Essence substance and nature

[billcu1]

Is there a difference in essence substance and nature? I know God has a divine nature and 3 fold personage. There are no “accidents” either to him I would assume because that’s all that our sense can detect.

 

[bzkoss236]

Is there a difference in essence substance and nature? I know God has a divine nature and 3 fold personage. There are no “accidents” either to him I would assume because that’s all that our sense can detect.

As I understand it. God’s nature is divine; God’s substance is spirit.

 

[jonathan_hili]

Using scholastic language, a “substance” is an individuated thing with properties, for example, chair, dog, cow… “Essence” and “nature” are sometimes used interchangeably but can be distinguished too. A substance’s essence would comprise of those properties fundamental to its being, or “nature”, the removal of which would result in no longer being the same essential substance. For example, an essential property of being human (that is, of human nature) is consciousness, or the potential of consciousness. Removing this property results in no longer having a human essence and consequently, human nature. Essential properties can be contrasted with accidentals (accidental properties), which are not essential for a substance to maintain its nature.

 

[hicetnunc]

Is there a difference in essence substance and nature? I know God has a divine nature and 3 fold personage. There are no “accidents” either to him I would assume because that’s all that our sense can detect.

These are very technical terms in philosophy, and are sometimes used in various senses, even by St Thomas himself. Briefly put, substance and essence are closely related, and what the Scholastics called “static”, while the nature of things is more “dynamic”. Natures, in other words, can admit of movement, while the substance of a thing remains the same; natures admit of what St Thomas calls, “a tendency to perfection”.

“Substance” us used in various senses (both Aristotle and St Thomas speak of primary and secondary substances), but the term is generally reserved for material beings subject to sense experience. Substance is also said of God, but it is used analogically from the sense in which it is used to speak of creatures (in other words, not in the same sense). Substance is most often used to describe esse or ens (“to be”, or “what-is”), while essence is used to describe that which makes a thing what it is, and so it often has a more general application (we can speak of the “essence of Justice”, for example, but not properly speaking, the “substance of justice”).

 

[fakename]

Is there a difference in essence substance and nature? I know God has a divine nature and 3 fold personage. There are no “accidents” either to him I would assume because that’s all that our sense can detect.

The above posters are mostly correct. For someone who wants to truly understand philosophy one must keep the subtle distinctions between form, essence, nature, etc. however, if one is just trying to approximately understand philosophy it may be better to just remember that these concepts are all similar and then re-read whatever text you are reading to master the concepts of substance.

But let me add that there are essential accidents which exist not according to the definition of a thing but according to how that thing necessarily and really exists/interacts with the world. For instance, it is an essential accident that man laughs or it is an essential accident that animals can be killed by knifes.

There are accidents in God but in a highly platonic/analogical sense, and these accidents are none other than the Trinitarian Persons themselves.

 

[hicetnunc]

There are accidents in God but in a highly platonic/analogical sense, and these accidents are none other than the Trinitarian Persons themselves.

There are no accidents in God, neither in an analogical sense nor in any other. See St Thomas on this question (ST I, q.3, a.6). Furthermore, the Persons in the Trinity are not accidental forms; the definition of person, philosophically, is an “incommunicable substance.” The notion of God’s infinite nature does not admit of accidents in any manner whatsoever (SCG, 1.43). Furthermore, accidents by definition supervene on a substance; the Persons of the Trinity are identical to the Divine Essence. This was solemnly defined by the 4th Lateran Council.

 

[levinas12]

For example, an essential property of being human (that is, of human nature) is consciousness, or the potential of consciousness.

I would add the nuance of “rational”. And “consciousness” might be too Cartesian. Maybe “embodied rational agent” might be a better formulation (although it’s a mouthful).

And “potential” must be unpacked a bit more. The fertilized egg is an actual human being, not a potental human being. But it does not yet have the organs associated with a human being. This is what confused Aristotle. There has to be a way of philosophically accounting for its actuality as a human being even without the organs.

Sorry for the digression.

 

[paduard]

I would add the nuance of “rational”. And “consciousness” might be too Cartesian. Maybe “embodied rational agent” might be a better formulation (although it’s a mouthful).

And “potential” must be unpacked a bit more. The fertilized egg is an actual human being, not a potental human being. But it does not yet have the organs associated with a human being. This is what confused Aristotle. There has to be a way of philosophically accounting for its actuality as a human being even without the organs.

Sorry for the digression.

I don’t know whether this is exactly logical; but would have thought that the fertilized egg is both actual and ‘in-potential’. Just as in the same way a man aged say 40 is actual and in potential to reach the age of say 60; even if it so happens he dies before 60.

 

[hicetnunc]

I would add the nuance of “rational”. And “consciousness” might be too Cartesian.

I wouldn’t say consciousness is Cartesian. It predates Descartes considerably and is integral to the notion of the person (the classical definition of person is, “an individual substance of a rational nature”). Interestingly, a number of philosophers held consciousness to be the seat of common sense; and still others held it to be the seat of natural law.

 

[jonathan_hili]

I would add the nuance of “rational”. And “consciousness” might be too Cartesian. Maybe “embodied rational agent” might be a better formulation (although it’s a mouthful).

And “potential” must be unpacked a bit more. The fertilized egg is an actual human being, not a potental human being. But it does not yet have the organs associated with a human being. This is what confused Aristotle. There has to be a way of philosophically accounting for its actuality as a human being even without the organs.

Sorry for the digression.

Hi Levinas. By “potential” I meant: “potentially having consciousness”, likewise if you use the definition “embodied rational agent”, you would have to say “embodied potentially rational agent” for a foetus.

I’d say it is a human being because it has essential human attributes, such as human DNA, and potential for us necessary attributes, such as agency and consciousness (oh, by which I mean awareness, self-reflection, etc.).