Double Effect: Trolley problem and loop varient

[o_mlly]

o mlly,

I think you’ll forgive BetterAve for taking you to task over your phrasing because I don’t think you were as clear the first time around that you were talking about morally indifferent objects of an act, i.e. acts which therefore have to take their moral quality from the intention.

Could we backtrack for a moment? When I was speaking of intermediate ends what I was trying to get at (perhaps in clumsy manner) was that one chooses that which has a character of a means.

Could you explain what “character of means” means?

If we look at the two trolley problems side by side there is a difference in them, right? In the first the driver switches the track from a track with 5 persons to 1 person. The fact that there is 1 person on that second track is incidental to the fact that there are not 5 people under the trolley.

But, in the second problem, the driver switches his route to hit the fat man first before hitting the 5 persons. The fact that he hits the fat man first isn’t incidental to the fact that there are not 5 people under the trolley – its cause and effect.

In the first, the fat man getting hit is foreseen and permitted, but it isn’t willed (you’d be happy if he jumped off the track at the last moment). But in the second, the fat man getting hit is foreseen and willed (your objective would be frustrated were he to jump off the track at the last moment).

Any thoughts on the differences between the two?

VC

Since DE is an analytical tool, perhaps it would clarify the points you make if you compare the different scenarios using the 4 principles:

1. The act must be good or indifferent.
   Scenario 1 What is the Act? Flip a switch. Is it morally good, indifferent or evil? Indifferent.
   Scenario 2 What is the Act? Flip a switch. Is it morally good, indifferent or evil? Indifferent.
2. The good effect must be intended.
   Scenario 1 What is the Intention? Save 5 lives.
   Scenario 2 What is the Intention? Save 5 lives.
3. The good effect may not proceed from the bad effect.
   Scenario 1 Do the five lives saved proceed from the death of the one? No. Their lives are saved because the trolley does not run over them.
   Scenario 2 Do the five lives saved proceed from the death of the one? No. Their lives are saved because the trolley does not run over them.

4 The good effect(s) must equal or exceed the bad effect(s).
Scenario 1? Yes.
Scenario 2? Yes.

In both scenarios, the bad effect, most probaly hitting and probably killing the fat man, is foreseen but not willed; only accepted.

It is the 3rd principle that muddies the clarity of the morality of flipping the switch. I hope if put in the trolley operator’s position, that I have the grace to do God’s will.

 

[Betterave]

Which is completely missing the point…

Maybe, maybe not. Care to explain?

 

[Doc_Keele]

Would you agree on the complete statement: The end can justify the means, but it cannot justify any means; it cannot justify evil means?

Well that’s contradictory, isn’t it?

 

[Verbum_Caro]

Could you explain what “character of means” means?

In this case, a but for cause.

1. The good effect may not proceed from the bad effect.
   Scenario 1 Do the five lives saved proceed from the death of the one? No. Their lives are saved because the trolley does not run over them.
   Scenario 2 Do the five lives saved proceed from the death of the one? No. Their lives are saved because the trolley does not run over them (because it hits the fat man - VC)

The fat man dying or not isn’t the issue. The issue is hitting a man with a trolley.

In Scenario 2 you choose to hit a man with a trolley in order to save the lives of the 5 people. But for hitting him you can’t save the lives of the 5. So you will hitting him. It isn’t a permitted side effect of turning the switch. It is willfully chosen – you *desire to hit the man.

***In the first scenario, the driver doesn’t will to hit anyone, right? But in the second he wills to hit the fat man, right? (not want to hit him, but wills to hit him as a necessary means to an end).

VC

 

[Doc_Keele]

Maybe, maybe not. Care to explain?

There’s no “maybe” about it. Trying to resolve the moral dilemma by some “fix” is to defeat the point of the thought experiment.

 

[o_mlly]

Well that’s contradictory, isn’t it?

I think not. “Means” do not have a universal moral status. Therefore, they can be differentiated as “good”, “evil”, and “indifferent.”

 

[Betterave]

I think your revisions muddle the points.

Intention is not a property but rather an attitude of the actor’s will informed by his intellect and therefore, it seems to me, the verb “knows” applies rather than “belongs.” *[So what? It is an attitude that belongs to the subject!]

The other modifications obscure the point rather than illuminate it. But, if it works for you, OK.

The problem with what you wrote is that it implies that intentions are entirely a beetle-in-a-box type phenomenon. Your position implied that we can never know what someone else’s intentions are and that is not just muddled, it’s false. It also suggests that intentions are always known to the actor, that is, they are a perfectly ‘transparent’ phenomenon. This too is false. Thus:

“Intention is always subjective, that is, it is always the intention of the acting subject who knows it first-hand; his Maker alone knows it perfectly; and third parties know it more or less, depending on the particular epistemic constraints of the given situation. No one can infallibly infer an intention to the actor solely by observation of the act and its effects”

Quote:
“That the good effect may never proceed from the evil [effect]” principle does not -]suggest/-] address anything regarding the actor’s intention. It merely proscribes the use ?]

of evil as a means to achieve good ends.

In this revision, I am not OK. Your revision changes the particular principle of the DE in question. In fact the revision creates a principle that is not a principle of the DE.

These are good points, they made me think. But, first, do you think that your use of ‘use’ can plausibly be construed as a non-intentional, or intention-neutral, term in this context? In other words, I think you led me into the muddling of principles, if there was one - isn’t that what you’ve done yourself? Can I properly be said to “use something as a means,” in a morally relevant sense, without intending to use it as a means? There is no sense in proscribing something that is never intended in the first place, right?

Second, what I suggested is a principle of DE, is it not?:

1. The evil effect must not be intended for itself but only permitted; all bad will must be excluded from the act.

Quote:
Originally Posted by Betterave
It is -]not/-] true to say that the “ends never justify the means” -](usually they do)/-]; it is -]true/-] therefore trivial to say that “evil means may never justify any end.”

Again, I disagree. Most human acts are morally indifferent and are justified or not based on their intended effects – the ends do justify the means.

Well you’re partly right here. But the phrase “ends don’t justify means” is a statement about moral justification. It simply doesn’t apply to morally indifferent situations. To say, for example, that the end of finding out the score of the hockey game ‘justifies’ my turning on the TV is really a strange and unnecessary use of the notion of ‘justification.’ ‘Explains’ is the more appropriate word to use here.

And, the ends are never justified by evil means. To state that this principle is trivial suggests that all reasonable men would agree. If you’ve been following the posts, you’ll find many who do not agree. Trivial? I don’t think so.

I’m sorry, but if you can show me a reasonable man who thinks that ends are justified by any kind of means, never mind evil ones, I’ll be surprised.

 

[Betterave]

There’s no “maybe” about it. Trying to resolve the moral dilemma by some “fix” is to defeat the point of the thought experiment.

Actually that’s the point, Doc - to see if we can find a fix! I’m curious: have you ever studied philosophy? I have, quite a bit actually.

 

[Betterave]

In the first, the fat man getting hit is foreseen and permitted, but it isn’t willed (you’d be happy if he jumped off the track at the last moment). But in the second, the fat man getting hit is foreseen and -]willed/-] accepted (your objective (to save the five) would be frustrated were he to jump off the track at the last moment (although you would have no objection to him doing so if he were able)).

Any thoughts on the differences between the two?

VC

You raise good points too. I’ve suggested some emendations. What do you think?

 

[o_mlly]

… In Scenario 2 you choose to hit a man with a trolley in order to save the lives of the 5 people. But for hitting him you can’t save the lives of the 5. So you will hitting him. It isn’t a permitted side effect of turning the switch. It is willfully chosen – you *desire to hit the man.

***In the first scenario, the driver doesn’t will to hit anyone, right? But in the second he wills to hit the fat man, right? (not want to hit him, but wills to hit him as a necessary means to an end).

VC

The “loop” is a red herring. The operator’s doesn’t intend to hit anyone in either scenario. His constant intention is to save five.

The “loop” attempts to test the 3rd principle of the DE by suggesting that the operator intentionally sacrifices one life to save five. Such an intention is immoral. But that intention is not specified in the OP.

The five are saved (good effect) because the the fat man’s body stops the trolley; his survival or death (bad effect) is incident not insturmental. If you argue otherwise, then you also must change the live grenade-covering soldier’s character from heroic to suicidal.

 

[o_mlly]

The problem with what you wrote …

Thanks for your comments and insights but I think we are on different tracks (pardon the pun) and talking past each other so let’s end the exchange.

 

[Thing]

There’s no “maybe” about it. Trying to resolve the moral dilemma by some “fix” is to defeat the point of the thought experiment.

Hey! …It worked for Captain Kirk; he knew he’d never have passed his spaceship flying test because the test was designed to make him fail. He did the only thing a conscientious leader could do - break into the flight HQ and re-write the test program making it possible to pass.
Way to go, Jim!

 

[Doc_Keele]

Actually that’s the point, Doc - to see if we can find a fix! I’m curious: have you ever studied philosophy? I have, quite a bit actually.

You have? It doesn’t show.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

if you can show me a reasonable man who thinks that ends are justified by any kind of means

Betterave,

I think what o_mlly means here is that an indifferent act (means) can be made good (or bad) because of the end in view.

I take it as St. Thomas lays it out (I-II, 18, 9):

It sometimes happens that an action is indifferent in its species, but considered in the individual it is good or evil (. . .) every individual action must needs have some circumstance that makes it good or bad, at least in respect of the intention of the end. For since it belongs to the reason to direct;** if an action that proceeds from deliberate reason be not directed to the due end, it is,* by that fact alone,*** repugnant to reason, and has the character of evil. But if it be directed to a due end, it is in accord with reason; wherefore it has the character of good. Now it must needs be either directed or not directed to a due end. Consequently every human action that proceeds from deliberate reason, if it be considered in the individual, must be good or bad.

VC

 

[Betterave]

You have? It doesn’t show.

…not to a blind man.

 

[tjm190]

As to the second “loop” (switch track) variant, is there any actual assurance that the (fat) person will stop the trolley? Perhaps it is a rather light trolley, in which case the trolley hits the (fat) person, derails and kills the passengers on board; an unexpected outcome. Are the other five skinny and therefore inherently worth saving due to a bias favoring skinny people?

It’s an empty trolley, and the fat person has a bomb strapped to his chest that will explode when struck, destroying the trolley and harming nobody else.

 

[Betterave]

Betterave,

I think what o_mlly means here is that an indifferent act (means) can be made good (or bad) because of the end in view.

So the justification of a ‘means’ (an act) depends on how it is related to an end. That’s fine, but it’s not at all what o_mlly said.

I take it as St. Thomas lays it out (I-II, 18, 9):
It sometimes happens that an action is indifferent in its species, but considered in the individual it is good or evil (. . .) every individual action must needs have some circumstance that makes it good or bad, at least in respect of the intention of the end. For since it belongs to the reason to direct; if an action that proceeds from deliberate reason be not directed to the due end, it is, by that fact alone, repugnant to reason, and has the character of evil. But if it be directed to a due end, it is in accord with reason; wherefore it has the character of good. Now it must needs be either directed or not directed to a due end. Consequently every human action that proceeds from deliberate reason, if it be considered in the individual, must be good or bad.

Again, there’s nothing here about ends being justified by means, is there?

 

[Verbum_Caro]

So the justification of a ‘means’ (an act) depends on how it is related to an end. That’s fine, but it’s not at all what o_mlly said.

No? I thought that is what he meant when he said that a human act that is morally indifferent is justified based on their intended effects.

Perhaps I’m not seeing it?

VC

 

[Doc_Keele]

…not to a blind man.

Smart comments aside, the fact is that you can’t tackle a thought experiment without resorting to a fix. Not what I’d expect from a philosopher:shrug:
It’s like a first year medical student postulating dialysis in the unconscious violinist thought experiment - completely missing the point of the exercise.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

The “loop” is a red herring. The operator’s doesn’t intend to hit anyone in either scenario. His constant intention is to save five.

I don’t think that’s accurate. He intends to flip a switch in both scenarios. He intends to save 5 in both scenarios. But he only intends to hit a fat man in the second scenario.

The “loop” attempts to test the 3rd principle of the DE by suggesting that the operator intentionally sacrifices one life to save five. Such an intention is immoral. But that intention is not specified in the OP.

Leave aside the living or dying. Let’s just work with aiming to smash a man with a trolley.

The five are saved (good effect) because the the fat man’s body stops the trolley; his survival or death (bad effect) is incident not insturmental.

Yes, yes. Again, his survival or death may or may not happen. But getting hit by the trolley is instrumental in the second scenario and not in the first.

When you will something you will all the (chosen) means, don’t you? You might not necessarily will all the consequences. Can you address the difference in the two scenarios? In the second scenario hitting the fat man isn’t merely a consequence of flipping a switch as it is in the first scenario. It is** one of your goals** to hit the fat man in the second scenario, isn’t it?

If you argue otherwise, then you also must change the live grenade-covering soldier’s character from heroic to suicidal.

Not at all. I would argue similarly about a soldier who throws a fat-man on a grenade!

VC