Doing evil so good may come?

[Bookcat]

You are still making the assumption that there is an “other way” – or, rather, that there will always be an “other way.”

You are making the assumption that there is not.

And are making assumptions well about what the actual event entails and what is in the person …and what virtues will guide him…what he will know even via connaturally which he cannot articulate even…and what the possibilities will be both human and grace.

We simply do not know such and cannot know such by nature of such.

And I also discussed the case of one who does not find such in that very rare event.

 

[Bookcat]

So what I am arguing, and please tell me if you disagree, is this: A Christian in this … situation should strive to the utmost not to sin, not matter how negative the potential outcomes of not sinning would be. Even if your venial sin were to save thousands or even millions of lives, the better way would be for you to not sin at all, despite the fact that your refraining from sin will in all probability result in the loss of all those lives.

Again in terms of venial sin – one does not find it put like that as some practical advice in terms of this kind of event.

Why? because we have “daily sins” – we commit venial sins daily – we eat too many cookies perhaps, we might argue with our spouse, we do not work as well as we should – daily sins and struggles. Are they essentially different from mortal sins? Absolutely. Should we sin? No.

Should we struggle against them Yes.

One does not really though go about drawing a line in the sand practically speaking – in a way that one plays off a venial sin against savings some ones life.

This is not to say “one may do evil so good may come” …

– no it remains evil --but it is to note that in the throws of life --we commit venial sins and we might likely falter more easily when it comes to a great good of saving some ones life…

We should never sin. But we do – at least venially.

In the world we live in (after the fall) one has to contend with conflicting virtues…or rather seemingly conflicting virtues…and we commit venial sins daily --even at times in trying to live other virtues! As Scripture puts it “the *just man *sins seven times daily” (or to that effect).

We know this from daily experience…

What is one to do? Follow Christ --walk by the Spirit-- live the virtues (especially charity)-- do good and avoid evil.

And when confronted with such serious events - like saving a persons life --we seek to do the good and avoid the evil and to find the good way in prudence…

But know that we *may falter *on this point or on that one – and need daily to pray “forgive us our trespasses” and seek to do better…

If there is any sin there…remember we are speaking of very rare and severely stressful things where a murderer is seeking to murder someone we are hiding…and maybe us. How many will keep their full wits? Some yes. But many will (just in other ways one might sin in weakness venially) – not find that way and find themselves lying.

And many of them will even judge in their conscience at that moment – that such a lie is the right thing to do --and thus for a further reason not sin.

 

[Bookcat]

(and again one is allowing only 3 options --when in reality there can be various ones such as a mental reservation)

 

[kelner]

But what you are arguing here is that sometimes sin (whether mortal or venial, I actually don’t know if you’re making a distinction) is justified. But that’s not the Catholic position, if I’m understanding the Catholic position correctly. The Catholic position is that you should never, ever sin if you can help it. And what I’m arguing is that the more you can help it, the more likely it is that in a situation where the choice is between your sin and someone else’s death, the likelihood of the other person’s death increases, and there’s no guarantee that God is going to step in and miraculously provide either you or the other person with a way out.

So the Catholic position is wrong. I have no problem with that.

Which means if you are given a choice between offending God (e.g., by deliberately sinning) or offending your neighbor (e.g., by unavoidably causing his/her death via your abstaining from sin), you are to offend your neighbor rather than God.

Wow. I always thought that the Catholic concept of ethics has moved forward a bit since the Crusades, but I must be wrong.

(A theocracy puts eternal life before life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, thereby justifying the use of capital punishment to protect the souls of its citizens.)

BWAHAHAHA!

Reality check: any actual theocracy puts self-preservation first, and will invent any theology needed to justify that. Example: Jesus.

If souls do not exist, then there is no life after death about which to be concerned.
Therefore, the only reason not to murder someone is the threat of negative consequences (e.g., execution, imprisonment, guilt feelings) for doing so. But if you can get away with it, and you can live with yourself having done it, there’s no real reason not to murder or likewise commit any other sin of any kind that benefits you in some way – no one’s going to judge you for it, as you have no soul to be judged.

All this paragraph demonstrates is that you are unaware of any concepts of ethics beyond the most basic (i.e. Kohlberg stage 1). That discussion makes no sense until you can actually understand that ethics can have different sources than fear of God’s punishment. Now, go read that wiki page.

 

[Carina20]

Doing bad so that good may come is still doing bad. There is never a ‘good’ reason to lie. Since there is no 100% sure way to know if lying will save anyone, then there is no reason to lie. What makes anyone think Nazis are rational? What makes anyone think they will even ask you and that they won’t just burst in with guns? What makes anyone think that saying ‘no’ will make the Nazis leave? What makes anyone think saying ‘yes’ will automatically lead to the death of the Jew? What makes anyone think that anything you do will save either of your lives? There are just too many variables to say that lying is the only beneficial response. If there is a chance of dying no matter which course of action, I’d rather not die a liar.

 

[Shin]

Doing bad so that good may come is still doing bad. There is never a ‘good’ reason to lie. Since there is no 100% sure way to know if lying will save anyone, then there is no reason to lie. What makes anyone think Nazis are rational? What makes anyone think they will even ask you and that they won’t just burst in with guns? What makes anyone think that saying ‘no’ will make the Nazis leave? What makes anyone think saying ‘yes’ will automatically lead to the death of the Jew? What makes anyone think that anything you do will save either of your lives? There are just too many variables to say that lying is the only beneficial response. If there is a chance of dying no matter which course of action, I’d rather not die a liar.

This is correct. One cannot sin, no matter how important the matter, even if it were to save the whole world.

The whole world is in the hands of God. Every human life is in the hands of God. The atheist, the agnostic, and the uninstructed Christian will not give God’s Providence sufficient weight, and think that their actions are what ultimately determine everything.

This is not the case at all. God is in control. Our job is to do good, and not evil, and not to consider ourselves as more than what we actually are.

The Lord giveth, the Lord taketh away.

 

[Bookcat]

And furthermore – there is the question for Moral Theologians of

“is such and such a lie?” or something else?

There may be what appears to be a “lie” – which in fact is not.

Is it a different “moral object”?

Similar to the fact of a starving person taking bread (as described below):

2408 The seventh commandment forbids theft, that is, usurping another’s property against the reasonable will of the owner. *There is no theft *if consent can be presumed or if refusal is contrary to reason and the universal destination of goods. This is the case in obvious and urgent necessity when the only way to provide for immediate, essential needs (food, shelter, clothing . . .) is to put at one’s disposal and use the property of others.

Such is not “theft”.

(hence such a person as described in 2408 is not faced with the false question of “should I steal or not” but with knowledge that here and now --this is not theft.)

So while it is an objective venial sin to *lie *to Nazi’s at the door (and culpability subjectively may not exist at all in such) – could there also be something that appears to be similar to a “lie” but which is not such? Some falsehood that is not a lie. Something that can exist alongside the use of discreet language or some legit mental reservation.

That is left to the Professional Moral Theologians to argue out --there are those who seem to think so and those who do not. This may be an area where some “development” in understanding such. I leave it to them to argue such…

 

[vames]

Peter Kreeft:

When we discuss Kant and the issue of lying, most of my students, even the moral absolutists, are quite certain that the Dutchmen were not wrong to deliberately deceive the Nazis about the locations of the Jews they had promised to hide. They do not know whether this is an example of lying or not. But they know that if it is, than lying is not always wrong, and if lying is always wrong, then this is not lying. Because they know, without any ifs or ands or buts, that such Dutch deception is good, not evil. If anyone is more certain of his philosophical principles than he is that this deception is good, I say he is not functioning as a human being but as a computer, an angel, a Gnostic, or a Kantian. He is a Laputan, like Swift’s absent-minded professors who live on an island in the sky in Gulliver’s Travels, and who make eye contact with abstractions but not with human beings.

But can’t we solve the problem of the Dutchmen and the Nazis by saying that all lying is wrong but the Dutchmen don’t have to lie to save the Jews because they could deceive the Nazis without lying by a clever verbal ploy? No, because effective deception by clever verbal ploys cannot usually be done by ordinary people, especially by clumsy Dutchmen. I know; I’m one of them. Our moral obligations depend on abilities that are common, not abilities that are rare.
…
If you don’t know that, you’re morally stupid, and moral stupidity comes in two opposite forms: relativism and legalism. Relativism sees no principles, only people; legalism sees no people, only principles.
…
If you say that morality changes in wartime, I reply that police ‘sting’ operations are an example of legitimate peacetime spying. An undercover policeman saves children from becoming drug addicts by pretending to be a drug customer to expose the drug dealer. Is this pretending ‘lying’ or not? I don’t much care, except as a professional philosopher and logician. I do much care that the ‘sting’ works and my kids are protected. Do you care more about protecting your own moral correctness than protecting your kids’ lives?

catholicvote.org/discuss/index.php?p=14306

 

[vames]

Wow. I always thought that the Catholic concept of ethics has moved forward a bit since the Crusades, but I must be wrong.

But it did. I don’t know why people keep arguing here.
Here’s the Catechism, again:

IV. RESPECT FOR THE TRUTH

2488 The right to the communication of the truth is not unconditional. Everyone must conform his life to the Gospel precept of fraternal love. This requires us in concrete situations to judge whether or not it is appropriate to reveal the truth to someone who asks for it.

2489 Charity and respect for the truth should dictate the response to every request for information or communication. **The good and safety of others, respect for privacy, and the common good are sufficient reasons for being silent about what ought not be known or for making use of a discreet language. The duty to avoid scandal often commands strict discretion. **No one is bound to reveal the truth to someone who does not have the right to know it.

2490 The secret of the sacrament of reconciliation is sacred, and cannot be violated under any pretext. “The sacramental seal is inviolable; therefore, it is a crime for a confessor in any way to betray a penitent by word or in any other manner or for any reason.”

2491 Professional secrets - for example, those of political office holders, soldiers, physicians, and lawyers - or confidential information given under the seal of secrecy must be kept, save in exceptional cases where keeping the secret is bound to cause very grave harm to the one who confided it, to the one who received it or to a third party, and where the very grave harm can be avoided only by divulging the truth. Even if not confided under the seal of secrecy, private information prejudicial to another is not to be divulged without a grave and proportionate reason.

2492 Everyone should observe an appropriate reserve concerning persons’ private lives. Those in charge of communications should maintain a fair balance between the requirements of the common good and respect for individual rights. Interference by the media in the private lives of persons engaged in political or public activity is to be condemned to the extent that it infringes upon their privacy and freedom.

 

[mpartyka]

Reality check: any actual theocracy puts self-preservation first, and will invent any theology needed to justify that. Example: Jesus.

Not sure what you mean by that.

All this paragraph demonstrates is that you are unaware of any concepts of ethics beyond the most basic (i.e. Kohlberg stage 1). That discussion makes no sense until you can actually understand that ethics can have different sources than fear of God’s punishment.

No, I understand that ethics can have different sources besides fear of God’s punishment. For example, there’s personal empathy. (But what if you lack empathy?) There is man’s punishment. (But what if you have a near-certain chance of getting away with whatever it is you’re contemplating?) There are abstract moral principles. (But what if you just don’t give a rip about those principles and only care to do what pleases you?) In other words, there is no binding reason to live morally apart from an afterlife where some kind of judgment is inescapable. Even the Apostle Paul recognized this and stated the case plainly: “Why do we stand in jeopardy every hour?..What advantage is it to me? If the dead do not rise, ‘Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die!’” (1 Cor 15:30,32) You are truly free to behave in whatever ways improve your chances of continued survival and flourishing – even ways that negatively affect the continued survival and flourishing of others. So long as you’re making out okay, you’re golden. Because who’s going to make it otherwise?

 

[mpartyka]

Carina and Shin,

THANK YOU. Yours have been the first straight answers I’ve received.

 

[kelner]

For example, there’s personal empathy. (But what if you lack empathy?) There is man’s punishment. (But what if you have a near-certain chance of getting away with whatever it is you’re contemplating?) There are abstract moral principles. (But what if you just don’t give a rip about those principles and only care to do what pleases you?) In other words, there is no binding reason to live morally apart from an afterlife where some kind of judgment is inescapable.

But what if there is no afterlife?

You see, your whole ethical system is predicated on existence of a particular deity. Not just a deity – a very particular deity! Your whole ethical system is built around pleasing this deity. If this deity does not exist, then your whole ethical system breaks down.

That’s why personal empathy, man’s punishment or abstract moral principles are much better sources of morality – they are based on things which are known to exist.

You are truly free to behave in whatever ways improve your chances of continued survival and flourishing – even ways that negatively affect the continued survival and flourishing of others. So long as you’re making out okay, you’re golden. Because who’s going to make it otherwise?

You know what is really funny? That if Vasili Arkhipov was a God-fearing Christian like yourself, you would not be here today.

falkvinge.net/2011/10/04/my-two-heroes/

 

[mpartyka]

But what if there is no afterlife?

Then “whatever I like is good; whatever I dislike is bad,” is the only sensible moral code to follow.

Your whole ethical system is built around pleasing this deity. If this deity does not exist, then your whole ethical system breaks down.

That’s very true.

That’s why personal empathy, man’s punishment or abstract moral principles are much better sources of morality – they are based on things which are known to exist.

But they are also changeable. You might not feel the same way towards people today as tomorrow. Man might not punish tomorrow behavior he punishes today. And there are many different sets of abstract principles to which one might choose to adhere, maybe different sets from one day to the next. Isn’t the best source of morality one that is singular, unchanging, and delivered to you not by a man but rather by a source just as singular and unchanging – i.e., an eternal God?

You know what is really funny? That if Vasili Arkhipov was a God-fearing Christian like yourself, you would not be here today. falkvinge.net/2011/10/04/my-two-heroes/

From the article:

“At the time, Soviet military protocol prescribed that if a sub loses contact with its chain of command under war conditions, and the three officers on board are in agreement, the sub may fire nuclear weapons…Lieutenant Vasili Arkipov said no.”

I don’t see any conflict with Christian morality here. Arkipov was under no moral imperative to agree with the other two officers.

 

[Bookcat]

And furthermore – there is the question for Moral Theologians –

“is such and such a lie?” or is it something else?

There may be what appears to be a “lie” – which in fact is not.

Is it a different “moral object”?

Similar to the fact of a starving person taking bread (as described below):

2408 The seventh commandment forbids theft, that is, usurping another’s property against the reasonable will of the owner. *There is no theft *if consent can be presumed or if refusal is contrary to reason and the universal destination of goods. This is the case in obvious and urgent necessity when the only way to provide for immediate, essential needs (food, shelter, clothing . . .) is to put at one’s disposal and use the property of others.

Such is not “theft”.

(hence such a person as described in 2408 is not faced with the false question of “should I steal or not” but with knowledge that here and now --this is not theft.)

So while it is an objective venial sin to *lie *to Nazi’s at the door (and culpability subjectively may not exist at all in such) – could there also be something that appears to be similar to a “lie” but which is not such? Some falsehood that is not a lie. Something that can exist alongside the use of discreet language or some legit mental reservation.

That is left to the professional (and of course) orthodox Moral Theologians to argue out --there are those who seem to think so. This may be an area where some “development” in understanding such. I leave it to them to argue such…but it may be the case.

 

[kelner]

Isn’t the best source of morality one that is singular, unchanging, and delivered to you not by a man but rather by a source just as singular and unchanging – i.e., an eternal God?

Except that your preferred source of morality (i.e. CCC) is demonstrably changing and delivered to you by a man. What about burning of heretics?

I don’t see any conflict with Christian morality here. Arkipov was under no moral imperative to agree with the other two officers.

Incorrect. According to the interpretation of his colleagues, the sub was being attacked by the Americans. According to him, Americans were trying to get the sub to surface. Which meant that if he was wrong, they were commiting suicide by surfacing.

Self-defense is justified in Catholicism, so he’d not sin if he fired at the Americans. And by your own words, he should choose self-preservation regardless of consequences to third parties.

But, fortunately, Arkhipov was an atheist.

Why did an atheist choose preservation of others over himself?

 

[mpartyka]

Except that your preferred source of morality (i.e. CCC) is demonstrably changing and delivered to you by a man. What about burning of heretics?

I’m curious about that one myself, actually. My present understanding is that execution is a state, not a church, function, so because we have secular governments rather than theocracies now, it is up to the state to determine for which crimes executions are justified. But in a theocracy, execution for heresy would be justified, as the state would be concerned not only with the lives of its citizens but also their souls.

According to the interpretation of his colleagues, the sub was being attacked by the Americans. According to him, Americans were trying to get the sub to surface. Which meant that if he was wrong, they were commiting suicide by surfacing. Self-defense is justified in Catholicism, so he’d not sin if he fired at the Americans. And by your own words, he should choose self-preservation regardless of consequences to third parties. But, fortunately, Arkhipov was an atheist. Why did an atheist choose preservation of others over himself?

Self-defense is justified in Catholicism, but it is not required. What Catholicism mandates is soul-preservation, not self-preservation – you’re going to die someday anyway; what’s important is that you die well.

Why did an atheist choose preservation of others over himself?

Presumably because he believed he couldn’t live with himself if it turned out he were right and the others were wrong. This is a valid concern and falls precisely in line with what I presented earlier as sensible morality if there is no afterlife: “Whatever I like is good; whatever I dislike is bad.” There are people who choose to suicide because their continued existence is no longer palatable to them, and that’s a perfectly acceptable decision under this moral paradigm. It’s ridiculous to think that the preservation of your own life is an ultimate goal given that someday you will die. Only the preservation of your personal happiness counts. So if you are faced with a decision between dying or living in a hell of your own making, you can morally choose whichever option you prefer.

I’m certainly not suggesting, for example, that an atheist mother wouldn’t sacrifice her own life to push her own child out of the way of a speeding bus. I’m just saying that the mother is bound by no moral imperative to do so other than her own feelings in the matter – if she values the child’s life more than her own, she’ll act, but if she doesn’t, she won’t, and either decision is perfectly moral.

P.S.: I think we should specify that we’re not really talking about atheism so much as unbelief in the afterlife – the two are not one and the same. One can believe in God without believing that humans have immortal souls, and one can believe no gods exist while still believing that there is an afterlife or cycle of reincarnation. I’m just not sure what the proper term is for a person who believes there is no afterlife.