All right, Mr. Spock, I got a thing or two to say to you…
Realism is materialism, which holds matter primary, and the “spirit” a product of the matter. Idealism is the opposite, it holds that the “spirit” is primary, and it created matter.
There are many realist philosophers who would not think that that matter is primary to spirit, at least depending one what you mean by primary. Aristotle being one, of course. Yet, he is definitely called a realist. You seem to be changing the definition of realism as its been traditionally used.
Are angels material entities? Can they be subjected to empirical verification? Or are they pure mental constructs which have no referents in reality?
Angels are definitely not material and thus cannot be subjected to empirical verification. However, you could also say that some people could deny the existence of Asia if they are unable to verify it empirically … you know, if they can’t afford to travel there and see it for themselves. Also, you could say that Alexander the Great never existed … because he cannot be empirically verified. So, all I’m saying is that just because you can’t empirically verify something doesn’t mean you are impelled to disbelieve its existence.
- Distance. It is not an ontological object. It is a relationship between 2 ontological objects.
- Before and behind. These are not ontological objects. They are positions based upon a specific point of observation.
- Abstactions. The concept of a chair. There is no ontological object called an abstract chair, it exists as a mental image, based upon actual chairs.
- Warm and cold. Not ontological objects. They describe our subjective feelings based upon the Brownian motion of molecules.
- Movement. It is not an ontological object, it is an action performed by ontological objects.
- Imaginary objects, the products of our imagination. Literary characters, symphonies. The same applies.
I might be misunderstand what you mean by “ontological object” … I assume it means the object of ontology … and object studied by ontology would be
being. A being, unless you are re-defining it, is “that which can exist.” Then, you claim that distance, before and behind, abstractions, warm and cold, movement, and imaginary objects are
not ontological objects. In other words, they aren’t beings. In other words, they can’t exist. In other words, they don’t exist. However, you also say …
No materialist says that concepts, attributes, relationships do not exist. They certainly do, and they are not material objects.
So, here you are saying that concepts, attributes, and relationships DO exist, but in that other quote you deny that they are beings, indicating that they can’t exist. What’s going on here?
There is no ontological object called an abstract chair, it exists as a mental image, based upon actual chairs.
So you are saying that abstractions exist as mental images. I will also assume, correct me if I’m wrong, that you mean abstractions
are mental images (otherwise I don’t know what you’re talking about). How is a mental image abstract? I mean, a mental image is an image, right? There are images all over the place, but not all of them are abstractions. Also, there could be two radically different looking chairs, but with understanding the abstract notion of a chair, I can identify them as chairs. But how does just having a mental image of a particular chair necessarily enable me to relate it universally to all chairs? There must be something else going on here.
Well, the observations of neuroscience are rather compelling. The fact that the brain can overcome some kinds of injuries is compelling, too. The experiments of splitting the brain into halves (not science fiction at all) also point to the fact that mind is the activity of the brain. We have come a long way from the ancient Greeks who surmised that the brain is just a cooling organ for the blood - but then again, since Aristotele is in such high regard, I am not very surprised that such outdated ideas might be entertained as well.
I actually don’t know what Aristotle said about the actual organ of the brain, but all his epistemological claims do not conflict with neuroscience, I was very surprised to find out. For example, he said that mental images, reflexes, instincts, emotions, memory, and even imagination are all based in the bodies and are material phenomenon. However, he said that abstractions, that is, finding the
meaning of the mental images that come from our senses and/or imagination is only possible with the intellect, which, he said, is immaterial. The intellect is a power of the soul and not the body, he said. It makes a fair deal of sense, too, because material cannot provide immaterial abstractions by just showing a material mental image. Just because I have a mental image in my head, I might not necessarily abstract its meaning.
Nonetheless, Aristotle claimed all knowledge comes from the senses, for we need those mental images so our intellect can abstract concepts from them. We need not only the senses, but the brain to process the sense impulses into mental images. It is also true that we need to recall mental images from our mental storage in our brain (memory) in order to re-understand the concepts that we abstracted from them. The material and the immaterial work hand-in-hand … it’s a theme that makes us human.
Anyway, if you can address what you mean by an ontological object, and how a mere mental image equates to an abstract concept and understanding that would be good.