Incorrect. This procedure is a direct abortion and therefore illicit:
ncbcenter.org/page.aspx?pid=940
The idea is that –
- if a good effect proceeds from a bad effect, then it is ILLICIT
- if a bad effect proceeds from a good effect, then it is LICIT
Or, in images –
- action → bad effect → good effect → ILLICIT
- action → good effect → bad effect → LICIT
So in case of ectopic pregnancy –
- you remove the tube to cause a good effect (remove the threat to woman’s life), but tube removal has a bad effect of killing the embryo; however, since death of the embryo is secondary, then the procedure is licit
- if you remove the embryo, then the death of the embryo is a primary consequence, and the good effect (saving the woman) proceeds from that, which renders the procedure ILLICIT
At least, this is the official view.
Now, the consequentialist view (which got some people excommunicated) is that it’s all hogwash: there’s no such thing as a primary or secondary effect, the action simply has two equivalent effects. The effects proceed from the action, not from each other. So, removal of the embryo from the tube simply results in saving the woman AND the death of the embryo. You can’t have one without the other.
This is best demonstrated when discussing killing someone in self-defense. Say that someone is attacking you with a knife and you have a gun. The double effect is normally used to justify that firing your gun at the attacker is legit, because the primary effect of the shot is stopping the attacker, while the attacker’s death is an
unfortunate, but intended and
secondary effect of your action. But one could as well say that attacker’s death is a
primary effect, and your safety is a
secondary effect (a dead attacker cannot hurt you, your safety proceeds from his death) – which would render self-defense illicit.
Obviously, something cannot be both licit and illicit based on the same rule.
There is a very interesting
article arguing that the problem arises from considering a textbook formulation of the doctrine in isolation from its original philosophical context. The author essentially argues that it should be about the primary intent of the action: