I think the answer to your query lies in the hypothetical “other possible worlds”. Defenders of free will contend that freedom demands a choice between at least 2 possible alternatives, X or not-X, and the choice made hypothetically generates 2 “possible worlds” - one in which choice X was made, the other follows choice not-X.
Determinism claims that, were you to step back and allow the agent to choose again, the same choice, say X, would be made every time because the illusory “choice” is really the result of a previously established course of causation, just like every other event in the universe. What started that course? The hypothetical “First Cause” or an infinite regression of causes, eitherway forces external to the arbiter of the choice itself. Thus there is only 1 “possible world”.
Indeterminism claims that, were you to step back and allow the agent to choose again, you cannot predict with absolute certainty the choice which the agent will make because, just like many other events in the universe, either A) there are infinitely many factors involved which can alter the decision, or B) the is inherent randomness associated with the event (i.e. it is
a priori unpredictable).
A third sort of indeterminism exists with regard to free will: C) the agent/arbiter is himself the ultimate source of causation with regard to a choice being made, the other factors merely influence the decision without absolutely compelling the choice one way or another.
B and C are compatible, the inherent randomness being the personal will of the arbiter. In C the “possible world” is ultimately dependent on the free agent who is author of his own decisions. With regard to time, however, C can be quite different from B.
If an observer watches an agent S make choice X at T2, the observer then has knowledge of the event, and knowledge implies truth, and truth is immutable. Thus, if the observer then travels back in time to observe the choice again, he
knows with the certainty of truth that S will choose X at T2 because he has “prior” experience of the event. This means that there is logically only one possible path for S, and many object that S therefore cannot truly “choose”! But this objection is ridiculous because it fails to acknowledge
why S must choose X at T2 - namely that S herself as arbiter has “already” established the truth of one possible world, and no one can choose both X and not-X simultaneously!
The above scenario involving “truth” with regard to future events falls between Determinism and Indeterminism. Determinism declares that “truth” with regard to future events is absolutely and entirely contingent upon
past events. Indeterminism declares that “truth” with regard to future events is nonsense, that the “future” is inherently undetermined until actualized as “present”. The third presented position allows for “truth” with regard to future events by simply changing view-points via a hypothetical observer - to the observer our “future” is his past, for he has already experienced what we have yet to experience. Thus, the “future” is undetermined until it is nolonger the “future”.
To conclude, I think the choices made by truly “free” beings constitute effects of “metaphysical randomness”, namely free will. However, this does not mean there are other “possible worlds”. Indeed, if there exists an omnipresent omniscient entity, then the “future” is not actually the “future” from His perspective and so all of time-space reality is “determined” - it’s just that it is determined at each present moment by precisely those free agents acting at that moment
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As for
physical randomness/indeterminism, even if all physical events are ultimately caused by the non-physical action of a free entity - namely the exercise of free choice, which constitutes creation
ex nihilo - they are still undetermined before their actualization.
So i guess I should ask, do you consider the exercise of free will “randomness” or not?