Double Effect: Trolley problem and loop varient

[Pug]

Hmmm. Pug, I’m not sure, but I might hold someone responsible for throwing a guy off a bridge in front of a train, even if he had a good reason to stop the train. I’m not certain what would happen in legal venue, either, would there be civil or criminal penalties?

I’ve got to clarify myself. I was thinking of #2, not the bridge when I wrote that paragraph. I know I made mention of the bridge in the same post, but that was not what **Thing **had asked about. He had asked about #2, or, at least that is what I was thinking he had done. I was trying with that line to answer Thing’s specific question about #2 and flipping the switch to the fat man, that I did understand it could be a snap decision that might not show any particular callousness, unless the decider themselves made it appear so, hence my reference to the horrid game of discussing passer-by and directing one’s automobile into them for points. That was a reference to directing the train onto a man to kill or hit him for fun or out of hatred or non-responsiveness to the value of life.

My thinking may be flawed. I’ll consider the remainder of what you said shortly, but since you assumed I meant #3, others might as well, so I had to address this promptly.

Do you have a response to my earlier post to you, or are you still thinking? (or perhaps you missed it…)

 

[Thing]

Hmmm. Pug, I’m not sure, but I might hold someone responsible for throwing a guy off a bridge in front of a train, even if he had a good reason to stop the train. I’m not certain what would happen in legal venue, either, would there be civil or criminal penalties?

By the way – for those who think it is permissible under double effect reasoning to throw a fat man off a bridge, or to switch a track to a fatman who will stop the train (not just switch a track to miss 5) – I have a question:

I assume that the 5 people versus 1 fatman survives the proportionality analysis. But, what happens when it is closer, say 2 people to 1 fatman?

Better yet, what if it is 1 person and 1 fatman? That seems proportional in a strict sense. Assuming you have no greater duty to either, could you flip the switch? Could you throw the fat man off the bridge?

If not why not?

If yes – do you think society would hold someone responsible for that? Would you hold someone responsible for that if you were friends with the person who ended up getting hit? I ask, because, personally if it was one person to one person in the first scenario I wouldn’t blame the operator who flipped the switch away from a stranger and hit a friend. But in the second scenario I would blame the operator who decided to flip the switch to “stop the train” by hitting my friend.

Pug, I don’t know where you stand regarding scenario 2 and 3, but what do you think of the above (even if you think scenario 2 and 3 aren’t permissible)?

VC

I think this experiment (no.2) is designed to attempt to produce a preselected outcome so that the experiment itself colours the result, as in, if an experiment caused the participant to choose an immoral choice how could the experiment really return an immoral choice.
Would you flip the switch to save the world or would you flip the switch to avoid just one person. Both of them have to return an immoral choice result to satisfy the experiment.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

Thing,

I think it is interesting that you want to contextualize these scenarios, and there is something to be said for doing so.

I have a somewhat similar notion: I wonder how scenario #2 would be viewed without scenario #1 in the back of our minds. If someone opened with scenario #2 and you never had exposure to scenario #1, do you think it would change your thinking?

VC

 

[Verbum_Caro]

Do you have a response to my earlier post to you, or are you still thinking? (or perhaps you missed it…)

Oops, sorry Pug. I didn’t miss it. I saw it, thought about, then forgot! Maybe I blocked it out? I’ll think about it some more and try to give a response.

It was a good post, though, thanks for it.

VC

 

[Pug]

What about the will of the unborn child? Leaving this invented dilemma for a moment, consider the will of the baby who in Catholic teaching may be allowed to die. If we presume life, must we also not presume the will to remain alive?

Yes, I would assume the child wished to remain alive, if possible. I would not assume the child wished to remain alive at all costs.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

I think this experiment (no.2) is designed to attempt to produce a preselected outcome so that the experiment itself colours the result, as in, if an experiment caused the participant to choose an immoral choice how could the experiment really return an immoral choice.

Thing,

I’m not sure about that. First of all, I don’t know why you call it an “experiment”. You don’t necessarily need a “mad philosopher” setting it up, I think it is in the realm of possibility that something like this, or similar *could *occur (although pretty unlikely).

I’m not sure also why you think in scenario #2 the trainman is forced to make an immoral choice? If flipping the switch to hit the fatman is immoral, do you think that also makes not flipping the switch immoral? It doesn’t seem to me to be the case. You certainly have a duty to avoid causing what harm you can, but in this case if you accept flipping the switch is immoral then you can’t permissibly do it. Our obligation to prevent harm is trumped by our obligation not to sin.

Thing:

Would you flip the switch to save the world or would you flip the switch to avoid just one person.

Not sure what you mean here. In this scenario, at least, you don’t have to flip a switch to avoid one person. That person is safe until you flip the switch towards him.

VC

 

[Betterave]

Betterave,

I just want to respond to this part quickly, and I’ll look at the next part when I can (if it is still relevant for us).

It dawns on me now that what I had been doing was taking “means” to denote the object of an act, and you were taking “means” to be the act as done. Is that right?

That’s right. I think that’s the right way to read it. Thus when you talk about ‘adultery’ as the object of an act, ‘adultery’ always (constitutively) includes adulterous intent and adulterous circumstances. So if all we care about is a bivalent evaluation, permissible or not, we know that adultery, as such, circumscribes a complete act (‘as done’) which is impermissible. But ‘adultery while away on crusades’ is nonetheless probably not the moral equivalent of ‘adultery at your wedding reception,’ although both fall into the impermissible category of ‘adultery.’

Maybe I took o_mlly’s assertion the wrong way by thinking “means” meant the object of an act? Maybe I approached it this was because I subscribe to the Thomist position that individual acts in the moral order aren’t generally* indifferent because the intention of the actor** gets factored in. What do you think?

*I’m vaguely aware of some sort of “indifferent act” in the moral order from a Thomist perspective, but I’m not sure if it is applicable here.

**I mean the “intention” to an end – something that the individual actor brings to the table, something we talk about when talking about a concrete act, something “added”, if you will to the abstract “object of the act”.

To your first question, I think that a “means” that is morally evaluable in itself cannot just be the ‘object’ of an act… although it can also be that, relative to further intentions and circumstances extrinsic to the initial evaluation of the act (which, in a secondary evaluation, we see functioning as a means to some further end, or as being implicated in some further relevant circumstances).

I’m not sure what to say about your other questions.

 

[Betterave]

I think that in the original scenario, the fact that the flip of a switch is sufficient to direct the train towards fat man or five men, implies that both parties are already and equally in harm’s way. On the other hand, pushing fat man or flipping a switch so as to first put fat man into harm’s way is a different matter.

(It might seem that that is exactly what you do in the first scenario, flip the switch to first put him in harm’s way- but I don’t think that’s right. He is tied to a train track! He’s already in harm’s way, simply as a result of the circumstances, and he is so in exactly the same way as the five!)

 

[Verbum_Caro]

I think that in the original scenario, the fact that the flip of a switch is sufficient to direct the train towards fat man or five men, implies that both parties are already and equally in harm’s way.

Betterave,

First a question: Why do you think it is important whether or not the fatman is in harm’s way or not in the first scenario?

Second questions for clarification: Regarding being in harm’s way I don’t think you are thinking about the mad philosopher having put both parties on the track – because we can conceive of the same situations without a mad philosopher involved.

I assume you mean that the fact the fatman is on a track (by any eventuality) means he is in harm’s way in a distinctly different manner than a fatman on a bridge overlooking a track?

I’m not sure. I can imagine a scenario similar to number one where it looks more clear. Imagine if you were driving a runaway car down a hill, on a narrow one way street. At the bottom of the hill a group of people (tourists, let’s say standing around a fountain. The street encircles the fountain, but you will be going so fast you’ll plow straight into them.) There is a pedestrian walking on the sidewalk on the hill.

If you swipe your car into the buildings on the side you can create enough friction to slow you down to divert your path from the tourists. But if you do, you’ll surely hit the pedestrian who won’t have time to get out of the way.

It doesn’t seem to me that the pedestrian is in harm’s way, exactly.

But maybe you mean by being in harm’s way you are in some sort of zone of harm™, i.e. in one of any possible paths the harmful object can take. And being on a bridge wouldn’t be in the zone of harm because a train can’t climb up onto the bridge?

VC

 

[Pug]

Better yet, what if it is 1 person and 1 fatman? That seems proportional in a strict sense. Assuming you have no greater duty to either, could you flip the switch? Could you throw the fat man off the bridge?

If not why not?

If yes – do you think society would hold someone responsible for that? Would you hold someone responsible for that if you were friends with the person who ended up getting hit? I ask, because, personally if it was one person to one person in the first scenario I wouldn’t blame the operator who flipped the switch away from a stranger and hit a friend. But in the second scenario I would blame the operator who decided to flip the switch to “stop the train” by hitting my friend.

Pug, I don’t know where you stand regarding scenario 2 and 3, but what do you think of the above (even if you think scenario 2 and 3 aren’t permissible)?

VC

If I were the fat man, and there were only one person on the other track, and someone switched the train onto me in #1, I might feel it to be unfair, as I contemplate the front of the train growing closer. Hopefully I’d spend the time more profitably, though. If it were the parent of the child at the other end who threw the switch, though, I would not feel unfairly treated.

How that would spill over into 2 and 3? Well, those wouldn’t suddenly make what I sense as unfair to seem fair.

About the question of holding a person responsible in the one to one situation, there are two ways to answer, and you mentioned both, society or me. Society (a jury) could do anything, really, in my view. Me? I’m inclined to find the person in #3 threatening. I might vote to convict them of something, on a jury.

If the person who ended up dying was Jewish, and the switch thrower looked like an Arab (or whatever suitable designation that people are likely to suspect of a hate crime against a Jewish person), I think a jury could go anywhere with that, in scenario one, two, or three.

 

[Thing]

Thing,

I’m not sure about that. First of all, I don’t know why you call it an “experiment”. You don’t necessarily need a “mad philosopher” setting it up, I think it is in the realm of possibility that something like this, or similar *could *occur (although pretty unlikely).

I’m not sure also why you think in scenario #2 the trainman is forced to make an immoral choice? If flipping the switch to hit the fatman is immoral, do you think that also makes not flipping the switch immoral? It doesn’t seem to me to be the case. You certainly have a duty to avoid causing what harm you can, but in this case if you accept flipping the switch is immoral then you can’t permissibly do it. Our obligation to prevent harm is trumped by our obligation not to sin.

Not sure what you mean here. In this scenario, at least, you don’t have to flip a switch to avoid one person. That person is safe until you flip the switch towards him.

VC

Is’nt this scenario thought up as a way to test how you can push an immoral choice on the trainman, or not. What ‘moral’ pressure you can apply to him to cause him to chose the immoral choice. Is the thought scenario itself moral, immoral, or morally indifferent, and does that preset fact unjustly colour the scenario to produce a result.

I see it as an electronic circuit, a line in to a switch which cannot be switched to line B no matter what load you put on line A. The switch to line B cannot close, or in other words line B is preset to ‘an immoral choice’, or ‘that which ends the thought experiment’.

In the first experiment, no.1 scenario, it was not clear which line choice would be possibly amoral or morally indifferent, but the two choices were alway equally open. In scenario no.2 the thought experiment presets one choice to ‘an immoral choice’, so in effect no choice needs be made, or rather the train operator is not allowed a choice. And I wonder if that in any way makes the choice of either line ‘morally indifferent’ in the confines of this particular scenario. As you see I do my best to get out of the choice, first.

If in scenario no.2 the line A leads to a thermonuclear big bang which vapourizes 5 States and line B unfortunately hits our fatman. Are there two levels of morality here, the morality of intention and the moral or immoral act.

 

[Betterave]

Betterave,

First a question: Why do you think it is important whether or not the fatman is in harm’s way or not in the first scenario?

Because it is not morally licit to involve an innocent bystander against his will; whereas the fatman is already involved, against his will, since he is tied to the train track.

Second questions for clarification: Regarding being in harm’s way I don’t think you are thinking about the mad philosopher having put both parties on the track – because we can conceive of the same situations without a mad philosopher involved.

[Agreed.]

I assume you mean that the fact the fatman is on a track (by any eventuality) means he is in harm’s way in a distinctly different manner than a fatman on a bridge overlooking a track?

---

I’m not sure. I can imagine a scenario similar to number one where it looks more clear. Imagine if you were driving a runaway car down a hill, on a narrow one way street. At the bottom of the hill a group of people (tourists, let’s say standing around a fountain. The street encircles the fountain, but you will be going so fast you’ll plow straight into them.) There is a pedestrian walking on the sidewalk on the hill.

If you swipe your car into the buildings on the side you can create enough friction to slow you down to divert your path from the tourists. But if you do, you’ll surely hit the pedestrian who won’t have time to get out of the way.

It doesn’t seem to me that the pedestrian is in harm’s way, exactly.

But maybe you mean by being in harm’s way you are in some sort of zone of harm™, i.e. in one of any possible paths the harmful object can take. And being on a bridge wouldn’t be in the zone of harm because a train can’t climb up onto the bridge?

Yes, something like that. And the important thing is that the circumstances have dictated the possible paths, so the fact that these two paths are possible is extrinsic to the intention of the agent, so the agent should be free to choose that path which is proportionately less evil, given these circumstances (which he has not chosen, but which have been thrust upon him).

 

[Verbum_Caro]

Yes, something like that. And the important thing is that the circumstances have dictated the possible paths, so the fact that these two paths are possible is extrinsic to the intention of the agent, so the agent should be free to choose that path which is proportionately less evil, given these circumstances (which he has not chosen, but which have been thrust upon him).

Which brings me to the following observation. We can distinguish between scenario 3 and scenaros 1 and 2, because in scenario 3 the fatman isn’t on one of the paths, he isn’t in jeopardy. But, can we also distinguish between scenario 1 and scenario 2?

I liked my car and tourists examples. I gave a scenario that I thought analogous to scenario 1. But, note, it was the friction between the car and buildings that stopped the car, and the man was in the way, because he was in the zone of harm. I would postulate that in order to make it analogous to scenario 2, the car wouldn’t be stoppable by sideswiping the buildings, but only by running down the pedestrian. So, the question is could you run over a pedestrian to save some tourists? I would hazard that the traditional applications of double effect would say no.

VC

 

[o_mlly]

Yes, I would assume the child wished to remain alive, if possible. I would not assume the child wished to remain alive at all costs.

Then one may assume the same about the fat man or the shoved soldier, no?

 

[Pug]

Then one may assume the same about the fat man or the shoved soldier, no?

One must assume concerning some people, like the very wee.

Yes, if one is required to assume, and can’t ask. To me, the phrase “at all costs” tends to imply “by any means” btw.

I’m not sure when one is “required” to assume something, though. For example, the fat man on the bridge can see exactly what you see, and he isn’t jumping.

 

[o_mlly]

One must assume concerning some people, like the very wee.

Yes, if one is required to assume, and can’t ask. To me, the phrase “at all costs” tends to imply “by any means” btw.

I’m not sure when one is “required” to assume something, though. For example, the fat man on the bridge can see exactly what you see, and he isn’t jumping.

If we must assume as we do for the unborn baby, the fat man tied to the track, the startled soldier momentarily frozen with fear, ought we not assume a righteous will – an other-oriented will? Or a self-centered will?

 

[Verbum_Caro]

If we must assume as we do for the unborn baby, the fat man tied to the track, the startled soldier momentarily frozen with fear, ought we not assume a righteous will – an other-oriented will? Or a self-centered will?

Or for that matter, ought we assume that the 5 on the track would choose to live rather than have one die? Should we assume that the rest of the platoon will like to go on living knowing one of their mates was pushed onto a grenade to save them?

VC

 

[o_mlly]

Or for that matter, ought we assume that the 5 on the track would choose to live rather than have one die? Should we assume that the rest of the platoon will like to go on living knowing one of their mates was pushed onto a grenade to save them?

VC

Pug originally stated, “Shoving a person in accordance with their reasonable will is okay …”
As Pug refers to a “reasonable” rather than “actual” will, my questions are aimed at deternining what a “reasonable will” ought to be.

What do you think the reasonable will of the five on the track and the survivors of the platoon ought to be?

 

[Doc_Keele]

“reasonable” implies an objective rather than subjective test - the reasonable will of the reasonable man AKA man in the street

 

[Verbum_Caro]

What do you think the reasonable will of the five on the track and the survivors of the platoon ought to be?

Well, if I were to attribute to the platoon a righteous and other-centered will (as you would have us do) then I say that no platoon member ought to wish another platoon member to push another platoon member onto a grenade.

I wouldn’t will it. I doubt many soldiers would.

Furthermore, if this were seen as an acceptable act, each soldier would fear the other would push him in the line of fire to save himself or at least to himself and one other. Furthermore, any platoon in which this happened would a) ostracize the pusher (regardless of any his objections that “we were all going to die if I didn’t do it!”) and b) likely suffer survivor’s guilt for having survived at the expense of an another. The idea of condoning this sort of thing would seem to me to completely undermine trust in the team.

VC