Z
zro_x
Guest
I think I get what you’re saying here, but I think we can still say that the drawing of you is good entirely as a means. I think one could make the argument that we say the drawing is good because we enjoy looking at it, not because it resembles you in any way.We call the thing good because it participates more in being. It is similar to calling a drawing of me a good drawing of me if it looks like me. This is done without reference to some function for which the drawing might serve as a means (as in, it’s good since it looks like me, which is good since it allows you to sell it to me and make money).
In any case, it is certainly true that your definition of “goodness” can’t account for everything that we say is good. Most of the time when we speak of “goodness”, we are not talking about how well something conforms to what it was meant to be; we are usually talking instead about how much pleasure and enjoyment it gives us. This indicates that either there are two related, but unidentical definitions for the word, “good”, or else everytime we say that something is good we ultimately mean that it gives us pleasure.
even if it is the former, under your definition of good, a loving person(one which wants the good of another) could by this definition love inanimate objects, and desiring the good of a hammer would be no different then desiring the good of a human being, and God would take the course of action that maximizes the number of things which conform to thier intended pupose. This is obviously not the world we see.
when we talk about love, we are talking about wanting good for sentient beings, not inanimate objects. And so when we speak of omnibenevolence, we must speak about maximizing happiness.
Even if you think of goodness as conformity to the object’s purpose, it is still not obviously true that lieing to someone would be evil, as long as more things approached their purpose than the purpose lost by the intellect. and that is a viable possiblity. If a person lies to the nazis by saying that he is not harboring Jews in the attic, the good, even by your definition, is increased, because the loss of purpose by the intellect is much less than the loss of purpose that comes out of losing a life.But there is no circumstance in which inculcating a definite falsehood into a human intellect can be conducive to the realization of the good for humans, since the human good involves realizing the individual goods of each human faculty in their proper place and measure. Thus it is good for us to eat, but not too much; it is good for us to reproduce, but not if we are not married. Taking falsehood into the intellect is not even simply not exercising the intellect; it is exercising the intellect, but in such a way that the intellect contradicts its own nature. It is good for us to exercise our intellect to know the truth; it can be acceptable for us not to know the truth on some occasions; it is never good, however, to accept falsehood with the intellect, since that is a violation of the good of the intellect, which is a part of the human good. So in doing evil to the intellect, one also does evil to the whole human being, of whom the intellect is a part.