Double Effect: Trolley problem and loop varient

[Thing]

Since philosophers like letters;

A = squash humans

B = squash humans

C = flip switch

D = variable unknown vague human mentality of Trollyman

X = Mad Philosopher

C + A = C + B…<…X
D…D…

 

[Thing]

Thing, I think you are supposed to be the trolley man, aren’t you?

VC

Yes, you’re right. Its a mystery. The human heart, who can understand it?..

 

[Doc_Keele]

Which reminds me, I have not seen your solution yet.

Yes it is vague because it is a human scenario which the viewer seems to judge subjectively. But. Is trollyman behaving morally now? Well, I don’t know what the trolly man is thinking, actually.
Prescriptive? It only give two choices which turn out to be the same choice. So I cannot say that any such choice is moral or immoral.

One guy versus 5, I’d have to go with the one. The two choices aren’t the same at all.

 

[Thing]

One guy versus 5, I’d have to go with the one. The two choices aren’t the same at all.

Oh well if it was just a case of numbers, 3 apples vs. 1 apple, I’d probably agree with you, though I still think I’d flip the switch repeatedly at the junction.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

Yes, you’re right. Its a mystery. The human heart, who can understand it?..

What I mean to say is that you can at least decide which motives you know you have, right? I assume you don’t want to kill anyone? There is no one in the group that stepped on your toe earlier and the fat man doesn’t have you as a beneficiary of his will, right?

So – you don’t long to kill anyone. Can you choose to divert the trolley in the first scenario away from the 5, permitting as an unintended side-effect that a man on the other track will get hit?

VC

 

[Thing]

What I mean to say is that you can at least decide which motives you know you have, right? I assume you don’t want to kill anyone? There is no one in the group that stepped on your toe earlier and the fat man doesn’t have you as a beneficiary of his will, right?

So – you don’t long to kill anyone. Can you choose to divert the trolley in the first scenario away from the 5, permitting as an unintended side-effect that a man on the other track will get hit?

VC

Ok. so I’m the Trolleyman. Down I go. Shock horror. Where are my brakes. My emergency brakes. Choose. Fat man or The Five. I think if this went on for a long time I would grow kinda cynical and evil. I would become desensitized, but thats just because I’m human and I must adapt to situations. Otherwise, all being well, I would realize that its out of my hands, I could make either choice without blame depending on what information was being fed through my eyes from moment to moment about the people on the tracks. Its an evolving situation, the five or at least half of them are waving me on towards them and I realize the Fatman is actually a pregnant woman…
Its tough to say. But I’ll leave it at saying that I don’t think, in that scenario, that it is immoral to chose the fat man as the question of immorality of action does not apply to the Trolleyman who has no say in avoiding someones death on the artificial rails.

 

[Betterave]

Betterave,

I don’t think I follow. Do you mean by latter claim “the ends are never justified by evil means”? Or do you mean by latter claim “‘the ends are never justified by evil means’ is not trivial”?

VC

I meant the part I bolded: “the ends are never justified by evil means.” That’s trivial, since ends aren’t justified by means of any kind.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

Ok. so I’m the Trolleyman (. . .) I would realize that its out of my hands, I could make either choice without blame (. . .)
Its tough to say. But I’ll leave it at saying that I don’t think, in that scenario, that it is immoral to chose the fat man as the question of immorality of action does not apply to the Trolleyman who has no say in avoiding someones death on the artificial rails.

Thing,

I think that makes sense pretty much. The operative point, in regard to PDE, is what you are intending to do. Although you said that you are choosing the fat man, you don’t mean (really) that you intend to hit him. You are intending to divert the trolley away from the 5 people, and you accept that it is going to hit the fat man. But, if the fat man got off that track. . . GREAT. You would be happy with that outcome. And you would still choose that track.

As far as making either choice without blame, perhaps you are right if you mean no one would hold you accountable for such a stressful spur of the moment decision no matter what you chose. But, if we abstract from the stress of the moment, I’m not sure the choices are, in themselves, equal. We can see that choosing to switch the trolley to track B isn’t necessarily a morally bad choice. But, I’m not sure that we can say that leaving it on track A is just as good a choice as switching it. If you are weighing the consequences of your choices, it would seem that switching to track B has less evil consequences than letting it ride on track A.

This all applies to the first scenario only though. The second scenario is a different thing.

VC

 

[Betterave]

Thing,

I think that makes sense pretty much. The operative point, in regard to PDE, is what you are intending to do. Although you said that you are choosing the fat man, you don’t mean (really) that you intend to hit him. You are intending to divert the trolley away from the 5 people, and you accept that it is going to hit the fat man. But, if the fat man got off that track. . . GREAT. You would be happy with that outcome. And you would still choose that track.

As far as making either choice without blame, perhaps you are right if you mean no one would hold you accountable for such a stressful spur of the moment decision no matter what you chose. But, if we abstract from the stress of the moment, I’m not sure the choices are, in themselves, equal. We can see that choosing to switch the trolley to track B isn’t necessarily a morally bad choice. But, I’m not sure that we can say that leaving it on track A is just as good a choice as switching it. If you are weighing the consequences of your choices, it would seem that switching to track B has less evil consequences than letting it ride on track A.

This all applies to the first scenario only though. The second scenario is a different thing.

VC

I think you misconstrue the second scenario though, as I tried to point out (and you didn’t respond). You claimed in the second scenario that you want to hit the fat man, but in the first you do not. Is that plausible? In the second scenario you don’t want to hit the five, and you do want to hit something, in order to avoid doing so. But if you insist that since that something is a fat man, therefore what you must intend is precisely to hit him, this is not true. You intend, rather, to stop the trolley by using an obstruction on the side track - you foresee that the obstruction is a man who will be hit and die, but you do not intend his death per se so as to save the five; you intend to stop the trolley so as to save the five.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

I meant the part I bolded: “the ends are never justified by evil means.” That’s trivial, since ends aren’t justified by means of any kind.

Ah, I see now! I think I wasn’t paying close enough attention to both statements and your comments on them. I was reading that second statement as “the end never justifies an evil means” – taking it as a more accurate “the end never justifies the means”.

Because, if you take into account o_mlly’s clarification that when he said the ends often justify the means he meant an indifferent act can be made good or bad depending on the end, that the end can justify the means. You seemed to want to edit that part of his statement though, and I’m not sure why.

But, you are right, when o_mlly went on to say what he actually said (and not what I thought he said) “the ends are never justified by evil means”. . . well, I’m quite at a loss to understand what that could mean. You too, right?

VC

 

[Verbum_Caro]

I think you misconstrue the second scenario though, as I tried to point out (and you didn’t respond). You claimed in the second scenario that you want to hit the fat man, but in the first you do not. Is that plausible? In the second scenario you don’t want to hit the five, and you do want to hit something, in order to avoid doing so. But if you insist that since that something is a fat man, therefore what you must intend is precisely to hit him, this is not true. You intend, rather, to stop the trolley by using an obstruction on the side track - you foresee that the obstruction is a man who will be hit and die, but you do not intend his death so as to save the five, but to stop the trolley so as to save the five.

Betterave,

Sorry I didn’t respond, I must have missed it in back and forth.

I do insist that I intend to hit him. It is true that I intend to stop the trolley by using an obstruction on the track, and that obstruction is him. I can’t intend to hit something else can I?

I have (at least) two intentions: to stop the trolley, and to hit the fat man. Or, to put it in order of occurrence, to hit the fat man and stop the trolley.

As far as not intending his death – I’m not sure it applies in this conversation (yet, anyway). I’m not concerned with looking at the death of the fat man at the moment, I’m just trying to point out that when you flip the switch you intend to hit him with the trolley. Yes, I foresee he will be hit, that is exactly why I flip the switch – I intend him to be hit.

Yes? No? What do you think?

VC

 

[Betterave]

Ah, I see now! I think I wasn’t paying close enough attention to both statements and your comments on them. I was reading that second statement as “the end never justifies an evil means” – taking it as a more accurate “the end never justifies the means”.

Because, if you take into account o_mlly’s clarification that when he said the ends often justify the means he meant an indifferent act can be made good or bad depending on the end, that the end can justify the means. You seemed to want to edit that part of his statement though, and I’m not sure why.

But, you are right, when o_mlly went on to say what he actually said (and not what I thought he said) “the ends are never justified by evil means”. . . well, I’m quite at a loss to understand what that could mean. You too, right?

VC

Quite right on the second part. I assume o_mlly just slipped and that’s not what he meant to say.

On the first part, it’s tricky. I think the indifferent act is no longer the same act when it ceases to be indifferent. Say I throw a cigarette butt (or glass of water) out the window and suppose this is a morally indifferent act. Then say I throw a cigarette butt (or a glass of water) out the window intending to start (prevent) a forest fire. The act itself changes, doesn’t it? In the second case I can no longer adequately describe the act by saying I threw a cigarette butt (or glass of water) out the window. The act becomes a means to an end in the second case, but the end does not justify (or unjustify) the act, it explains it.

 

[Betterave]

Betterave,

Sorry I didn’t respond, I must have missed it in back and forth.

I do insist that I intend to hit him. It is true that I intend to stop the trolley by using an obstruction on the track, and that obstruction is him. I can’t intend to hit something else can I?

I have (at least) two intentions: to stop the trolley, and to hit the fat man. Or, to put it in order of occurrence, to hit the fat man and stop the trolley.

As far as not intending his death – I’m not sure it applies in this conversation (yet, anyway). I’m not concerned with looking at the death of the fat man at the moment, I’m just trying to point out that when you flip the switch you intend to hit him with the trolley. Yes, I foresee he will be hit, that is exactly why I flip the switch – I intend him to be hit.

Yes? No? What do you think?

VC

I actually quite sympathize with some of Thing’s thoughts on the issue.

But look at it this way: I see the fat man and I think, “oh no, a fat man, I can’t switch to that track, even just to buy time, because I would hit him.” Then you think, “wait, that’s not just a fat man, it’s an obstruction that would stop the trolley and save the five from being hit! … but it’s still a man, I can’t intentionally hit him to save the five - but I don’t intend to hit him: I foresee that I will but I intend to use the only obstruction available to avoid hitting the five and I’ll have to just accept that the obstruction is a fat man, and that saving the five is a sufficiently grave reason to justify accepting that I will hit him. &@#$&, here goes…”

Does that make sense?

 

[Verbum_Caro]

On the first part, it’s tricky. I think the indifferent act is no longer the same act when it ceases to be indifferent. Say I throw a cigarette butt (or glass of water) out the window and suppose this is a morally indifferent act.

Wait, that first part might bear more scrutiny, and might shed light on your second part. There are morally indifferent objects of an act, acts morally indifferent in their kind. But an individual act when performed isn’t indifferent because there it is always done in some circumstance, or with some intent. So when you throw a glass of water out a window, when you actually do it and not just define the human act of “throwing a glass of water out of the window” you can’t have an indifferent act.

That’s why o_mlly’s point works: because our acts as done always have their definition and their concrete circumstances (and presumably an end aimed at). And if by definition an act is indifferent, then the circumstances or the end in view when performing it justifies it (or vilifies it) when done.

Thoughts?
VC

 

[Verbum_Caro]

I actually quite sympathize with some of Thing’s thoughts on the issue.

But look at it this way: I see the fat man and I think, “oh no, a fat man, I can’t switch to that track, even just to buy time, because I would hit him.” Then you think, “wait, that’s not just a fat man, it’s an obstruction that would stop the trolley and save the five from being hit! … but it’s still a man, I can’t intentionally hit him to save the five - but I don’t intend to hit him: I foresee that I will but I intend to use the only obstruction available to avoid hitting the five and I’ll have to just accept that the obstruction is a fat man, and that saving the five is a sufficiently grave reason to justify accepting that I will hit him. &@#$&, here goes…”

Does that make sense?

To me it makes sense in one way, but not in another. It might make sense as a description of a tortuous few moments of an internal monologue, but it doesn’t hold up as an analysis of what one can actually intend.

The problem is you can’t define away the fact that you intend to hit this man by saying you only want to hit an obstruction that happens to be a man. You might as well say you only intend to hit his fatness and not him.

Or, if one still wants to parse the man and his mass, let’s put it this way. The problem is intending to use a man as an obstruction. Or intending to hit an obstruction that happens to be a man.

Saying “it happens to be a man” or “I merely accept it is a man” doesn’t help you out at all, I’m afraid. I can’t shoot a target (to practice marksmanship! to get the blue ribbon at the all-state biathalon! to learn how to defend my family from dingos!) when the target “happens” to be a man. Right?

VC

 

[Coder]

“the good effect must not be obtained by means of the evil effect; the evil must be only an incidental by-product and not an actual factor in the accomplishment of the good”

In both the loop and non-loop cases the man’s death is not a “means” to an end. Rather, in both cases his death is an unwanted consequence in the saving of the five. What this question illustrates is that it is choices that affect the morality of decisions. In the case of someone who kills for gain they are responsible for this choice because it is freely made. In the loop and non-loop trolley situations, from the perspective of the alternatives available, the man’s death is still a side effect.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

In both the loop and non-loop cases the man’s death is not a “means” to an end. Rather, in both cases his death is an unwanted consequence in the saving of the five.

Coder,

In the second scenario, can you explain why you say that hitting the man (let’s leave dying or not out of it for a bit) is a consequence of saving the five? Since “consequence” means “to follow after”, how in the second scenario does one view the man being hit as following after saving the five, and not the other way round? (i.e. saving the five is a consequence of the man being hit?)

Thanks,
VC

 

[Coder]

Since “consequence” means “to follow after”, how in the second scenario does one view the man being hit as following after saving the five,

Hi, the consequence is not after saving the five. The consequence is the result of the moral decision to save the five. In the non-loop case, the track to the man could be shorter than to the five and in this case his death would still not “follow after” the projected time of when they would be hit. In both cases the man’s death is the consequence of a decision and that’s what the question relates to - a moral decision.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

Hi, the consequence is not after saving the five. The consequence is the result of the moral decision to save the five. In the non-loop case, the track to the man could be shorter than to the five and in this case his death would still not “follow after” the projected time of when they would be hit. In both cases the man’s death is the consequence of a decision and that’s what the question relates to - a moral decision.

Coder,

Perhaps we were addressing two different things? I didn’t mean “to follow after” in an unrelated temporal way, rather in a causal way. Let me clarify my view. In the first scenario you will to flip a switch which has two foreseen consequences: 5 people on track A won’t get hit and 1 person on track B will. Him getting hit is a consequence of willing to and flipping the switch, and willing the train to miss the 5. But in this scenario it seems possible for hitting the man to be an unintended (though foreseen) consequence of that which is deliberately willed (flipping a switch, trolley not hitting 5, saving the 5 etc.). You don’t desire to hit the fat man either as an end in itself or as a means to another end. You will the cause(s) (throwing the switch, etc.) but not this effect (hitting the fat man).

In the second scenario, you will the cause(s) and you will not only the effect of saving 5 but also, necessarily, the effect of hitting the fat man because hitting him is not just an effect but also a necessary cause of saving the 5.

Thoughts?
VC

 

[Coder]

In the second scenario, you will the cause(s) and you will not only the effect of saving 5 but also, necessarily, the effect of hitting the fat man because hitting him is not just an effect but also a necessary cause of saving the 5.

The point (as my previous posts indicate) is that in this case the necessary cause is not a “means to an” end because there are no alternatives. In moral decision making the term “means to an end” refers to means made as choices. In both cases there are only two choices and they both have the same “ends” and neither is a “means” because it is sought to be avoided.

In the second case the man’s death is no less “necessary” than in the first from the perspective of a moral decision. In the second case, the man’s body is involved but this has no effect on whether his death is involved as his death occurs in both cases. Both cases have no better alternatives and in both cases the man would die.

Don’t try to force a moral rule above the principle that the rule should meet and that is “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.”