Duns Scotus

[Vico]

Interesting. I know this is not infallible, but I notice that Descartes teachings are disapproved of. I have a couple of issues though. It says that reason is a power of the soul, while Scotus says they are one and the same. It says that matter nor form have being of themselves, although Scotus says that prime matter can exist on its own. Proposition 7 also says that angels have accidents. I dont understand that.

St. Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologica First Part Q54 A3

Objection 2. Further, if the angel’s power of intelligence be anything besides his essence, then it must needs be an accident; for that which is besides the essence of anything, we call it accident. But “a simple form cannot be a subject,” as Boethius states (De Trin. 1). Thus an angel would not be a simple form, which is contrary to what has been previously said (50, 2).

Reply to Objection 2. A simple form which is pure act cannot be the subject of accident, because subject is compared to accident as potentiality is to act. God alone is such a form: and of such is Boethius speaking there. But a simple form which is not its own existence, but is compared to it as potentiality is to act, can be the subject of accident; and especially of such accident as follows the species: for such accident belongs to the form–whereas an accident which belongs to the individual, and which does not belong to the whole species, results from the matter, which is the principle of individuation. And such a simple form is an angel.

newadvent.org/summa/1054.htm

 

[thinkandmull]

Scotus is often said be to Platonic, at least more so then Aquinas. However, from what I know there is only three distinct ideas of Platonism: that we have a previous life in which we knew eternal ideas, that the soul is not the form per se of the body but merely guides it, and that there are eternal ideas separate from God. Am I right about these? I am sure Scotus didn’t believe in the first two, but what then is a Christian Platonist? Is it only believing in eternal ideas separate from God?

 

[Vico]

Scotus is often said be to Platonic, at least more so then Aquinas. However, from what I know there is only three distinct ideas of Platonism: that we have a previous life in which we knew eternal ideas, that the soul is not the form per se of the body but merely guides it, and that there are eternal ideas separate from God. Am I right about these? I am sure Scotus didn’t believe in the first two, but what then is a Christian Platonist? Is it only believing in eternal ideas separate from God?

People may think that, but Duns Scotus repudiated the Platonic viewpoint.

See: Questiones Metaphysicae VII 18:13-15, Lectura I 3:114, 153-171, I 8.220 f., I 17:178 and II:3.38 and 157.

 

[thinkandmull]

The Old Catholic Encyclopedia says “On September 18, 1861 sevem propositions of Ontologists were declared tuto tradi non posse (Denzinger-Bannwart, nn. 1659-65. In 1862 condemned two propositions of Abba Branchereau (numbers xii and xiii) for ontologism.” I have never seen the text for these. Augustines has a notion though that was Platonic they say. The idea of illumination. I suppose it means that we have darkness of thoughts until God enlightens us and that the same reasoning that can reach an understanding of God bulsters our ideas of other things. I don’t think ontologism can be refuted though

 

[Vico]

The Old Catholic Encyclopedia says “On September 18, 1861 sevem propositions of Ontologists were declared tuto tradi non posse (Denzinger-Bannwart, nn. 1659-65. In 1862 condemned two propositions of Abba Branchereau (numbers xii and xiii) for ontologism.” I have never seen the text for these. Augustines has a notion though that was Platonic they say. The idea of illumination. I suppose it means that we have darkness of thoughts until God enlightens us and that the same reasoning that can reach an understanding of God bulsters our ideas of other things. I don’t think ontologism can be refuted though

The first seven of the Ontologists are enumerated in Denzinger, Sources of Catholic Dogma (Enchiridion symbolorum, definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum):

Errors of the Ontologists*

[From the decree of the Sacred Office, Sept. 18, 1861, “they cannot be safely taught”]

• 1659 1. Immediate knowledge of God, habitual at least, is essential to the human intellect, so much so that without it the intellect can know nothing, since indeed it is itself intellectual light.
• 1660 2. That being which is in all things and without which we understand nothing, is the divine being.
• 1661 3. Universals considered on the part of the thing are not really distinguished from God.
• 1662 4. Congenital knowledge of God as being simply involves in an eminent way all other cognition, so that by it we hold as known implicitly all being, under whatever aspect it is knowable
• 1663 5. All other ideas do not exist except as modifications of the idea by which God is understood as Being simply.
• 1664 6. Created things exist in God as a part in the whole, not indeed in the formal whole, but in the infinite whole, the most simple, which puts its parts, as it were, without any division and diminution of itself outside itself.
• 1665 7. Creation can be thus explained: God, by that special act by which He knows Himself, and wills Himself as distinct from a determined creature, man, for example, produces a creature.

patristica.net/denzinger/

The others declaration of forty in the same source: The Errors of Antonius de Rosmini-Serbati*

[Condemned in a Decree of the Holy Office, 14th of Dec., 1887]

cf. Denzinger-Bannwart, nn. 1891-1930

 

[Latinitas]

Scotus was called the “Subtle Doctor” for a reason… he was very difficult to follow.

This is true, and unfortunately, many who read Scotus don’t really understand him.

He also got that whole analogy thing wrong… which screwed up a lot of stuff.

This is not necessarily true. The Church has never condemned the Scotistic thesis on analogy. Again, however, there’s a lot of misconception here. Scotus did not hold the univocity of being as it’s commonly understood. He readily admits that God exists by His essence, whereas creatures exist by participation. What Scotus emphasizes is that from the analogy of being between creatures and God, a universal conception of being can be known, one that’s applicable to both God and creatures. In other words, between two analogues, there’s something common and something different. Thus, between the Divine being and created beings there’s something common, i.e. the notion of being, and something different, namely that God’s being is essential and necessary, whereas in creatures being is participated and contingent. This view has never been condemned by the Church, and has been defended by Scotists even up to the modern day. For a great 20th century Scotist, I recommend Fr. Marian Fernandez Garcia, who was personally praised by Pius X.

I’m unfamiliar with some of the language, though the first sentence is about the means of angelic knowledge… Must God directly illumine the mind of an angel with a form, or do angels have the capacity to find knowledge on their own power? Scotus takes the latter position, though allows for illumination as a possibility as well. This jives with the scholastics.

That’s what I see at least.

I’ll answer some of these questions below when I have time.

Benedicat Deus,
Latinitas

 

[Latinitas]

The Old Catholic Encyclopedia lists the following as teachings of Duns Scotus. I was wondering if people could explain the following to me. THANKS!

I’ll try and do this in simple language.

“The angels can of themselves know things; they do not need an infused species though in fact they receive such from God”

So, Scotists hold, contra the Thomists, that the angels can know things by contemplation of things and other things, rather than purely infused knowledge (knowledge given by God). Thus, the Scotists say that the angels can be said to be rational (in a certain sense), whereas the Thomists say that the angels are intellectual, but not rational, since, in their opinion, the angels do not know by discursive abstraction and consideration of things themselves.

“that the relationes t[r]initariae are not a perfection simpliciter simplex”

The Thomists strongly emphasize the Divine simplicity (non-composition), and thus hold that anything in God that is not a perfection is accidental, which cannot be admitted. Thus, even the Trinitarian relations are simply simple perfections. The Scotists however object to this, because, in their view, if the perfections are simply simple perfections, because then it would seem to follow that the Son lacks a perfection, namely paternity, and similarly for the other Persons. The Thomists respond to this in various ways. Garrigou-Lagrange, for example, responds to this obejction in his Trinity and God the Creator book.

I’m not even try bother explaining what is meant by the term perfectiones simpliciter simplices, since this would require too much room.

“that the merits of Christ are not simpliciter et intrinsece, but only extrinsece and secundum quid, infinite”

The Thomists hold that the merits of Christ are simply and intrinsically infinite, that is, by their very nature, infinite, since they are the works of a Divine Person, and acts are predicated to persons, not natures. The Scotists hold however, that since in Christ there are two ontologically distinct wills, one of which is a truly human will, which is thus finite, the works of Christ in His human nature, could not be intrinsically infinitely meritorius, since this require an (intensively) infinite charity, which no creature can possess (and Christ, as man, is a creature). They are only infinite because God accepted them as such. The vast majority of non-Scotist theologians accept the Thomistic opinon on this question.

“that transubstantiation makes the Body of Christ present per modum adductionis”

The Scotists hold that Christ becomes present in the Eucharist as it were, by the substitution of the the substance of Christ’s body and blood for the substance of the bread and wine, whereas the Thomists generally hold that the substance of the bread and wine is converted into the substance of the bread and wine. A diagram will be helpful here:

According to the Thomists:

Substance of bread and wine ----------------> substance of Christ’s body and blood

According to the Scotists:

Substance of bread and wine - → substance of Christ’s body and blood
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“the dotrine of the univocatio entis”

The Thomists hold that being is attributed to God strictly by analogy. A proper analogy to be sure. (A proper analogy is that which exists between say a square and a cube, rather than a metaphoric analogy, which is only loosely based on a similarity). The Scotists too hold that being is attributed to God analogously, but hold that from the analogous attribution of being, a universal concept of being can be abstacted, and this concept can be attributed univocally to both God and creatures. The Thomists object to this because it appears to them that this makes an idea of being greater than that found in God, an idea that is neither creature nor Creator. The Scotists respond to this in various ways, normally by noting that this concept does not really exist, but only exists in the mind. This obviously can go on and on, and is a subtle and complicated point, one which is very much misunderstood, particularly the Scotist position. You can reference my previous post here for another explanation of this.

“that mortal sin, as an offence against God, is not intrinsically and simpliciter, but only extrinsically infinite”

Similar to the point about Christ’s merits, Scotists hold that no act of a creature can either instrinsically infinitely meritorious or infinitely demeritorious. In regards to sin, the Scotists it is not that the action itself is infinitely evil, but rather is offense against an infinitely good God, who thus takes infinite offense at mortal sin. Thomists object to this because it would seem to make God punish evil with greater severity than it demands, an obvious injustice. In other words, God would punishing an offesne as an infinite evil which was not instrinsically such. God can hold a finite act of goodness as infinitely good because He’s good and merciful, but He cannot take an infinite offesne at an evil that is not intrinsically infinite, since this would be unjust. This again could be discussed in great lengths, much more than I have written here.

I should note that even what I’ve written here is very much simplified, and I tried to do justice to both opinions (Thomistic and Scotistic). If I failed, I apologize.

Anyway, I hope this was helpful,
Benedicat Deus,
Latinitas

 

[thinkandmull]

Several points:

I am thinking that perfectionanes simpliciter simplices has to do with God as Trinity is greater than the sum of its parts. I don’t see how Scotus can say that the Son is paternity though

As for finite sin, it seems that sin is less serious in the Scotian system.

Vico, Rosmini has been approved by John Paul II and Benedict XVI and even the present Pope. I don’t see how Ontologism can be refuted either. Its all a matter of how one feels they receive knowledge. If it feels like a thought is innate is it truly? If it feels like reason “make” the idea, is it not innate? Who knows

 

[Vico]

Several points:

I am thinking that perfectionanes simpliciter simplices has to do with God as Trinity is greater than the sum of its parts. I don’t see how Scotus can say that the Son is paternity though

As for finite sin, it seems that sin is less serious in the Scotian system.

Vico, Rosmini has been approved by John Paul II and Benedict XVI and even the present Pope. I don’t see how Ontologism can be refuted either. Its all a matter of how one feels they receive knowledge. If it feels like a thought is innate is it truly? If it feels like reason “make” the idea, is it not innate? Who knows

CDF stated that Rosmini did not really hold those ideas that were condemned, and that those ideas still remain condemned.

At the same time the objective validity of the Decree Post obitum referring to the previously condemned propositions, remains for whoever reads them, outside of the Rosminian system, in an idealist, ontologist point of view and with a meaning contrary to Catholic faith and doctrine.

vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20010701_rosmini_en.html

 

[thinkandmull]

A couple of points. The Church has never infallibly said that Holy Office decrees have authority from the apostles. Its a policy issue. Cardinal Ratzinger for example had a decree in which he said that infallibility does not apply to Church laws, which is clearly false. How can an indefectable Church issue evil laws or invalid sacraments and liturgies that are heretical? So those decrees are really theologians opinions. Also, ontologism rings true for me. How can you prove God didn’t create ontologists one way and other people as Thomists?

 

[Vico]

A couple of points. The Church has never infallibly said that Holy Office decrees have authority from the apostles. Its a policy issue. Cardinal Ratzinger for example had a decree in which he said that infallibility does not apply to Church laws, which is clearly false. How can an indefectable Church issue evil laws or invalid sacraments and liturgies that are heretical? So those decrees are really theologians opinions. Also, ontologism rings true for me. How can you prove God didn’t create ontologists one way and other people as Thomists?

What is infallible is the teaching authority on faith and morals, and that does not pertain to merely eccleasical laws. The faithful are to give assent to more than infallible teachings on faith and morals: that assent is also to be given for other teachings on faith and morals of the Magisterium.

See CIC:

Canon 750 – § 1. Those things are to be believed by divine and catholic faith which are contained in the word of God as it has been written or handed down by tradition, that is, in the single deposit of faith entrusted to the Church, and which are at the same time proposed as divinely revealed either by the solemn Magisterium of the Church, or by its ordinary and universal Magisterium, which in fact is manifested by the common adherence of Christ’s faithful under the guidance of the sacred Magisterium. All are therefore bound to avoid any contrary doctrines.

§ 2. Furthermore, each and everything set forth definitively by the Magisterium of the Church regarding teaching on faith and morals must be firmly accepted and held; namely, those things required for the holy keeping and faithful exposition of the deposit of faith; therefore, anyone who rejects propositions which are to be held definitively sets himself against the teaching of the Catholic Church.

Canon 1371 – The following are to be punished with a just penalty:

1° a person who, apart from the case mentioned in canon 1364 § 1, teaches a doctrine condemned by the Roman Pontiff, or by an Ecumenical Council, or obstinately rejects the teachings mentioned in canon 750 § 2 or in canon 752 and, when warned by the Apostolic See or by the Ordinary, does not retract;

2° a person who in any other way does not obey the lawful command or prohibition of the Apostolic See or the Ordinary or Superior and, after being warned, persists in disobedience.

 

[thinkandmull]

Church laws are not teachings, at least the ones you are talking about. So of course they are not infallible. But what the liturgy says must be orthodox, and laws cannot contradict Divine Revelation. There are disciplinary aspects that are not always binding. You are not suppose to disobey a superior but there are exceptions. Theresa the Little Flower for example vowed obedience but refused to agree with her mother superior on whether one can avoid purgatory through trust alone. Divine office teachings are to be respected but if one is convinced it is wrong we are not bound. Nobody can be without exception bound to a fallible teaching

 

[Vico]

Church laws are not teachings, at least the ones you are talking about. So of course they are not infallible. But what the liturgy says must be orthodox, and laws cannot contradict Divine Revelation. There are disciplinary aspects that are not always binding. You are not suppose to disobey a superior but there are exceptions. Theresa the Little Flower for example vowed obedience but refused to agree with her mother superior on whether one can avoid purgatory through trust alone. Divine office teachings are to be respected but if one is convinced it is wrong we are not bound. Nobody can be without exception bound to a fallible teaching

The canons given pertain to faith and morals, not other things that you mention.

 

[thinkandmull]

Congregation of Divine Faith* Instruction on the Ecclesial Vocation of the Theologian*:

“all acts of the Magisterium derive from the same source,… magisterial decisions in matters of disciple, even if they are not guaranteed by the charism of infallibility…”

This is false

 

[Vico]

Congregation of Divine Faith* Instruction on the Ecclesial Vocation of the Theologian*:

“all acts of the Magisterium derive from the same source,… magisterial decisions in matters of disciple, even if they are not guaranteed by the charism of infallibility…”

This is false

The source is Donum Veritatis 1990

1. Divine assistance is also given to the successors of the apostles teaching in communion with the successor of Peter, and in a particular way, to the Roman Pontiff as Pastor of the whole Church, when exercising their ordinary Magisterium, even should this not issue in an infallible definition or in a “definitive” pronouncement but in the proposal of some teaching which leads to a better understanding of Revelation in matters of faith and morals and to moral directives derived from such teaching.

One must therefore take into account the proper character of every exercise of the Magisterium, considering the extent to which its authority is engaged. It is also to be borne in mind that all acts of the Magisterium derive from the same source, that is, from Christ who desires that His People walk in the entire truth. For this same reason, magisterial decisions in matters of discipline, even if they are not guaranteed by the charism of infallibility, are not without divine assistance and call for the adherence of the faithful.

…

This Instruction was adopted at an Plenary Meeting of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith and was approved at an audience granted to the undersigned Cardinal Prefect by the Supreme Pontiff, Pope John Paul II, who ordered its publication.

vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19900524_theologian-vocation_en.html

 

[thinkandmull]

Why is CDF questioning Trent here.

“The Church’s infallibility extends to ecclesiastical laws passed for the universal Church for the direction of Christian worship and Christian living…” (Van Noort, Dogmatic Theology. 2:91)

“If anyone says that the ceremonies, vestments and outward signs, which the Catholic Church uses in the celebration of Masses, are incentives to impiety rather than the service of piety: let him be anathema” Trent

“The Church is infallible in her general discipline” (P. Hermann 1908, Institutiones Theologiae Dogmaticase)

“The Church is also rightly helfd to e infallible in her disciplinary decrees” (E. Dorsch 1928, Institutionest Theologiae Fundamentalis)

“The Church, in establishing universal laws, is infallible as regards their substance.” (R.M. Schultes 1931 De Ecclesia Catholica)

“In establishing disciplinary laws for the universal Church, the Church is likewise infallible” (Valentino Zubizarreta 1948 Theologia Dogmatico-Scholastica)

Also check out Serapius Iragui 1959 Manuale Theologiciae Dogmaticae and Joachim Salaverri 1962 Sacrae Theologiae Summa

In order to be a good Mother, the Church can never require or allow something contrary to the Faith.