Does appeal to natural law commit the naturalistic fallacy?

[Inego_de_Loyola]

Well, that’s not a world in which we’d like to live. Which is precisely my point. We don’t want to have a society where little old ladies are suspicious of everyone. So fraud is something we frown on.

I’m not sure why we’re debating this particular point. We both think that fraud is wrong. I suspect you think it’s ‘wrong because it’s wrong - isn’t it obvious’. Maybe because God has told you that it’s wrong by writing it in your heart. I’m good with that, but it doesn’t work for me becuase I don’t believe in God.

Yet I can agree with you that murder, fruad, theft, assault etc are all wrong. Maybe you think that God has written these ‘rules’ into my heart as well, so the fact that I don’t belive in Him doesn’t really matter.

If that’s the case, then I’m not likely to be able to persuade you otherwise. But even if there were no God, if you woke up tomorrow with no conception of God, you would still be able to give me practical reasons why people should not lie, steal, murder etc. That’s what I’m doing to you.

You seem frustrated by that.

I’m not the least bit frustrated, you’ve not given me a reason yet that stands up to scrutiny as to why from the perspective of the fraudster it is immoral. He loves a world in which people are suspicious of each other; It’s one of the easiest cons to play.

 

[Bradski]

I’m not the least bit frustrated, you’ve not given me a reason yet that stands up to scrutiny as to why from the perspective of the fraudster it is immoral. He loves a world in which people are suspicious of each other; It’s one of the easiest cons to play.

We have agreed that fraud is wrong. No-one would want to live in a society that doesn’t think that.

But it is obvious that people will still be fraudsters. I would suggest that they would all accept that what they are doing is immoral, but they are prepared to ignore that for a variety of reasons. If they are caught, they don’t stand up in court and plead that they had done nothing wrong.

If you asked the guy who cheated the old lady if he wouldn’t mind being cheated then I’d expect him to say no. That is, he would realise that it was immoral.

 

[Inego_de_Loyola]

We have agreed that fraud is wrong. No-one would want to live in a society that doesn’t think that.

But it is obvious that people will still be fraudsters. I would suggest that they would all accept that what they are doing is immoral, but they are prepared to ignore that for a variety of reasons. If they are caught, they don’t stand up in court and plead that they had done nothing wrong.

If you asked the guy who cheated the old lady if he wouldn’t mind being cheated then I’d expect him to say no. That is, he would realise that it was immoral.

As already stated the fraudster would love to live in a society where fraud is accepted; and who says you must do unto others as you would have them do unto you? That is another absolute moral principal that you assume without providing reason.

 

[Portofino]

I’m not the least bit frustrated, you’ve not given me a reason yet that stands up to scrutiny as to why from the perspective of the fraudster it is immoral. He loves a world in which people are suspicious of each other; It’s one of the easiest cons to play.

But your own position is a paradox, as regards this fraudster. Is not the moral law inscribed in his heart, that fraud is morally wrong? Why is he so happy, then? Are you saying that, “deep down, he knows he is doing wrong?” This would be news to him, would it not? The example you gave – of the happy go-luck fraudster – suggests an individual who is *not *aware of this.

Here is Bradski’s position (as I understand it) and mine, in a nutshell:

–the fraudster’s behavior is anti-social; it is anathema to life in society. It’s in everyone’s interest – except the fraudster himself, who is a minority of one – that his behavior meet with disapprobation and social censure. Even if he shares his loot with his girlfriend or his child, they too are potential victims of his scheming (if the profit is sweet enough, for example).

–the fraudster could have the intelligence to realize that he really doesn’t want to live in a society where fraud is legally permissible (I think he does realize this; to the contrary, he’d like to live in a society where it’s permissible for * him* to victimize people, but for no one else). I’ve met a few “fraudster” types in my life, and not one enjoyed being cheated or double-crossed by others (a true-to-life filmic example is Gordon Gekko of Wall Street, who says to Budd Fox, after being double-crossed: “I opened the doors for you! Showed you how the system works! The value of information! How to get it! Fulham oil! Brant resources! Geodynamics! And this is how you…pay me back you COCKROACH?”)

In my experience, those who cheat others are actually more sensitive to taking offense from others’s behavior and their sense of being wronged or slighted tends to have a “hair-trigger” threshold. This is the ultimate in “irrationality” because it is not only a double-standard, but predictable in terms of human psychology – yet they are *surprised *when others treat them the same way they treat others.

But Bradski and I are giving rationales for our moral sense, at least, and I actually don’t think they’re rationales that a Christian has to disagree with. This could be part of the “natural law” that was instituted by God, as “St. Francis” alludes to in an above post.

But when we say, “it’s wrong because God declared it to be wrong,” we are still begging the question – from the perspective, at least, of someone who is not convinced you’ve proven God, nor proven what God determined to be moral and immoral (and how we can know it rationally). When you argue for “innate ideas” (inscribed in our hearts and minds) you are still raising additional question marks – for example, is this moral awareness really in the hearts and minds of everyone? ; and does this argument for an innate moral awareness prove anything about objective morality, or does it rather commit the fallacy of the consensus gentium (the consensus theory of truth, whereby what is universally acknowledged by human beings must be true and cannot be mistaken).

 

[Peter_Plato]

It might. But it would be wrong in the way you have put it because killing is not the same as murdering. It is natural to kill for food. Even necessary. But it isn’t natural to murder.

I don’t want my family to be murdered.
Therefore murder is wrong in the type of society in which I want to live.
Therefore, we ought not to murder.

I think you are missing the point in all of your subsequent posts to this one. Your claim essentially is: because I don’t want something and I can show you that it is undesirable, therefore it is wrong.

The points in rebuttal are that others have precisely the same argument as you, pointing the opposite direction. They could very well say, if simple want is the determiner of the good, that “I want to overcome others and I am powerful and smart enough to generally win out so I ought to do so because I want to, regardless of what Bradski wants. Why should Bradski’s wants take precedent over mine? We just disagree in what we want.” How are you going to dispute that? It’s not what Bradski wants therefore, not good?

Want does not translate to that stance being “right” or “wrong” in the moral sense, but only because things are pragmatically advisable towards a desirable end that the agent desires them. Your wanting something does not translate into: Therefore, everyone ought to do it. Pragmatic for you does not entail morally imperative for everyone else. There is no logical compulsion there.

I understand that you are “padding” your position with the appeal to reason; any reasonably good person would want the same, so therefore what “we” want is what is right. That, unfortunately assumes the nature of the good that you are trying to define. In a sense, you are claiming that the “good” thing to do is desired by you because rational and “good” moral agents would choose that. Bradski wants the good because it is what good agents desire. What are good agents? Good agents are those that want the same good as Bradski. Can you spell “tautology?”

Appeal to God does overcome this issue, because through this appeal we have a compelling reason to will the good, defined as what is willed by God. Ultimately, it is his game, so his rules. He is the First Cause, so if we want to be and therefore be “good” we follow the rules of Being.

I anticipate you will appeal to the Euthyphro Dilemma in response. Is it good because it is willed by God or does God will it because it is good?

Notice that your position suffers from the same difficulty. Is it good because you (and your sympathetic moral agents) will it or do you will it because it is good?

The Thomistic answer to this dilemma is as “good” as any. The answer is: both are true, but only in the case of God because he ultimately defines what is and therefore what is good. Being is transferable to goodness. Things are good to the extent that they are, i.e., to the extent that they are actualized, and they are actualized to the extent that they are good. Evil is the privation of good precisely because evil takes something away from what it is. God is the complete actualization of Being and therefore the complete actualization of Goodness.

 

[Bradski]

As already stated the fraudster would love to live in a society where fraud is accepted;

No, I think that you’re wrong. As Portofino has ably pointed out (with his signature reference to the medium of cinematography), the fraudster would like the rules just to apply to him. He knows that it’s wrong, but wants exemption from doing wrong so he can personally make a profit. He would no more appreciate being the victim as would you.

So this is an easy question: do you think the fraudster would mind being cheated? If the answer is yes, then you must admit that he knows it’s wrong.

…and who says you must do unto others as you would have them do unto you?

Correct me if I’m wrong, but I think Jesus might have mentioned it (Matthew 7:12 if you need to check).

That is another absolute moral principal that you assume without providing reason.

I’m not sure that Jesus went on to give a reason for it, but that’s all I seem to have been doing these last few posts. It was obvious to Him and it’s obvious to me: if you do harm to someone else, then you’re going to have to accept that people will do harm to you.

Now isn’t that obvious to you?

 

[Bradski]

I think you are missing the point in all of your subsequent posts to this one. Your claim essentially is: because I don’t want something and I can show you that it is undesirable, therefore it is wrong.

No, I haven’t said that. This is not one person’s take on morality. It is the general consensus of society that something, such as fraud, for example, is to be avoided because not to do so would be detrimental to society as a whole.

Is not what Bradski wants therefore, not good?

Does it benefit me? Possibly. Is it good? Well, I would have to argue that if it’s good for me, then it would have to be good for everyone. In the case of fraud, I would not want to be cheated, so I would have to say it’s not good. But that’s not to say it would prevent me from committing fraud. That doesn’t mean the reasons behind me deciding it’s not good are faulty. Whatever code of morality someone adheres to, that person can still decide that he will not apply to himself in particular cases.

Your wanting something does not translate into: Therefore, everyone ought to do it. Pragmatic for you does not entail morally imperative for everyone else. There is no logical compulsion there.

I agree. But that’s not what I’m saying. Just because I want something does not make it right. If what I want is detrimental to society as a whole then it’s wrong. If I think that something that someone does to me is wrong, then I cannot justify my doing it to someone else.

In a sense, you are claiming that the “good” thing to do is desired by you because rational and “good” moral agents would choose that. Bradski wants the good because it is what good agents desire. What are good agents? Good agents are those that want the same good as Bradski. Can you spell “tautology?”

I never mentioned that ‘good’ people should decide what is right. That would indeed be a tautology. I said that reasonable people will decide what is correct or not. I’ve not suggested that that would only include ‘good’ people. In fact, I have suggested that even ‘bad’ people can and would be included in deciding whether something is wrong. Because the question would not be: ‘do you think that this course of action is wrong for you?’. The question would be: ‘do you think that this course of action should be acceptable?’.

In the case of the ‘bad’ person, on the assumption that he would not want to be victim to that course of action, he would answer no. He may well think to himself that the rule does not apply to himself, but that is irrelevant.

Appeal to God does overcome this issue, because through this appeal we have a compelling reason to will the good, defined as what is willed by God. I anticipate you will appeal to the Euthyphro Dilemma in response. Is it good because it is willed by God or does God will it because it is good?

You’ve saved me bringing it up.

Notice that your position suffers from the same difficulty. Is it good because you (and your sympathetic moral agents) will it or do you will it because it is good?

I don’t believe that reasonable people somehow gain access to what is good in a Platonic sense. I don’t believe that ‘good’ is out there waiting for us to discover it either by reason or revelation. If that was the case, then Euthyphro’s question would be a valid one. If you believe something is good because God says so, then how does a reasonable person who doesn’t believe in God reach the same conclusion?

Someone like myself must have a reason for believing something to be immoral. I cannot accept divine guidance on this (note ‘I cannot’ as opposed to ‘I will not’). And I’m pretty certain that you’d be able to come up with equally valid reasons for deciding on a moral course other than God’s will. At least I hope you could.

The Thomistic answer to this dilemma is as “good” as any. The answer is: both are true, but only in the case of God because he ultimately defines what is and therefore what is good.

I don’t have that option.

 

[Portofino]

I think you are missing the point in all of your subsequent posts to this one. Your claim essentially is: because I don’t want something and I can show you that it is undesirable, therefore it is wrong.

“Wrong” is a morally-loaded word, and I will admit that my – or Bradski’s – arguments ultimately may not give us the right to it, if by “wrong” we mean an objective metaphysical standard.

What Bradski is saying, as I understand it, is, “theft is absolutely unacceptable behavior, from the standpoint of a functioning society.” We hear that admonition all the time, in various contexts – “your behavior is unacceptable.” That in itself carries a kind of moral weight; it is a stern admonition. There is an inexorable logic to the way a society – as society – is set up, and the prohibition against murder, rape, and (at the very least) violent forms of theft, are universal. Even the Babylonians had this figured out.

It’s as if we’re building a great edifice, and that edifice is society itself. What we call morality is the “brick and mortar” of that society (which a Catholic such as Pope Benedict would wholeheartedly agree with – morality is the bedrock or the mortar of a human society). In order to build, you need a stable foundation that has structural integrity. Well, the prohibition against murder, rape, and stealing provide that stable foundation, and – in day-to-day life – constitute the mortar that holds the “bricks” of the social edifice together.

Now let’s say someone proposes, “I think murder ought to be allowed if someone believes that murdering someone is to their advantage.” This is the equivalent of proposing that the mortar be removed, and that the foundation of the edifice itself be compromised. The structure won’t hold – or, to use a related analogy, those are load-bearing walls you would be trying to take away. The whole thing would collapse and bury all of us under a heap of rubble.

In that sense, I suppose there is something Kantian about it, in terms of a categorical imperative (the categorical imperative is strangely praxis-oriented). Bradski is “right” in saying that theft is socially unacceptable behavior, because a society’s laws generally have universal application (when they don’t and people are acutely aware of that, there is social instability and unrest). So you can legitimately ask, “what if everyone suddenly decided they were going to steal from everyone else?” Or, “what if everyone suddenly decided that they had the right to kill each other, with no legal ramifications?”

At best, you would have vigilante justice – so, a man’s daughter has just been raped. Rape, all of a sudden, is perfectly legal. Now that woman’s father and brothers track down the rapist and are ready to kill him, for the deed he committed. Only problem is, that rapist also has a band of brothers, and a father who loves him. Now it becomes a family thing – a true vendetta. Any semblance of order that existed on a larger social level must now reconstitute itself on the level of families – families making truces with each other, or mutually agreeing to refrain from harm. Something has to come in and fill that vacuum, and rule by families would be the likely replacement. That’s because the alternative is a Hobbesian “war of all against all” – anarchy and rioting, burning buildings, the constant sound of gunfire. A true state of war.

And if human beings didn’t have intelligence to figure this out – and emotional potential to form bonds with strangers that are an extension of the bonds they form with their blood kin – and “social instincts” – then this society never could have come together. If humans weren’t intellectually and emotionally capable of cooperation, then cooperation never could have occurred.

 

[Peter_Plato]

What Bradski is saying, as I understand it, is, “theft is absolutely unacceptable behavior, from the standpoint of a functioning society.” We hear that admonition all the time, in various contexts – “your behavior is unacceptable.” That in itself carries a kind of moral weight; it is a stern admonition. There is an inexorable logic to the way a society – as society – is set up, and the prohibition against murder, rape, and (at the very least) violent forms of theft, are universal. Even the Babylonians had this figured out.

I understand where Bradski is coming from, I just don’t think he follows the “trail” far enough.
The reason he seems reasonable to this point is that most of us would agree that a well-functioning society is a good, until, of course, we get down to the nitty gritty of defining a good functioning society. Nazi Germany, for a time, functioned very well. The economy thrived. Most citizens enjoyed a satisfying modicum of goods and this could have become the norm for a great part of the world had the vision been successful. So the question remains, “Does good equal well-functioning?” There were prohibitions against murder, rape, deviant behaviour and so forth, but also restrictions against harboring Jews and other “enemies” of the state that, arguably, protected the integrity of the state.

Now one could hold that this was not a “just” state because some individuals were not treated humanely, but then we are moving away from merely “functional” considerations to those more accurately called “moral” ones. So why should “justice” be included since it appears to be more of an absolute metaphysical moral term than merely a pragmatic one? It could be argued that incorporating universal justice into the edifice would, in fact, weaken it. Nazi propaganda claimed precisely that, in fact. Having to care for every individual, especially the weak was an undue burden on others. (As an aside, western culture implicitly holds this same view in some of its policies even today.)

Here we arrive at a crucial problem. How do we determine where the limits of justice and functional efficiency should be drawn? Have we not arrived at a truly moral dilemma?

It’s as if we’re building a great edifice, and that edifice is society itself. What we call morality is the “brick and mortar” of that society (which a Catholic such as Pope Benedict would wholeheartedly agree with – morality is the bedrock or the mortar of a human society). In order to build, you need a stable foundation that has structural integrity. Well, the prohibition against murder, rape, and stealing provide that stable foundation, and – in day-to-day life – constitute the mortar that holds the “bricks” of the social edifice together.

The difficulty becomes, is the structure of the edifice founded merely on efficiency or functionality or are other transcendent qualities like justice, honesty, equal opportunity, etc. also necessary? Which take precedent? Truth or functionality? Justice or efficiency?

Now let’s say someone proposes, “I think murder ought to be allowed if someone believes that murdering someone is to their advantage.” This is the equivalent of proposing that the mortar be removed, and that the foundation of the edifice itself be compromised. The structure won’t hold – or, to use a related analogy, those are load-bearing walls you would be trying to take away. The whole thing would collapse and bury all of us under a heap of rubble.

Not necessarily because murder could very well be incorporated into the mortar (communist states?) that a solid structure for promoting survival and even flourishing (Soviet or Chinese political and economic structures) albeit lacking some qualities.

The lack of characteristics that would make some of us unhappy in a merely functional society would then raise questions of, What is missing in this social structure that does not fulfill the needs of “a complete human being?” So we move away from social considerations back to those of individuals. How are those decided? Where are the lines between social and individual needs determined?

And if human beings didn’t have intelligence to figure this out – and emotional potential to form bonds with strangers that are an extension of the bonds they form with their blood kin – and “social instincts” – then this society never could have come together. If humans weren’t intellectually and emotionally capable of cooperation, then cooperation never could have occurred.

It could be argued that cooperation doesn’t occur but some sort of compromise does. How is compromise mediated? By reference to the “good functioning” of society? That puts us back at the top with the question of with or without the application of justice and including whom?

 

[Portofino]

I understand where Bradski is coming from, I just don’t think he follows the “trail” far enough.

These are fair questions, certainly. I think that any naturalistic defense of the “good society” has to ascribe towards extreme subtlety of insight, and not just rely on the crudest of surface appearances; it has to ascribe to the same subtlety of insight, for example, that led Epicurus to say that pleasure was the highest good, yet --based on his subtle understanding of the nature of pleasure in human beings – led him to advocate an ascetic life of frugality and celibacy.

If your reasoning is crude or your understanding is not sufficiently refined, you will have unintended consequences (like those who confuse the path to happiness in life with the pleasure of hard drugs).

Germany, for a time, functioned very well. The economy thrived. Most citizens enjoyed a satisfying modicum of goods and this could have become the norm for a great part of the world had the vision been successful.

With Nazi Germany, for example, you could have had – over and above human fellow feeling, that would deplore the treatment of the Jews – the following reasoning:

*Nazi Germany is a dysfunctional state because it pursues a policy of aggression against all of its neighbors, which cannot help but lead us down the road to war; there is, seemingly, no such thing as Nazi diplomacy; this peace and prosperity will be short-lived because the only policy of Hitler is a policy of aggression

*It is a dysfunctional state because, based on spurious theories of racial superiority, it persecutes a segment of the population that not only poses no discernible threat, but that has contributed much to German society by way of economic and cultural flourishing (the same mistake was made by medieval Spain, in expelling the Jews); and it begs the question, who is next? German Catholics, perhaps? Germans of Slavic descent? Who knows who will be next.

*there is no freedom of speech or of the press, which is a loss to everyone; we’ve seen anyone who dared criticize this regime, be deported or executed

*in the treatment of the Jews, there is no respect for their individual rights or even their lives; “you mark my words,” a discerning German could have said, “this government has no respect for your life, either, you just think it does” (which is true; Hitler, in the end, wanted the German people to be destroyed, because they had failed him in the war effort; “if they were good Germans,” he believed, “they would be already dead; and the ones who are left are the dregs”; he hated the Jews and but had no love for the German people, either, despite his rhetoric to the contrary; he had no real respect for human life, period).

*a German could have said, “overall, this is not a tenable model for a society, in the long-term; this society cannot see any further than the end of its own nose; you mark my words that, if it is not destroyed from the outside, it will end up destroying itself”

The same argument can be made, even today, with abortion; that it can’t help but impact the attitude that a society has about human life in general, and the circumstances under which one can dispose of a life. It’s like the more personal analogy of the man who thinks he’s going to hate his neighbor and love his family, until he realizes that the way he treats his neighbor has become so ingrained that it’s beginning to infiltrate his family relationships, as well.

Even consumerism, for its critics, has “less-than-obvious” implications – namely, you treat everything as a commodity, until you end up treating every person as a commodity, as well. Even the people in your life are just objects for your utility and appropriation; the anti-consumerist would say, “it’s affecting you in ways you cannot even begin to imagine.”

 

[Peter_Plato]

If your reasoning is crude or your understanding is not sufficiently refined, you will have unintended consequences (like those who confuse the path to happiness in life with the pleasure of hard drugs).

Even if your refined view can be practically shown to result in “happiness,” a crude person might disagree that your concept of happiness need apply to anyone else, which would lead to a concession on your part that there is no “obligatory” or imperative sense to be had in the naturalistic view.

Correct?

 

[Bradski]

Even if your refined view can be practically shown to result in “happiness,” a crude person might disagree that your concept of happiness need apply to anyone else, which would lead to a concession on your part that there is no “obligatory” or imperative sense to be had in the naturalistic view.

But that ‘happiness’ is not personal. If it was, we’d look no further than our own well-being and the devil take the hindmost. You have to think of the overall effect. To such an extent that you may come to realise that what is best for society as a whole, that which is morally correct, is detrimental to you personally.

To use an example, you should be prepared to vote for a political party that in your opinion would do most for your country even if their policies would have a detrimental effect on you personally.

 

[Peter_Plato]

But that ‘happiness’ is not personal. If it was, we’d look no further than our own well-being and the devil take the hindmost. You have to think of the overall effect. To such an extent that you may come to realise that what is best for society as a whole, that which is morally correct, is detrimental to you personally.

To use an example, you should be prepared to vote for a political party that in your opinion would do most for your country even if their policies would have a detrimental effect on you personally.

Correct. Which is in opposition to your first post in this thread (Post #5) where you state precisely the opposite as the grounding principle of ethical behaviour.

I don’t want my family to be murdered.
Therefore murder is wrong in the type of society in which I want to live.
Therefore, we ought not to murder.

Your argument, then, was that your personal want (aversion actually) is the motivating reason for ethical behaviour, yet in the top post you are saying your personal wants will be undermined by ethical behaviour. So which is it?

 

[Portofino]

To use an example, you should be prepared to vote for a political party that in your opinion would do most for your country even if their policies would have a detrimental effect on you personally.

Interesting. But, if you were to persuade someone to adopt this view, you would have to appeal to their “enlightened self-interest”, yes? For example, appealing to “long-term thinking” versus “short-term thinking”; or “big picture” thinking, versus “myopic” thinking.

For example:

Short-term or myopic thinking: “my taxes are lowered, that’s all I care about; I really don’t care about others, because they’re not me.”

Long-term or big-picture thinking: “they’re not me, but they’re my countrymen. If the rich continue to get richer and the poor to get poorer, we’ll be creating a larger and larger underclass in this country; crime and social unrest will increase; our society will become a more violent and unstable place to live, both for myself and my children; I don’t want to live in a place that more and more resembles a Third World country, because the ramifications will be far-reaching; I don’t know what kind of a future my country will have, and that includes a future for me and for my children.”

Of course, they might say, “I’ll take my chances.” But the ultimate example is that of the (anecdotal?) comment of Marie Antoinette: “let them eat cake.” She severely misjudged her own self-interest in the matter – the personal ramifications of her indifference.

In addition, there’s no law against appealing to more idealistic motivations – “is it socially just or equitable?”; or to reasons of the heart – “if you love your children, how can you not care about the children of others?” Or, “which is the greater evil – you, who can afford it, paying a few percent higher in taxes; or others, who need it more than you, sinking further into poverty?” Or, “do you indeed consider yourself a Christian?” Or (for the non-Christian), “do you indeed consider yourself a compassionate person?” And when they say, “actually, I don’t; compassion is weakness” then you appeal to their self-interest, again, as to the lowest common denominator for a sense of social responsibility.

The problem is that even appeals to objective morality are not guaranteed to work. So, you say, “it is morally wrong only to care about yourself, and not care about anyone else. Do you understand that? It is morally wrong.” And they say… “prove it.”

 

[Peter_Plato]

Interesting. But, if you were to persuade someone to adopt this view, you would have to appeal to their “enlightened self-interest”, yes? For example, appealing to “long-term thinking” versus “short-term thinking”; or “big picture” thinking, versus “myopic” thinking…

The problem is that even appeals to objective morality are not guaranteed to work. So, you say, “it is morally wrong only to care about yourself, and not care about anyone else. Do you understand that? It is morally wrong.” And they say… “prove it.”

Portofino,

I never cease to wonder at your brilliance. Attempting to talk someone into the consistency of their own belief!

You should be selling cars! That would be crude, though.

 

[Portofino]

Portofino,

I never cease to wonder at your brilliance. Attempting to talk someone into the consistency of their own belief!

You should be selling cars! That would be crude, though.

I see The moment someone says, “let’s be good for the sake of being good,” I say, “actually, you want to reel that in and align it with self-interest, for the sake of consistency”

In honesty, I do (as do most of us) have a conception of “being good for the sake of being good.” I consider it an emotional response (e.g., I would feel bad about selling a defective car). When I present it as such – as an emotional response, or a response of empathy – the criticism that’s been made is, “you can’t base morality on emotions; they are too subjective.”

And on some level – just as a Richard Dawkins gets indignant about the topic of genocide, as he has – there is indeed a sense I have that, “yes, this is objectively wrong. I not only feel it to be wrong; I believe it to be wrong.”

The problem, as I see it, is I cannot easily prove it. And, to the contrary, when I would try to persuade a skeptic to it – give reasons – those reasons inevitably would involve appeals to self-interest and pragmatism, as opposed to appeals to emotion or personal conviction (the latter, in my mind, risk begging the question, as being tantamount to saying, “it’s wrong because it’s self-evidently wrong”).

Catholics appeal to self-interest as a means to persuasion, as well – I’ve heard them. “If you wait until you’re married to have intercourse, you will be happier.” Or, “condoms aren’t 100% effective against STD’s; you should know this.” Or, “did you read that study that concluded that married people live longer? Or that children who grow up with a mother and a father are happier?”

One of the most poignant calls to morality in modern times persuades so powerfully by straddling an elusive line between empathy and self-interest; indeed, by showing that the two are inseparable (“I-thou”):

"When the Nazis came for the communists,
I remained silent;
I was not a communist.

When they locked up the social democrats,
I remained silent;
I was not a social democrat.

When they came for the trade unionists,
I did not speak out;
I was not a trade unionist.

When they came for the Jews,
I remained silent;
I wasn’t a Jew.

When they came for me,
there was no one left to speak out."

 

[Bradski]

Your argument, then, was that your personal want (aversion actually) is the motivating reason for ethical behaviour, yet in the top post you are saying your personal wants will be undermined by ethical behaviour. So which is it?

This is the first argument:

I don’t want my family to be murdered.
Therefore murder is wrong in the type of society in which I want to live.
Therefore, we ought not to murder.

This is not me basing morality on my personal desires. This is me realising that if I don’t want my family murdered, then firstly, no-one else would either – I can empathise with others, so ‘do unto others etc’ and secondly, that if murdering families was not morally incorrect then it would result in a society in which no-one would want to live.

I have emphasised a few times that one cannot base morality on personal preferences:

This is not one person’s take on morality. It is the general consensus of society that something, such as fraud, for example, is to be avoided because not to do so would be detrimental to society as a whole.

And…

Just because I want something does not make it right. If what I want is detrimental to society as a whole then it’s wrong.

And…

But that ‘happiness’ is not personal. You have to think of the overall effect.

Now this is the second:

…you should be prepared to vote for a political party that in your opinion would do most for your country even if their policies would have a detrimental effect on you personally.

And as I emphasised earlier that it is not simply my personal preference that dictates my decision about what is right or wrong:

QUOTE=Bradski;9932461]Well, I would have to argue that if it’s good for me, then it would have to be good for everyone.

…meaning that I can’t decide something is morally correct simply because it’s good for me, but that it has to be good for everyone (or at least the majority). This is just the other side of the coin. I can’t claim something to be moral simply because it benefits me and I can’t claim something as being immoral simply because it has a detrimental effect.

Interesting. But, if you were to persuade someone to adopt this view, you would have to appeal to their “enlightened self-interest”, yes? For example, appealing to “long-term thinking” versus “short-term thinking”; or “big picture” thinking, versus “myopic” thinking.

Yes. Exactly.

 

[Peter_Plato]

I see The moment someone says, “let’s be good for the sake of being good,” I say, “actually, you want to reel that in and align it with self-interest, for the sake of consistency”

In honesty, I do (as do most of us) have a conception of “being good for the sake of being good.” I consider it an emotional response (e.g., I would feel bad about selling a defective car). When I present it as such – as an emotional response, or a response of empathy – the criticism that’s been made is, “you can’t base morality on emotions; they are too subjective.”

And on some level – just as a Richard Dawkins gets indignant about the topic of genocide, as he has – there is indeed a sense I have that, “yes, this is objectively wrong. I not only feel it to be wrong; I believe it to be wrong.”

The problem, as I see it, is I cannot easily prove it. And, to the contrary, when I would try to persuade a skeptic to it – give reasons – those reasons inevitably would involve appeals to self-interest and pragmatism, as opposed to appeals to emotion or personal conviction (the latter, in my mind, risk begging the question, as being tantamount to saying, “it’s wrong because it’s self-evidently wrong”).

Catholics appeal to self-interest as a means to persuasion, as well – I’ve heard them. “If you wait until you’re married to have intercourse, you will be happier.” Or, “condoms aren’t 100% effective against STD’s; you should know this.” Or, “did you read that study that concluded that married people live longer? Or that children who grow up with a mother and a father are happier?”

One of the most poignant calls to morality in modern times persuades so powerfully by straddling an elusive line between empathy and self-interest; indeed, by showing that the two are inseparable (“I-thou”):

"When the Nazis came for the communists,
I remained silent;
I was not a communist.

When they locked up the social democrats,
I remained silent;
I was not a social democrat.

When they came for the trade unionists,
I did not speak out;
I was not a trade unionist.

When they came for the Jews,
I remained silent;
I wasn’t a Jew.

When they came for me,
there was no one left to speak out."

A true moral sense does not exclude self-interest but is neither limited by it. It is a kind of dynamic between 1) a reasoned subjective point of view that provides the content for ethical considerations and 2) a universal “objective” or “omnibenevolent” perspective that provides the scope or field of view.

I think the “omnibenevolent perspective” is important for providing the extent of who should be considered in your deliberations, thus concepts of justice, equality and fairness enter in. The reasoned subjective viewpoint allows for a reasonable application of responsibility and the content of what the good actually looks and feels like. These are not unlike your “reason” and “emotion” distinctions.

The cross is a symbol of this. The intersection of the omnibenevolent viewpoint (vertical member) and the subjective application (horizontal member.)

How can this moral “theory” be made convincing?

It is a necessary part of why we are here. It is our purpose, our destiny. There is a great deal of credible data to support this. A person could deny that for a variety of reasons, but basically the only valid reason would be denial of ultimate purpose in the universe. The question then for an atheist to answer is, “What difference would any action make?” That answer could only be expressed as mere personal preference. This is not denying that an atheist can be moral, just that one’s principle reason for being moral could only be an isolated subjective one. There is something lost.

Self-interest and long term repercussions in terms of legacy as moral considerations are radically changed if the universe has purpose as against it doesn’t.

Marie Antoinette’s “Let them eat cake!” couched inside a purposeless universe has quite different moral repercussions than if an ultimate purpose exists.

Considerations about my children’s future would lead to quite different conclusions if this life is all there is as opposed to this life being only a transitional stage to another. Don’t you agree?

 

[Portofino]

Considerations about my children’s future would lead to quite different conclusions if this life is all there is as opposed to this life being only a transitional stage to another. Don’t you agree?

This is indeed inevitable. If you’re a Hindu (or a Buddhist), you’ll likely want your child to live in such a way that they have a favorable reincarnation, their next time around. If you’re a Muslim, you’ll want your children to live in such a way that honors Allah. If you’re a Christian, you’ll want them to live in a way that will merit eternal salvation, though methods differ – Mormons, for example, have a different view of what is conducive to salvation, than do Catholics. They also have a different conception of what it means to live in a purposeful universe.

Most non-believers I know – and most believers, in my experience, at least – want their children to know happiness in life. They’d like their children to be well-educated; to have the ability to enjoy their childhoods; to learn how to ride a bike; to have friends and plenty of time with their parents; to learn how to drive a car; to have a first date; to have help in developing in-born talents or things they are good at, or love to do (music, for example, or theater); to find work that fulfills them and that enables them to make a living; to find a wife or a husband and, if it is their wont, to have children of their own (also for selfish reasons – they want to know the joy of being grandparents); finally, they want their children to live long and healthy lives, and to outlive their parents.

Other wishes that non-believers, as they exist in actuality, want for their children – that they are well-socialized (“say please”; “say thank you”; “play nice”; “no hitting”; “share”); learn to get along with others and to be a good friend and a caring spouse; don’t end up in prison or on the 5:00 news, for having committed some heinous crime. Never forget your parents, even when you have a family of your own; be nice to your brothers and sisters and don’t forget about each other, either.

 

[VeritasLuxMea]

Proponents of natural law do not base their claims on the widespread presence of certain beliefs or actions being the reason why they “ought” to be adopted. A natural law proponent would not claim that murder is wrong because most people believe it to be. That would be deriving an ought from an is.

How is this not deriving ought from is:

Natural law proponents would claim that the moral law (the imperative nature of “ought”) is written into the very being of “normal” or reasonable human beings precisely because we are moral agents. Our status as moral beings compels us to act morally. We ought to do certain actions precisely because we are moral beings and have the impulse to act morally out of our nature as moral agents.

???

Trying to decode this paragraph:

1. We naturally desire to do X.
2. Therefore, we ought to do X?

How is that not an ought from an is?

Just so we’re clear: I’m not unsympathetic towards natural law. I have no desire to see it torn down. I would like to understand it, though.

In other words, justice is not a morally good trait because most people believe it is (ought from is fallacy), but that most people (as moral agents) will act justly because it is a morally good trait.

I know this is very complex, but I’m just not seeing it right now.

This one sounds something like:

1. “Justice” is a desirable/good goal
2. Therefore, most people seek “Justice”
3. Therefore, “Justice” is a desirable/good goal

Which is circular, at the very least.

I’m actually OK with just adopting moral axioms, but this sounds worse to me… it’s like they’re taking an axiom and trying to hide it behind a non-existent argument. Why bother?