Essence and Existence

[coolduude]

From Peter Kreeft’s website:

In more abstract philosophical language, the proof [First Cause] goes this way. Every being that exists either exists by itself, by its own essence or nature, or it does not exist by itself. If it exists by its own essence, then it exists necessarily and eternally, and explains itself. It cannot not exist, as a triangle cannot not have three sides. If, on the other hand, a being exists but not by its own essence, then it needs a cause, a reason outside itself for its existence. Because it does not explain itself, something else must explain it. Beings whose essence does not contain the reason for their existence, beings that need causes, are called contingent, or dependent, beings. A being whose essence is to exist is called a necessary being. The universe contains only contingent beings. God would be the only necessary being—if God existed. Does he? Does a necessary being exist? Here is the proof that it does. Dependent beings cannot cause themselves. They are dependent on their causes. If there is no independent being, then the whole chain of dependent beings is dependent on nothing and could not exist. But they do exist. Therefore there is an independent being.

So this is how I understand it- God’s essence is existence. His essence is to be existence itself, like how our essence is to be human. Am I right or totally off? Can someone clarify this (although Kreeft did simplify it very well )

If I am correct, what are objections to this?

Thanks,
coolduude

 

[hatsoff]

Kreeft’s argument seems more like obfuscation than clarification. A few points of concern:

What does it mean to for something to exist “by itself, by its own essence or nature,” as opposed to existing not by itself?

What does it mean for something to exist “necessarily,” as opposed to “contingently”? Is it just that contingent means caused and necessary means uncaused?

What does is a thing’s “essence”? And what does it mean for that thing’s essence to “contain the reason” of its existence?

 

[coolduude]

What does it mean to for something to exist “by itself, by its own essence or nature,” as opposed to existing not by itself?

Existing by itself means that it is the very act of existence. Not existing by yourself would mean you are contingent (see below).

hatsoff:

What does it mean for something to exist “necessarily,” as opposed to “contingently”? Is it just that contingent means caused and necessary means uncaused?

Yep! Contingent beings (such as us) need a cause. A necessary being does not.

hatsoff:

What does is a thing’s “essence”? And what does it mean for that thing’s essence to “contain the reason” of its existence?

Essence may be described as the “what” of a thing. It is the quiddity of the thing, that which is known about it by our forming of a concept. It is a formal principle since for material reality, it is abstracted by the human intellect. Hence, it is a universal principle making many material individuals to be of the same kind (for angels, it makes each angel to be a species unto itself).

aquinasonline.com/Topics/essencex.html

Get it?

 

[Damase]

So this is how I understand it- God’s essence is existence. His essence is to be existence itself, like how our essence is to be human. Am I right or totally off? Can someone clarify this (although Kreeft did simplify it very well )

If I am correct, what are objections to this?

Thanks,
coolduude

Kreeft’s argument is nothing more than a rephrasing of Thomas Aquinas’s Third Way (see I, q. 2, art. 3Summa Theologica). He’s saying that all beings in the universe are continent on something else for their existence; they are essentially contingent (i.e., they wouldn’t be what they are if they weren’t dependent on something else for their existence). As a consequence, all things in creation are free to either be or not be. Now there must be a thing which is wholly necessary: “there must exist something the existence of which is necessary”: otherwise at one time there could have been nothing in existence, and since time is apparently infinite, then this would have definitely occurred at some point in the past, and thus nothing would be now, which is absurd.

What Kreeft and Thomas are saying here is not that God’s “essence is existence itself.” God is super-essential. Essences are limiting by their nature, and God cannot be limited in any way. And although we can talk about Him being necessary, we must remember that ultimately all our logical propositions and attempts at understanding will fail when we talk about God; thus Thomas does not conclude his proofs with the assertion that he has defined God, but rather says simply that, “This all men speak of as God.”

There are some possible objections to this chain of reasoning, as sound as it would appear to most rational human beings. There is a certain mode of philosophical thought based on the quantum theory in physics that seems to be denying that all things must have a cause. I regret, however, that I am not knowledgeable enough on this point that I could comment.

 

[Rocinante]

From Peter Kreeft’s website:

So this is how I understand it- God’s essence is existence. His essence is to be existence itself, like how our essence is to be human. Am I right or totally off? Can someone clarify this (although Kreeft did simplify it very well )

If I am correct, what are objections to this?

Thanks,
coolduude

it sounds to me that this argument starts by presupposing that there exists a very real distinction between necessary and contingent beings and therefore since such a distinction exists (we’ve presupposed it does) then there must be a very real necessary being to make sense of this distinction. but how do we know that this distinction itself isn’t just gobbledygook? it sure sounds like a nonsense distinction to me.

 

[Damase]

it sounds to me that this argument starts by presupposing that there exists a very real distinction between necessary and contingent beings and therefore since such a distinction exists (we’ve presupposed it does) then there must be a very real necessary being to make sense of this distinction. but how do we know that this distinction itself isn’t just gobbledygook? it sure sounds like a nonsense distinction to me.

I wouldn’t call it a “presupposition” to say that there exists a difference between necessary and contingent beings. The truth is self-evidencing; it is an intuitive fact that nothing in the universe contains within itself the adequate ground of its existence. Nothing in the physical world simply explains itself—can you think of a counter-example?

If there is a “presupposition” to this sort of thinking, then it simply that we suppose the world to be intelligible. We must approach philosophy with the assumption that our minds are configured in such a way that it is possible for us to trust our senses to at least some extent and thereby abstract knowledge from the material world. If things aren’t knowable, then we might as well throw up our hands and stare at our navels all day.

 

[Rocinante]

I wouldn’t call it a “presupposition” to say that there exists a difference between necessary and contingent beings. The truth is self-evidencing; it is an intuitive fact that nothing in the universe contains within itself the adequate ground of its existence. Nothing in the physical world simply explains itself—can you think of a counter-example?

certainly reality doesn’t just hand us this distinction between necessary and contingent beings. you are creating the distinction as a possibly useful tool for understanding the world (but is it?) and just presupposing that “nothing in the universe contains within itself the adequate ground of its existence.” how do you know that? no, i can’t think of a counter example, but my ignorance or lack of imagination is no proof of anything.

the point is that such “proofs” work if one is willing to buy into a particular vocabulary, but they are only likely to be convincing to people who weren’t already convinced to begin with.

If there is a “presupposition” to this sort of thinking, then it simply that we suppose the world to be intelligible. We must approach philosophy with the assumption that our minds are configured in such a way that it is possible for us to trust our senses to at least some extent and thereby abstract knowledge from the material world. If things aren’t knowable, then we might as well throw up our hands and stare at our navels all day.

it is interesting that you say this because i find that people who have a theistic conception of god so often tell me the opposite–that there are some things that we as mere humans cannot possibly understand, that some things that appear completely nonsensical or contradictory to us are really not.

rocinante

 

[Damase]

certainly reality doesn’t just hand us this distinction between necessary and contingent beings. you are creating the distinction as a possibly useful tool for understanding the world (but is it?) and just presupposing that “nothing in the universe contains within itself the adequate ground of its existence.” how do you know that? no, i can’t think of a counter example, but my ignorance or lack of imagination is no proof of anything.

I would argue that reality does, in fact, hand us these distinctions by the fact that we can make them and that they are validly made. You question the value of such a distinction—besides the fact that it allows us to justify the project of science and the validity of trusting our sensory perception (everything has a cause and therefore an explanation), we just used it to argue for the existence of God. Not useful enough?

the point is that such “proofs” work if one is willing to buy into a particular vocabulary, but they are only likely to be convincing to people who weren’t already convinced to begin with.

What’s the alternative vocabulary that would suggest that terms like “necessary” and “contingent” are not useful? The bottom line is that you either agree to accept the language of philosophy or don’t play the game. I’m not saying that you have to accept the distinction, but at least be prepared to argue against the validity of the concept rather than just the terminology.

it is interesting that you say this because i find that people who have a theistic conception of god so often tell me the opposite–that there are some things that we as mere humans cannot possibly understand, that some things that appear completely nonsensical or contradictory to us are really not.

I suppose that you have never met a Thomist before.

What is beyond our understanding? God, since He exists outside of the universe, unencumbered by limit and definition. Thus there are things about God that we cannot understand: His nature, His will, etc. Incidentally, one wouldn’t have to be a theist to accept these propositions; they are, in a matter of fact, so basic that deists will assent to them. (Theists, as you know, are differentiated from deists in that they believe that God manifests Himself to His creation as a person, desiring us to understand Him, and active in the governance of the universe.)

But everything in the physical world has an explanation and a cause.