Does morality exist?

[Syntax]

Do you remember Sytax’s comments about the good not being definable, although we can give instances in all sorts of contexts of things that are objectively good? “Better than” means “more good than” so the same comments apply. Therefore the answer to your question is: Neither proposition is either true or false - they have not been defined relevant to some context by which we can apprehend what they actually mean, i.e., by which we can apprehend them as instances of the ‘more good’ or not. You could throw in a ceteris paribus clause and we might have something to say, or modify the content to make it properly abstract such that we can say something entirely abstract about it, the way you want us to (e.g., “Malice is morally better than benevolence”); or you could say something concrete, something with an adequately circumscribed context for our concepts to be applicable to it (e.g., “Fr. Damien was a better person than Josef Mengele” or “Sidney Crosby is a better hockey player than Kobe Bryant”). But none of this has truth-value in your view, you’re stymied, you don’t know what to say in any of these cases - “is it true… or false…?”

Nice, you said it better than I did, and with thrift too…so I’m not sure what the issue is with Anti. At least Ender inquires, offers arguments, and maintains a receptive and open mind.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

Nice call, warpseed. I also have decisively shown that one of his claims leads to a contradiction–twice now–but with no response. So it seems Anti thinks employing double-standards are permissible for him but not for the rest of us.

double standards are the hall mark of disbelief.

 

[Syntax]

Page 1

Originally Posted by Ender
If I make a value judgment I can accept that I am stating what I believe to be objectively true but what makes it objectively true?

Posted by Syntax:
The truth-maker for value-judgments are good and bad-making properties that attach to actions or states-of-affairs.

Posted by Ender:
I have no idea what you mean here but I think this is the heart of the debate so, if you would, dumb it down so I can understand what your point is.

My apologies about that. Also, I just now noticed your post–sorry about that too. By the way, you are right to notice this is approaching the heart of the debate! I will do my best to explain. Some of this may sound obvious to you, but hopefully it clarifies some things.

The mere *grammatical requirements for a statement (claim, proposition, belief) about the world to have a truth-value at all is that the statement must have at least *a subject and a predicate, e.g., as in, “John runs” or “All bears are furry” or “Killing innocent people for fun is wrong.”

The term “John,” even though it refers to John, cannot be evaluated for truth because it is not saying anything about him. The term “runs” refers to running, but it cannot be evaluated for truth either, because it doesn’t tell us who or what is doing the running.

John, the class of all bears, and killing-innocent-people-for-fun are all things denoted by their respective terms above. “John” refers to the individual John, “all bears” refers to the class of all bears “killing innocent people for fun” refers to the complex action of killing-innocent-people-for-fun.

“Runs” refers to the property of running, and this property is what we are ascribing to John when we utter the statement “John runs.” “Furry” refers to the property of furriness which we are ascribing to bears when we say that “All bears are furry.” And “wrong” refers to the property of wrongness which we ascribe to the complex action of killing-innocent-people-for-fun when we utter “Killing innocent people for fun is wrong.”

So the statement “John runs” is true if and only if John does, in fact, run. “All bears are furry” is true if and only if all bear are, in fact, furry. And “Killing innocent people for fun is wrong” is true if and only if killing innocent people for fun is, in fact, wrong.

So when I say something like, “The *truth-maker *for normative-judgments are right-making and wrong-making properties that attach to actions or states-of-affairs,” I mean to say that,

Wrongness is a *really existent *property in the world which attaches to this really existent action of killing-people-for-fun, and it is this property of the action which makes the statement “Killing innocent people for fun is wrong” true. What else could make this statement true?

We can substitue “bad” or “good” in this statement and get the same result. “Bad” refers to the property of badness, and “good” refers to the property of goodness, and I am ascribing this property to happiness, for instance, when I say “Happiness is good.” So it is the goodness property that attaches to happiness which makes the statement true.

Hopefully this clears up some basics. Now comes the interesting stuff!

continued…

 

[Syntax]

Page 2

I have no idea what a non-cognitivist anti-realist is, let alone what he believes. You tell me what you believe and I’ll tell you what I believe.

Anti-realists will vary in their actual views here and there, but the important point to understand is that they believe that the alleged normative properties rightness and wrongness do not actually exist in the outside world (most will extend this view to the alleged evaluative properties of goodness and badness too). So they are not real properties. The terms “right” and “wrong” refer to nothing. Usually, the most often-cited reason for denying their existence is that we don’t actually observe these properites empirically. So when I say “Killing innocent people for fun is wrong” the statement is false. All I can really say, then, is that killing innocent people for fun hurts them or causes them pain since I can observe these events in the outside world. But I don’t have the license to say that this action of killing innocent people for fun is a wrong or bad action because wrong-making and bad-making properties of actions simply do not exist.

Now for noncognitivism:
This is not a metaphysical view about whether right, wrong, good, and bad really exist in the world, but a linguistic view about the status of our ethical judgments themselves and what we think they are saying when we make them.

Normally, when a person says “torturing babies is wrong” he naturally thinks he is asserting just what his claim says, namely, that torturing babies is wrong. But the non-cognitivist argues that the person is not actually asserting this at all but asserting instead the claim that,

“The act, or thought, of torturing babies makes me feel terrible.”

So rather than being an objective claim made about the outside world, the claim (so the noncognitivist says) is really a subjective report about what makes you feel terrible.

So the real meaning of the statement “torturing babies is wrong” is “the act, or thought, of torturing babies makes me feel bad.”

This is why the statement “torturing babies is wrong” cannot be true or false about the outside world because it is not even a claim being made about the outside world to start with at all! So normative claims are incapable of being evaluated for objective truth–they are truth-valueless when we apply them to the outside world.

But notice, they do have a truth value with respect to your own subjective feelings, of what makes you feel happy or sad, joyful or repugnant. So if someone says “torturing babies does not make Syntax feel terrible” they would be saying something false because torturing babies does make me feel terrible.

So the statement “torturing babies is wrong” is just not the objective kind of claim about the outside world we originally thought it was.

So here are the two variations:

(1) Anti-realist cognitivist–believes no right or wrong exists, but ethical judgments still purport to make judgments about the outside world. Therefore, they are all objectively false.

(2) Anti-realist noncognitivist–believes no right or wrong exists, but ethical judgments don’t even purport to make judgments about the outside world either. So they are neither true nor false.

I think (2) is the worse of the two views, and I’ve explained why in other posts. For one, it faces too many looming contradictions and, two, the noncognitivist has absolutely no justification–neither logically, empirically, epistemically, nor otherwise–for his believing that *my own *moral judgments do not purport to claim exactly what I think they purport to claim, namely, objective moral facts about the outside world. How does the non-cognitivist know this? Does he have a priviledged access to my own personal mental states that I don’t have? When I say “torturing babies is wrong” I mean exactly what I say I mean, namely, torturing babies is wrong

.—This view is too absurd to believe. But this is exactly AntiTheist’s view.

Hopefully all this helps some…

 

[Ender]

Before I get back to all the new posts I would like to point to an interesting article that just appeared at InsideCatholic on this very topic. In it the author challenges the atheist position on morality held by Sam Harris, who, like Richard Dawkins, is quite outspoken in his rejection of religion in general and Christianity in particular. Harris’, like most of you, believes that an objective morality can exist without God.

What needs to be kept in mind here is that, for this debate, we are all atheists in that it was specified that God does not exist so it is somewhat humorous to note that all of you who oppose my position are defending Harris while my position is defended by the (very Catholic) author.

insidecatholic.com/Joomla/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=504&Itemid=48

Ender

 

[Ender]

I agree that if evil does not exists then slavery cannot be evil, but I don’t understand why the existence or nonexistence of God has any bearing on whether or not something can be rightly called evil. My claim that slavery is evil is not based on an axiom that God exists. Why do you assume that it must?

Where did evil originate? We do not believe that animals can behave morally; their actions are all amoral so how is it that evil suddenly appeared only with the evolution of man? In the “God does not exist” universe man is an evolutionary accident of no more significance than a rabbit. When a male lion drives out the old male and takes possession of his pride he will kill all of the cubs that are still nursing so their mothers will mate with him. We may consider that harsh but we don’t consider it immoral so what would make it immoral for a man to do the same thing? Why is it acceptable to kill and eat rabbits but not other men when one has no more significance than the other?

Ender

 

[Prodigal_Son]

I haven’t been part of this conversation for some time, but I think it may be worth throwing in my two cents again.

What makes a statement true? Most of us will answer: the meaning of the statement corresponds to the way the world is.

What makes the statement “this stapler is black” true (or false)? Most of us will answer: this statement corresponds to some fact about the stapler, a fact that could have been otherwise.

What makes the statement “all bachelors are male” true? The meaning of the words alone. The proposition is necessarily true.

What makes the statement “a triangle with equal sides has equal angles” true? This one is controversial. The proposition is necessary, and it follows from our definitions, but a person may understand the meaning of all the words in the statement, and still not assent to its truth.

When an atheist says that there are moral truths, the first question to ask is this: are they “this stapler is black” truths, or “a triangle with equal sides has equal angles” truths? Are they necessary or contingent?

1. If moral truths are contingent (think stapler), then the atheist must claim that they are either a) knowable, or b) unknowable. If b, then morality is bunk, since our epistemological limitations make all actions justifiable. If morality is knowable and contingent, however, then moral truths must be known through some faculty analogous to the senses. Such a claim is perfectly consistent with observation.
2. If moral truths are necessary, then the same epistemological divide exists. Assume the atheist says that such truths are knowable. Then moral truths would be known by an analysis of our present concepts, which would reveal synthetic a priori truths about the world. Disputes about morality would be resolved with reference to those concepts, akin to explaining geometric proofs. A nihilist would be equivalent to a person who was extraordinarily incompetent in conceptual analysis, or (alternately) didn’t possess the same concepts to start with as a moral realist.

Both options #1 and #2 are available to the atheistic moral realist. But consider the following proposition:

“We never have most reason to do a morally impermissible action.”

Why should this be true, on an atheistic moral view? Morally impermissible actions would sometimes benefit us; for example, by saving our lives. The Christian – who believes in an afterlife – sees a reason to act rightly, no matter what the circumstance. But why should the atheist do the same?

Ethics, broadly construed, is the study of those things we have most reason to do. The atheistic moral realist claims that there are moral truths, but this does not make them ethical truths. Why would anyone ever have the most reason to end his existence forever, by sacrificing his life for others?

 

[Betterave]

Where did evil originate? We do not believe that animals can behave morally; their actions are all amoral so how is it that evil suddenly appeared only with the evolution of man? In the “God does not exist” universe man is an evolutionary accident of no more significance than a rabbit. When a male lion drives out the old male and takes possession of his pride he will kill all of the cubs that are still nursing so their mothers will mate with him. We may consider that harsh but we don’t consider it immoral so what would make it immoral for a man to do the same thing? Why is it acceptable to kill and eat rabbits but not other men when one has no more significance than the other?

Ender

Lions cannot be evil, because they are not moral beings, because they do not have moral concepts, because they don’t have any concepts. If human beings likewise had no concepts, nothing could be morally evil for humans either. Certain things would still be objectively bad, but only in the natural sense in which natural beings can flourish or languish. But it is only when this natural flourishing/languishing is expressed conceptually and is made into the object of practical reasonings, reflections on the good, that a moral being comes into existence. (This is why an infant cannot commit morally evil acts.) So how did moral beings first come into existence? Good question… but not one we need to answer for our purposes here.

(An aside: One possible turn our reflection could take here would be away from the notion that knowledge of objective morality is grounded in knowledge of God towards the possibility that knowledge of objective morality naturally invites us to reflect on the possibility (indeed, the ‘moral necessity’) of the existence of God.)

 

[Ender]

Putative moral laws exist and if these are truly moral laws, they have the property of universality, i.e., of being unconditionally binding in each and every situation to which they apply

I don’t know what you mean by unconditionally binding. We can behave morally only by freely choosing between good and evil so in that regard we cannot be bound. If you mean universally true in every situation then I’m not sure you can say that murder is immoral because it is in fact not held universally to be true. It may be universally true that I may not murder someone of my tribe but it has been held in the past by pretty much everyone - and is so today among many - that murder of someone in another tribe is a positive good.

There are no good reasons to doubt that many of the putative moral laws we apprehend are objectively grounded (true moral laws) and many good reasons to think that they are objectively grounded (in our institutions of reason-giving and the basic conceptual structures by which we grasp reality).

This is no argument at all; it is merely a declaration that you prefer your rationale to mine. I’m still waiting for an explanation.

You might object: but why not accept Anti’s alternate ‘basic conceptual structure’? It’s novel and unintuitive, sure; but why not?

If it is novel it is only because most atheists are unwilling to face the logic of their own belief and pretend that there is some reason to behave morally even though they can’t rationally explain why. Anti is unique in accepting the conclusion his belief requires, a position, by the way, that is neither novel nor unintuitive as it is precisely the same conclusion Dostoyevsky (among others) expressed 150 years ago.

Well, why would we do that?.. It’s so we can grasp reality as it really is - that’s the claim I’m hearing, at least. …What do you think motivates Anti’s position?

He believes, as do I (and Fyodor) that it describes reality. What more motivation is necessary?

So now you are using the property “more logical” as your basis for making existential claims?

Let’s not make this a word game. Pick whatever descriptive term you prefer: logical, rational, truthful, realistic…

One of the things that appear to us is our practical mastery in the domain of morality, our ability to reflect upon our preferences and to form judgments on their basis. Judgments are not preferences, they are practical (action-directed) axioms based on our preferences, and they can be, qua judgments, public statements of value, and therefore public practical axioms. Moral judgments, then, instantiate the possibility of public practical axioms in a particular way, namely as unconditionally binding imperatives in terms of which we recognize and interact with the collection of features of reality that we call moral - virtue, vice, right, wrong, good, bad, admirable, base, beautiful, ugly. These ways of apprehending reality are not proposed to the individual such that she can agree to see the world in these terms or not. When we look at our own capacity for understanding what is, these are objectively constituted categories of reality that are given to us and transcend, contextualize, give meaning to, our personal preferences.

I really don’t know what you’re trying to say here. I think more clarity is going to require less jargon.

Ender

 

[Betterave]

Before I get back to all the new posts I would like to point to an interesting article that just appeared at InsideCatholic on this very topic. In it the author challenges the atheist position on morality held by Sam Harris, who, like Richard Dawkins, is quite outspoken in his rejection of religion in general and Christianity in particular. Harris’, like most of you, believes that an objective morality can exist without God.

What needs to be kept in mind here is that, for this debate, we are all atheists in that it was specified that God does not exist so it is somewhat humorous to note that all of you who oppose my position are defending Harris while my position is defended by the (very Catholic) author.

insidecatholic.com/Joomla/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=504&Itemid=48

Ender

I think you’ve either misread that article or are still not understanding the arguments being made here (both actually!). Harris’ argument is crudely scientistic, not related in any detail (though I suspect it is intrinsically incoherent), and unrelated to the arguments that have been offered here. Just because two arguments have the same conclusion does not mean they are the same argument.

 

[Ender]

There is an objective ground for morality. It is called the “natural law” or the “natural moral law,” which is the same everywhere and at all times. There can be no genuine understanding of morality or ethics as long as natural law is neglected.

But can the natural law exist without God? It was stipulated that for this discussion God does not exist so we are addressing the question of whether, in that situation, there is an objective ground for morality.

Ender

 

[Betterave]

Ethics, broadly construed, is the study of those things we have most reason to do. The atheistic moral realist claims that there are moral truths, but this does not make them ethical truths. Why would anyone ever have the most reason to end his existence forever, by sacrificing his life for others?

In other words, why would a communist ever have the most reason (i.e., be most strongly motivated) to end his existence forever, by sacrificing his life for others? I’m not sure what kind of answer you’re looking for, but what’s wrong with noticing that that’s just the way people are? They are highly motivated by the reality they apprehend as being true, and they rarely apprehend as being true the claim that there is nothing worth dying for. Why *would *anyone believe that, or have reason to believe that?

 

[Ender]

“What’s true for you many not be true for me” is a very nonsensical way of talking and confuses matters all-too quickly, not exactly a logical fallacy.

OK, that’s literally true but the expression is really slang and simply expresses the notion that your perception of truth is different than mine. It is not a comment on the (as Betterave would say) quality of truth qua truth.

Axioms are self-evident and necessarily true, but they are not definitions.

I am using “axiom” in the mathematical sense: *“An axiom is a statement that is accepted within a formal system as being true without requiring any proof.” *For this discussion, the debate is based on the axiom that God does not exist.

Ender

 

[Ender]

At least Ender inquires, offers arguments, and maintains a receptive and open mind.

I don’t know that you recognize the irony in this situation. It is very easy for me to retain an “open mind” as (in my mind) I am defending the Christian position and you are in fact defending the atheist position. That is, you are defending the position held by most atheists other than AntiTheist who is the first atheist I have encountered who accepts (what I see as) the necessary conclusions of his belief.

Ender

 

[Betterave]

Let’s not make this a word game. Pick whatever descriptive term you prefer: logical, rational, truthful, realistic…

Okay, here’s where laziness does need to be applied to you - one can be very industrious with the production of groundless claims, but still very intellectually lazy. If you want to insist on taking the attitude that it doesn’t matter what words and concepts we use in a context like this, we’re wasting our time here. If you’re not interested in using words correctly, in ways that we have come to agree upon, if you want to just say “pick one - I don’t care which!” from a list of words that are clearly not synonymous, if you don’t want to learn to understand the distinction between different concepts when that is required in order to understand something… If you don’t like my use of a term you need to say why not, just as I have done, and you need to respect it when I do that - you *need *to try to understand *why *I am objecting to your way of putting it, and if you don’t like my objection, tell my why. You can’t just tell yourself “I already know what I’m clearly thinking, so he should too - even if I haven’t clearly expressed what it is I’m thinking.” If you can’t find precise words to use, that’s because you need to learn to use words better - it’s not justification for you thinking others ought to understand what you mean regardless of your imprecise way of expressing what you mean. (Sorry if this has been a rant, but it’s of fundamental importance.)

 

[Prodigal_Son]

In other words, why would a communist ever have the most reason (i.e., be most strongly motivated) to end his existence forever, by sacrificing his life for others? I’m not sure what kind of answer you’re looking for, but what’s wrong with noticing that that’s just the way people are? They are highly motivated by the reality they apprehend as being true, and they rarely apprehend as being true the claim that there is nothing worth dying for. Why *would *anyone believe that, or have reason to believe that?

I think you’re confusing my usage of the term “reason”. By reason, I do NOT mean “stated motivation” nor “implicit motivation”. Rather, I mean “something that *actually *counts in favor of an action.”

Assume there is no afterlife. For many conventional cases, then, people still have reason to be moral: if I lie to people, they won’t trust me, etc. The state of the world actually counts in favor of my actions. But I can construct realistic cases where doing the right thing will not have good effects for me, and doing the wrong thing will have good effects for me. And I can be fully aware that acting wrongly hurts others, and yet it might puzzle me why my moral reasons for doing right outweigh my prudential reasons for doing wrong. Now you could make the case that “goodness is its own reward”; indeed, Plato makes this case at length in the Republic. But is this case plausible?

Thus, atheistic morality collapses into prudential ethics. Indeed, this is the tragedy that many less-than-scrupulous Kantians encounter in their daily lives.

 

[Syntax]

OK, that’s literally true but the expression is really slang and simply expresses the notion that your perception of truth is different than mine. It is not a comment on the (as Betterave would say) quality of truth qua truth.

If you agree, then why didn’t you say so? Since the “slang” use of it doesn’t even make any sense, we should just drop it altogether. On other hand, if you want the slang use of “true” to hold an additional meaning other than what people correctly use it for, then you need to specify what that meaning is, because quite honestly (and I’m serious!), I don’t even understand what people are saying when they use “true” in such an irresponsible manner; and I’m quite certain they understand what they are saying either.

I am using “axiom” in the mathematical sense: "An axiom is a statement that is accepted within a formal system as being true without requiring any proof." For this discussion, the debate is based on the axiom that God does not exist.Ender

I understand what you are trying to say. All of us are discussing whether or not there are any other positive reasons for believing objective morality exists independent of the hypothesis that God exists. But this doesn’t mean the statement “God does not exist” is an implicit *assumption * informing the context of our discussion from which further conclusions can be derived–it is completely irrelevant for our purposes in this context just as its alternative “God exists” is irrelevant.

Still, you are misusing the word “axiom,” since the statement “God does not exist” in and of itself requires proof or demonstration precisely because it is *not *self-evident. Therefore, it is not an axiom.

 

[Syntax]

I don’t know that you recognize the irony in this situation. It is very easy for me to retain an “open mind” as (in my mind) I am defending the Christian position and you are in fact defending the atheist position. That is, you are defending the position held by most atheists other than AntiTheist who is the first atheist I have encountered who accepts (what I see as) the necessary conclusions of his belief.

What?? How so? I sure hope I am not defending other atheists! I will articulate their position better than they can, precisely so that I can expose the fundamental error lurking in the mud informing the rest of their views. That’s not defending their views, that’s undercutting the very foundation so the entire superstructure collapses on itself at once. I would call that getting right to the point.

 

[Ender]

Thank you for taking the time to post such a thorough response. I have a science background so I really don’t think I’m too obtuse to understand this … but I may have to bookmark this page to refer to now and then.

Syntax:

Wrongness is a *really existent *property in the world which attaches to this really existent action of killing-people-for-fun, and it is this property of the action which makes the statement “Killing innocent people for fun is wrong” true. What else could make this statement true?

The statement is true if wrongness is in fact a really existent property, but this claim assumes the point in question. What makes wrongness a really existent property? I’m looking for something like a syllogism that has “wrongness is a really existent property” as a conclusion, not as a premise.

So here are the two variations: … .—This [second] view is too absurd to believe. But this is exactly AntiTheist’s view.

My view would be the first no right or wrong exists, but ethical judgments still purport to make judgments about the outside world. Therefore, they are all objectively false.] I will point out, however, that I am as justified in applying the term “anti-realist” to your position as you are in applying it to mine since the proper use of the term turns on which of us has the true understanding of morality in a Godless universe.

Ender

 

[AntiTheist]

Well, apparently, you and I use very different definitions of “happiness.” I use the word to refer to things that people value and enjoy – things that produce happiness, those good feelings in your head. So yes, a masochist would consider pain “happiness,” and a drug addict would consider getting high “happiness.” Now, such individuals might discover at some later point that those things no longer produce pleasure, or have consequences that they did not forsee, and they may decide to value it no longer, but until such a time, I would consider those things to be what those individuals consider “happiness.”

In fact, I could imagine someone who is always pleased by pain or drugs and who always considers them to constitute “happiness.”

What definition do you use for happiness?

You are conflating statements of comparitive value which vary from one individual and one context to the next with what we find intrinsically valuable–so the truth-value of the above statements can change.

Good. So the statement “Pleasurable mental feelings are better than undergoing pain” doesn’t have a truth value unless we give it a context – a set of values. For some people it will be true, and for other people it will be false.

Let’s try another value judgment: “It’s better to give money to a homeless person than it is to spend that money on an extravagent dinner for one’s wealthy family.”

And another: “It’s better to spend money on an extravagent dinner for one’s wealthy family than it is to give money to a homeless person.”

Which of the above value judgments is the true one and how do you know?

The point I’m making here is that value judgments need a context to make sense. I’m pointing out that absent a supernatural Big Brother who sets the values for everyone, the value that one places on, for example, charitable donations depends upon the individual.