Does the end EVER justify the means?

[Blackbog]

I am aware that the Catholic position is that ends do not justify means, however I recall reading somewhere in the dialogue over immigration that, according to Catholic theologians, it is sometimes permissible to steal out of necessity. For example, if one is starving to death it would be morally licit to take an apple from someone if that apple is not integral to the survival of the one stolen from. (I don’t know if this is actually the case; this is just how I recall the argument.)

Could someone please clarify this for me?

 

[mosher]

I am aware that the Catholic position is that ends do not justify means, however I recall reading somewhere in the dialogue over immigration that, according to Catholic theologians, it is sometimes permissible to steal out of necessity. For example, if one is starving to death it would be morally licit to take an apple from someone if that apple is not integral to the survival of the one stolen from. (I don’t know if this is actually the case; this is just how I recall the argument.)

Could someone please clarify this for me?

The answer to your question is no.

The point that you cite is an issue of subsidiarity. A person that has enough has an obligation to give. A person that is starving has a right to that apple. Thus in that case it is not theft anymore but rather the starving taking something that is rightfully his.

I do not believe that this applies to the immigration debate as it is subject to a different set of moral principles.

 

[Ham1]

Mosher got it right. Stealing (which is intrinsically evil) is taking that which one does not have a right to. Since a starving person actually has a right to the food, the act is not stealing but a different act altogether. So it is consistent with the Church teaching that one can never commit an immoral act even if great good may come of it.

 

[Blackbog]

Interesting. I have an additional question.

I’d like to pose a scenario which came up in an introductory ethics course I’m taking: A poor man’s wife is bed-ridden with some deadly disease for which a prominent doctor has invented a cure. If the cure is not administered within 24 hours, the poor man’s wife will die. The doctor refuses to give the cure away; rather, he is charging $100,000 for it, and he wants payment in full. The poor man cannot afford to pay for the cure. According to the Church, would it be morally licit for the man to steal the cure from the doctor to save his wife’s life?

(We actually examined ethical formalism and utilitarianism in class, but In my head I was more concerned with Catholicism.)

 

[wjp984]

Mosher got it right. Stealing (which is intrinsically evil) is taking that which one does not have a right to. Since a starving person actually has a right to the food, the act is not stealing but a different act altogether. So it is consistent with the Church teaching that one can never commit an immoral act even if great good may come of it.

that seems odd. What if the store owner is a poor and competing against the larger corporations. The apple is rightfully his and he needs to sell it in order to have enough money to be able to afford his own necessites. Does he need to eat that apple? No. But it is still rightfully his to sell. I don’t understand the argument here.

Also, stealing is wrong regardless. The person just loses moral copability and is not sinning when stealing if starving. That is just my opinion.

 

[Scottgun]

Stealing (which is intrinsically evil) is taking that which one does not have a right to. Since a starving person actually has a right to the food, the act is not stealing but a different act altogether.

I think this would be called appropriation. When the danger of starvation passed, there would be a moral obligation to compensate the one from whom the food was appropriated.

But yes, the ends never justify the means.

Scott

 

[Zahmir]

Interesting. I have an additional question.

I’d like to pose a scenario which came up in an introductory ethics course I’m taking: A poor man’s wife is bed-ridden with some deadly disease for which a prominent doctor has invented a cure. If the cure is not administered within 24 hours, the poor man’s wife will die. The doctor refuses to give the cure away; rather, he is charging $100,000 for it, and he wants payment in full. The poor man cannot afford to pay for the cure. According to the Church, would it be morally licit for the man to steal the cure from the doctor to save his wife’s life?

(We actually examined ethical formalism and utilitarianism in class, but In my head I was more concerned with Catholicism.)

I’ve been thinking about this myself.

I think the question here, then, following the lines of logic from the point up above is to ask: “Does that woman have a right to that cure?”

Remember what you’re saying that if she does. Remember how powerful a “right” is.

If the woman was starving to death, and she needed some food, I know she would have a right to that food.

However, I feel there is something intrinsically different with this particular example, though I can’t pin it down.

I think the idea with food is that, there is enough for everyone to live. Everyone has a right to that food. And food is such a basic necessity.

With medicine, however, I would argue that everyone has a right to basic medical treatment, to cure diseases like malaria which can be treated with minimal cost.

I would extend that argument to say, everyone should be given every oppurtunity to extend their lives through the course of normal and ethical means.

But when it comes to this particular example, I find no justification to steal something that, indeed, costs a lot of money, and which other people may have patiently been saving up for.

I may be wrong, but stealing the cure is not morally justified, especially when the man never intends to pay the doctor back.

 

[batteddy]

It depends on the treatment. Is the treatment obligatory “ordinary means”…or is it non-obligatory “extraordinary means”?

If it’s extraordinary…then you are niether obligated to obtain it, nor to provide it (though you may very well be punished for your greed…you won’t be punished for her death)

 

[Zahmir]

Waht does “extraordinary” refer to, though?

Does it refer to the cost? the method?

 

[mosher]

Waht does “extraordinary” refer to, though?

Does it refer to the cost? the method?

Generally it means that it would be an over burden to the patient and (note the word and) there is no evidence that the procedure would cause the persons condition to improve or (note the word or) financially over-burdensome to the family.

This last part is operative to the question stated. The medical procedure would cause a disproportionate harm to the financial condition of the family. This is not leaning toward ethical proportionalism but has its root foundations in another moral issue. For the sake of brevity I will not go into the issue but the point must be made that the overburden to the family must be grave and not just a lack of comfort.

So, in the case above the patient does not have a right to the treatment and none ever have the right to steal anything. As stated with the starving man example when he takes the apple he is not stealing because he has a right to the apple not just that is culpability is limited due to circumstance.

 

[mosher]

that seems odd. What if the store owner is a poor and competing against the larger corporations. The apple is rightfully his and he needs to sell it in order to have enough money to be able to afford his own necessites. Does he need to eat that apple? No. But it is still rightfully his to sell. I don’t understand the argument here.

Also, stealing is wrong regardless. The person just loses moral copability and is not sinning when stealing if starving. That is just my opinion.

The starving mans right to the apple is greater than the need of the storeowner who does not have a right to own the store.

 

[Orionthehunter]

The answer to your question is no.

The point that you cite is an issue of subsidiarity. A person that has enough has an obligation to give. A person that is starving has a right to that apple. Thus in that case it is not theft anymore but rather the starving taking something that is rightfully his.

I do not believe that this applies to the immigration debate as it is subject to a different set of moral principles.

This is totally incorrect. First of all, the owner of the apple is obligated to be sensitive to the needs of their fellow man. They are stewards of the gifts they have from God and in their stewardship they are called to invoke their conscience which MAY instruct them to give. This is a matter for the apple owner and God.

Secondly, the person who is starving has no “right” to something that is in the stewardship of another. While their taking of the apple may be mitigated regarding the seriousness of the sin, they do not have carte blanche personal authority to determine it is their “right” to take the apple. They first have an obligation to explore other alternatives to taking the apple without permission (ie asking for it and are required to respect the answer they recieve). In the absence of being able to get permission, they have an obligation to “repay” the apple owner.

In short, a starving person has no right to demand that another satisfy their hunger.

I think that the point Mosher is trying to make is related to the following from the Catechism:

2408 The seventh commandment forbids theft, that is, usurping another’s property against the reasonable will of the owner. There is no theft if consent can be presumed or if refusal is contrary to reason and the universal destination of goods. This is the case in obvious and urgent necessity when the only way to provide for immediate, essential needs (food, shelter, clothing . . .) is to put at one’s disposal and use the property of others.

In this case, one may make use of another’s property in obvious and urgent necessity but they are then obligated to compensate them as soon as practical. Also from the Catechism:

2412 In virtue of commutative justice, reparation for injustice committed requires the restitution of stolen goods to their owner:

Jesus blesses Zacchaeus for his pledge: "If I have defrauded anyone of anything, I restore it fourfold."193 Those who, directly or indirectly, have taken possession of the goods of another, are obliged to make restitution of them, or to return the equivalent in kind or in money, if the goods have disappeared, as well as the profit or advantages their owner would have legitimately obtained from them. Likewise, all who in some manner have taken part in a theft or who have knowingly benefited from it—for example, those who ordered it, assisted in it, or received the stolen goods—are obliged to make restitution in proportion to their responsibility and to their share of what was stolen.

 

[fix]

2408 The seventh commandment forbids theft, that is, usurping another’s property against the reasonable will of the owner. There is no theft if consent can be presumed or if refusal is contrary to reason and the universal destination of goods. This is the case in obvious and urgent necessity when the only way to provide for immediate, essential needs (food, shelter, clothing . . .) is to put at one’s disposal and use the property of others.191

 

[mlchance]

Just a needlessly pedantic aside, Machiavelli never said the ends justifies the means. What he said what that, if there were no God, then the ends justify the means.



– Mark L. Chance.

 

[mosher]

2408 The seventh commandment forbids theft, that is, usurping another’s property against the reasonable will of the owner. There is no theft if consent can be presumed or if refusal is contrary to reason and the universal destination of goods. This is the case in obvious and urgent necessity when the only way to provide for immediate, essential needs (food, shelter, clothing . . .) is to put at one’s disposal and use the property of others.191

Thank you fix, you beat me to the punch.

 

[mosher]

Just a needlessly pedantic aside, Machiavelli never said the ends justifies the means. What he said what that, if there were no God, then the ends justify the means.



– Mark L. Chance.

And even in that case he is wrong as the moral principle stems from the natural moral law that still remains intact with a remote completely eminent God. He would only be correct if he were to deny the intrinsic goodness of things and if that were so then nothing would exist as existence and goodness are transferable concepts. So, rather he would only have been right it he had said “if nothing exists then the ends justify the means” which is an absurd statement.

 

[Trelow]

. According to the Church, would it be morally licit for the man to steal the cure from the doctor to save his wife’s life?

No.

He does however have time to get a Priest. And blessed is she for that grace.

 

[Orionthehunter]

Thank you fix, you beat me to the punch.

But Fix’s post isn’t complete unless you read the entire section on stealing and the requirements to try to meet your need w/o theft and then to make restitution. Your use of the word “right” implies that this gives them an absolute right to take w/o consequences or to make restitution.

Additionally, the phrase in the Catechism is to “use” and not “take” as your words imply. Use means that one is to return it in the same form or to make restitution. Failure to do so makes one culpable for the theft.

 

[mosher]

But Fix’s post isn’t complete unless you read the entire section on stealing and the requirements to try to meet your need w/o theft and then to make restitution. Your use of the word “right” implies that this gives them an absolute right to take w/o consequences or to make restitution.

Additionally, the phrase in the Catechism is to “use” and not “take” as your words imply. Use means that one is to return it in the same form or to make restitution. Failure to do so makes one culpable for the theft.

To this I would agree.

 

[fix]

From the old CE:

…Thus one in danger of death from want of food, or suffering any form of extreme necessity, may lawfully take from another as much as is required to meet his present distress even though the possessor’s opposition be entirely clear. Neither, therefore, would he be bound to restitution if his fortunes subsequently were notably bettered, supposing that what he had converted to his own use was perishable. The reason is that individual ownership of the goods of this world, though according to the natural law, yields to the stronger and more sacred right conferred by natural law upon every man to avail himself of such things as are necessary for his own preservation. St. Thomas (II-II:66:7) declares that in such straits what is taken becomes, because of the dire need experienced, one’s very own, and so cannot be said to be stolen. This doctrine is sometimes expressed by saying that at such a time all things become common, and thus one reduced to such utter destitution only exercises his right.

newadvent.org/cathen/14564b.htm

I do not think it contradicts the CCC. Any thoughts?