Does morality exist?

[Leela]

Morality does not exist. Obviously, there are moral codes, but these codes do not correspond to rules that are somehow “out there” in the universe, beyond an individual’s mind.

Rather than saying "morality does not exist…“out there,” I think it would be better to say, "The Moral Law does not exist “out there,” and even better to say that since there is no way to appeal to this Moral Law to settle disagreements about what is moral even if it does exist, then the existence of the Moral Law is nothing we need to either affirm or deny since its existstence or nonexistence can make no practical difference.

Best,
Leela

 

[Leela]

I agree with Oreoracle that “moral claims possess no truth value.” There are two kinds of statements: factual statements about the universe, which have a truth value and can be investigated, and value judgments, which do not have a truth value (i.e. they are neither true nor false) and cannot be investigated.

The universe doesn’t seem to slice so easily along that line. I highly recommend the following article called The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy

virtualsalt.com/int/factvalue.pdf

Best,
Leela

 

[Betterave]

It is obvious that this is not how morality is viewed but I am talking about it in a specific context. In the real world there are billions of religious people who take their values from their religious beliefs;

There are different kinds of values. Granted they take their religious values from their religious beliefs (e.g., Hindus don’t kill or eat cows.) But you’re begging the question if you want to claim that they simply ‘take’ their *moral *values from their *religious *beliefs. (No religion that has anything to say about morality is purely fideistic.) Certainly moral values will be *expressed *in religious beliefs, but this need not imply that the *source *of those values is religious belief.

other billions just grow into them without close thought. In the case of this thread those categories are irrelevant, the first because I specified that God does not exist and the second because they don’t thoughtfully consider the implications.

Do you think Aristotle might have given the matter close thought? (Not to mention hundreds of Aristotelian philosophers, many of them atheists.) Do you think that Kantians are all God-fearing believers? Or how about consequentialists? Do any moral philosophers routinely invoke God to prove the objectivity of their reasoning?

But … I am questioning whether morality can even exist as anything other than personal preference if there is no God. Clearly my comments don’t accord with what most people actually believe - nor do they accord with what I believe - but this is a theoretical discussion. I am asking “What are the implications of X being true?” In this specific case it is: “What is true about morality if God does not exist?”

I’ve tried to be careful to keep God out of my arguments (which I would generally do anyway). Do you think I have failed somehow?

 

[AntiTheist]

I think you’re getting closer to the truth here, but it still worth clearly distinguishing the concept of value and the concept of motivating force. I can value something but lack motivation to pursue it (think of akrasia). Or I can be motivated to pursue something, but not value it (think of the addict trying to quit).

Certainly. This is why I wrote that values are “an important part of the motivating force.” Obviously, people have values, opinions (however we’re defining the difference), urges, desires, goals, etc. A lot of these forces are bound up in each other. Action is always a weighing of values, preferences, urges, and options, and sometimes it’s a complicated weighing. But that’s all there is. There is no moral standard that applies to everyone.

Don’t you want to say something much stronger, that if *one *person wakes up tomorrow and decides to become a serial killer, then his decision is not objectively immoral? If he prefers that, *that *is moral - he need not give reasons, he need not reflect on his preferences, he need only *note *his preference, from which he can directly infer that his choice is intrinsically permissible (i.e., moral).

Congratulations on missing the point. If some guy wakes up tomorrow and starts valuing being a serial killer, then he’s likely going to entertain the idea of being a serial killer. That’s it. It’s not “moral” or “immoral.” The word literally has no meaning, other than a person expressing an individual value judgment on the subject.

Now, I’m not going to like the fact that he’s entertaining the idea of being a serial killer – there go my own values speaking up – but nothing outside of my judgment and the judgment of people like me makes his value “right” or “wrong.”

Ender:

[Values] are not arbitrary in that people accept them without thinking; in that sense they are simply customs, but let’s not talk about the mass of people who don’t think about these things; let’s restrict it to how we should understand it.

Alright, let’s. We can stick with the example about the guy who wakes up and decides he wants to be a serial killer – just because that example amuses me (and it reminds me a little bit of Dexter…although that character doesn’t value an urge he has, which goes back to my point earlier in this post about weighing of values, urges, preferences, and options).

He wakes up and decides to be a serial killer. What exactly, outside of the value judgments of pretty much everyone else in that society, makes his decision “wrong” or “right”? As I’ve been saying, those words need a context in order to make sense. If the context is not a human value judgment, it’s nothing, because there are no other kinds of value judgments. [You might claim that there are supernatural value judgments, but you’re gonna have a hell of time demonstrating it]

We have no danger of that happening * but … logically why should it not?* Because, values not being arbitrary, it’s very, very, very likely that most people in a society will value not being a serial killer and it’s trememendously unlikely (times a million) that everyone at once will wake up and immediately reverse all of the values that have been motivating culture since the dawn of time. The odds of it happening are so utterly remote that I feel comfortable classing it as an impossibility.

Leela:

The universe doesn’t seem to slice so easily along that line. I highly recommend the following article called The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy

Thanks, Leela. I will read this later and then respond with my thoughts about it – you’ve tried to bring this article to my attention a few times, and it deserves more serious attention than a brief skim.

 

[Ender]

Do you think Aristotle might have given the matter close thought? (Not to mention hundreds of Aristotelian philosophers, many of them atheists.) Do you think that Kantians are all God-fearing believers? Or how about consequentialists? Do any moral philosophers routinely invoke God to prove the objectivity of their reasoning?

If you think any of these philosophers have come up with a valid conclusion as to the existence of an extrinsic moral code then please explain it. That is precisely what I have been hoping someone would do. My comment about “other people” is that I don’t want to deal in generalities.

Ender

 

[Ender]

If some guy wakes up tomorrow and starts valuing being a serial killer, then he’s likely going to entertain the idea of being a serial killer. That’s it. It’s not “moral” or “immoral.” The word literally has no meaning, other than a person expressing an individual value judgment on the subject.

I agree with this.

Because, values not being arbitrary, it’s very, very, very likely that most people in a society will value not being a serial killer and it’s tremendously unlikely (times a million) that everyone at once will wake up and immediately reverse all of the values that have been motivating culture since the dawn of time.

Oh, sure. In theory it is possible but the probability is likely something around the Avogadro Constant against it.

Given the dictionary definition of arbitrary I provided I don’t see how you can claim that values are not arbitrary.

Ender

 

[Charlemagne_II]

Much of this discussion is dependent on a distinction to be made between laws and values. The argument raised by some is that natural laws can be verified in the real world, whereas moral values cannot. This distinction seems arbitrary. The law of gravity that exists in our minds is not “out there” in the world around us any more so than the moral **law **that exists in our minds that murder is wrong is “out there.” Both are verifiable based on our observations and experience. We deny both laws at our peril. Leap from a tall building and your body dies. Commit murder and your soul dies.

 

[Betterave]

Certainly. This is why I wrote that values are “an important part of the motivating force.”

But are they?? I don’t think so. Aren’t values ends, that *towards which * a motivating force may (in a virtuous person) or may not (in a vicious person) be directed? I don’t think you’re being very careful with your conceptual distinctions here.

Obviously, people have values, opinions (however we’re defining the difference), urges, desires, goals, etc. A lot of these forces are bound up in each other. Action is always a weighing of values, preferences, urges, and options, and sometimes it’s a complicated weighing. But that’s all there is. There is no moral standard that applies to everyone.

That’s all there is? You list a bunch of words without explaining the conceptual content of any of them and “that’s all there is”? (Btw, “action” is what?) If your concepts are this impoverished, naturally you won’t be able to do much reasoning.

Congratulations on missing the point. If some guy wakes up tomorrow and starts valuing being a serial killer, then he’s likely going to entertain the idea of being a serial killer. That’s it. It’s not “moral” or “immoral.” The word literally has no meaning, other than a person expressing an individual value judgment on the subject.

Literally has no meaning other than…? That’s no way to introduce a stipulative definition! (And surely you can’t think that your definition is anything but pure stipulation? Anyway, it’s certainly not a conventional definition, and if it’s supposed to be an essential definition I’d like to know where you got it from (other than you-know-where).)

Now, I’m not going to like the fact that he’s entertaining the idea of being a serial killer – there go my own values speaking up – but nothing outside of my judgment and the judgment of people like me makes his value “right” or “wrong.”

Wonderful Anti, nothing outside of your judgment… (and, we had better add, *your *judgment is not objective or reasonable). Now let’s try to address the judgment of people unlike you (i.e., basically all intelligent people who have tried to understand the nature of morality as objective, i.e., the vast majority of people who have given it any thought): is their judgment objective? They all think so! But you throw down your wildly stipulative definition of “moral” and you think you’ve won the day?

So we’re back to the question of giving reasons (versus making wild stipulations). Is it rational to be irrational? (That’s a funny question!) Well if you’re irrational, perhaps you won’t care about reasons, so the irrational person doesn’t care about being rational, and he might even claim that all the rational people are just as irrational as him - and he won’t care about their reasons for claiming otherwise! It would be irrational to think that an irrational person would care about reasons! (Do you see the analogy I’m making here? I’m guessing you won’t but I’ll let you try to think about it before I spell it out.)

 

[Charlemagne_II]

AntiTheist

• Action is always a weighing of values, preferences, urges, and options, and sometimes it’s a complicated weighing. But that’s all there is. There is no moral standard that applies to everyone.*

Then why have laws? Is it not a moral law that applies to everyone that “needless violence against anyone is forbidden”? **To whom **would you grant the exception?

 

[Betterave]

If you think any of these philosophers have come up with a valid conclusion as to the existence of an **extrinsic **moral code then please explain it. That is precisely what I have been hoping someone would do. My comment about “other people” is that I don’t want to deal in generalities.

Ender

“Extrinsic”? Where’d that come from? What’s it supposed to mean?

Anyway, I have been explaining it along the way. Maybe I’ve been too allusive? The key point is about understanding that we give reasons for our moral beliefs. These reasons may be grounded in “personal preferences” but “personal preferences” are grounded in objective realities (nature, reason, general will, sentience - accounts vary but we don’t need to choose one in order to grasp the point). Preferences do *not *assert themselves as absolute criteria of morality or of choice (remember the point about preferring chocolate?). For an irrational being, preferences could assert themselves as absolute criteria of choice, but such beings would be amoral. To be a moral being means to master one’s preferences by incorporating them within a general domain of rational choice which is, qua rational, not “purely personal”. Someone who rejects moral reasoning by an act expressing his personal preference to be immoral does not destroy the objective reality of morality, he only cuts himself off from it. If I kill myself, my death doesn’t effect the death of everyone else (though it might encourage copy-cats). If I shoot myself in the foot, others will still have no difficulty walking (unless they decide to shoot themselves too!). Do you get the point?

 

[Charlemagne_II]

Leela
*
then the existence of the Moral Law is nothing we need to either affirm or deny since its existstence or nonexistence can make no practical difference.*

No practical difference? **All civil law **is based on moral law. Do all civil laws make no practical difference in the life of individuals or societies?

 

[Charlemagne_II]

A question has been raised earlier about atheist philosophers who have affirmed an objectivist athic. Ayn Rand is one such and here is her view on subjectivist ethics.

The subjectivist theory of ethics is, strictly speaking, not a theory, but a negation of ethics. And more: it is a negation of reality, a negation not merely of man’s existence, but of all existence. Only the concept of a fluid, plastic, indeterminate, Heraclitean universe could permit anyone to think or to preach that man needs no objective principles of action—that reality gives him a blank check on values—that anything he cares to pick as the good or the evil, will do—that a man’s whim is a valid moral standard, and that the only question is how to get away with it. The existential monument to this theory is the present state of our culture.

 

[AntiTheist]

Given the dictionary definition of arbitrary I provided I don’t see how you can claim that values are not arbitrary.

I mean that values – many of the basic ones, anyway – are “not arbitrary” in the sense that they are shaped by forces outside of the individual. Maybe “not random” or “not whimsical” is closer to my meaning? I mean that people don’t wake up and choose their values just for the hell of it, without the influence of environment, social forces, and biological makeup.

Charlemagne II:

Then why have laws?

Because most of us value living in a society where, for example, our safety is guaranteed. This value derives from both biology (a desire for self-preservation) and society (thousands of years of living in relatively safe communities have made our culture privilege such safety over more dangerous kinds of living). When you get together a group that shares the same values, you can decide on establishing rules that will promote the kind of society that most of the group values. That’s how it works. The rest of your post doesn’t make sense.

Leela: I haven’t gotten around to thoroughly reading that article, but before I do, could you please explain what relevance you think it has? From my glancing through it, I understand that its author argues that values and facts influence each other – i.e. values often derive from facts and our perception of facts depends upon our values. As it goes, I would agree with that: values don’t form in a vacuum – they’re obviously influenced by our experience of the physical world, and our experience is likewise influenced by our values. All of that, however, doesn’t make value judgments acquire truth values. “That sunset is pretty” isn’t a truth statement in the way that “There’s a table in this room” is, even though values underlie both statements.

If you could explain your point and its significance for morality, I’d be delighted.

And if you think “That sunset is pretty” is a truth statement, could you please explain how to determine its truth value?

 

[Charlemagne_II]

AntiTheist

Action is always a weighing of values, preferences, urges, and options, and sometimes it’s a complicated weighing. But that’s all there is. There is no moral standard that applies to everyone.

I replied:

Then why have laws? Is it not a moral law that applies to everyone that “needless violence against anyone is forbidden”? To whom would you grant the exception?

I assume it’s the second sentence that didn’t make sense to you. Let me rephrase:

Suppose there was a law that said “Needless violence against anyone is forbidden.”

You have said there is no moral standard that applies to everyone. So to whom would you say this law would not apply?

 

[Ender]

The key point is about understanding that we give reasons for our moral beliefs. These reasons may be grounded in “personal preferences” but “personal preferences” are grounded in objective realities (nature, reason, general will, sentience - accounts vary but we don’t need to choose one in order to grasp the point).

I’m sure AntiTheist can give reasons for his moral beliefs but I think we all agree that that doesn’t make them objectively correct. When you admit that reasons are personal preferences (I don’t know that “grounded in” changes this) that pretty much ends the discussion: that’s been our point. The fact that those preferences are being made from a collection of objective realities doesn’t change the fact that the preferences are not objectively real.

To be a moral being means to master one’s preferences by incorporating them within a general domain of rational choice which is, qua rational, not “purely personal”.

I think AntiTheist’s position is imminently rational. The bully who takes a classmates lunch money is acting rationally: if he does X (threatening smaller kids) he gets rewarded. If the definition of being moral is to act rationally, then his action is moral.

Someone who rejects moral reasoning by an act expressing his personal preference to be immoral does not destroy the objective reality of morality, he only cuts himself off from it.

You haven’t demonstrated that morality objectively exists. Let’s start there.

Ender

 

[Ender]

I mean that values – many of the basic ones, anyway – are “not arbitrary” in the sense that they are shaped by forces outside of the individual. Maybe “not random” or “not whimsical” is closer to my meaning? I mean that people don’t wake up and choose their values just for the hell of it, without the influence of environment, social forces, and biological makeup.

It’s a bit humorous to reflect that in our discussion of objective and subjective morality, it is the subjective implication of “arbitrary” that makes you unwilling to apply it to your values. I certainly agree that our values are neither random nor whimsical and they are held in all seriousness… nonetheless, according to its dictionary definition, arbitrary is the proper word. I understand your aversion to the word though, so how about using “discretionary”?

Ender

 

[warpspeedpetey]

values = personal opinions.

the whole subjectivist argument falls apart because no matter how they phrase it, subjective morals are just personal opinions. having no force. you can do anything that you can get away with.

if a serial killer murders 893 people, thats just fine. just as long as he can avoid punishment. then its ok.

under this scheme, nothing that you can get away with is wrong.

which is exactly why the idea of subjective morality isnt taken seriously by anyone without a philosophical axe to grind.

 

[Charlemagne_II]

*which is exactly why the idea of subjective morality isnt taken seriously by anyone without a philosophical axe to grind. *

How true!

The homosexual wants subjective ethics to legalize homosexual marriage.

The pedophile wants subjective ethics to legalize sex between adults and children (NAMBLA).

The abortionist wants subjective ethics to cast doubt on the humanity (and the rights) of the child in the womb, and to legalize his murder of the unborn.

Etc., etc.

 

[Betterave]

When you admit that reasons are personal preferences (I don’t know that “grounded in” changes this) that pretty much ends the discussion: that’s been our point.

If that has been your point, then it’s based on a very simplistic misunderstanding. Consider:

1. Reasons are *grounded *in personal preferences; therefore reasons *are *personal preferencecs.
2. A tree is *grounded *in soil; therefore a tree *is *soil.
3. A plant’s flourishing is *grounded *in (some combination of) sun, water, and soil; therefore a tree *is *(some combination of) sun, water, and soil.

 

[Betterave]

values = personal opinions.

the whole subjectivist argument falls apart because no matter how they phrase it, subjective morals are just personal opinions. having no force. you can do anything that you can get away with.

if a serial killer murders 893 people, thats just fine. just as long as he can avoid punishment. then its ok.

under this scheme, nothing that you can get away with is wrong.

which is exactly why the idea of subjective morality isnt taken seriously by anyone without a philosophical axe to grind.

Values and opinions can certainly have force (they can even be true/truly valuable, or justified and true!). You speak as if it’s ‘absolute force’ or ‘no force’.

Also, the subjectivist argument emphasizes the importance of different perspectives; this crucial element gets ignored in your account. I believe the subjectivist argument is clearly wrong, as I’m trying to argue, but what you’ve written isn’t helpful since it’s clearly a straw man.