newadvent.org/summa/1007.htm#article4
Your explanation of per se vs accidental doesn’t seem to fit with Aquinas. There can be an infinite accident group of causes? Without there being a per se, there would be no accidental, as you’ve explained it
Thank you for the reference. I think the example given by St. Thomas of the carpenter fits illustrates the distinction between
per se and
per accidens.
I tried to simplify a little in my answer, but maybe I should have given the full explanation from the get-go.
“Per se” and “per accidens” are technical terms that Aquinas inherits from Aristotle (in Greek,
kata hauta and
kata symbebekos). The indicate the level of dependency: in order to write something in red, I must have a
red writing instrument. In that technical language, it must be red
per se. On the other hand, there are a variety of writing instruments that I could use: a pen, a pencil, a paintbrush, my finger, etc. Hence, if I decide to use a red
pen, then pen is only necessary
per accidens.
Similarly, in this article, the carpenter must put into use several operations in order to make something: his faculties, his art, the movement of his hand, a hammer, and so on. To that degree, the carpentry work depends
per se: no carpenter (or no hand, or no hammer), no capentry;
sublata causa, tollitur effectus (if you remove the cause, you take away the effect).
On the other hand,
which hammer (of the appropriate type, naturally) is used is immaterial. Hence the use of
this hammer or
that one is only a
per accidens cause.
Remember, though that the
per accidens is the level of dependence, and there are different ways that it can happen. In the case of the hammer, what is indifferent is the
individual hammer: the carpentry does not depend on the this or that hammer, only on having a hammer.
In the case of human or biological generation, however, we are analyzing a different facet of causality: the actuality or reality of the causative action. My parents
caused my existence (in the past). They are not causing my existence
now. While they were in the process of causing my existence (at the moment of my conception), my existence depended on them (no conception, no me; again,
sublata causa, tollitur effectus). Now, my continued existence no longer depends on them. I owe my existence to them, but through an action on their part that has now ceased. The maxim
sublata causa, tollitur effectus no longer applies. Hence they are
per accidens causes of my existence.
In sum: a
per se cause always obeys the maxim
sublata causa, tollitur effectus. If a cause, or an aspect of that, cause does
not obey this principle, then it is a
per accidens cause (or anyhow,
per accidens with respect to that aspect).