V
Vouthon
Guest
ft.com/content/63a8c1cc-3713-11e7-bce4-9023f8c0fd2e#comments
**Emmanuel Macron’s grand Franco-German bargain
A well-led and united EU leadership will make life harder for Britain as it leaves
Mr Macron envisages a grand bargain in which Berlin secures the euro with a fiscal union while Paris agrees to structural reform at home. Such a trade would revive an old relationship that has atrophied through the weakness of his predecessors and the economy they oversaw. If it happens — and the freshness of his electoral mandate gives him a shot — then Britain enters an invidious.
It has worked for centuries to avoid a concentration of power in mainland Europe. When it failed, as it did before the world wars, Britain paid a blood price. When it failed again in the postwar era, it paid an economic price: a unified continent led by a Franco-German industrial core left Britain for dust until it started to bid for membership of the project in the 1960s.
A coherent, decisively led Europe will always be a problem for Britain. It cannot not be. It has the power to set the terms of access to the continental market and exclude Britain from any influence over events that nevertheless affect it…
Both countries want to see Britain incur some material cost for its decision to leave. Both want to lure some banking activity from London. Both want the euro to survive and challenge the dollar. Both are led by politicians who believe populists can be seen off through confrontation rather than capitulation. Both can think of a dozen things they would rather harmonise at European level before they can name one they would return to nations.
All of this points to the emergence of a tighter, better-led EU that makes life harder for Britain as it leaves and in the years after. And all of it has become more achievable with the election of Mr Macron.
Britain would not be neighbourly to say so, of course, but once it chose to leave the EU it gained a strategic interest in the paralysis or even breakdown of the bloc. That way the eternal dilemma — what to do about a giant neighbouring trade zone whose rules you observe but cannot shape — would resolve itself. Not only does the restoration of Europe’s central bilateral relationship make that breakdown less likely, it creates the dread prospect of an EU that is actually more coherent after British departure…
For generational reasons, Mr Macron might be the first post-national president of France, the first to believe in the European project as an end in itself as well as an alternative instrument for French glory after the eclipse of empire. His dynamism promises a tighter bond between France and Germany, and a Europe that is harder to divide and rule.