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Gorgias
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In an Aristotelian framework, yes. It’s the “coming into being” change.Is creation ex nihilo “change”?
In an Aristotelian framework, yes. It’s the “coming into being” change.Is creation ex nihilo “change”?
Not close enough. After all, it still presumes a quantum sub-stratem which is, of course, not ‘nothing’.Indeed. It would be a state of space-time with zero matter and energy.
How close to nothing is that?
No. @AlNG is just having a hard time understanding precisely what it claims (and what it doesn’t claim).Are we really debating the law of non-contradiction?
Interesting. Do you assert that space-time pre-exists the Big Bang, or does the Big Bang give rise to it?Don’t forget that space-time is a framework. It’s not a thing with a start and end.
This is exactly what Aristotle and Aquinas were getting at.It’s not a matter of just arbitrarily choosing one thing as being the first cause “just because”, but about (1) deducing that there must be a First Cause and (2) describing that first cause, as much as it can be described, by determining what it can’t be (it can’t be composite, changing, extended through space, have a beginning… etc… precisely because any of these require a cause, and we can’t engage in special pleading)
I don’t know. Do you know?pocaracas:
Interesting. Do you assert that space-time pre-exists the Big Bang, or does the Big Bang give rise to it?Don’t forget that space-time is a framework. It’s not a thing with a start and end.
Well, I think we can have an intelligent discussion about it. And, my intuition is that – from a philosophical perspective – we can conclude from that discussion that we can rule out the “space-time framework” as the unmoved mover.I don’t know. Do you know?
I don’t think we can assert that with any degree of confidence. It is (as far as I can tell) an unknowable unknown.
Right. So, if that holds, then our space-time proceeds from something that precedes it (chronologically or as a cause). Therefore… “not unmoved mover.”I’m saying that Krauss’ point of view does consider a space-time sort of independent from the big bang, of which the space-time within our universe is a (possibly finite) subset.
I wouldn’t go there so bravely…Well, I think we can have an intelligent discussion about it. And, my intuition is that – from a philosophical perspective – we can conclude from that discussion that we can rule out the “space-time framework” as the unmoved mover.
Not necessarily.If we’re saying that multiverses exist, then we’re making a claim that different physics apply in the various universes.
Under what Krauss seems to be proposing, I think (and this is my interpretation so feel free to rip it apart) that the space-time in our Universe is a subset of the all-permeating space-time.If that’s the case, then our space-time framework must be different from others’; more to the case, there can’t be a single framework in which all universes participate. This implies that our framework came into existence with our universe. Hence… not the unmoved mover.
Just because I can’t probe beyond our Universe doesn’t mean that it’s an invalid possibility. Certainly, never more invalid than a god.If the latter, then you’ve painted yourself into the corner of never being able to say anything about the question of the nature of space-time (and therefore, can’t really make the claim that it’s the unmoved mover).
I may have not made myself clear.Right. So, if that holds, then our space-time proceeds from something that precedes it (chronologically or as a cause). Therefore… “not unmoved mover.”I’m saying that Krauss’ point of view does consider a space-time sort of independent from the big bang, of which the space-time within our universe is a (possibly finite) subset.
So basically an infinite regress.I may have not made myself clear.
The notion I wish to pass is that the space-time on which our Universe lies is a part of the “greater” infinite(?) space-time. There’s no preceding.
No… a part of, a subset.pocaracas:
So basically an infinite regress.I may have not made myself clear.
The notion I wish to pass is that the space-time on which our Universe lies is a part of the “greater” infinite(?) space-time. There’s no preceding.
Your whole posts deserve a long treatment, so I apologize, but you’ve just stated that space-time in this instance has parts and can be divisible into parts and is therefore composite. And by composite, it should be clear that we are not just referring to a physical composition.I may have not made myself clear.
The notion I wish to pass is that the space-time on which our Universe lies is a part of the “greater” infinite(?) space-time. There’s no preceding.
So… is that the definition of composite?has parts and can be divisible into parts and is therefore composite.
No, you cannot. A three part god would be a false god. The persons of the Trinity are not parts.Can I interest you in a three-part god?
A strawman, of course! As long as one can redefine terms… what’s a person in here?pocaracas:
No, you cannot. A three part god would be a false god. The persons of the Trinity are not parts.Can I interest you in a three-part god?
So, if you are thinking that you question applies to the God described by Christianity, you have resorted to a straw man.
Lol… compartmentalization, gotcha!Again, Trinitarianism is neither here nor there at this time. You’ve raised no objection to monotheism in it.
This excerpt from Theology and Sanity might be useful on Trinitarianism: The Trinity: Three Persons in One Nature | Frank Sheed | From "Theology and Sanity" | Ignatius InsightNo spatial parts (spatial simplicity).
No temporal parts (temporal simplicity).
No sort of metaphysical complexity where different parts are distinct from the First Cause