Does morality have a reference in this world?

[Oreoracle]

Logical point. But, remember, the rape victim doesn’t care about being valued. She just cares about not being raped. To say that how a person treats her is because of a value that he may or may not have is a mockery to moral education. If a person has a bad upbringing, you can be *sure *they will not have the right feelings toward this potential victim; but an internal moral law can still enable them to act decently toward her.

If you talk to people who grew up on the streets, they most certainly have a moral compass. But their feelings cause them to violate it.

So we can agree that there is an emotional bias to appeal to, but it is outweighed at the time by other feelings?

But people who have been hurt want to hurt others. They are fascinated by the power they have in hurting, and I don’t blame them for that fascination. No authority has ever convinced a hostile thug to stop hurting people by telling them to consider how the hurt person feels.

(You want me to just outright say it, don’t you? ) There are cases when force must be used. If we cannot dissuade someone from violence, we should incarcerate them and attempt to rehabilitate. This might sound ironic, but it seems moral to use violence in order to prevent a greater quantity of violence. Isn’t this the professed hope of many soldiers who enter the military?

This last quote demonstrates, IMHO, that you think of love as proceeding from feelings.

Well, yes. What is love but a combination of attraction and acceptance (my own definition, of course)? I don’t think love isn’t valuable just because it’s a feeling. On the contrary, feelings are what make life worth living.

A great number of thinkers, theistic and otherwise, would consider this a flaw. You don’t love others because you feel for them – in fact, oftentimes a person that you serve will disgust you (prisoners, addicts).

I wouldn’t necessarily call that “love.” That’s more like a sense of duty (I think Kant would approve). But isn’t that still just an emotional bias we are born with, likely being the result of evolution (feeling compelled to help others is beneficial to our species)? It might be instinctual as well.

You love because you ought to love.

Are you not just telling others how to feel, as you accused me of doing with the rapist scenario? May I ask what your reference point is?

I wish I could download some Kantian thinking into your brain…

Ohhh…Ambitious! That might prove a difficult task, since the philosophers I admire hold beliefs that are diametrically opposed to Kant’s (such as Bentham, Mill, Singer, etc.). But good luck with that, anyway.

 

[Oreoracle]

Oreo:

You say statements like, “Killing humans is wrong.” hold no truth value and that ethical statements are nothing more than shared sentiments, approvals, or disapprovals. Then,
I have a simple question for you, "If ethical judgments are nothing more than expressions of approval, how do we distinguish between actual approval and right approval? If it is a true statement of fact that I do approve, is it not also true that I can approve or disapprove of my approval? Does this not make a true ethical judgment about my factual judgment?

jd

It’s not clear to me what you mean. Could you give an example?

 

[Prodigal_Son]

If you talk to people who grew up on the streets, they most certainly have a moral compass. But their feelings cause them to violate it.

So we can agree that there is an emotional bias to appeal to, but it is outweighed at the time by other feelings?

A moral compass is not an emotional bias. That presupposes what you’re trying to prove.

There are cases when force must be used. If we cannot dissuade someone from violence, we should incarcerate them and attempt to rehabilitate. This might sound ironic, but it seems moral to use violence in order to prevent a greater quantity of violence.

(Facetiously) But what did they ever do wrong?

I will agree that imprisonment is sometimes necessary, but it is possible to appeal to a criminal, only *not *on the basis of sympathy or emotions. You can appeal to the fact that, at any point, they can stop sinning and turn to Jesus, and *as soon *as they do this they are acting heroically. There is a great deal of empirical evidence that this works, although I do not endorse it only for its pragmatic value.

But isn’t that still just an emotional bias we are born with, likely being the result of evolution (feeling compelled to help others is beneficial to our species)?

Why would natural selection nurture in us a desire to help those who ought not reproduce, according to the standards of natural selection (that is, the environment)?

But bringing back evolution into the picture reminds me. Are you a proponent of eugenics?

Are you not just telling others how to feel, as you accused me of doing with the rapist scenario? May I ask what your reference point is?

“You love because you ought to love” does not tell you how to feel! Remember my definition of love? It is (analytically, in this case) not a feeling.

What is the reference point of love? Love is a relational term, like “trust”. It points to a reference that is clarified in the predicate. You trust ______ (Bob, say). The relation is an object in the world, but the relational term is not. In the case, “love” means “to wish the good [of another]”.

 

[Oreoracle]

A moral compass is not an emotional bias. That presupposes what you’re trying to prove.

If you’re waiting for cold hard evidence that emotions account for our moral decisions, I can’t present that. No one can.

The problem I’m having is that I don’t know what you mean by “moral compass.” How does this manifest itself? How do I perceive it directly or indirectly in my mind?

You see, whenever I have to make a decision, I’ll ‘feel out’ my options, as everyone does. When we are making particularly aggravating decisions, we can’t help but feel our emotions raging. The way I see it, each person has undeniable firsthand evidence that emotions/feelings exist (even Descartes would agree) and are present during these deliberations. I don’t see any evidence for this moral compass, however.

While I can’t prove that emotions necessarily prompt us to make decisions, I can at least prove (to myself) that they exist and are present during decision-making. Can the same be said of a moral compass?

I will agree that imprisonment is sometimes necessary, but it is possible to appeal to a criminal, only *not *on the basis of sympathy or emotions. You can appeal to the fact that, at any point, they can stop sinning and turn to Jesus, and *as soon *as they do this they are acting heroically. There is a great deal of empirical evidence that this works, although I do not endorse it only for its pragmatic value.

Well, you wouldn’t be talking about feelings or emotions, but it would still be an emotional appeal. If I believe I’m doing something heroic, I’m going to feel excited. The word “heroic” itself is loaded with connotations.

Why would natural selection nurture in us a desire to help those who ought not reproduce, according to the standards of natural selection (that is, the environment)?

This might sound like a cop out, but I don’t know if the evolutionary process can be that specific.

But bringing back evolution into the picture reminds me. Are you a proponent of eugenics?

Most of us are, in one way or another. For example, I disapprove of inbreeding because it has a high probability of resulting in children with defects. While this wouldn’t make me a eugenicist per se, it does further the end of eugenics.

But I assume you are referring to a much stricter sense of eugenics. If I had to guess, I would say that forcing people to use certain mates and forcing others to remain celibate would result in much suffering. In the end, even if we succeed in improving the quality of our species, I don’t think this would do much to allow people to lead more fulfilling lives. As a utilitarian, I can’t endorse a process that entails much suffering and little happiness. I approve of preventing defects, but “improvement” is in the eyes of the beholder.

“You love because you ought to love” does not tell you how to feel! Remember my definition of love? It is (analytically, in this case) not a feeling.

What is the reference point of love? Love is a relational term, like “trust”. It points to a reference that is clarified in the predicate. You trust ______ (Bob, say). The relation is an object in the world, but the relational term is not. In the case, “love” means “to wish the good [of another]”.

I’m not sure what you’re meaning to say. If I said “You hate Bob” would you deny that hate is an emotion? And personally, I can’t think of anything more emotional than wishing, in reference to your definition of “love.”

 

[Prodigal_Son]

The problem I’m having is that I don’t know what you mean by “moral compass.” How does this manifest itself? How do I perceive it directly or indirectly in my mind?

You see, whenever I have to make a decision, I’ll ‘feel out’ my options, as everyone does. When we are making particularly aggravating decisions, we can’t help but feel our emotions raging. The way I see it, each person has undeniable firsthand evidence that emotions/feelings exist (even Descartes would agree) and are present during these deliberations. I don’t see any evidence for this moral compass, however.

Consider an eight-year-old who has never stolen anything before. He knows that there is money in his grandma’s purse, and he decides to sneak some into his pocket while she isn’t looking. He is compelled (by something) to consider the action reprehensible, but he does it nevertheless. Afterward, he feels horribly guilty.

Everyone has had the above experience, with the details adjusted somewhat. After the first time you break a rule, it becomes easier and easier, because you are numbing your conscience.

By moral compass, this is what I mean: the fact that the injunctions in children’s consciences (both positive and negative) are extremely similar, across cultures. Children are drawn to glory and admiration, and children are averse to all perversity. These inhibitions are weathered by familiarity with wrong actions.

You might say that this moral compass is developed by nurture, but it is present in those who have terrible role models and parents. You might say that this moral compass has evolved through evolution, but it is unclear what evolutionary purpose many attractions and aversions serve. (For example, why do human beings find such beauty in the night sky, if not as a response to its goodness?)

I do not dispute, by the way, that emotions are present in essentially all moral reasoning. But even if you could demonstrate that every one does make decisions because of their emotions, this would not indicate that everyone *should *do so.

If I believe I’m doing something heroic, I’m going to feel excited. The word “heroic” itself is loaded with connotations.

But why do we want to be heroic, if heroism always involves self-sacrifice?

This might sound like a cop out, but I don’t know if the evolutionary process can be that specific.

Yeah, it’s a cop-out. If our environment is the only force acting upon us and shaping us, then it explains our characteristics. If we have the characteristic of caring for the old, or helping the disabled, then these must be explained by natural selection. Or else there is *some other force *that explains these phenomena.

But I assume you are referring to a much stricter sense of eugenics. If I had to guess, I would say that forcing people to use certain mates and forcing others to remain celibate would result in much suffering.

Then why are utilitarians encouraging the urban poor to abort their babies, which causes suffering to the mother, disaster to family structures, and steadily eradicates (and further impoverishes) these populations? This is eugenics. (Sorry, this is a pet peeve of mine).

I’m not sure what you’re meaning to say. If I said “You hate Bob” would you deny that hate is an emotion? And personally, I can’t think of anything more emotional than wishing, in reference to your definition of “love.”

Good point. My definition of love was shoddy, inconsistent with my previous statements (and my belief). Love is not a wish – you might wish that prisoners might be rehabilitated, but it is of no account. You only love when you do everything that you can about it. This is similar to Leela’s idea of expanding circles of sympathy, but it is based on a metaphysical reality as well. Love is **action **focused on the best interest of others; whether you wish it or not is irrelevant. This is the only intrinsically good kind of love, whereas the loves based on affection are essentially based on our own deficiencies and needs.

 

[Oreoracle]

Consider an eight-year-old who has never stolen anything before. He knows that there is money in his grandma’s purse, and he decides to sneak some into his pocket while she isn’t looking. He is compelled (by something) to consider the action reprehensible, but he does it nevertheless. Afterward, he feels horribly guilty.

It’ safe to assume this child has already been told that stealing is wrong (if not by his parents, then he’s surely been told in school). He could feel guilty because he knows his grandma needs the money. More than likely, though, he’s probably learned that he’ll get punished for such behaviors, meaning that he is not feeling guilt, but anxiety. Lastly, he may not want to disappoint his grandma by being disobedient, and is afraid he’ll get caught (again resulting in anxiety). The list goes on.

Everyone has had the above experience, with the details adjusted somewhat.

Yep. And when I stole, I had already been told that people who steal get punished. It made me quite nervous, leading me to believe I didn’t just automatically feel guilty. I was simply afraid I’d get caught (I was stealing my aunt’s cigarettes so she couldn’t smoke. )

After the first time you break a rule, it becomes easier and easier, because you are numbing your conscience.

I wouldn’t say that stealing my aunt’s cigarettes made it easier for me to steal. I knew that I meant well, so my conscience was perfectly quiet during my actions.

By moral compass, this is what I mean: the fact that the injunctions in children’s consciences (both positive and negative) are extremely similar, across cultures. Children are drawn to glory and admiration, and children are averse to all perversity. These inhibitions are weathered by familiarity with wrong actions.

What do you mean by “perversity?”

(For example, why do human beings find such beauty in the night sky, if not as a response to its goodness?)

I don’t know why our minds have developed to include conception of beauty. I’m just not willing to leap to an objective morality based on this ignorance.

I do not dispute, by the way, that emotions are present in essentially all moral reasoning. But even if you could demonstrate that every one does make decisions because of their emotions, this would not indicate that everyone *should *do so.

Correct. That is why ethical systems that assume emotivism are subjective. However, I could just as easily say that just because I’m naturally (possibly a poor choice of word) opposed to stealing, doesn’t mean it’s wrong for me to steal.

But why do we want to be heroic, if heroism always involves self-sacrifice?

Everything involves self-sacrifice, even walking into the kitchen and fixing yourself dinner. I think we want to be heroes because of the recognition we believe we’ll receive from others. There are other reasons of course, but this covers most people.

Yeah, it’s a cop-out. If our environment is the only force acting upon us and shaping us, then it explains our characteristics. If we have the characteristic of caring for the old, or helping the disabled, then these must be explained by natural selection. Or else there is *some other force *that explains these phenomena.

I’m sorry that I can’t seem to impress you without holding multiple scientific degrees. It’s not intended to be a cop-out, I just don’t know everything. In the end, I’m going to go with what I believe to be more probable. At least we have evidence for natural selection. We have none for a moral compass/other force.

Then why are utilitarians encouraging the urban poor to abort their babies, which causes suffering to the mother, disaster to family structures, and steadily eradicates (and further impoverishes) these populations? This is eugenics. (Sorry, this is a pet peeve of mine).

It’s alright. We all have our pet peeves.

First off, I’ve never heard of utilitarians encouraging abortion. They permit it, sure, but I’ve never heard of any encouragement. But I’ll assume you’re correct, here, because you don’t seem like the kind to make up stories about abortion. You said that they are poor…could it be that utilitarians are trying to help these families become financially stable (they won’t have to spend money raising children)? I don’t know enough to side with you or them, but I imagine that the utilitarians aren’t eugenicists.

Good point. My definition of love was shoddy, inconsistent with my previous statements (and my belief). Love is not a wish – you might wish that prisoners might be rehabilitated, but it is of no account. You only love when you do everything that you can about it. This is similar to Leela’s idea of expanding circles of sympathy, but it is based on a metaphysical reality as well. Love is **action **focused on the best interest of others; whether you wish it or not is irrelevant. This is the only intrinsically good kind of love, whereas the loves based on affection are essentially based on our own deficiencies and needs.

This definitely sounds more in line with what I’ve heard about the Catholic concept of love.

Now I have a question for you. Let’s assume that you’re right and my inclination to do good things isn’t emotional. In fact, whatever inclines me to do these things was made by God himself. But why did God make this moral law? Perhaps he wanted it to be this way, because he felt that it was right? If I’m not compelled to do these things by emotion, then wouldn’t God be compelled to make this moral law by his emotions? I mean, he couldn’t have been compelled by moral law, because he wasn’t designed as we were. See what I mean?

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Now I have a question for you. Let’s assume that you’re right and my inclination to do good things isn’t emotional. In fact, whatever inclines me to do these things was made by God himself. But why did God make this moral law? Perhaps he wanted it to be this way, because he felt that it was right? If I’m not compelled to do these things by emotion, then wouldn’t God be compelled to make this moral law by his emotions? I mean, he couldn’t have been compelled by moral law, because he wasn’t designed as we were. See what I mean?

I think I’ll have time to reply to the rest of your post later, but this last question is so compelling that I had to write in right away.

In your own way, you have stumbled upon one of the most classic and fascinating questions in all of philosophy. It’s often called the Euthyphro problem, because it was first asked in the dialogue of that name.

You ask whether God made the moral law for us because it was right or for some other reason (you hypothesize emotions). The corollary question is: Is something moral because God demands it, or does God demand it because it’s moral?

Think about it. If A) something moral because God demands it, then what do we mean when we say “God is good”? Doesn’t this make it a merely analytical proposition, a statement whose predicate is contained in its subject? If this is true, then the statement “God is good”* is no longer a moral statement*.

But what if B) God demands something because it’s moral? In order for this to be the case, there must be some standard *external *to God, by which God is judged. But then something else exists, before God – which brings into question God’s existence as the sole originator of the universe.

I have no easy answers to this question, and I have never been clear on what the Church’s answer to this dilemma is. But I would caution against using it as an attack on orthodox Christianity. Whether you pick A or B, Christianity has to adjust one of its dogmas (at least I think so), but both A and B are reconcilable with all the other fundamental tenets of Christianity.

In answer to your question, then, did God make the moral law because of His emotions? I’m very much inclined to say no, because I’m not sure how emotions can even apply to a necessary Being. But the larger question behind your post – the Euthyphro dilemma – I cannot answer, as it brings us beyond religion, into a fascinating vision of the fundamental nature of the universe.

 

[Chiral]

…the Euthyphro problem… You ask whether God made the moral law for us because it was right or for some other reason (you hypothesize emotions). The corollary question is: Is something moral because God demands it, or does God demand it because it’s moral?
…If A) something moral because God demands it, then what do we mean when we say “God is good”? Doesn’t this make it a merely analytical proposition, a statement whose predicate is contained in its subject? If this is true, then the statement “God is good”* is no longer a moral statement*.
…But what if B) God demands something because it’s moral? In order for this to be the case, there must be some standard *external *to God, by which God is judged. But then something else exists, before God – which brings into question God’s existence as the sole originator of the universe.

The “Euthyphro Problem” does not exist in Christianity due to Trinitarian doctrine - as three persons in one being, God is capable of judging Himself according to Himself. Jesus was/is God, “one in being with the Father”, and yet He died for us on the cross and was Himself judged as a sacrifice to atone for our sins.
“God is good” is indeed not a moral statement if we ascribe ourselves as judge. God is goodness itself and all good emanates from and is defined by Him. Thus A is correct. Having established morality in Himself, God can judge all things equal to and inferior to Himself, including Himself, with reference to the very system of morality He establishes. Thus, B is also correct and there is no contradiction.
God demands what is moral and defines what is moral. Now enters the problem of knowing the mind of God with regard to morality…

 

[Chiral]

With regard to why God established morality or instituted a moral law which we struggle to understand and disseminate also must correspond to His divine nature. God is Goodness, and we believe that God is also Love. We believe that God freely created other free creatures in an act of love, that this love intends for the creatures to be freely united in will with their Creator. Since the Creator is Goodness, unity of will with goodness implies a need to be good ourselves, and moral law functions as the guide to goodness and unity of will with our creator, the source of all goodness and thus also morality. Does this make sense?
Of course, if you do not believe that Love entails a desire for unity, this explanation falls flat. But keep in mind that no attributes of God can ever really be separated, so His goodness and love is also intrinsically connected to Truth (another attribute). This means that God’s love for us entails His desire that we be united to the very source of all Truth, thus the pursuit of truth is the pursuit of God. Morality and Truth are intrinsically linked.

And now I’ll stop rambling and go back and read what this thread is really supposed to be about

 

[Prodigal_Son]

The “Euthyphro Problem” does not exist in Christianity due to Trinitarian doctrine - as three persons in one being, God is capable of judging Himself according to Himself. Jesus was/is God, “one in being with the Father”, and yet He died for us on the cross and was Himself judged as a sacrifice to atone for our sins.
“God is good” is indeed not a moral statement if we ascribe ourselves as judge. God is goodness itself and all good emanates from and is defined by Him. Thus A is correct. Having established morality in Himself, God can judge all things equal to and inferior to Himself, including Himself, with reference to the very system of morality He establishes. Thus, B is also correct and there is no contradiction.
God demands what is moral and defines what is moral. Now enters the problem of knowing the mind of God with regard to morality…

I don’t understand how this avoids the problem, although I am quite open to it. I agree that the fact that God says something is right makes it right for all involved. I don’t see how the statement “God is good” has a reference in this case, however, even with the Trinity. “God is good” still seems to be a tautology, if there is no objective standard to judge it by.

Are you saying that God the Father sets up a system by which God the Son is judged? But this is impossible, since their wills coincide, and their wills create from the beginning.

If God defines what is moral, then are we saying anything of any significance when we say God is moral?

 

[Chiral]

…I don’t see how the statement “God is good” has a reference in this case, however, even with the Trinity. “God is good” still seems to be a tautology, if there is no objective standard to judge it by.
Are you saying that God the Father sets up a system by which God the Son is judged? But this is impossible, since their wills coincide, and their wills create from the beginning.
If God defines what is moral, then are we saying anything of any significance when we say God is moral?

Well, I tend to agree that saying “God is good” is either a tautology or a confusion, either way nothing really significant. “God is good” is a statement of judgment, and only an equal or superior being (with regard to knowledge of the standard of morality) can make such a judgment. It really makes more sense to say “God is Goodness”.
But as to God the Father judging God the Son, I did think that was part of Trinitarian teaching… Not that the Father sets up a system apart from the Son but that they will together. And then on earth Jesus says, “I come not to do my will but the will of Him who sent me,” and “Father, not my will but thine be done,” etc.; and then there’s the matter of becoming a sacrifice to atone for the sins of mankind - atone to whom? Doesn’t atonement imply a judgment of the sacrifice by Him who accepts it? I really should start memorizing texts like those evangelicals, then I’d have verses to back up what I think is orthodoxy Anyway, given a Trinitarian deity, God the Son can say of God the Father, “God is good” as an anthropomorphism to help us understand His omnibenevolence.
But anyway, I’ve high-jacked the thread and we should get back to disagreeing about an objective standard of morality

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Well, I tend to agree that saying “God is good” is either a tautology or a confusion, either way nothing really significant. “God is good” is a statement of judgment, and only an equal or superior being (with regard to knowledge of the standard of morality) can make such a judgment. It really makes more sense to say “God is Goodness”.

I agree that we’ve managed to hijack the thread, but I have just one more thought.

I think there might be a way to get entirely around the Euthyphro problem, so that “God is good” no longer becomes a tautology. It’s based on Kant’s ethics, though, so it will have all the problems inherent in Kant.

Kant based his key ethical principles on a priori reasoning, making the claim that *a priori *reasoning could produce more than just analytic truths. He said that human beings were rational creatures, and that a rational creature is an end in itself. His ethics were based on the fact that every rational creature wants to be treated as an end in itself, and thus all rational creatures are obliged to treat other rational creatures as ends in themselves. (This is a gross oversimplification).

In the context of the larger thread, then, Kant would say that ethics refer to people. The reference of the moral action is the person as an end in himself. (This is appealing, because it establishes morality with or without God. But, since there is no extrinsic motivator to good in Kant’s system, nor any clear benefit to the intrinsic motivator, it is unclear how Kant expects people to be motivated to good).

But here’s the point about Euthyphro: God is a rational being. The insight that rational beings must respect each other as ends follows simply from the laws of logic and the definition of “rational being”, not from any external moral standard. Therefore, God can be good, according to *a priori *reasoning, if He respects others as ends in themselves. And yet there is no standard of morality greater than God, only logic. Very few theists claim that God created the laws of logic (which are not, after all, laws; they are preconditions for laws).

I may have talked myself into being a Kantian. Oh, dear.

I’ll probably start another thread on this…

 

[Prodigal_Son]

It’ safe to assume this child has already been told that stealing is wrong (if not by his parents, then he’s surely been told in school). He could feel guilty because he knows his grandma needs the money. More than likely, though, he’s probably learned that he’ll get punished for such behaviors, meaning that he is not feeling guilt, but anxiety. Lastly, he may not want to disappoint his grandma by being disobedient, and is afraid he’ll get caught (again resulting in anxiety). The list goes on.

It’s impossible to sort out such a situation fully, to see what is conscience and what is externally learned.

I wouldn’t say that stealing my aunt’s cigarettes made it easier for me to steal. I knew that I meant well, so my conscience was perfectly quiet during my actions.

Your case is an exception. Doing wrong makes it easier to do wrong, without feeling guilty; this is so obvious I need not defend it.

What do you mean by “perversity?”

Using good things as an end in themselves – or, coarsely, using good things for evil purposes.

I’m sorry that I can’t seem to impress you without holding multiple scientific degrees.

You would impress me if you could juggle them, however, whether or not you can hold them.

At least we have evidence for natural selection. We have none for a moral compass/other force.

To say we have no evidence for a moral compass is outrageous. The evidence may not be conclusive, but we do have evidence.

You said that they are poor…could it be that utilitarians are trying to help these families become financially stable (they won’t have to spend money raising children)? I don’t know enough to side with you or them, but I imagine that the utilitarians aren’t eugenicists.

They wouldn’t define themselves that way. But utilitarianism operates on several assumptions: 1) I can predict the outcome of any given action accurately. I cannot. 2) I know what other people want out their lives. I do not. 3) My assumptions about the nature of pleasure and pain are correct. They are not.

The utilitarian, by encouraging abortions in these cases, causes an increase in sexual promiscuity and an increase in unwedded pregnancy. The ends don’t justify the means ever, but such ends are hardly worth justifying in themselves.

 

[Oreoracle]

It’s impossible to sort out such a situation fully, to see what is conscience and what is externally learned.

Agreed. However, it seems practical to assume the most probable theory, whether we’re sure of ourselves or not. If you’re waiting for us to know everything (the ideal situation), I fear you’ll always be disappointed.

Your case is an exception. Doing wrong makes it easier to do wrong, without feeling guilty; this is so obvious I need not defend it.

Certainly. I thought you meant something else, I guess.

Using good things as an end in themselves – or, coarsely, using good things for evil purposes.

I wish you would be a bit more specific. After all, it seems we can’t agree on what is “good” and “bad.” Could you use terms that we both agree on?

You would impress me if you could juggle them, however, whether or not you can hold them.

To say we have no evidence for a moral compass is outrageous. The evidence may not be conclusive, but we do have evidence.

We have no evidence that a moral compass manifests itself as many Christians claim. I believe the moral compass, according to Catholics, resides in the soul, am I right? If so, would you be so kind as to point out the soul, or how I might perceive such a thing? (And if I am my soul, then perceiving my soul would mean that myself perceives myself. Strange.)

They wouldn’t define themselves that way. But utilitarianism operates on several assumptions: 1) I can predict the outcome of any given action accurately. I cannot. 2) I know what other people want out their lives. I do not. 3) My assumptions about the nature of pleasure and pain are correct. They are not.

1. Utilitarians don’t assume that their calculations are without error, they simply consider this a risk they’re willing to take. Again, if you’re waiting for ideal situations, you’ll always be disappointed. I don’t know how else to say this, but welcome to reality.
2. This is a good point. Egoism, which is related to utilitarianism, contends that we shouldn’t attempt to help others because of our imperfect knowledge of their desires. But I’m sure you realize that if we never helped each other, we’d be worse off. Because of this, most egoists don’t seem to fully obey this rule. It’s best just to be cautious when helping others, and not prohibit such efforts.
3. You have yet to provide evidence that I’m wrong or that my theory is less probable than yours. I don’t sense any mysterious force inclining me to do certain things, other than emotions. It’s entirely psychological from what I can tell.

The utilitarian, by encouraging abortions in these cases, causes an increase in sexual promiscuity and an increase in unwedded pregnancy. The ends don’t justify the means ever, but such ends are hardly worth justifying in themselves.

I presume that you already know why utilitarians don’t posit inherent value in chastity or traditional marriage, so there’s not much more to say about this.

 

[Ender]

{Kant} said that human beings were rational creatures, and that a rational creature is an end in itself. His ethics were based on the fact that every rational creature wants to be treated as an end in itself, and thus all rational creatures are obliged to treat other rational creatures as ends in themselves.

It doesn’t seem that there is anything logical in concluding that rational beings must respect each other simply because they want to be treated as ends. That is an assumption not based on the premises; there is no syllogism you can construct that leads to that conclusion. It is certainly unclear why your desires (to be treated as an end) place any obligations on me (to respect you).

It’s impossible to sort out such a situation fully, to see what is conscience and what is externally learned.

For any particular individual this is probably true but I don’t think it’s true across cultures. Certain behaviors are condemned (held as wrong) virtually in every culture. Whatever else may differentiate the most enlightened societies from the most backward tribes, their moral standards are remarkably similar.

Ender

 

[Prodigal_Son]

It doesn’t seem that there is anything logical in concluding that rational beings must respect each other simply because they want to be treated as ends. That is an assumption not based on the premises; there is no syllogism you can construct that leads to that conclusion. It is certainly unclear why your desires (to be treated as an end) place any obligations on me (to respect you).

This is why I tried to make clear that I was brutalizing Kant’s argument. I will try to explain it more fully here, but it will take more than a paragraph to explain.

For any particular individual this is probably true but I don’t think it’s true across cultures. Certain behaviors are condemned (held as wrong) virtually in every culture. Whatever else may differentiate the most enlightened societies from the most backward tribes, their moral standards are remarkably similar.

I agree. This could be attributed to evolutionary processes, but I don’t think that attribution stands up to scrutiny. There is an internal sense we have, and – even if it contained fully within our genes – I have no doubt that it proceeds from a true moral law.

 

[Ender]

This is why I tried to make clear that I was brutalizing Kant’s argument.

You did point this out; I recognize that.

I will try to explain it more fully here, but it will take more than a paragraph to explain.

Please … I have yet to read a convincing explanation for the existence of morality outside of the existence of God so I am quite interested in seeing how Kant went about it.

Ender

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Please … I have yet to read a convincing explanation for the existence of morality outside of the existence of God so I am quite interested in seeing how Kant went about it.

Here’s my best shot…

A rational being cannot do anything without thinking about himself as free, even though this freedom seems to conflict with the laws of nature that seem to apply to him. This is the paradox of freedom. (In essence, Kant is saying here that we MUST consider ourselves free). It seems, then, that we live in two worlds: the world of internal freedom and the world of external determinism. Both are governed by laws, in Kant’s view: the external world by the laws of physics, the internal world by a hypothesized moral law. But the moral law is optional, whereas the external laws are inviolable.

The question, then, is what practical law can an autonomous individual be held to. The law must be derived from the very concept of a rational being (a priori), not his experiences, but it is not contained in the term “rational being” itself. This means Kant needs a “synthetic” *a priori *proof, to justify the moral law.

If I am free to violate a law, then it is not a law; the nature of a law (e.g. laws of physics) is to *cause *the action. Thus, we are left with three options: Either 1) the moral law is not a law, 2) the moral law is not anything, or 3) the moral law has a lawgiver, whereby it is binding. Options #1 and #2 take us nowhere. But who is the lawgiver, in option #3? It cannot be anyone but myself, because, if anyone else gave the law, I would not be bound by it. Therefore my practical reason (if I am rational) operates according to a universal law that I myself am the author of.

What can this law be? It must be a rule that each rational being, insofar as he is rational, cannot but assent to. The answer is to be found, once again, in the concept of freedom.

There are two kinds of imperatives, hypothetical and categorical. A hypothetical imperative is something that you must do, *in order to *accomplish some end. According to Kant, no action that is motivated by desire or inclination (a hypothetical imperative) is of moral worth. If you serve the poor because you want to go to heaven, then you are simply pursuing a hypothetical imperative. Critically, this means that you are acting as if you were determined by the rules of the external world.

A categorical imperative is something that you must do, period. Though it be of no advantage to you, though you are thrown in a pot of boiling water because of it, you must do it anyway. Empirical observation makes us think there is no categorical law we **do **act on, but *a priori *reasoning reveals that there is an imperative we **should **act on. (As stated earlier, the categorical imperative is “produced” by the rational individual, which is why it is binding.)

If a hypothetical imperative makes you act as if you were determined by the outside world, then a categorical imperative makes you act out of the very concept of freedom – autonomy. The only action you can take that will not be determined by the “outside” – your hopes, fears, desires – is to affirm freedom itself, by being purely rational. What is rational for a rational being? To act in such a way that your very action could, through your own doing it, become a universal law. This is the categorical imperative (give or take a few words).

In other words, the only way we can affirm our own freedom is to **be **that which we claim to be: rational.

There are holes in this description, of course. I’ve left out the most inspiring part, about not using people merely as means to an end. I don’t think Kant’s system salvages agnostic morality, in itself, at all. Kant himself wrote in God as a part of the Groundwork, but as a rather minor and disposable character.

There are other things I want to mention, but I’ve really got to get going…

 

[wxboss]

Now, my claim is this: moral actions have a reference. They are “good” or “bad”. But remember, in both previous cases (with words and sentences), references, in order to be meaningful, had to refer to things that exist in the real world. If morality is not a thing that exists in the real world, then it has no reference, and may be discarded.

But if morality does exist in the real world, then what kind of thing is it? Is it like a keyboard, or is it like the color red? Clearly, it is like the color red. If we can find where the color red exists, then we can find where the object of morality exists, for they seem to be the same types of things.

Plato would say they exist in the world of Forms, but it is a much simpler proposition to say that they exist in the mind of God.

This is as far as I’ve gotten. But my thought is that if *good *or *bad *are references, just as *true *and *false *are references, then they must pertain to some reality. It is clear that *true *and *false * pertain to the physical world, so do *good *or *bad * pertain to the spiritual world – or rather, do they pertain to our world which is both physical and spiritual?

Or do they pertain to “states of being” that are co-temporal with our world, can be fully experienced in our world, and yet cannot be known in our world? These states would be, respectively, heaven and hell.

This may be quite obscure. I’m interested in your thoughts, and I’d be happy to explain anything that doesn’t make sense. Also, feel free to correct me if I’ve fallen into some major error or heresy at some point here.

Good question, but it seems to me that you are trying to compare apples to angles. One thing is concrete and another is quite elusive (something tangible but yet out of physical reach). The old saying of leading a horse to water but not being able to make him drink comes to mind here.

One thing can be handled and manipulated by brute force, the other requires a certain willingness to yield (a sort of resignation to what one knows is right in spite of it’s own selfish obligations). Every time a thought is acted upon, the mystical is united with the physical as this is precisely where good and bad take on their physical form.

G.K. Chesterton had a little to say about this in his book, Orthodoxy during the beginning of the chapter: The Paradox of Christianity;

*"THE real trouble with this world of ours is not that it is an unreasonable world, nor even that it is a reasonable one. The commonest kind of trouble is that it is nearly reasonable, but not quite. Life is not an illogicality; yet it is a trap for logicians. It looks just a little more mathematical and regular than it is; its exactitude is obvious, but its inexactitude is hidden; its wildness lies in wait. I give one coarse instance of what I mean. Suppose some mathematical creature from the moon were to reckon up the human body; he would at once see that the essential thing about it was that it was duplicate. A man is two men, he on the right exactly resembling him on the left. Having noted that there was an arm on the right and one on the left, a leg on the right and one on the left, he might go further and still find on each side the same number of fingers, the same number of toes, twin eyes, twin ears, twin nostrils, and even twin lobes of the brain. At last he would take it as a law; and then, where he found a heart on one side, would deduce that there was another heart on the other. And just then, where he most felt he was right, he would be wrong.

It is this silent swerving from accuracy by an inch that is the uncanny element in everything."*

 

[wxboss]

Good question, but it seems to me that you are trying to compare apples to angels. One thing is concrete and another is quite elusive (something tangible but yet out of physical reach). The old saying of leading a horse to water but not being able to make him drink comes to mind here.

One thing can be handled and manipulated by brute force, the other requires a certain willingness to yield (a sort of resignation to what one knows is right in spite of it’s own selfish obligations). Every time a thought is acted upon, the mystical is united with the physical as this is precisely where good and bad take on their physical form.

G.K. Chesterton had a little to say about this in his book, Orthodoxy during the beginning of the chapter: The Paradox of Christianity;

*"THE real trouble with this world of ours is not that it is an unreasonable world, nor even that it is a reasonable one. The commonest kind of trouble is that it is nearly reasonable, but not quite. Life is not an illogicality; yet it is a trap for logicians. It looks just a little more mathematical and regular than it is; its exactitude is obvious, but its inexactitude is hidden; its wildness lies in wait. I give one coarse instance of what I mean. Suppose some mathematical creature from the moon were to reckon up the human body; he would at once see that the essential thing about it was that it was duplicate. A man is two men, he on the right exactly resembling him on the left. Having noted that there was an arm on the right and one on the left, a leg on the right and one on the left, he might go further and still find on each side the same number of fingers, the same number of toes, twin eyes, twin ears, twin nostrils, and even twin lobes of the brain. At last he would take it as a law; and then, where he found a heart on one side, would deduce that there was another heart on the other. And just then, where he most felt he was right, he would be wrong.

It is this silent swerving from accuracy by an inch that is the uncanny element in everything."*