Doctrine of Double Effect counter example?

[Ender]

it’s not that Foot asserts that the example fails the DDE; it’s that she believes it proves the invalidity of the DDE.

I don’t care what Foot believes or why she proposed the example; either we can explain and apply the DDE or we can’t.

I don’t believe that valid cases can be created that invalidate the notion of the DDE (although I see that one might wish to create examples that raise the question). Why not raise alternative cases? 'Cause I disagree with her premise: I don’t think that the DDE is invalid.

Her premise is irrelevant. The reason to raise alternative cases is to explain the DDE and show how it applies.

Are you really asking me to create an argument or thought experiment to attack a proposition in which I believe? Really?

What I’m asking you to do is to demonstrate confidence in the DDE by explaining how it applies in genuinely difficult circumstances. Claiming the DDE is right and doesn’t need defending is not all that compelling.

Have you read her article? She mentions this precise example. [streetcar]

No, I only read the OP.

The streetcar example can either appear identical or distinct to the ectopic pregnancy example, it seems, depending on how you frame it up. … In any case, there is one distinct difference between the two situations: in the streetcar example, if you do nothing, then five die and one lives; in the ectopic pregnancy example, if you do nothing, both mother and child die.

This still doesn’t answer the question: should we take no action and let the streetcar kill five people or redirect it so that it kills only one?

Ender

 

[Ender]

You seem to have hit the nail on the head with the streetcar example, which like the original example is not analogous to ectopic pregnancy.

An ectopic pregnancy is not the only form where the DDE applies. It is the most commonly cited because it is a real-world example of a difficult situation. The issue before us here is to examine the principle to see if we can apply it correctly.

I am no expert on double effect, but those examples, especially the street car - do not seem to fit the criteria.

The fact that you express this doubt is the reason to address the problem. How else will you (and the rest of us) come to better understand how to apply the principle?

At any rate, the streetcar example seems definitely immoral to me. That innocent person has an independent right to life and is in no way impacting the lives of those in the other car; furthermore the incalculable value of a single life, to my mind, precludes the consideration of mere numbers in defining moral principles.

Yet this example seems definitely moral to me, which means one of us doesn’t understand the principle … which is why the example should be discussed and not simply dismissed.

Ender

 

[Gorgias]

I don’t care what Foot believes or why she proposed the example

Oh. So you really are trying to hijack the conversation and push it in a direction of your own choosing. OK, then…

Claiming the DDE is right and doesn’t need defending is not all that compelling.

Which is exactly why I demonstrated that her approach was in error, by explaining why her example wasn’t an application of the DDE at all. Others attempted to explain her error through another approach – that is, by attempting to show that her claim fails due to the mistaken argument that the DDE leads to a conclusion of ‘morally licit activity’ in this case. After all, she claims “DDE is erroneous because it concludes ‘licit’ in a clear case of morally illicit activity”. You can attack her claim in a variety of ways: (1) the action isn’t morally illicit; (2) the DDE doesn’t conclude ‘licit’; (3) that’s not a valid application of the DDE at all.

This still doesn’t answer the question: should we take no action and let the streetcar kill five people or redirect it so that it kills only one?

It doesn’t answer your question, perhaps, but it addresses the OP’s.

What I’m asking you to do is to demonstrate confidence in the DDE by explaining how it applies in genuinely difficult circumstances.

That’s just the point: the ‘devil in the details’ here is in how one frames up the argument!

If you frame up the case as “divert the trolley onto the other track,” then you admit to committing an immoral act of murder. The DDE succeeds, and you conclude “immoral activity”. However, if you frame up the case as “divert the trolley away from its current track,” then you might be able to argue for moral liceity; either way, in this case the DDE succeeds whether you conclude ‘licit’ or ‘illicit’. Finally, regardless of the way you frame up the argument, you might get stuck on the requirement that the bad effect cannot be the means by which the good effect occurs; after all, the diversion onto the other track is the means by which the five are saved, isn’t it? In this case, regardless of how you frame up the action, the DDE concludes that the act is morally illicit.

So, we’re still stuck. Your answer, utilizing the DDE approach, seems not to be able to be clearly determined. I would argue, then, that this demonstrates that the DDE is inapplicable in this situation. After all, no one is claiming that the DDE is the one-size-fits-all method of determining moral liceity. In other words, in the final analysis, it seems that one cannot use DDE here, but rather, must instead utilize a different approach in resolving the trolley problem. I would suggest that the approach of proportionalism is the most reasonable: one cannot weigh one moral evil against another in search of a morally licit decision.

 

[Ender]

Oh. So you really are trying to hijack the conversation and push it in a direction of your own choosing.

I’m trying, so far without success, to get a direct answer.

If you frame up the case as “divert the trolley onto the other track,” then you admit to committing an immoral act of murder. The DDE succeeds, and you conclude “immoral activity”. However, if you frame up the case as “divert the trolley away from its current track,” then you might be able to argue for moral liceity; either way, in this case the DDE succeeds whether you conclude ‘licit’ or ‘illicit’.

If DDE *succeeds *whether I conclude the action of diverting the trolly is licit or illicit then I have no idea what you mean by succeeds. I would consider it a success only if it gave me an answer of yes or no. I am diverting the trolly from track A to track B and surely the moral nature of that act cannot depend on whether I define it as “moving from A” or “moving to B”.

So, we’re still stuck. Your answer, utilizing the DDE approach, seems not to be able to be clearly determined. I would argue, then, that this demonstrates that the DDE is inapplicable in this situation.

The principle of double effect is inapplicable in this particular case … of an action that clearly has two effects? I’m not sure this answer isn’t as damaging as what Foot set out to prove. Either we are justified in diverting the trolly or we are not. By declaring DDE incapable of dealing with the issue we simply remove one of the moral tools available to us by which judge our actions, with the additional effect of minimizing the usefulness of that tool in the process. Which was pretty much what Foot was trying to do.

Ender

 

[Gorgias]

If DDE *succeeds *whether I conclude the action of diverting the trolly is licit or illicit then I have no idea what you mean by succeeds.

I mean that DDE succeeds in being able to provide a proper resolution to the moral question being asked. Foot posited that DDE fails – that is, it provides an incorrect answer. In these two scenarios, I suggest that DDE finds a ‘correct’ answer. The problem, as I later state, is that the answer depends on the statement of the problem.

The principle of double effect is inapplicable in this particular case

This, too, does not mean that DDE ‘fails’, but that it is not the right tool for this job.

The principle of double effect is inapplicable in this particular case
… of an action that clearly has two effects? I’m not sure this answer isn’t as damaging as what Foot set out to prove.

Not at all. If you have a nail, use a hammer; if you have a screw, use a screwdriver. We don’t declare hammers to be useless because screws exist in the world, we just search for the appropriate tool for the task…

By declaring DDE incapable of dealing with the issue we simply remove one of the moral tools available to us by which judge our actions, with the additional effect of minimizing the usefulness of that tool in the process.

No; all we’re saying is that in this case, DDE is the elephant gun to the trolley problem’s mosquito…

(The appropriate tool, I’d suggest, is the notion of proportionalism: the trolley problem doesn’t play well with DDE because it’s purely a question of attempting to weigh one life against five, which is clearly morally illicit, according to Catholic moral theology. No need for recourse to DDE – it’s already an issue we can resolve without asking about double effects…)

Which was pretty much what Foot was trying to do.

Again, no. What Foot was trying to do was demonstrate that DDE is useless, since it provides the wrong answer. That’s a completely different kind of conclusion.

 

[Ender]

Not at all. If you have a nail, use a hammer; if you have a screw, use a screwdriver. We don’t declare hammers to be useless because screws exist in the world, we just search for the appropriate tool for the task.

Except in this case we have a situation where one action has two effects, one good and one bad, which is precisely what DDE should be able to resolve. I see no justification for asserting that DDE doesn’t apply here other than that you can’t see a way to make it come out with the “right” answer.

(The appropriate tool, I’d suggest, is the notion of proportionalism: the trolley problem doesn’t play well with DDE because it’s purely a question of attempting to weigh one life against five, which is clearly morally illicit, according to Catholic moral theology.

I’m not familiar with proportionalism but I’m pretty comfortable saying the death of five people is worse than the death of one.

Again, no. What Foot was trying to do was demonstrate that DDE is useless, since it provides the wrong answer. That’s a completely different kind of conclusion.

It may be a different kind of conclusion but I’m not sure it’s any better to imply DDE is useless because it can’t provide any answer. How useful is a technique that is only good if it confirms what we already (believe we) know?

Ender

 

[Gorgias]

I’m not familiar with proportionalism but I’m pretty comfortable saying the death of five people is worse than the death of one.

Actually, it isn’t. It’s more tragic, sure. One has greater scope than the other, Sure. However, it’s not ‘worse’ in the sense that one is ‘more’ morally preferable to the other.

That’s what proportionalism is all about: you cannot say “I choose this morally unacceptable act, simply because in this situation, it seems like the best choice.”

Except in this case we have a situation where one action has two effects, one good and one bad, which is precisely what DDE should be able to resolve. I see no justification for asserting that DDE doesn’t apply here other than that you can’t see a way to make it come out with the “right” answer.

Fine, then. If you require a DDE answer, then I reply that DDE says you can’t switch tracks: the action that produces the good effect (switching the track) also directly produces the bad effect. Happy?

How useful is a technique that is only good if it confirms what we already (believe we) know?

But that’s not at all what DDE does – it provides us with a rationale for choosing one course of action. For many, DDE doesn’t “confirm what (they) already know,” but rather, provides a surprising answer!

 

[seekerz]

Seekerz,

Thank you for your beautiful signature! When one deals with liberals and conservatives all day, it’s refreshing to read the comments of Merton on how both the right and the left are fundamentally confused. As Chesterton said, “Christianity has not been tried and found wanting; it has been found difficult and not tried.”

Let’s you and I try it, shall we?

I’m game! I love Merton’s works simply because they make so much practical sense; they are also deep but it’s not a depth that I find myself lost in - there’s always something applicable to the level that I’m at.

 

[seekerz]

An ectopic pregnancy is not the only form where the DDE applies. It is the most commonly cited because it is a real-world example of a difficult situation. The issue before us here is to examine the principle to see if we can apply it correctly.
The fact that you express this doubt is the reason to address the problem. How else will you (and the rest of us) come to better understand how to apply the principle?
Yet this example seems definitely moral to me, which means one of us doesn’t understand the principle … which is why the example should be discussed and not simply dismissed.

Ender

I was discussing it; sorry if it seemed like a dismissal. I just find it clearly immoral to take an action which will end someone else’s life when that person’s life is not at all related to the lives of those under threat. If they were facing a common threat, that would be a different story, because the common threat links the lives of one to the other. But from what I understood in this case, saving the others would involve creating a threat against the one not initially at any risk.

As to double effect, I do understand it is more widely applicable than just to ectopic pregnancy, but the comment I was responding to was making the comparison between the example and an ectopic.