Does this theodicy work?

  • Thread starter Thread starter Neithan
  • Start date Start date
Status
Not open for further replies.
N

Neithan

Guest
Atheists often try to build a proof for the nonexistence of God from the Problem of Evil by using his attributes: omnipotency, omnibenevolence, and omniscience. Here is my understanding of the standard refutation (maybe I’ll try to put together the proof but right now it’s rough):

Out of His omnibenevolence, God creates persons with free-will. Their free-will logically precludes God’s omniscience from knowing what they would do unless He creates them (i.e. there is nothing to know unless they exist). Once created, God’s immutability atheists conveniently ignore this one] prevents Him from destroying them or removing their free-will. God’s omnipotence brings good out of the evil they do (bringing us back to His omnibenevolence).

Does that work? Is it orthodox?
 
Why would God’s immutability imply that He could not destroy people, or their free will?
 
Why would God’s immutability imply that He could not destroy people, or their free will?
I guess that does warrant a bit of further explanation:

(Immutability=changelessness).

Because God does not change and persons do not cease to exist (a spiritual being exists forever after its creation); so once He creates us, we are creatures that He sustains in existence forever. Destroying us or removing our free-will would be like changing His intention to create us.
 
I guess that does warrant a bit of further explanation:

(Immutability=changelessness).

Because God does not change and persons do not cease to exist (a spiritual being exists forever after its creation); so once He creates us, we are creatures that He sustains in existence forever. Destroying us or removing our free-will would be like changing His intention to create us.
What if God created some people to exist forever, and others only to exist for a time?

Like some were made to live a day, and others for many years.

And some made for heaven, and others for a lesser happiness.
 
What if God created some people to exist forever, and others only to exist for a time?

Like some were made to live a day, and others for many years.

And some made for heaven, and others for a lesser happiness.
I think it is in the nature of a person to live forever after conception. St. Thomas calls it aeviternal existence. A beginning without an end. The spiritual soul is incorruptible and doesn’t cease to exist with the dissolution of the body.

That would also account for why God doesn’t simply annihilate the damned, rather than let them suffer punishment forever in hell to serve His Justice.
 
I think it is in the nature of a person to live forever after conception. St. Thomas calls it aeviternal existence. A beginning without an end. The spiritual soul is incorruptible and doesn’t cease to exist with the dissolution of the body.
I’m not disputing this. I just don’t see how this is required by God’s immutability. It would seem fair to me that God could create something with the appearance of having a beginning but no end, and then ending the thing Himself. One might argue that this is not fitting for God, but I don’t see that it would be impossible.
That would also account for why God doesn’t simply annihilate the damned, rather than let them suffer punishment forever in hell to serve His Justice.
I agree, if you can establish that God designed humans with a spiritual soul intended to exist forever after creation, and that God wouldn’t after destroy these souls, then eternal punishment is the remainder.
 
I’m not disputing this. I just don’t see how this is required by God’s immutability. It would seem fair to me that God could create something with the appearance of having a beginning but no end, and then ending the thing Himself. One might argue that this is not fitting for God, but I don’t see that it would be impossible.
Possible sure, but that seems like just throwing a wrench into the equation unnecessarily. To account for why God allows the evil committed by persons with free-will, my answer would be that His immutability prevents him from acting contrary to the nature of the person He has created. In other words, He simply would not have created that person if He intended to destroy them. Given that God is omnipresent, it wouldn’t make sense to make His decision contingent on a person’s free-will.
 
prevents Him from destroying them or removing their free-will.
Wouldn’t that make him not allpowerful because he’s limited by his own character?
 
Wouldn’t that make him not allpowerful because he’s limited by his own character?
G-d being all-powerful doesnt mean that He can do everything conceivable… G-d cannot make 2 + 2 = 1, G-d is limited by His own character… This is not a violation of His potency it is actually a fulfillment of His power… 😉
 
G-d being all-powerful doesnt mean that He can do everything conceivable… G-d cannot make 2 + 2 = 1, G-d is limited by His own character… This is not a violation of His potency it is actually a fulfillment of His power… 😉
Um… no? (unless you were being sarcastic)
This would mean that there a certain criterea/rules that are higher & more powerful than God, who is supposed to be allpowerful.

lol God gets pwned by math 😛 technically, because the authority & the power of the mathematical truths is not subject to God’s rule & exist outside of his authority, or something.
 
Um… no? (unless you were being sarcastic)
This would mean that there a certain criterea/rules that are higher & more powerful than God, who is supposed to be allpowerful.

lol God gets pwned by math 😛 technically, because the authority & the power of the mathematical truths is not subject to God’s rule & exist outside of his authority, or something.
No it doesnt make the rules (maths) higher or more powerful then G-d because the rules of maths are part of nature / creation and therefore either part of G-ds nature and G-ds creation…either way, they are not greater then G-d 😉
 
No it doesnt make the rules (maths) higher or more powerful then G-d because the rules of maths are part of nature / creation and therefore either part of G-ds nature and G-ds creation…either way, they are not greater then G-d 😉
Can you explain your rationale?
 
Can you explain your rationale?
Sure, sorry for the short replies atm… I’m at work 😛

Some people might make as assertion along the lines of “Newton (Leibniz) created calculus”. However, he (they) didnt create calculus, It seems like they discovered calculus–meaning, the principles were already present within the nature of numbers themselves. So the question might be Did God create numbers? This is a bit of the complicated question, however I don’t think the answer is material atm, because, if God can’t create numbers, it could only be because somehow mathematical reality is entailed in the very essence of God–in which case, Leibniz and Newton were grasping something in the essence of God, and thus not creating anything at all.

Therefore, G-d cannot contradict a simple Maths equation, not because Maths principles are greater then G-d but because the principles are part of His being…

Did that make sense?
 
Sure, sorry for the short replies atm… I’m at work 😛

Some people might make as assertion along the lines of “Newton (Leibniz) created calculus”. However, he (they) didnt create calculus, It seems like they discovered calculus–meaning, the principles were already present within the nature of numbers themselves. So the question might be Did God create numbers? This is a bit of the complicated question, however I don’t think the answer is material atm, because, if God can’t create numbers, it could only be because somehow mathematical reality is entailed in the very essence of God–in which case, Leibniz and Newton were grasping something in the essence of God, and thus not creating anything at all.

Therefore, G-d cannot contradict a simple Maths equation, not because Maths principles are greater then G-d but because the principles are part of His being…

Did that make sense?
To me it seems like: God is alpowerful, but he can’t run cause he’s disabled, but it’s in his nature not to run so it’s ok.
There are lots of things that are part of my nature, yet I can try to change them.

Some primitive animal instincts still remain in people & are part of our nature, yet I’m supposed to fight those & change my natural reactions in order to be a civil person & not get into trouble. However, as you say “math” are part of God’s nature, yet those cannot be changed.
 
To me it seems like: God is alpowerful, but he can’t run cause he’s disabled, but it’s in his nature not to run so it’s ok.
There are lots of things that are part of my nature, yet I can try to change them.

Some primitive animal instincts still remain in people & are part of our nature, yet I’m supposed to fight those & change my natural reactions in order to be a civil person & not get into trouble. However, as you say “math” are part of God’s nature, yet those cannot be changed.
I’m not entirely sure what you were getting at, but I’ll reply accordingly to what I think you were saying:

Well why would anyone want to change “math”… Does the fact that cant G-d change certain actually take anything away from His nature?
To say this undermines God’s power would be like saying something eternal isn’t omnipiotent because it can’t “begin to exist.” But this inability is a logical consequence of a thing’s perfection, not an obstacle to it.

In the same way that G-d cannot begin to exist. He also can’t contradict math because it is part of H-s nature. As above, the is a logical conseqeunce and not really a problem IMHO…
 
Possible sure, but that seems like just throwing a wrench into the equation unnecessarily. To account for why God allows the evil committed by persons with free-will, my answer would be that His immutability prevents him from acting contrary to the nature of the person He has created. In other words, He simply would not have created that person if He intended to destroy them. Given that God is omnipresent, it wouldn’t make sense to make His decision contingent on a person’s free-will.
I suppose I still prefer the Thomistic “solution” (though there really is none), in that God’s goodness is the reason He allows free-willed persons to do evil, because God can bring a greater good out of their evil.

This also justifies natural disasters, apart from the “results of sin” answer, which is less than satisfying.

I suppose I don’t see the wrench as so much unnecessary as unaccounted for, but not necessarily fatal. The concepts you present here are very interesting, and I plan to incorporate aspects of them into my understanding of theodicy.

Have you read Leibniz’s “book” on this subject?
 
Status
Not open for further replies.
Back
Top