Epistemic Modal Ontological argument

[Matthias123]

Let P be an omniscient, omnipotent, immutable supremely intelligent, intellect.

If P is possibly necessary, it is necessary in a possible world.

S5 axiom

◊□P → □P

If P knows its existence as a fact, then this fact is true.

Axiom T

Ki A → A

If P is necessary in a possible world, P would know the fact that it exists (cargito ergo sum) and the fact that P exists would be true.

Axiom T

Ki A → A

P is possibly necessary

Therefore P exists

 

[NowAgnostic]

Sorry not following the logic. Your premises are correct but where’s the deduction?

Let P be an omniscient, omnipotent, immutable supremely intelligent, intellect.

If P is possibly necessary, it is necessary in a possible world.

S5 axiom

◊□P → □P

True. What is possibly necessary is necessary.

If P knows its existence as a fact, then this fact is true.

Axiom T

Ki A → A

True, given P’s omniscience.

If P is necessary in a possible world, P would know the fact that it exists (cargito ergo sum) and the fact that P exists would be true.

Axiom T

Ki A → A

True. If P is necessary, then P exists and knows it exists.

P is possibly necessary

Huh? How have you proved this?

 

[Matthias123]

No, but it is a wedge. Have you proved otherwise? As far as I know you can’t force someone with epistemic logic to hold the notion that P is possibly nessecary.

Your agnostic are you not? Do you not believe that P is possibly nessecary?

 

[Matthias123]

Let P be an omniscient, omnipotent, immutable supremely intelligent, intellect.

If P is possibly necessary, it is necessary in a possible world.

S5 axiom

◊□P → □P

If P knows its existence as a fact, then this fact is true.

Axiom T

Ki A → A

If I know that P is necessary in a possible world, P would know the fact that it exists (cargito ergo sum) and the fact that P exists would be true.

Axiom T

Ki A → A

The existence of an effect requiring the concurrent existence and action of an efficient cause may imply the existence and action of that cause

The cosmos as a whole might exists

The existence of the cosmos as a whole may be radically contingent (meaning that it needs an efficient cause of its continuing existence to preserve it in being, and prevent it from being annihilated, or reduced to nothing)

If the cosmos might need a efficient cause of its continuing existence, then that cause might be a supernatural being, supernatural in its action, and one the existence of which is uncaused, in other words, the Supreme Being, or God

P is possibly necessary

Therefore P exists

 

[NowAgnostic]

No, but it is a wedge. Have you proved otherwise?

Of course not, otherwise I’d be a strong atheist.

As far as I know you can’t force someone with epistemic logic to hold the notion that P is possibly nessecary.

Your agnostic are you not? Do you not believe that P is possibly nessecary?

For all we know, it is (or, it is epistemically possible that P is necessary). But it might not be. P might be logically impossible for all we know. Every version of the ontological proof I’ve encountered confuses epistemic possibility with logical possibility.

 

[Matthias123]

If you don’t know that proposition A (P is necessary) is impossible, then it is not true that A is impossible therefore A is possible, therefore P is possibly necessary. (Axiom T)

So how can you say that you do not hold P as possibly necessary?

 

[NowAgnostic]

If you don’t know that proposition A (P is necessary) is impossible, then it is not true that A is impossible…

No. Just because you don’t know something is impossible doesn’t mean it isn’t.

So how can you say that you do not hold P as possibly necessary?

Because I don’t know.

 

[Matthias123]

Because I don’t know.

Isn’t it true that cosmology could possibly prove the necessity of God for the creation and sustaining of the universe, considering we are not certain what is before plank time?

I believe that I know this as a fact, but I may not. How would we clear this up?

 

[NowAgnostic]

Isn’t it true that cosmology could possibly prove the necessity of God for the creation and sustaining of the universe, considering we are not certain what is before plank time?

No. All that cosmology could ever hope to prove would be the necessity of a creator of the universe; it could never prove the creator was God.

I believe that I know this as a fact, but I may not. How would we clear this up?

Well we can prove it deductively, if one accepts as a basic belief that every finite effect can have a finite cause, then the creation of the universe need not have an infinite cause.

 

[Matthias123]

Well we can prove it deductively, if one accepts as a basic belief that every finite effect can have a finite cause, then the creation of the universe need not have an infinite cause.

If this is true, this creator would have to be a free agent, as it would have to have a will so the first efficient cause isn’t still in effect. Also since greater doesn’t come from less, this creator would have to be greater then the physical universe.

What would you define as an infinite being? I define infinite is just an umbrella term for the omnimax attributes – a pure act.

In our world we see deficiencies among existing things. Such as good greatest and less.The perfection of these things is the first principle that causes everything else in it’s genus. So why shouldn’t the first principle of all things not be perfect? If this creator is not perfect, how will it sustain it’s own being?

 

[Matthias123]

If it is epistemologically possible that ◊□P then this implies ◊□◊□P]

◊□◊□P] implies □◊□P]
□◊□P] implies ◊□P
◊□P implies □P

do you agree?

 

[hatsoff]

If it is epistemologically possible that ◊□P then this implies ◊□◊□P]

No, it only implies that Q is epistemically possible, where Q is the statement ◊□P in terms of metaphysical (or logical) possibility semantics.

 

[NowAgnostic]

If it is epistemologically possible that ◊□P then this implies ◊□◊□P]

◊□◊□P] implies □◊□P]
□◊□P] implies ◊□P
◊□P implies □P

do you agree?

No to the first statement. Epistemologically possible means “for all we know” possible. Yet it could still be logically impossible. P might entail a logical contradiction we are unaware of. You just can’t substitute epistemic possibility for the logical possibility in modal logic.

 

[NowAgnostic]

If this is true, this creator would have to be a free agent, as it would have to have a will so the first efficient cause isn’t still in effect.

Obviously if the universe is defined as the set of all physical things it would need to be something non-physical. I don’t know whether that implies it would also have to have free will.

Also since greater doesn’t come from less, this creator would have to be greater then the physical universe.

Well technically it would have to be at least as great as the physical universe.

What would you define as an infinite being? I define infinite is just an umbrella term for the omnimax attributes – a pure act.

Infinite means without limits. Every finite being is surpassable in some respect.

In our world we see deficiencies among existing things. Such as good greatest and less.The perfection of these things is the first principle that causes everything else in it’s genus.

This seems to be from Aquinas’ Fourth Way, and this is no longer a modal ontological argument, but a cosmological one.

Anyway, the first principle defines the genus (what makes things good greater or less), it doesn’t necessarily cause everything else in it (it only does on the assumption the theistic God exists). This illustrates precisely what frustrates me about many alleged theistic proofs. Yes, under traditional theism God is truth, God is being, etc. and the cause of everything, therefore the cause of truth and being in other things, which can be related to “ultimate” (infinite, perfect) truth and being as the cause. Yet this is only true under the assumption God exists. While it’s a tautology that there must be something(s) among a class of finite objects which is (are) the “best” in some category, it is not established that there must be an infinite entity among the class.

So why shouldn’t the first principle of all things not be perfect? If this creator is not perfect, how will it sustain it’s own being?

You’d need to prove “sustaining” of being to be necessary, and that an imperfect being is necessarily incapable of sustaining its own being.

 

[Matthias123]

No to the first statement. Epistemologically possible means “for all we know” possible. Yet it could still be logically impossible. P might entail a logical contradiction we are unaware of. You just can’t substitute epistemic possibility for the logical possibility in modal logic.

Couldn’t we say that for all we know ◊□P therefore it is logically possible for P to be necessarily logically possible?

Yet it could still be logically impossible.

Let A be possibly Ki (◊□P)

A → □◊□P | ┐◊□P]

A !→ ┐◊□◊□P]

A → ◊□◊□P]

◊□◊□P] → □◊□P]

□◊□P] → ◊□P

◊□P → □P

Why do you say that A → ┐◊□◊□P]?

I don’t understand.

 

[NowAgnostic]

Couldn’t we say that for all we know ◊□P therefore it is logically possible for P to be necessarily logically possible?

No, we can’t. You’re still substituting epistemic for logical possibility. The reason why the two are distinct is because we do not have perfect knowledge of what is possible. Someone who hadn’t studied Euclidean geometry wouldn’t know that every triangle’s angles add to 180 degrees. Thus, to him it would be true for all he knew there could be a possible triangle with angles summing to 170 degrees.

Let A be possibly Ki (◊□P)

A → □◊□P | ┐◊□P]

A !→ ┐◊□◊□P]

A → ◊□◊□P]

Here’s your error in the last line. The fact that A does not entail B does not mean that A entails not B.

Why do you say that A → ┐◊□◊□P]?

I don’t.

 

[Matthias123]

Accepted. It seems I need to find another way.