a coma. This makes the case parallel situations like ectopic pregnancy, which the PDE is classically applied to. Does this change our intuitions? Should it?

Yes, this distinction occurred to me too and I think it may change the answer. Like the ectopic pregnancy, there is no way to save one of the people involved; one death in inevitable and this distinction may allow the other five to be saved.

Ender

 

[marymary1975]

This is a perfect example of what I call trying to manipulate people’s emotions by using sentimental scenarios to diverge the rational reading of the words in paragraph. We are talking here about a “gas” that releases “lethal fumes.” What we are talking here is a hazardous material. If a gas with lethal fumes must be used for an important reason it is basic logic that the manufacturer has a duty to seal the gas in a way that it doesn’t escape and that the people who have to handle such gas are prepared and trained to handle in such a way that the gas is not going to escape. As it is with any hazardous material if there is a minimal possibility of failure you don’t use it. Blowing a hazardous material into a room with no precautions and that passing to another room has nothing to do with double effect. That is plain and simple negligence and no negligence is not double effect.

 

[Gorgias]

Thought experiment:

“Suppose, for instance, that there are five patients in a hospital whose lives could be saved by the manufacture of a certain gas, but that this inevitably releases lethal fumes into the room of another patient whom for some reason we are unable to move. His death, being of no use to us, is clearly a side effect, and not directly intended.”-Philipa Foot The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect.

Philipa says the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) allows us to manufacture the gas, thus killing an innocent person (death unwilled, and does not cause the good), but as this is false the DDE must be wrong. How does the production of the gas fail the DDE?

I say that the example is a misapplication of double effect, and therefore, while it seems a reasonable thought experiment, it is fundamentally flawed.

Double effect talks about a single action that has both positive/intended and negative/unintended effects. Foot’s example subtly conflates the intended action with a subsequent positive effect; however, the action does not cause the positive effect, which is the basis upon which double effect works.

I’ve placed the intended effect in his example in green and the negative/unintended effect in red. The problem, though, is that positive effect isn’t the intended effect! The positive effect, on the other hand, is highlighted in blue. Let’s look at it closely:

The positive effect is “saving the lives of five patients;” however, the “manufacture of the particular gas” is not what saves the patients’ lives! Rather, it’s the application of the gas, previously manufactured, that is what saves their lives! Think about it: if they manufacture the gas, but not apply it to the five patients, are those patients cured? Of course not! Therefore, we’re talking about two distinct actions – manufacture and application – and it’s only the manufacture that has the negative effect…

So, he’s correct in that the manufacturing of the gas is morally illicit, since it has the effect of killing a person: clearly, “gas manufacture” does not outweigh “patient’s death.” However, it does not disprove double effect, since in his example, there is no single action with both a positive/intended effect and a negative/unintended effect.

(Now, if Foot reformulated the argument such that the application of the gas released the lethal gas, then he might be able to ask the question he wants to ask. However, that example is highly implausible, to say the least…)

 

[Prodigal_Son]

I say that the example is a misapplication of double effect, and therefore, while it seems a reasonable thought experiment, it is fundamentally flawed.

Double effect talks about a single action that has both positive/intended and negative/unintended effects. Foot’s example subtly conflates the intended action with a subsequent positive effect; however, the action does not cause the positive effect, which is the basis upon which double effect works.

I’ve placed the intended effect in his example in green and the negative/unintended effect in red. The problem, though, is that positive effect isn’t the intended effect! The positive effect, on the other hand, is highlighted in blue. Let’s look at it closely:

The positive effect is “saving the lives of five patients;” however, the “manufacture of the particular gas” is not what saves the patients’ lives! Rather, it’s the application of the gas, previously manufactured, that is what saves their lives! Think about it: if they manufacture the gas, but not apply it to the five patients, are those patients cured? Of course not! Therefore, we’re talking about two distinct actions – manufacture and application – and it’s only the manufacture that has the negative effect…

So, he’s correct in that the manufacturing of the gas is morally illicit, since it has the effect of killing a person: clearly, “gas manufacture” does not outweigh “patient’s death.” However, it does not disprove double effect, since in his example, there is no single action with both a positive/intended effect and a negative/unintended effect.

(Now, if Foot reformulated the argument such that the application of the gas released the lethal gas, then he might be able to ask the question he wants to ask. However, that example is highly implausible, to say the least…)

Why does it matter how implausible the imagined case is? Implausible things happen every day.

 

[Ender]

Double effect talks about a single action that has both positive/intended and negative/unintended effects. Philipa’s example subtly conflates the intended action with a subsequent positive effect; however, the action does not cause the positive effect, which is the basis upon which double effect works.

I’m willing to accept that the particulars of the example are flawed but arguing over those details is an evasion of the question, not a response to it. Basically the situation is this: five people will lose their lives unless Action X is taken, but by taking Action X one person will lose his life. And the question is whether we are justified in taking Action X?

Now, more details are surely required but can we really say there are no conditions under which we would be allowed to take that action?

Ender

 

[Gorgias]

I’m willing to accept that the particulars of the example are flawed but arguing over those details is an evasion of the question, not a response to it.

No… it is a response to it! The question is, quite simply, “is double effect itself a flawed premise? That is, isn’t it possible to meet the requirements of double effect and yet take an immoral action?”

The answer, of course, is ‘no’. That requires the person who wants to assert the contrary position to provide a counter-example demonstrating that his assertion is true. Foot attempts – and fails! – to do so here. Therefore, we’re not evading her question; rather, we’re simply denying her counter-example. No evasion here…

Basically the situation is this: five people will lose their lives unless Action X is taken, but by taking Action X one person will lose his life. And the question is whether we are justified in taking Action X? Now, more details are surely required but can we really say there are no conditions under which we would be allowed to take that action?

Actually, Foot dances around this particular example a few times in his article. She seems to be arguing for utilitarianism: if one person dies in an attempt to save another, that’s bad; if one person dies in an attempt to save another, that’s good!

Yet, that is not what we say, in the appeal to double effect! We use the example of an ectopic pregnancy as a canonical example to demonstrate an appeal to double effect! We also point to the notion (as Foot illustrates) of the question of a pregnant mother with a cancerous uterus.

In general, Foot gets it terribly wrong on a number of counts in his article, from the perspective of Catholic moral theology. But, moreover, the question that you ask isn’t precisely the one Foot is attempting to pin down, although it figures in her analysis. In any case, your statement of the question (“are there no conditions under which…?”) doesn’t make sense – there are conditions, and double effect addresses what kinds of conditions might be successfully argued for!

 

[Gorgias]

Why does it matter how implausible the imagined case is? Implausible things happen every day.

It matters because Foot’s project is the presentation of a counter-example to the notion of double effect. Therefore, she needs to develop a case that works; if we can deny the counter-example, we can continue to deny her assertion.

But, go ahead: if you want to work with the basic notion she’s setting up, try and come up with a plausible scenario. Anything else would be, as she notes in the reaction of some to DDE, simply sophistry…

 

[Ender]

The question is, quite simply, “is double effect itself a flawed premise? That is, isn’t it possible to meet the requirements of double effect and yet take an immoral action?”

That is not the question we are dealing with. You may believe that Foot’s objective is to justify taking an immoral action (and you may well be right), but that is irrelevant to the question actually asked. Objecting to someone’s perceived intent is not the same as responding to their actual question.

In general, Foot gets it terribly wrong on a number of counts in his article, from the perspective of Catholic moral theology. But, moreover, the question that you ask isn’t precisely the one Foot is attempting to pin down, although it figures in her analysis. In any case, your statement of the question (“are there no conditions under which…?”) doesn’t make sense – there are conditions, and double effect addresses what kinds of conditions might be successfully argued for!

You assert that Foot’s example is flawed, that the particulars of her case don’t meet the criteria for double effect, yet you seem to recognize that valid cases can be created that raise essentially the same question she raised. Why not deal with the basic issue raised (as opposed to implied) instead of attacking the details of her example?

Her situation is similar to what I have seen described as the streetcar example. A streetcar goes out of control and if nothing is done it will crash into a vehicle with five people, killing them all. The only other alternative is to send it down a different track where it will crash into a vehicle killing only one person. The question is: are we justified in taking that action?

I think we are and I think the rationale is the same as with the ectopic pregnancy so the question is: in what essential way does the streetcar example differ from the situation created by Foot?

Ender

 

[Gorgias]

Gorgias:

The question is, quite simply, “is double effect itself a flawed premise? That is, isn’t it possible to meet the requirements of double effect and yet take an immoral action?”

That is not the question we are dealing with.

MalteseFalcon:

Philipa says the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) allows us to manufacture the gas, thus killing an innocent person (death unwilled, and does not cause the good), but as this is false the DDE must be wrong. How does the production of the gas fail the DDE?

Ender, perhaps you and I are reading different threads.

In fact, the problem that MalteseFalcon raises is precisely Foot’s contention that the thought experiment demonstrates that “the DDE must be wrong”. (I think Falcon’s final question is unfortunately phrased: it’s not that Foot asserts that the example fails the DDE; it’s that she believes it proves the invalidity of the DDE. )

Hence my reply: the Foot construction does not demonstrate the invalidity of the DDE, since it does not provide us with a valid application of the DDE.

you seem to recognize that valid cases can be created that raise essentially the same question she raised. Why not deal with the basic issue raised (as opposed to implied) instead of attacking the details of her example?

I don’t believe that valid cases can be created that invalidate the notion of the DDE (although I see that one might wish to create examples that raise the question). Why not raise alternative cases? 'Cause I disagree with her premise: I don’t think that the DDE is invalid. Are you really asking me to create an argument or thought experiment to attack a proposition in which I believe? Really?

Why attack the details of her example? 'Cause it’s a flawed example.

Her situation is similar to what I have seen described as the streetcar example. A streetcar goes out of control and if nothing is done it will crash into a vehicle with five people, killing them all. The only other alternative is to send it down a different track where it will crash into a vehicle killing only one person. The question is: are we justified in taking that action?

Have you read her article? She mentions this precise example.

and I think the rationale is the same as with the ectopic pregnancy so the question is: in what essential way does the streetcar example differ from the situation created by Foot?

I see. So… since I responded to her assertion, and not yours, I’m missing the point. Got it.

The streetcar example can either appear identical or distinct to the ectopic pregnancy example, it seems, depending on how you frame it up. So, you’re stuck with a debate over whether this is an example of proportionalism or not. If it is proportionalism, then it is prohibited by the Catholic Church (see Veritatis splendor); if it is not proportionalism, then one might be able to construct the argument that double effect applies. In any case, there is one distinct difference between the two situations: in the streetcar example, if you do nothing, then five die and one lives; in the ectopic pregnancy example, if you do nothing, both mother and child die.

So, strictly speaking, here’s your answer: yes, there’s an essential element to the two examples, so the two are not the same question.

 

[seekerz]

Ender, perhaps you and I are reading different threads.

In fact, the problem that MalteseFalcon raises is precisely Foot’s contention that the thought experiment demonstrates that “the DDE must be wrong”. (I think Falcon’s final question is unfortunately phrased: it’s not that Foot asserts that the example fails the DDE; it’s that she believes it proves the invalidity of the DDE. )

Hence my reply: the Foot construction does not demonstrate the invalidity of the DDE, since it does not provide us with a valid application of the DDE.

I don’t believe that valid cases can be created that invalidate the notion of the DDE (although I see that one might wish to create examples that raise the question). Why not raise alternative cases? 'Cause I disagree with her premise: I don’t think that the DDE is invalid. Are you really asking me to create an argument or thought experiment to attack a proposition in which I believe? Really?

Why attack the details of her example? 'Cause it’s a flawed example.

Have you read her article? She mentions this precise example.

I see. So… since I responded to her assertion, and not yours, I’m missing the point. Got it.

The streetcar example can either appear identical or distinct to the ectopic pregnancy example, it seems, depending on how you frame it up. So, you’re stuck with a debate over whether this is an example of proportionalism or not. If it is proportionalism, then it is prohibited by the Catholic Church (see Veritatis splendor); if it is not proportionalism, then one might be able to construct the argument that double effect applies. In any case, there is one distinct difference between the two situations: in the streetcar example, if you do nothing, then five die and one lives; in the ectopic pregnancy example, if you do nothing, both mother and child die.

So, strictly speaking, here’s your answer: yes, there’s an essential element to the two examples, so the two are not the same question.

You seem to have hit the nail on the head with the streetcar example, which like the original example is not analogous to ectopic pregnancy. In neither example do you have a case where:

a. one life is dependent on the other
b. doing nothing will allow biological complications (I stress biological as opposed to an intervening external factor such as a runaway car) directly related to the dependent life to cause the death of the non-dependent party

The only similarity I see with ectopic pregnancy is that the same action which saves one, results in the death of the other - and in the case of the street car, the intervention seems to be more direct than indirect.

I am no expert on double effect, but those examples, especially the street car - do not seem to fit the criteria. If one life is not bound to the other, how can it be moral to save one by taking action that leads to the death of the other? At any rate, the streetcar example seems definitely immoral to me. That innocent person has an independent right to life and is in no way impacting the lives of those in the other car; furthermore the incalculable value of a single life, to my mind, precludes the consideration of mere numbers in defining moral principles.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Seekerz,

Thank you for your beautiful signature! When one deals with liberals and conservatives all day, it’s refreshing to read the comments of Merton on how both the right and the left are fundamentally confused. As Chesterton said, “Christianity has not been tried and found wanting; it has been found difficult and not tried.”

Let’s you and I try it, shall we?