Double Effect: Trolley problem and loop varient

[Doc_Keele]

This is all very pertinent to the treatment of ectopic pregnancy as well, which again revolves around the issues of foresight and intention.

It certainly is the case that that something can be foreseen as an almost certain consequence of an action, but not be intended. One argument by analogy is a stutterer getting up to defend his father from a false allegation. He will almost certainly stutter, but he doesn’t intend to stutter. What about a policeman who shoots a criminal who is holding a “human shield” in front of him? Does he intend to shoot the hostage? Is it any different for a police officer behind the criminal whose bullet will pass through the criminal and injure the hostage just like the first cop?

 

[Verbum_Caro]

What about a policeman who shoots a criminal who is holding a “human shield” in front of him? Does he intend to shoot the hostage? Is it any different for a police officer behind the criminal whose bullet will pass through the criminal and injure the hostage just like the first cop?

Doc,

If you want to draw a similarity in the above two scenarios to the trolley problem, both of the above police scenarios are similar to the first trolley problem. Neither is similar to the second trolley problem.

This is because in both police scenarios the cops would be relieved if their bullet didn’t go through the hostage. But in the second trolley problem the switch thrower would be disappointed if the fat man rolled off the track. Would you agree?

VC

 

[Doc_Keele]

Doc,

If you want to draw a similarity in the above two scenarios to the trolley problem, both of the above police scenarios are similar to the first trolley problem. Neither is similar to the second trolley problem.

This is because in both police scenarios the cops would be relieved if their bullet didn’t go through the hostage. But in the second trolley problem the switch thrower would be disappointed if the fat man rolled off the track. Would you agree?

VC

I was just commenting on the foresight/intention issue, the thought experiments weren’t intended to correlate exactly with the one being discussed.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

I was just commenting on the foresight/intention issue, the thought experiments weren’t intended to correlate exactly with the one being discussed.

Gotcha. Thanks.

 

[Betterave]

Smart comments aside, the fact is that you can’t tackle a thought experiment without resorting to a fix. Not what I’d expect from a philosopher:shrug:
It’s like a first year medical student postulating dialysis in the unconscious violinist thought experiment - completely missing the point of the exercise.

Doc Keele

Reading comprehension: F

 

[Doc_Keele]

Doc Keele

Reading comprehension: F

Yes, smart comments show that you’re no philosopher:thumbsup:
I won’t be equally childish, I’ve grown up

Don’t hold your breath waiting for a response to any future “digs”

 

[Betterave]

No? I thought that is what he meant when he said that a human act that is morally indifferent is justified based on their intended effects.

Perhaps I’m not seeing it?

VC

He did say:" Most human acts are morally indifferent and are justified or not based on their intended effects – the ends do justify the means."

…but then he added:
“And, the ends are never justified by evil means. To state that this principle is trivial suggests that all reasonable men would agree. If you’ve been following the posts, you’ll find many who do not agree. Trivial? I don’t think so.” This latter claim is the problematic one which I referred to (“if you can show me a reasonable man who thinks that ends are justified by any kind of means”) and you commented on.

 

[Betterave]

Yes, smart comments show that you’re no philosopher:thumbsup:

Non sequitur.

I won’t be equally childish, I’ve grown up

In body maybe; now just work on your mind.

 

[o_mlly]

I don’t think that’s accurate. He intends to flip a switch in both scenarios. He intends to save 5 in both scenarios. But he only intends to hit a fat man in the second scenario. …
VC

Here’s where we disagree. The man gets hit in both scenarios. I take the OP to indicate the operator’s intention is always and only to save the five. He doesn’t intend the evil effect to the fat man in either scenario. You disagree.

I can only hope you aren’t the operator of an out of control trolley while I and four others are trapped onboard.

 

[Doc_Keele]

juvenile, Betterave

feel free to waste your own time with smart comments and a false sense of superiority

 

[Betterave]

VC and o’mlly,
I think you both have good arguments. But the thought experiment is an intuition pump. It’s only purpose is to help us to think through our intuitions, to dredge up our ‘deepest’ and ‘best-considered’ intuitions. So here’s a twist we could throw in that might help (or it might not - you tell me): Suppose the trolley had been headed for the fat man, the driver noticed him and flipped the switch, then he noticed that he was now headed for the 5 who could be saved if he switched back to the fat man - so we’re back to the original scenario. Does this make a difference? What if he switched it back unthinkingly as soon as he saw the 5, then remembered the fat man? Now what? Does this make a difference?

 

[Betterave]

Smart comments aside, the fact is that you can’t tackle a thought experiment without resorting to a fix. Not what I’d expect from a philosopher:shrug:
It’s like a first year medical student postulating dialysis in the unconscious violinist thought experiment - completely missing the point of the exercise.

In philosophy it doesn’t matter who does the postulating: first year med student or JJT herself, it really doesn’t matter. What matters is what they postulate and how they defend it.
That aside, it’s not at all like postulating what you suggest here. It’s like postulating that we unplug the violinist then consider whether we have a duty to plug him back in. (My comments to you about your reading comprehension may be ‘smart’, but they are not stupid - indeed they’re quite relevant!)

 

[Doc_Keele]

If any of these comments are to me, they are a waste of time Betterave
I’m not reading them.

 

[kage_ar]

How many times have we had this SAME question posed on this board?

It would be great if the athiests would at least get a new bit of material now and then.

 

[Doc_Keele]

Some of the Catholic posters here make a virtue of repeating the same point ad nauseum. If something represents a valid problem with a particular approach, why wouldn’t people come back to it time after time?

 

[Verbum_Caro]

Here’s where we disagree. The man gets hit in both scenarios. I take the OP to indicate the operator’s intention is always and only to save the five. He doesn’t intend the evil effect to the fat man in either scenario. You disagree.

Yes we disagree. But, I have a difficult time understanding your position. Perhaps you can help me see it? In the **second scenario:**First – do you agree that at least one evil visited upon the fat man is getting hit by the trolley?

Second – do you agree that getting hit by the trolley is absolutely essential to stopping the trolley?

Third – do you agree that stopping the trolley is absolutely essential to saving five people?

I can only hope you aren’t the operator of an out of control trolley while I and four others are trapped onboard.

You mean you and four others trapped on one track right? But perhaps you would hope I was in charge of the trolley if that fat man was you (or someone you cared about!) Or would you not mind if I used you (or your relations) to stop a trolley? :choocho:

VC

P.S. Could you explain why you could think that “the operator’s intention is always and only to save the five.”?

He has several intentions in both scenarios – but I’ll list the ones that we care about. In the first he intends to flip the switch, and he intends the trolley to switch tracks, and he intends to save the 5 people through the agency of the prior two events.

In the second he intends to flip the switch, and he intends the trolley to switch routes, and he intends the trolley to hit a fat man, and he intends to save 5 people through the agency of the prior three events.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

He did say:" Most human acts are morally indifferent and are justified or not based on their intended effects – the ends do justify the means."

…but then he added:
“And, the ends are never justified by evil means. To state that this principle is trivial suggests that all reasonable men would agree. If you’ve been following the posts, you’ll find many who do not agree. Trivial? I don’t think so.” This latter claim is the problematic one which I referred to (“if you can show me a reasonable man who thinks that ends are justified by any kind of means”) and you commented on.

Betterave,

I don’t think I follow. Do you mean by latter claim “the ends are never justified by evil means”? Or do you mean by latter claim “‘the ends are never justified by evil means’ is not trivial”?

VC

 

[o_mlly]

Yes we disagree. But, I have a difficult time understanding your position. Perhaps you can help me see it? In the **second scenario:**First – do you agree that at least one evil visited upon the fat man is getting hit by the trolley?

Second – do you agree that getting hit by the trolley is absolutely essential to stopping the trolley?

Third – do you agree that stopping the trolley is absolutely essential to saving five people?

You mean you and four others trapped on one track right? But perhaps you would hope I was in charge of the trolley if that fat man was you (or someone you cared about!) Or would you not mind if I used you (or your relations) to stop a trolley? :choocho:

VC

P.S. Could you explain why you could think that “the operator’s intention is always and only to save the five.”?

He has several intentions in both scenarios – but I’ll list the ones that we care about. In the first he intends to flip the switch, and he intends the trolley to switch tracks, and he intends to save the 5 people through the agency of the prior two events.

In the second he intends to flip the switch, and he intends the trolley to switch routes, and he intends the trolley to hit a fat man, and he intends to save 5 people through the agency of the prior three events.

Since it is a hypothetical and intention is always subjective, I believe we must accept the OP’s implication that the operator’s intention is to do good. The dillema then is for the reader to decide what action or non-action on his part is morally right.

However, since evil occurs in both scenarios whether the operator acts or not, the operator’s moral obligation is to act (or not) in order that the evil is minimized. Since the operator’s intention is always to minimize the evil, then in either scenario harming the one is a lesser evil than harming the five. The DE is not applicable since there is no “good effect” and the “loop,” as I still contend, is a red herring.

And, no, (if I was fat and tied to the track) I would not want my life to continue at the expense of the life of five others. You not only have my permission to flip the switch, if you hesitated, I would be yelling at you to flip it.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

Since it is a hypothetical and intention is always subjective, I believe we must accept the OP’s implication that the operator’s intention is to do good. The dillema then is for the reader to decide what action or non-action on his part is morally right.

o mlly,

Intention might be subjective in the sense of further intention – i.e. what does the driver hope to ultimately accomplish. We don’t know of course, save for the OP’s hypothetical giving us that privileged information, which we take as true, that the driver ultimately wants to save 5 lives in both scenarios.

So far so good.

But intention in the sense of a proximate intention is not unassailably subjective. Because of our cause and effect world in which we live, when we see someone do something to bring about their ultimate intent, we can know that they intend to do that action as a means.

Put simply: there is no way that the driver in the second scenario cannot intend to hit the fat man with trolley if he hit the switch because one reason for hitting the switch is to hit the fat man. If one chooses something as a means, one intends it. One wills it to happen, for the very reason that it will further one’s progress to the ultimate goal.

I don’t quite understand your position. It seems like you are dodging this issue?

However, since evil occurs in both scenarios whether the operator acts or not, the operator’s moral obligation is to act (or not) in order that the evil is minimized.

When you say “both scenarios” do you mean both trolley scenarios or both options in each scenario? There is rather large distinction between the evils in the two scenarios with their two options.

Evil will occur in both options in the first scenario – but only physical evil (granting the OP’s characterization of a benevolent driver). People are going to get hit by a trolley.

But in the second scenario in the first option (to stay on the route) physical evil occurs and in the second option (to alter the route to hit the fat man to stop the trolley) both physical evil and moral evil will occur.

Since the operator’s intention is always to minimize the evil, then in either scenario harming the one is a lesser evil than harming the five.

Only if you don’t factor in moral evil. To minimize the evil in the second scenario the trolley driver only choice is to accept the physical evil of hitting 5 people (for which he is not responsible). If he chooses to hit the fat man then he chooses both the physical evil of hitting the fat man **and **the moral evil of choosing to hit a man with a trolley.

And, as the Catechism states, moral evil is “incommensurably more harmful than physical evil”. (CCC 311)

And, no, (if I was fat and tied to the track) I would not want my life to continue at the expense of the life of five others. You not only have my permission to flip the switch, if you hesitated, I would be yelling at you to flip it.

That’s your choice of course. But it can’t be my choice for you. Would you want me to choose for you? Could I choose to hit your child or parent in order to stop the trolley from hitting others?

VC

 

[o_mlly]

o mlly,

… But intention in the sense of a proximate intention is not unassailably subjective. Because of our cause and effect world in which we live, when we see someone do something to bring about their ultimate intent, we can know that they intend to do that action as a means.

I disagree. Parse your logic above and I think you’ll see it begs the question.

Put simply: there is no way that the driver in the second scenario cannot intend to hit the fat man with trolley if he hit the switch because one reason for hitting the switch is to hit the fat man. If one chooses something as a means, one intends it. One wills it to happen, for the very reason that it will further one’s progress to the ultimate goal.

Another reason for hitting the switch is to avoid hitting five.

To **foresee and accept **an event is not necessarily to intend the event. We’re in the season fof Lent; I’m presently reflecting on the Passion so I turn my reflection toward this issue.

Did Christ intend his own death by crucifixion? He certainly foresaw it. (Matthew 16:21-23). Or did He intend to obey His Father and accept His death as arguably the greatest moral evil in history? He could have taken Peter’s advice and not gone to the Temple. Rather he strongly rebuked Peter. Did Peter **observing and listening to Christ “know” His intention **at that time? No, absolutely not!

When Christ “flipped” the tables at the Temple, did he foresee His execution as a consequence? I think so. Was “flipping” the tables a moral evil? Certainly not. Was “flipping” the tables in a moral good? Certainly, yes.

No one can know the intention of another because to do so would require access to that person’s conscience – “… man’s most secret core and his sanctuary. There he is alone with God whose voice echoes in his depths” CCC# 1776. Intention, formed in the conscience, is always and everywhere subjective.

I don’t quite understand your position. It seems like you are dodging this issue?

And it seem to me that you are missing the issue.

When you say “both scenarios” do you mean both trolley scenarios or both options in each scenario? There is rather large distinction between the evils in the two scenarios with their two options.

All of the above.

Evil will occur in both options in the first scenario – but only physical evil (granting the OP’s characterization of a benevolent driver). People are going to get hit by a trolley.

No. If the operator does not act to minimize the physical evil, he adds a moral evil to the mix.

But in the second scenario in the first option (to stay on the route) physical evil occurs and in the second option (to alter the route to hit the fat man to stop the trolley) both physical evil and moral evil will occur.

I think exactly the opposite. You seem to suggest that if the operator just let’s things happen that he avoids a moral evil. A moral evil may occur in either commission or ommission.

Only if you don’t factor in moral evil. To minimize the evil in the second scenario the trolley driver only choice is to accept the physical evil of hitting 5 people (for which he is not responsible). If he chooses to hit the fat man then he chooses both the physical evil of hitting the fat man **and **the moral evil of choosing to hit a man with a trolley.

Once again, you are begging the question.

That’s your choice of course. But it can’t be my choice for you. Would you want me to choose for you? Could I choose to hit your child or parent in order to stop the trolley from hitting others?
VC

My choice is to encourage you to do good, to minimize the physical evil. Your choice is to listen and act or not. It makes no difference who is the loner on the track. Why do you try to emotionalize what is a rational moraltiy problem?