Does sweetness exist, really, or does it only taste that way to us?

[Touchstone]

So you both want to say that language never captures reality (and maps never capture territory), but language (or a map) is a tool for using reality? So the question remains for both of you, why do you deny that language captures reality? What are you denying when you deny this??

The first of objection is the terminology itself. I think understand what “capture reality” means, but then I consider it some more, and I have the connotations of “have” and “possess” or “take”, but that doesn’t really help very much. By contrast when I say language helps build isomorphisms, I can put concrete semantics behind it – this word “rock” gets mapped to a concept that represents an object you might find in your back yard that has the following attributes or qualifiers. I can “use reality” in a pragmatic sense with language that way; if I tell my son to pick up the rocks on the driveway, that’s an actionable directive, semantically. I can get the job done.

But those attributes, the mappings that I make to [what ‘rock’ points to as discrete instances of a class] with ‘rock’, don’t give me “rock-ness” in any essential way, any way that goes beyond the pragmatics of the language usage. I understand “rock-ness” in a pragmatic sense, as something I can grasp conceptually myself, practically communicate with others toward my desired ends. But in doing that, I’ve not got any basis for dealing in “forms”, or “essences” or some kind of ‘ultimate’ knowing. I don’t even recognize those aims as having coherent targets.

Mirrors are also part of reality, but they are not a part of reality rather than mirrors of reality. Where did this “rather than” come from: “language is of course part of reality *rather than *a mirror of reality”?

One of the complications of materialism is just the practical problem that it is monist in nature, which means that when we talk about concepts, we are talking about physical phenomenon, but there are good, practical reasons to talk about them as if they were abstract. In the same way we find it useful sometimes to use anthropomorphic language (talking about my sailboat as a “she”, for example) when the object we are anthropomorphizing is not a ‘she’, but an impersonal object, it’s useful to “abstractify” concepts and mental constructs, when they are not really abstract, any more than my sailboat is really a “she”.

Language is then both a physical phenomenon in nature – a physical process that occurs in all the various brains that deploy language for cognition – as well as a “mirror” or a “reflector”, a semantic framework by which we can “see territory on a map”. Just as a cartographic map is a physical object itself, but also about the geography and physical features of our planet in your state, language is a physical process itself, but also about something else (which can be about physical referents for the concepts symbolized in the language, but need not be).

Here you lump ‘language’ and ‘truth’ together for some reason. Why would you do this?

Because truth is a word, a symbol pointing to a concept in the brain, representing (typically, anyway) a proposition about the world. If you eliminate language, you’ve eliminated truth, necessarily. If there were no minds whatsoever in this universe, no living beings, nature would be what it is, but wondering what “truth” is would be a divide by zero, full stop. It’s transcendental; you must presuppose language to even get to your question.

I do this, then, because it’s necessary, unavoidable.

Whose view do you take yourself to be opposing in making this strange statement: “I deny that language and truth function essentially as correspondence”?

I don’t have any particular poster in mind.

Does it fall apart? How so?

I think you may have mean this for Leela, but for my part, it breaks down when you try to identify the “territory referents”, the entity or feature you are mapping to, if one supposes that the map must have concrete (or even more narrowly, physical) targets that the map pointers point to. This is why (I believe) Leela chose “good” for one of his examples. It’s not a word->concept->Platonic ideal chain at work there, as is often supposed by “correspondence theory”, or by pushing the map/territory metaphor farther than is warranted.

And what do these cases have to do with the discussion here? If you note that the metaphor falls apart in certain cases, this implies that it does not fall apart in others… and yet you make the claim that language NEVER captures reality.

Well, what do mean by “capture” then? I don’t know what it means in any non-superficial way, as you’ve used it. If I use the word ‘rock’ to connect my statement to a concept in your head that describes a class of hard, dense objects that match something you might be looking at out the window in your driveway, have a “captured” reality with that reference? Have you? I have no idea. I think not just based on my sense that “capture” connotes “total ownership” or some such, and that doesn’t match my understanding. I don’t need to “capture” rock-ness in any more full or essential way than is needed by the task at hand, and even if my goal is to “fully capture ‘rock-ness’” in my usage, I’ve no way to judge whether I have or have not, because I don’t know what that even means.

Yes, of course we posit the existence of those entities that are required to make our theories true. That’s basic Quine. So what?

(I’ve asked a lot of questions here, which usually tends to upset TS, but please note that you’ve made a lot of ungrounded assertions, so that’s why questions are called for.)

OK, uh… noted.

I want to post answers as a good example of what I’d like to see from others when I have questions (hint, hint).

-TS

 

[Touchstone]

Well of course “language is just as much a part of the real world as any other” - that’s a very banal statement - what’s the point of making it here?

It’s a ramification of materialism. It’s not a feature of supernaturalism, and that’s an important point. If language is grounded in “mind-as-supernatural” then it very well may have access to “essence”, or… well, in that model, anything goes, it’s a cartoon universe and language might be just as magic as the soul. On materialism, my statement is matter-of-fact, but on supernaturalism, it’s a problematic statement. If language is as physical as the rock in my driveway, the supernatural mind doesn’t obtain insofar as the mind is “that which thinks (via language)”.

So you’ve changed your mind? A good map does capture the territory after all? This is confusing!

I think the confusion stems from the terms you are deploying. What separates “capturing reality” from “not capturing reality” in your view? (This is a question, an invitation to provide an answer! The answers you seek from me are contingent on other answers I need from you.)

Sure, all metaphors break down somewhere. Where does yours break down?

Like I said, “the map is not the territory” is highly effective as pointer to a key distinction that often gets lost in the discussion, that the symbol is not the referent. It seems obvious when it’s pointed out, but the conflation becomes a problem all the time. So the metaphor is really useful pedagogically when, for instance, there is advanced the idea that a word “captures” some “essence” (and here, I’m not committing you that, necessarily). But per Leela’s example of ‘this is a good dog’, a simplistic rendering of the metaphor presents problems when it is applied: OK, I have this word “good”, now take me from map to [real] territory so I can see the land called ‘Good’. We can point to practical, grounded concepts for “good”, but there is no “Platonic Good” as a concrete entity like there is a “Mt. McKinley” to go hike on in Alaska that corresponds to the that label on your map of Alaska.

Right at the beginning, when you can’t decide whether or not maps ‘capture’ territory, it seems, and in your purely rhetorical gestures at applying the metaphor to different cases, where it’s not at all clear that you’re saying anything coherent at all.

Perhaps not, but if not, I think the problem stems from the problematic nature of “capture” – it’s not a word I can apply in a non-superficial way. I invite you to give that word some more depth, here, as to what you mean, precisely. That would get what I’ve said to hold together, better. I don’t think “isomorophism”, for example, is problematic in a discussion here about symbols and referents. But “capture reality” is super fluffy, the more I try to work with that term.

Maybe you should consider the possibility: deep down you’re just a fideistic devotee of some vague something-or-other of a mysterious, metaphorical theory, which expresses your visceral desire, but no intelligible cognitive content.

Could be, it’s worth considering.

-TS

 

[Betterave]

The first of objection is the terminology itself. I think understand what “capture reality” means, but then I consider it some more, and I have the connotations of “have” and “possess” or “take”, but that doesn’t really help very much. By contrast when I say language helps build isomorphisms, I can put concrete semantics behind it – this word “rock” gets mapped to a concept that represents an object you might find in your back yard that has the following attributes or qualifiers. I can “use reality” in a pragmatic sense with language that way; if I tell my son to pick up the rocks on the driveway, that’s an actionable directive, semantically. I can get the job done.

That doesn’t make any sense. The ‘actionableness’ of your directive has nothing to do with the terminological issue here (obviously! ).

But those attributes, the mappings [or ‘captures’ (why not?)] that I make to [what ‘rock’ points to as discrete instances of a class] with ‘rock’, don’t give me “rock-ness” in any essential way, any way that goes beyond the pragmatics of the language usage. I understand “rock-ness” in a pragmatic sense, as something I can grasp conceptually myself, practically communicate with others toward my desired ends. But in doing that, I’ve not got any basis for dealing in “forms”, or “essences” or some kind of ‘ultimate’ knowing. I don’t even recognize those aims as having coherent targets.

Again, this doesn’t make sense. If you failed altogether to capture the “form” or “essence” of rocks with the concept of rock that you invoke by use of the word ‘rock’, then you would have no possibility of an actionable directive to pick up rocks (as opposed to non-rocks).

One of the complications of materialism is just the practical problem that it is monist in nature, which means that when we talk about concepts, we are talking about physical phenomenon, but there are good, practical reasons to talk about them as if they were abstract. In the same way we find it useful sometimes to use anthropomorphic language (talking about my sailboat as a “she”, for example [that’s not anthropomorphic]) when the object we are anthropomorphizing is not a ‘she’, but an impersonal object, it’s useful to “abstractify” concepts and mental constructs, when they are not really abstract, any more than my sailboat is really a “she”. *[why is your sailboat not really a “she”?]

Obvious question: why would you claim that this is “just [a] practical problem”??? Is that just because you are unable to discuss the problem in a theoretically coherent way (not that this lack of performance shakes your conviction)?

Language is then both a physical phenomenon in nature – a physical process that occurs in all the various brains that deploy language for cognition – as well as a “mirror” or a “reflector”, a semantic framework by which we can “see territory on a map”. Just as a cartographic map is a physical object itself, but also about the geography and physical features of our planet in your state, language is a physical process itself, but also about something else (which can be about physical referents for the concepts symbolized in the language, but need not be).

So you disagree with Leela and retract your earlier claim about language and maps never capturing reality and territory?

Because truth is a word, a symbol pointing to a concept in the brain, representing (typically, anyway) a proposition about the world. If you eliminate language, you’ve eliminated truth, necessarily. If there were no minds whatsoever in this universe, no living beings, nature would be what it is, but wondering what “truth” is would be a divide by zero, full stop. It’s transcendental; you must presuppose language to even get to your question.

I do this, then, because it’s necessary, unavoidable.

This is the non sequitur your comments rely on here:

Language and truth are connected; therefore language and truth can be lumped together in making propositions about either one.

I don’t have any particular poster in mind.

Neither does Leela, I’m sure, nor does she have any real philosophical position in mind. In other words, this denial of a nonsense statement is a red herring.

 

[Betterave]

I think you may have mean this for Leela, but for my part, it breaks down when you try to identify the “territory referents”, the entity or feature you are mapping to, if one supposes that the map must have concrete (or even more narrowly, physical) targets that the map pointers point to. This is why (I believe) Leela chose “good” for one of his examples. It’s not a word->concept->Platonic ideal chain at work there, as is often supposed by “correspondence theory”, or by pushing the map/territory metaphor farther than is warranted.

Well that just begs all sorts of questions. What about maps of maps? Those are real maps too - maps of concrete referents which are themselves concrete referents, so it’s concrete referents all the way down, isn’t it? How could it not be? This is a major theoretical difficulty, not just some practical problem.

Well, what do mean by “capture” then? I don’t know what it means in any non-superficial way, as you’ve used it. If I use the word ‘rock’ to connect my statement to a concept in your head that describes a class of hard, dense objects that match something you might be looking at out the window in your driveway, have a “captured” reality with that reference? Have you? I have no idea. I think not just based on my sense that “capture” connotes “total ownership” or some such, and that doesn’t match my understanding. I don’t need to “capture” rock-ness in any more full or essential way than is needed by the task at hand, and even if my goal is to “fully capture ‘rock-ness’” in my usage, I’ve no way to judge whether I have or have not, because I don’t know what that even means.

My ‘capture’ is no more and no less superficial than your ‘map.’ You have said nothing substantive to suggest otherwise. ‘Capture’ is like ‘apprehend’, ‘grasp’, ‘conceive’, ‘understand’. It is quite obvious that none of these concepts connote “total ownership” and your suggestion to the contrary is mere cavilling.

I want to post answers as a good example of what I’d like to see from others when I have questions (hint, hint).

I always answer questions (go ahead and show me where I haven’t), so don’t pretend otherwise. I don’t tend to follow your example, however, which is to go off into irrelevant digressions (I understand you may not be doing this intentionally) and to not answer questions.

 

[Betterave]

It’s a ramification of materialism. It’s not a feature of supernaturalism, and that’s an important point. If language is grounded in “mind-as-supernatural” then it very well may have access to “essence”, or… well, in that model, anything goes, it’s a cartoon universe and language might be just as magic as the soul. On materialism, my statement is matter-of-fact, but on supernaturalism, it’s a problematic statement. If language is as physical as the rock in my driveway, the supernatural mind doesn’t obtain insofar as the mind is “that which thinks (via language)”.

I don’t know where you are getting any of this. This is a cartoon argument (i.e., part of your cartoon universe).

I think the confusion stems from the terms you are deploying. What separates “capturing reality” from “not capturing reality” in your view? (This is a question, an invitation to provide an answer! The answers you seek from me are contingent on other answers I need from you.)

If you can invoke the concept ‘rock’ to get someone to pick up rocks, you have captured reality. If you invoke the concept ‘rock’ to get someone to pick up rocks and that person picks up sticks instead, there is a problem somewhere with “not capturing reality.”

Like I said, “the map is not the territory” is highly effective as pointer to a key distinction that often gets lost in the discussion, that the symbol is not the referent. It seems obvious when it’s pointed out, but the conflation becomes a problem all the time. So the metaphor is really useful pedagogically when, for instance, there is advanced the idea that a word “captures” some “essence” (and here, I’m not committing you that, necessarily). But per Leela’s example of ‘this is a good dog’, a simplistic rendering of the metaphor presents problems when it is applied: OK, I have this word “good”, now take me from map to [real] territory so I can see the land called ‘Good’. We can point to practical, grounded concepts for “good”, but there is no “Platonic Good” as a concrete entity like there is a “Mt. McKinley” to go hike on in Alaska that corresponds to the that label on your map of Alaska.

But obviously this is a red herring: no one has ever believed in the silly cartoon universe you invent here, including, obviously, Plato.

Your claim is not simply that the symbol is not the referent (which is another banal claim, which has no opponents). Your claim appears to be that no symbol is essentially different from any referent (which ‘monism’ you can of course assert, but so far cannot even begin to defend).

Perhaps not, but if not, I think the problem stems from the problematic nature of “capture” – it’s not a word I can apply in a non-superficial way. I invite you to give that word some more depth, here, as to what you mean, precisely. That would get what I’ve said to hold together, better. I don’t think “isomorophism”, for example, is problematic in a discussion here about symbols and referents. But “capture reality” is super fluffy, the more I try to work with that term.

Your charge of “super fluffiness” is super fluffy.

Could be, it’s worth considering.

…and it’s worth thinking through the ramifications of this possibility for many of your habitual claims.

 

[Touchstone]

Well that just begs all sorts of questions. What about maps of maps? Those are real maps too - maps of concrete referents which are themselves concrete referents, so it’s concrete referents all the way down, isn’t it? How could it not be? This is a major theoretical difficulty, not just some practical problem.

Why? In my software development, where maps are basic building blogs (the isomorphic data structure kind, not the cartographic kind), I use maps of maps of maps and the like regularly. The value is typically realized by tracing through those indirections for something concrete – say the IP address of a connection point store as the “territory” referent in map – but maps of maps is just indirection. It’s not a theoretical or practical problem, but is an invaluable design pattern for managing information. If I have to dereference through, say, seven layers of maps to get to my “terrain data” (the map entry pointing to a represent of the concrete target), it’s no problem, so long as I can get there.

My ‘capture’ is no more and no less superficial than your ‘map.’ You have said nothing substantive to suggest otherwise. ‘Capture’ is like ‘apprehend’, ‘grasp’, ‘conceive’, ‘understand’. It is quite obvious that none of these concepts connote “total ownership” and your suggestion to the contrary is mere cavilling.

Well, the “mapness” of a map is demonstrable – you have symbols and representations on both sides (key, value), and you can examine those relationships: does this key have an associated value, and if so, does that value correspond representationally to the “territory” being mapped? You could have a machine answer the question in an instrumental way on my usage.

On “capture” though – here’s Webster, just as a starting point:

1a : to take captive; also : to gain control of especially by force
b : to gain or win especially through effort <captured 60 percent of the vote>
2
a : to emphasize, represent, or preserve (as a scene, mood, or quality) in a more or less permanent form <at any such moment as a photograph might capture — C. E. Montague>
b : to record in a permanent file (as in a computer)
3
: to captivate and hold the interest of
4
: to take according to the rules of a game
5
: to bring about the capture of (a subatomic particle)

If you’re using “capture” as “conceive”, to use one of the associations you mentioned, I guess I can work with that, but even so, an agreement on what you mean in that case doesn’t give us clarity on whether person A has “captured” (i.e. “conceived”, etc.) extra-mental reality via concept X, or the use of map M. I still do not know, deterministically how to determine “yes, you’ve captured it”, vs. “no, you haven’t captured it”. Like I said, with a map, I just start traversing the key space, and look at the values associated, and test those for grounding in the target territory (say, by use of another map we trust or have otherwise validated, or maybe “walking the ground” of the territory).

I always answer questions (go ahead and show me where I haven’t), so don’t pretend otherwise. I don’t tend to follow your example, however, which is to go off into irrelevant digressions (I understand you may not be doing this intentionally) and to not answer questions.

Well, I think it would be quite an improvement just to see a response that wandered off, hither and yon. That’s something, at least. My direct questions, reiterated several times, are right here in this thread, and you’ve even said in your post that your replies were given rather than as a direct answer, some things for me to think about that may perhaps let me figure things out myself. That’s just bad faith, frankly, disingenuous engagement – I don’t mind pedagogy offered along with an answer, but my request was for your position, your answer, not what you think will help my find some answer for myself. But I’ve given up on that question for you, and so here will ask:

How does one test, given a map of some territory, or a model of the extra-mental world, if one has “captured” that reality, or not? That is, what is the procedure you would lay out to give to someone else and say "Apply these rules to the person you are analyzing, and this will produce “captured” or “not captured”?

Thanks in advance for your direct answer!

-TS

 

[Touchstone]

If you can invoke the concept ‘rock’ to get someone to pick up rocks, you have captured reality. If you invoke the concept ‘rock’ to get someone to pick up rocks and that person picks up sticks instead, there is a problem somewhere with “not capturing reality.”

OK, so perhaps this is what you’d like to offer as the answer to my question in my previous post? That “capturing reality” is a functional, practical test? I’d be quite satisfied with that, first because it’s clear, and practical, but secondly, because it obviates the whole business of “essence” and “rock-ness”, and “the nature of being a rock”. If my functional description is practically effective, I’ve got it, got what I’m going to get.

That’s an understanding I’m happy to arrive at, if I understand you, here. That whole “essence” thing just adds no value or knowledge in this model, as the value is pragmatic.

But obviously this is a red herring: no one has ever believed in the silly cartoon universe you invent here, including, obviously, Plato.

Well, a cosmology that has an omnipotent, supernatural God as the creator and plenipotentiary of the entire universe is the apotheosis of the “cartoon universe” idea. God wants the sky red – “Let it be red”, says God. and he saw that it was good. Just like the cartoonist drawing his world however he pleases. An objective reality is a reality that obtains independent of mind or will. A subjective reality is that which is predicated on mind and will, a function of the self. On Catholicism, our universe is utterly subjective, and the nature of the universe is conferred on the universe from the mind and will of God, a “cosmic cartoonist”, who, as omnipotent, can “draw” reality any old he wills.

So, to the extent the RCC endorses doctrines of reality being a creation issuing from God as a person, as a mind or will, it has believed and taught a ‘cartoon universe’, where relity isn’t how it is as a brute fact, but is whatever the Divine Pen drew it to be.

Your claim is not simply that the symbol is not the referent (which is another banal claim, which has no opponents).

That is the utility of my claim, primarily, and while you may say it’s banal and obvious when it’s called out, it’s a pervasive problem, dialectically, and one I suggest was a practical problem in the conversation. I do sometimes use that very language – “the symbol is not the referent!” – but that ends up being more confusing to those reading or talking with me, because the “referent” (an everyday term for a software developer) may be obscure to them. When one pays attention to the discourse, symbols and referents getting confused for each other is a common and recurring problem. I have to work at it myself, and know I fall into that trap. I’m not the only one, looking around and reading.

Your claim appears to be that no symbol is essentially different from any referent (which ‘monism’ you can of course assert, but so far cannot even begin to defend).

I don’t know what “essentially different” means – again, that seems like vacuous language. I did like the functional principles you used above – “rock” is effective where it achieves its telic results, and my son picks up the objects I intended in the driveway. But “essence” is routinely give a wave of the hand here, and I get tripped up, because I can’t think of what a thoughtful answer about “essentially different” would look like, either way. If you mean that all symbols are on some level physical, then yes I agree, they all share that.

-TS

 

[The_Exodus]

Am I the only one who finds it odd that, the one claiming that language does not capture reality, is using language (in examples, i.e. this rock, etc.) to make his point about said reality, which cannot be captured to begin with? Presumably, a “real” example is given to capture the point that the example (i.e. the rock) is unable to be captured. But what is captured, were it not captured, would not be captured, and thus the example would be useless. —>

I don’t think betterave (correct me if I’m wrong) is committed to a “totalness” with regard to capturing reality entire, but merely, a “totalness” with regard to the intellect’s ability to capture reality as it is in material things; i.e. the sensible world. Hence, there may be all other sorts of effects of reality or existence in a rock, say, other than its material effects. Yet, insofar as it is material, it seems to me that it is entirely captured in its essence by the intellect, and, were this not so, language would be destroyed and no knowledge would be possible, since we would not truly be grasping anything, because in order to capture a thing, a thing must be captured. We must really be able to grasp at least something, otherwise nothing is grasped.

 

[Touchstone]

Am I the only one who finds it odd that, the one claiming that language does not capture reality, is using language (in examples, i.e. this rock, etc.) to make his point about said reality, which cannot be captured to begin with? Presumably, a “real” example is given to capture the point that the example (i.e. the rock) is unable to be captured. But what is captured, were it not captured, would not be captured, and thus the example would be useless. —>

The problem must be the amibiguity of “captured”. As above, if a purely pragmatic paradigm is adopted for the meaning of “captured” – the reality is “captured” only insofar as it is useful for any practical purpose – I don’t think it’s a problem at all. I wouldn’t use that word that way, but it fits my understanding, so fine.

But the practical approach denies (or at least avoids) any tar-pits concerning “essence” or metaphysics beyond functional description. It’s mechanical, descriptive, pragmatic. It doesn’t pretend or bother with “capturing reality” in some sense beyond that, apprehending “essence” or the rock’s “nature of being” beyond a functional description. I’m surprised to hear Betterave (or you) endorse that understanding of “capture”, but I’m not one to look a gift horse in the mouth.

If I’m mistaken, and “capture” actually was intended to include “essence” or something metaphysical beyond functional descriptions that have practical value, then I am again at a loss as to what is being “captured” under that usage.

I don’t think betterave (correct me if I’m wrong) is committed to a “totalness” with regard to capturing reality entire, but merely, a “totalness” with regard to the intellect’s ability to capture reality as it is in material things; i.e. the sensible world.

Hmmm. That seems just as intractable, if so. How would one know that one had achieved “totality” in one’s capture of reality as material? This is measuring without a measuring rod, isn’t it?

Hence, there may be all other sorts of effects of reality or existence in a rock, say, other than its material effects.

OK, sure. We are agnostic on the matter. We don’t know.

Yet, insofar as it is material, it seems to me that it is entirely captured in its essence by the intellect, and, were this not so, language would be destroyed and no knowledge would be possible, since we would not truly be grasping anything, because in order to capture a thing, a thing must be captured.

Why would this be? This doesn’t get off the ground even a little, I suggest. First, whence your measure for “entirely”? Apparently, it’s necessary, because this is an “all or nothing” dichotomy. Either we “know in entirety” of a thing, or we don’t have anything. But why should we even suspect this to be true? In our efforts to build knowledge, we acquire knowledge in increments, and with varying degrees of confidence, and the perimeters of knowledge move as the picture becomes less fuzzy, more clear, more rich with evidence to test and analyze as we accumulate it.

Before we discovered atoms (Democritus’ amazing conjecture aside) our concept of “rock” would have been necessarily “non-atomic”. The macroscopic features we still use ('has a hard, rough, opaque surface", etc.), but now our apprehension of a rock has descriptive elements it did not have 200 years ago (“the types of molecular bonds between the atoms determine the crystalline stuctures…”, etc.).

Did we have “material totality” captured before we added atomic theory and understanding to our knowledge base? Do we have it now?

We must really be able to grasp at least something, otherwise nothing is grasped.

Tautologically true, yes. But it’s not the grasping that’s problematic here, its what you are construing as a “thing”. I though I understood a bit of where you were going above with the embrace of functional knowledge of a thing (a rock, say). But that functional knowledge is just the basket of propositions that we assemble to achieve practical ends. It’s incremental; the rock is the rock, no matter what we might deploy as a means to describe it. But our descriptions evolve and grow while the rock remains the rock it ever was.

This means that what we grasp is just that which is functionally effective. As the functional recipe for “rock” grows, we have new ways to understand and talk about “rock”, and our “capture” grows right along with it.

-TS

 

[The_Exodus]

Touchstone,

If there is not some common denominator that we both understand whenever you say “rock,” how is communication not entirely useless?

“Mechanical” description relies just as much on the assumption of some sort of universal and shared concepts - some denominated essence, as it were. In fact any description, were it to have the power of actually conveying meaning, must actually describe some “thing.”

It seems to me that on your view we’d be doomed to perpetually talking past each other. Judging from the dialogues, you may be right!

 

[The_Exodus]

Just a few ramblings…

It seems to me a thing need not be completely captured in itself, to be completely captured as it is sensed; and a thing need not be completely captured in itself, to have its essence captured, in some respect, and whatever respect that is, it is still really and truly essential about whatever it is that is captured.

Hence, I may look out my window, and see a rock, and, insofar as this is how I am sensing rock, it follows that I really perceive rockness, so to speak, insofar as I am currently able. I am, as it were, perceiving rockness “as a man with 20/20 vision does as he looks out his window as the sun sets in middle tennessee, etc.” On the other hand, if I went outside and picked the rock up, I would be sensing rockness insofar as “a man, with nerves such as mine and calloused hands, touches a rock with x density, etc.”

Both predicates about rockness would be true, it seems to me. They would just be added on, experientially, to all my previous knowledge of rockness. Would, then, the essence of rock change? It seems to me obviously yes. But would it fundamentally change? I don’t see that it must. Indeed, I don’t see how it could, since, were the essences or concepts completely different, I could not connect the dots of all my experiences and predicate all gained knowledge about “what is a rock.”

It also seems that, if there is not an immaterial form, which gives essence to rock - whatever its accidents may be, i.e. a black rock, a gray rock - then there would be no true univocal knowledge of anything, and we would all be lost in some infinite sea of singularties, not connected by anything.

But this just leads into the problem of universals, metaphysical verse physical essences, abstraction, etc.

Nevermind these ramblings, by the way, unless you find them interesting. I don’t intend them to be assertions or matters of argument.

 

[Touchstone]

Touchstone,

If there is not some common denominator that we both understand whenever you say “rock,” how is communication not entirely useless?

These common denominators abound, and effective. They just aren’t “ultimate”, or rather, we have nothing meaningful behind the words when we say they are “essence” or “total” or “ultimate”. “Rock” is a practically useful concept, to be shared and used as part of a common lexicon. But it’s useful because it’s practical, descriptive, functional. “Ultimate” or “essence” just are ciphers semantically, by comparison.

“Mechanical” description relies just as much on the assumption of some sort of universal and shared concepts - some denominated essence, as it were. In fact any description, were it to have the power of actually conveying meaning, must actually describe some “thing.”

Yes, but it’s just as extensive as it is functional or effective. It can be and is shared, universal; this is how communication happens from mind to mind. But we use the descriptors and attributes that work, that facilitate recognition, concept matching and understanding. If, for you, “functionally effective” and “practical” is synonymous with “essence”, I can work with that use of “essence” (even if I find that quite an eccentric use), but in any case, it’s not “total” anything, or “ultimate”, or “complete”. We have no grounds for those as meaningful adjectives. It’s just… practical, effective.

It seems to me that on your view we’d be doomed to perpetually talking past each other. Judging from the dialogues, you may be right!

I think the challenge here stems from the idea of “essence” and “capture” as denoting some kind of totality, completness, or ultimacy. If I’m confused, and you don’t see “essence” or “capture” implicating any of that, I’m quite fine with an accord on functional and pragmatic semantics. That’s effective, practical for human communication. It’s just boring (in all the best ways) for metaphysics and philosophy – it avoids “ultimate”, and “totality”, and the “nature of being” for a rock, or anything else.

-TS

 

[Touchstone]

Just a few ramblings…

It seems to me a thing need not be completely captured in itself, to be completely captured as it is sensed; and a thing need not be completely captured in itself, to have its essence captured, in some respect, and whatever respect that is, it is still really and truly essential about whatever it is that is captured.

Hence, I may look out my window, and see a rock, and, insofar as this is how I am sensing rock, it follows that I really perceive rockness, so to speak, insofar as I am currently able.

Yes, again, tautologically. “Rockness” is defined as that-which-you-are-able-to-sense for the rock. But the crucial distinction you have here comes with “insofar as I am currently able”. That denies ultimacy, totality, completeness, and admits degree (“so far as…”). This is pragmatic semantics, and this accords with science, as (boring!) practical and functional, and just giving a shrug to “total”.

I don’t “capture the rock’s reality” in any comprehensive sense, looking out my window, or talking with you about it. As you said yourself “Hence, there may be all other sorts of effects of reality or existence in a rock, say, other than its material effects.” There may be, so our apprehension of the rock’s totality cannot be said to be total or ultimate, but rather partial (so far as we know), practical, functional.

I am, as it were, perceiving rockness “as a man with 20/20 vision does as he looks out his window as the sun sets in middle tennessee, etc.” On the other hand, if I went outside and picked the rock up, I would be sensing rockness insofar as “a man, with nerves such as mine and calloused hands, touches a rock with x density, etc.”

Both predicates about rockness would be true, it seems to me. They would just be added on, experientially, to all my previous knowledge of rockness. Would, then, the essence of rock change? It seems to me obviously yes. But would it fundamentally change? I don’t see that it must. Indeed, I don’t see how it could, since, were the essences or concepts completely different, I could not connect the dots of all my experiences and predicate all gained knowledge about “what is a rock.”

Well, if you really do say “yes” to your question as to whether the essence of a rock changes between one level of description and another, then you have necessarily denied the objective reality of the rock! You have – and this can be said without even understanding what you mean by essence (which I don’t) – subjectivized the essence of that rock. It’s essence is now not predicated on the rock itself, apart from your mind, but is now a product of your mind, and changes as your mental grasp of it changes.

That’s wild, man!

It also seems that, if there is not an immaterial form, which gives essence to rock - whatever its accidents may be, i.e. a black rock, a gray rock - then there would be no true univocal knowledge of anything, and we would all be lost in some infinite sea of singularties, not connected by anything.

That’s a thoughtful point, but the worry and risk is misplaced. The same thing can be said about spacetime under a general relativity model. There is no true, univocal frame of reference! Is all lost, are we now lost on a sea of disconnected reference frames, none more ‘true’ than the other. Well, yes, one is not more ‘true’ than the other – that’s a terminology error – but they are connected, related, unified mathematically.

So, too, with descriptions. If reality is objective, the rock is what it is, and our apprehension doesn’t change that in the least. Our descriptions vary in depth and composition, and there is no “true, univocal description” of a rock, because ‘true’ is contingent on the practical purpose at hand, and that varies from context to context. “that big gray round thing at the end of the driveway!” may be as perfectly “true” as any true proposition for the purposes of directing my son. The rock is what it is, regardless, but a physicist’s description of the rock would not be any more “true” (and arguably less, given that it may just confuse) as a description for my son.

Descriptions and concepts that establish relationships between subjects and objects are not, and cannot be “universally univocal”, because while the object may remain what it is (the rock is the rock), the subjects and relationships change, depending on the practical demands at hand.

This does not prevent or nullify language as effective communication, at all. It just means we need a “shared reference frame”, “locally univocal” semantics to get “rockness” where it needs to go, for our purposes. We haven’t captured “ultimate rockness”, but just the part we need for the task at hand, and our tasks vary. But so long as we can align our “partial grasps”, we have everything we need to communicate, clearly, effectively.

But this just leads into the problem of universals, metaphysical verse physical essences, abstraction, etc.

Nevermind these ramblings, by the way, unless you find them interesting. I don’t intend them to be assertions or matters of argument.

Same here. There’s a profound point or two in the mix here, somewhere.

-TS

 

[Betterave]

Why? In my software development, where maps are basic building blogs (the isomorphic data structure kind, not the cartographic kind), I use maps of maps of maps and the like regularly. The value is typically realized by tracing through those indirections for something concrete – say the IP address of a connection point store as the “territory” referent in map – but maps of maps is just indirection. It’s not a theoretical or practical problem, but is an invaluable design pattern for managing information. If I have to dereference through, say, seven layers of maps to get to my “terrain data” (the map entry pointing to a represent of the concrete target), it’s no problem, so long as I can get there.

That’s lovely, but how does it even begin to address my point?

Well, the “mapness” of a map is demonstrable – you have symbols and representations on both sides (key, value), and you can examine those relationships: does this key have an associated value, and if so, does that value correspond representationally to the “territory” being mapped? You could have a machine answer the question in an instrumental way on my usage.

No more demonstrable than the “captureness” of a capture.

On “capture” though – here’s Webster, just as a starting point:

Thanks, but why?

If you’re using “capture” as “conceive”, to use one of the associations you mentioned, I guess I can work with that, but even so, an agreement on what you mean in that case doesn’t give us clarity on whether person A has “captured” (i.e. “conceived”, etc.) extra-mental reality via concept X, or the use of map M. I still do not know, deterministically how to determine “yes, you’ve captured it”, vs. “no, you haven’t captured it”. Like I said, with a map, I just start traversing the key space, and look at the values associated, and test those for grounding in the target territory (say, by use of another map we trust or have otherwise validated, or maybe “walking the ground” of the territory).

It doesn’t matter whether you use the term ‘capture’ or ‘map’ - there is no deterministic procedure in either case for deciding whether your ‘map’ or your ‘capture’ is adequate to its object. (I hope I won’t have to repeat this again.)

Well, I think it would be quite an improvement just to see a response that wandered off, hither and yon. That’s something, at least.

Just because you like meaningless rhetorical digressions doesn’t mean that they are an improvement over anything I write.

My direct questions, reiterated several times, are right here in this thread, and you’ve even said in your post that your replies were given rather than as a direct answer, some things for me to think about that may perhaps let me figure things out myself.

That’s funny, I thought I had said that I was pointing out perfectly obvious things that you ought to be able to see if you thought about it. You *have *to figure things out for yourself at some level (the lightbulb coming on thing) - that’s just how understanding works. Please think about this. It’s true and obviously true, and it’s frustrating to have to point it out.

That’s just bad faith, frankly, disingenuous engagement – I don’t mind pedagogy offered along with an answer, but my request was for your position, your answer, not what you think will help my find some answer for myself.

This is disingenuous nonsense, TS. I always answer your questions. If you still don’t get it, you should say, “I don’t get it.” Then I’ll probably say, “What don’t you get?” And so it goes… Instead you go off into an annoying, dishonest digression about how I don’t answer your questions.

But I’ve given up on that question for you, and so here will ask:

How does one test, given a map of some territory, or a model of the extra-mental world, if one has “captured” that reality, or not? That is, what is the procedure you would lay out to give to someone else and say "Apply these rules to the person you are analyzing, and this will produce “captured” or “not captured”?

I already answered this question, but you probably didn’t notice, so I’ll repeat: There is no generalized procedure for getting someone to understand something or for checking if they have understood, although there are obviously commonly used ones that work more or less well within certain circumscribed contexts (you’ve been to school, I’m sure you must know how that works). Your demand for one is simply and profoundly misguided.

 

[The_Exodus]

But I don’t see that “change” means necessarily “fundamental change.” I.e. I perceive the essence of rock for the first time, by having looked at it briefly. It is there, conceived however incompletely in my mind. But incomplete does not denote “ungraspable.” It is incomplete with reference to what it can become, and, as all that is known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower, an object, say, rock, may be able to be known in itself infinitely (by, say, an infinite intellect) or finitely (by, say, my intellect). Nevertheless my initial, finite, and “subject to growth” concept of the essence may be a real and true access to the essence I am, at the moment of intellection, on the way to knowing more fully. I.e., what is known has a property of being known in such and such a way that is a certain “doorway” into an infinitely long hallway which ever approaches the secret of its being, or its “infinite” essence, graspable only by an infinite intellect. But it is still true that, by my initial intellection, I have gone in that door, and I am in the “hallway of that essence” so to speak. (Yes, I realize I’m way out there now. An infinite hallway of “rockness”! )

Thus I may incompletely grasp an essence, but that “incompleteness” is only due to the fact that the essence, in itself, can be more completely grasped by an infinitely greater intellect. However, my grasp, at the moment of intellection, is as complete a grasp as it can be, given the intellection exercised.

Further, it seems to me that I may later on pick up that rock, study it, weigh it, etc; and my understanding of the essence of rock will change, but not fundamentally change. I see now that I am using change carelessly, maybe, since in the first place I mean growth of a concept of an initial intellection, and the second place I mean recognition of a concept by intellection. The first is a “beginning to walk;” the second is a “birth.” The initial seed will grow, evolve, etc in line with my perception. The more reality I drink, the more it will nourish my mental concept, as it were. But the initial intellection seems to me to give some real essence to me, to really latch me onto the thing, to really set me in that infinite hallway, notwithstanding however much potential there is to grow, or how long the hallway is.

There is still the problem of distinguishing “universally univocal” and “locally univocal.” The problem is not with universal or local, it’s with univocal, since it is that term which speaks to the “sameness” that carries over from what is in reality, to sense, to intellect, to speech, to your mind, etc. That’s a line that cannot break, or else we lose knowledge and the ability to communicate.

 

[The_Exodus]

But I don’t see that “change” means necessarily “fundamental change.” I.e. I perceive the essence of rock for the first time, by having looked at it briefly. It is there, conceived however incompletely in my mind. But incomplete does not denote “ungraspable.” It is incomplete with reference to what it can become, and, as all that is known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower, an object, say, rock, may be able to be known in itself infinitely (by, say, an infinite intellect) or finitely (by, say, my intellect). Nevertheless my initial, finite, and “subject to growth” concept of the essence may be a real and true access to the essence I am, at the moment of intellection, on the way to knowing more fully. I.e., what is known has a property of being known in such and such a way that is a certain “doorway” into an infinitely long hallway which ever approaches the secret of its being, or its “infinite” essence, graspable only by an infinite intellect. But it is still true that, by my initial intellection, I have gone in that door, and I am in the “hallway of that essence” so to speak. (Yes, I realize I’m way out there now. An infinite hallway of “rockness”! )

Thus I may incompletely grasp an essence, but that “incompleteness” is only due to the fact that the essence, in itself, can be more completely grasped by an infinitely greater intellect. However, my grasp, at the moment of intellection, is as complete a grasp as it can be, given the intellection exercised.

Further, it seems to me that I may later on pick up that rock, study it, weigh it, etc; and my understanding of the essence of rock will change, but not fundamentally change. I see now that I am using change carelessly, maybe, since in the first place I mean growth of a concept of an initial intellection, and the second place I mean recognition of a concept by intellection. The first is a “beginning to walk;” the second is a “birth.” The initial seed will grow, evolve, etc in line with my perception. The more reality I drink, the more it will nourish my mental concept, as it were. But the initial intellection seems to me to give some real essence to me, to really latch me onto the thing, to really set me in that infinite hallway, notwithstanding however much potential there is to grow, or how long the hallway is.

There is still the problem of distinguishing “universally univocal” and “locally univocal.” The problem is not with universal or local, it’s with univocal, since it is that term which speaks to the “sameness” that carries over from what is in reality, to sense, to intellect, to speech, to you, or whoever I am communicatingwith. That’s a line that cannot break, or else we lose knowledge and the ability to communicate.

 

[Betterave]

OK, so perhaps this is what you’d like to offer as the answer to my question in my previous post? That “capturing reality” is a functional, practical test? I’d be quite satisfied with that, first because it’s clear, and practical, but secondly, because it obviates the whole business of “essence” and “rock-ness”, and “the nature of being a rock”. If my functional description is practically effective, I’ve got it, got what I’m going to get.

No it does not obviate any of that “essence” and “rockness” business. As I already explained, it presupposes it.

That’s an understanding I’m happy to arrive at, if I understand you, here. That whole “essence” thing just adds no value or knowledge in this model, as the value is pragmatic.

I can just as well say that that whole “pragmatic” thing adds no value or knowledge to the “essence” thing. You’re completely missing the point when you say this. You are supposed to look at the pragmatic reality and understand the conditions for its possibility.

Well, a cosmology that has an omnipotent, supernatural God as the creator and plenipotentiary of the entire universe is the apotheosis of the “cartoon universe” idea. God wants the sky red – “Let it be red”, says God. and he saw that it was good. Just like the cartoonist drawing his world however he pleases. An objective reality is a reality that obtains independent of mind or will. A subjective reality is that which is predicated on mind and will, a function of the self. On Catholicism, our universe is utterly subjective, and the nature of the universe is conferred on the universe from the mind and will of God, a “cosmic cartoonist”, who, as omnipotent, can “draw” reality any old he wills.

No, that’s just TS’s cartoon theology (unfortunately you think it’s real).

Here’s a puzzle for you: Is the claim that “An objective reality is a reality that obtains independent of mind or will” a claim about objective reality that obtains independent of mind or will?

So, to the extent the RCC endorses doctrines of reality being a creation issuing from God as a person, as a mind or will, it has believed and taught a ‘cartoon universe’, where relity isn’t how it is as a brute fact, but is whatever the Divine Pen drew it to be.

That’s seems to be an absurd non sequitur - unless you happen to have imported certain trivial stipulative definitions into this claim which make it true, without explaining those definitions (since if you did, even you would probably notice that your claim was absurd).

That is the utility of my claim, primarily, and while you may say it’s banal and obvious when it’s called out, it’s a pervasive problem, dialectically, and one I suggest was a practical problem in the conversation. I do sometimes use that very language – “the symbol is not the referent!” – but that ends up being more confusing to those reading or talking with me, because the “referent” (an everyday term for a software developer) may be obscure to them. When one pays attention to the discourse, symbols and referents getting confused for each other is a common and recurring problem. I have to work at it myself, and know I fall into that trap. I’m not the only one, looking around and reading.

WHAT is the utility of your claim? It’s banality?? If you think the failure to recognize this banal distinction has been a practical problem say where and how this is the case, and please, spare me your empty rhetorical gestures. (Please also consider that the real problem may have been your assuming that this was a problem, that others are as prone as you are to forgetting this distinction.)

I don’t know what “essentially different” means – again, that seems like vacuous language. I did like the functional principles you used above – “rock” is effective where it achieves its telic results, and my son picks up the objects I intended in the driveway. But “essence” is routinely give a wave of the hand here, and I get tripped up, because I can’t think of what a thoughtful answer about “essentially different” would look like, either way. If you mean that all symbols are on some level physical, then yes I agree, they all share that.

-TS

The point is that you never get to reality, you never get to the territory. You’ve claimed that everything is “essentially the same.” Sorry you don’t understand how to use this term, but that’s exactly what you’ve done, and if you don’t know what “essentially different” means, then you also don’t know what your own claim means.

 

[Touchstone]

But I don’t see that “change” means necessarily “fundamental change.” I.e. I perceive the essence of rock for the first time, by having looked at it briefly. It is there, conceived however incompletely in my mind. But incomplete does not denote “ungraspable.”

Agreed. Right there with you, so far.

It is incomplete with reference to what it can become, and, as all that is known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower, an object, say, rock, may be able to be known in itself infinitely (by, say, an infinite intellect) or finitely (by, say, my intellect).

Right. Still tracking.

Thus I may incompletely grasp an essence, but that “incompleteness” is only due to the fact that the essence, in itself, can be more completely grasped by an infinitely greater intellect.

Ok, we’re doing well, but I gotta get off the bus at this point. I agree that the essence (as you use it) may be more completely grasped, but I don’t think we need an “infinitely greater intellect” do we? Maybe this is just put there as an example, but it seems we might have a mind with lesser intellect that nonetheless has a ‘fuller’ grasp of some subject (a rock?).

So, a nod to your general point – the incompleteness derives because the grasp of some other mind might be deeper, more in depth, more functional, etc.

However, my grasp, at the moment of intellection, is as complete a grasp as it can be, given the intellection exercised.

Yes, agree, but getting a whiff of tautology again (which is fine if that’s how it’s offered). The completeness of my grasp is as complete as my intellect will let me grasp.

Further, it seems to me that I may later on pick up that rock, study it, weigh it, etc; and my understanding of the essence of rock will change, but not fundamentally change. I see now that I am using change is carelessly, maybe, since in the first place I mean growth of a concept of an initial intellection, and the second place I mean recognition of a concept by intellection.

Ok, I had to chew on that a minute, but I can grasp that now, if incompletely.

I do get that distinction now, and that does explain what seemed an oddly subjective view, above.

The first is a “beginning to walk;” the second is a “birth.” The initial seed will grow, evolve, etc in line with my perception. The more reality I drink, the more it will nourish my mental concept, as it were. But the initial intellection seems to me to give some real essence to me, notwithstanding however much potential to grow.

Ok, I’m rolling with your definition of ‘essence’, here, and beyond the novelty of that, for me, this has me nodding along with you. I don’t doubt the reality of the essence, but the “essentiality” of what you call essence. But that’s only when clinging to my natural understanding of the term “essence”. Given your clarification on your meaning, I agree with the above.

There is still the problem of distinguishing “universally univocal” and “locally univocal.” The problem is not with universal or local, it’s with univocal, since it is that term which speaks to the “sameness” that carries over from what is in reality, to sense, to intellect, to speech, to your mind, etc. That’s a line that cannot break, or else we lose knowledge and the ability to communicate.

Agree. Communication obtains with some degree of alignment in shared symbols and concepts, non? A lot of the software I’ve written in my careers has been around custom computer languages, and all the symbolic and semantic manipulation that entails, and it’s extra clear to me from many years of that that that line is the “must have” for communication.

That said, though, I think the problem of “what is universally univocal” is not a problem, because, just like inertial frames are all relative, all communications contexts are local. There is no “universal communication context” that I can identify, in which we might identify univocal semantics, any more than there is a “center of the universe” or even a “privileged inertial frame”.

Some communication contexts are minimally small; my twin three year old sons have some words between them that are apparently quite rich in meaning between them, but are utterly opaque to us. Other contexts are huge; “rock” is an English word which probably has purchase enough for effective communication (for simple tasks at least) for a billion people or more. Even so, the usage of “rock” and intention behind that use is crucial. That is limiting scope for its “vocality”.

Given that, isn’t it a non-problem if all communication contexts are local(i.e. non-universal), even if some are quite large and other are quite small? We just need to seek “univocality” – that is, conceptual alignment in our semantics – for that audience or context to communicate, right?

-TS

 

[The_Exodus]

I agree that the essence (as you use it) may be more completely grasped, but I don’t think we need an “infinitely greater intellect” do we? Maybe this is just put there as an example, but it seems we might have a mind with lesser intellect that nonetheless has a ‘fuller’ grasp of some subject (a rock?).

Conceded. My example of “infinitely greater intellect” need not be “God.” It can simply be “an infinitely greater intellect” minus whatever you think the concept “God” adds.

touchstone:

Yes, agree, but getting a whiff of tautology again (which is fine if that’s how it’s offered). The completeness of my grasp is as complete as my intellect will let me grasp

I do use tautology often, but most of the time to make a point; i.e. by repeating what has been pointed out, an incongruous proportion can be seen by the comparison of the middle term (that which is being discussed, i.e. essence in this case) with two “tautological” points.

What I meant to say, is the initial, finite, and “subject to growth” concept of the essence may be a real and true access to the essence I am, at the moment of intellection, on the way to knowing more fully. I.e., what is known has a property of being known in such and such a way that is a certain “doorway” into an infinitely long hallway which ever approaches the secret of its being, or its “infinite” essence, graspable only by an infinite intellect. But it is still true that, by my initial intellection, I have gone in that door, and I am in the “hallway of that essence” so to speak. (Yes, I realize I’m way out there now. An infinite hallway of “rockness”! )

The initial intellection seems to me to give some real essence to me, to really latch me onto the thing, to really set me in that infinite hallway, notwithstanding however much potential there is to grow, or how long the hallway is.

touchstone:

Given that, isn’t it a non-problem if all communication contexts are local(i.e. non-universal), even if some are quite large and other are quite small? We just need to seek “univocality” – that is, conceptual alignment in our semantics – for that audience or context to communicate, right?

-TS

I just don’t see how “localizing” solves the problem, since there are no terms to be localized around; no solid posts to plant in the ground, as it were, to build this local tent which houses meaningful terms.

I can’t part with that tenet of critical realism, because I honestly and truly cannot see how, if there is no connective line from reality to my mind to my speech to your mind etc… if that line is not univocal (even if it communicates something we cannot quite put our finger on, so long as it’s there!), I don’t see how knowledge, communication, etc. are possible.

 

[Touchstone]

Conceded. My example of “infinitely greater intellect” need not be “God.” It can simply be “an infinitely greater intellect” minus whatever you think the concept “God” adds.

OK, I wasn’t trying to quibble about where that was “God” or not. Rather, can we agree that, infinitely greater or not, some grasps can be greater (firmer? deeper?) than others? That seems the important issue for me, because “greater” and “lesser” support the idea of degree, and incompleteness of any grasps we have, which lets me assent to knowledge and communication to one degree or another, and also avoids the ‘divide by zero’ of saying “I have it” in some ultimate, total, complete, or – in my typical understanding of the term – essential sense.

I’m happy to stipulate that any “infinitely greater intellect” would be “god” if not “God”, in any case.

I do use tautology often, but most of the time to make a point; i.e. by repeating what has been pointed out, an incongruous proportion can be seen by the comparison of the middle term (that which is being discussed, i.e. essence in this case) with two “tautological” points.

Yes, and don’t want to discourage that, as its useful. But it’s pedagogical (which I appreciate) when you go there, and not a statement about reality, just so we’re clear. And I think from what you say here, we are clear enough that I won’t worry about that point further.

What I meant to say, is the initial, finite, and “subject to growth” concept of the essence may be a real and true access to the essence I am, at the moment of intellection, on the way to knowing more fully. I.e., what is known has a property of being known in such and such a way that is a certain “doorway” into an infinitely long hallway which ever approaches the secret of its being, or its “infinite” essence, graspable only by an infinite intellect.

Yes, agree. I can say the same for myself – it may be. But there’s the key difference, I suppose. “May” doesn’t get beyond “may”, for me. It’s an option, one among other logical possibilities, and remains an unknown as to whether that is actual. Further complicating that is the (severe!) problem that I wouldn’t have a way to know if such was the case, even if it were true. I might suppose I was “going down the hall to true access to the essence”, but may not be. I couldn’t tell either way, as I’m without a reference frame to check that against.

Nevertheless, it’s a lemma that can’t be ruled out.

But it is still true that, by my initial intellection, I have gone in that door, and I am in the “hallway of that essence” so to speak. (Yes, I realize I’m way out there now. An infinite hallway of “rockness”! )

No, this is brilliantly put. It’s a weird paragraph to read here if you are just parachuting in, but I understand very well what you are getting at, and it’s a nuanced point. Kudos.

The initial intellection seems to me to give some real essence to me, to really latch me onto the thing, to really set me in that infinite hallway, notwithstanding however much potential there is to grow, or how long the hallway is.

I don’t feel uncomfortable in saying the same for myself. It does seem that way to me, too, at least some of the time. But (you see it coming now!) “seems” doesn’t overcome other “seems” that compete with it. It also seems to me an intuition that’s appealing and natural, but self-deceptive, or maybe just indulgent. If I only grasped in some nominal, functional way, I may well suppose, even then, that I am “walking the hallway” as you say.

I just don’t see how “localizing” solves the problem, since there are no terms to be localized around; no solid posts to plant in the ground, as it were, to build this local tent which houses meaningful terms.

There are, they are just practical rather than abstract. If you get dropped on an island with someone who only speaks Japanese, if you want to communicate, you will, and you can learn each other’s language. There are no “cosmic posts” to stake your semantics, but you can, for example, demonstrate “rock” by gesture, by picking up examples and “naming them” for your Japanese counterpart, and he can do the same with, saying “iwa!” as he points to the rocks in your hand.

This is the post-driving of “local univocality”, in the lingo of this thread. You might extend the concept of “rock” by pointing out that the huge rock cliffs nearby are also “rock”, discounting the idea that by “rock” you meant “something I can hold in my hand”. This is to extend the shared concept of “rock” with your counterpart. That’s a very rudimentary concept of “rockness”, but even so, if you called from down the beach that you needed a “rock”, your friend can participate in communication and understanding with you, know, where he could not the day before when you both washed up on the island.

I can’t part with that tenet of critical realism, because I honestly and truly cannot see how, if there is no connective line from reality to my mind to my speech to your mind etc… if that line is not univocal (even if it communicates something we cannot quite put our finger on, so long as it’s there!), I don’t see how knowledge, communication, etc. are possible.

Agree, but those lines are “imputed”; it’s a post-facto way of describing the depth and quality of the shared terms and concepts we are deploying. When we communicate well, we can see a stronger link, a brighter line. If we cannot communicate at all, then yeah, shared knowledge (as well as communication) is a non-starter. But so long as we can (and if you admit of the truthiness of sense experience and evidence), then those lines, by definition, exist, to one degree or another.

Thanks for the exchange. We’ve managed to communicate a little, and understand, even if we don’t agree across the board.

-TS