Euthyphro Dilemma

[Cruxis117]

What is the Catholic position on the Euthyphro dilemma?

 

[Pfaffenhoffen]

What is the Catholic position on the Euthyphro dilemma?

Plenty of reading here:
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euthyphro_dilemma

My position: what comes first: the hen or the egg?

 

[VeritasSeeker]

I don’t think that there is a “Catholic position” on this issue, if by that phrase you mean what Holy Mother Church has said with respect to Euthyphro’s dilemma.The Church does not say that this or that philosophical argument for the existence of God is sound (although the Church has infallibly declared that God’s existence can be known just by reason alone). Neither does it say that this or that argument against the existence of God can be solved in such and such a manner. That being said, there are many theists (Catholics included) who have proposed solutions to the Euthyphro dilemma. Let me lay out the dilemma and discuss one such solution:

**Euthyphro’s Dilemma **

1. Either God wills something because it is good, or something is good because God wills it.
2. If God wills something because it is good, then goodness is independent of God(something which is denied by most mainstream monotheists).
3. If something is good because God wills it, then goodness is based on the arbitrary whim of God.
4. Therefore, either goodness is independent of God, or goodness is based on the arbitrary whim of God.

Presumably, Euthyphro (being a religious priest in Ancient Greece) and classical theists would have a problem with affirming either disjunct of (4) and are therefore caught in the horns of the dilemma. Most theists do not want to say goodness is independent of God (which is understandable). But according to the argument, the only other option is to say that what is good is based on God’s arbitrary whim. If that is the case then whatever God wills, including rape, torture, etc., would be justified. Affirming the 2nd disjunct of (4) is called ‘voluntarist divine command theory’, and it is a position held by some theists (like William of Ockham). However, I think the best objection is to say that the first premise is a false dilemma. God wills something not because it is good, but rather because he is Good. Following William Lane Craig, this position is called ‘essentialist divine command theory’— because morality is based on the essence/nature of God. On this view, God can only do what is consistent with his nature. God’s nature is the standard of all morality, he is the supreme Good. This answers the ontological question of what grounds morality. The question of how we come to know what is good (i.e., what is consistent with God’s nature) is a separate epistemic question(I believe we can come to know what is consistent with God’s nature through the natural law and divine revelation).

P.S. Here is a visual representation of what I just said by noted defender of essentialism, Dr. William Lane Craig: youtube.com/watch?v=m-dpcJSTsKs

God Bless

 

[tonyrey]

However, I think the best objection is to say that the first premise is a false dilemma. God wills something not because it is good, but rather because he is Good. Following William Lane Craig, this position is called ‘essentialist divine command theory’— because morality is based on the essence/nature of God. On this view, God can only do what is consistent with his nature. God’s nature is the standard of all morality, he is the supreme Good. This answers the ontological question of what grounds morality.

So far I haven’t come across a rebuttal of that explanation. It certainly corresponds to Christian teaching because God is Love - and what is love but goodness in action?

 

[Arizona_Mike]

The Euthyphro Dilemma is actually a pretty good argument against polytheism, but not so good against monotheism. As such, it is a pretty fair argument on the Christian side against the inane atheist “One God is as Good as Another” argument or the equally insipid “I Just Believe in One Less God” argument.

 

[Sair]

On this view, God can only do what is consistent with his nature. God’s nature is the standard of all morality, he is the supreme Good. This answers the ontological question of what grounds morality. The question of how we come to know what is good (i.e., what is consistent with God’s nature) is a separate epistemic question(I believe we can come to know what is consistent with God’s nature through the natural law and divine revelation).

The primary problem with this conception is that the primary means of knowing what is consistent with God’s nature (at least historically) is, in fact, scripture - and according to scripture, God countenances or even actually commits actions which most human moral systems find repugnant, such as genocide, rape, incest, murder, infanticide and so forth. It therefore seems difficult to argue from a monotheistic perspective that such things are objectively wrong, and if we consider them wrong from a subjective perspective, a monotheist could easily claim that our merely human subjective opinions count for nothing against the subjective opinion of an all-powerful god.

If the god of classical theism has arbitrary whims, what does that say about any theistic argument for objective morality? Is it sufficient to fall back on the claim that God can do what he likes, because he’s God? And if God created humans, it seems reasonable to suppose that he gave us our moral sense - why would he make our moral sense so different from his own?

The atheistic counter is, of course, that God is imaginary, and has simply been used as an excuse for committing atrocities; as long as it has divine sanction, anything is permissible…

 

[belorg]

I don’t think that there is a “Catholic position” on this issue, if by that phrase you mean what . If that is the case then whatever God wills, including rape, torture, etc., would be justified. Affirming the 2nd disjunct of (4) is called ‘voluntarist divine command theory’, and it is a position held by some theists (like William of Ockham). However, I think the best objection is to say that the first premise is a false dilemma. God wills something not because it is good, but rather because he is Good. Following William Lane Craig, this position is called ‘essentialist divine command theory’— because morality is based on the essence/nature of God. On this view, God can only do what is consistent with his nature.

Yes, God can only do what is consistent with His nature, and I can only do what is consistent with my nature.
But that does not offer a way out of the ED, becasue it is still the case that whatever God wills, including reape etc. would be justified. The only way out of this would be to claim that it is impossible for God to will such things. But then , this has to be argued for.
Is there any logical contradiction in a God who wills rape or torture?
If there is none, then there is no ‘essentialist divine command theory’, because these command are not essential in that a being who issues different commands can still be God.
If there is something logically contradictory about God willing those things, then morality is not grounded in God, but in the fact that a different morality would lead to a logical contradiction e.g. with God’s perfection. ‘Rape’ e.g. would then be considered an imperfection, but an imperfection can be assessed as such in the absense of God.

As far as I know, the ED is not used as an argument against monotheism or polytheism, but as an argument against God (or Gods) being the ground of morality without morality being arbitrary. And the ED succeeds in doing so.

God’s nature is the standard of all morality, he is the supreme Good. This answers the ontological question of what grounds morality. The question of how we come to know what is good (i.e., what is consistent with God’s nature) is a separate epistemic question(I believe we can come to know what is consistent with God’s nature through the natural law and divine revelation).

P.S. Here is a visual representation of what I just said by noted defender of essentialism, Dr. William Lane Craig: youtube.com/watch?v=m-dpcJSTsKs

God Bless

 

[tonyrey]

Yes, God can only do what is consistent with His nature, and I can only do what is consistent with my nature.
But that does not offer a way out of the ED, becasue it is still the case that whatever God wills, including rape etc. would be justified. The only way out of this would be to claim that it is impossible for God to will such things.

You might as well say it is impossible for God to destroy Himself - which is obviously absurd because He is the Creator not the Destroyer. To will any negative or destructive result is contrary to divine positivity, i.e. the immense value of existence, development, love, fulfilment and joy.

 

[tonyrey]

You might as well say it is impossible for God to destroy Himself - which is obviously absurd because He is the Creator not the Destroyer. To will any negative or destructive result is contrary to divine positivity, i.e. the immense value of existence, development, love, fulfilment and joy.

What I mean is that it doesn’t make sense for God to be - or do - evil any more than for a straight line to become crooked! To suggest that it is a limitation for the loving Father not to be able to become a crook is ludicrous…

 

[belorg]

You might as well say it is impossible for God to destroy Himself - which is obviously absurd because He is the Creator not the Destroyer. To will any negative or destructive result is contrary to divine positivity, i.e. the immense value of existence, development, love, fulfilment and joy.

Yes, but who says God is necessarily positive?
Of course God cannopt destroy Himself, but that has nothing to do with being a Creator, it has to do with Him being necessary, and necessaru beings cannot not exist, because their nonexistence would be contradictory. But there is nothing contradictory in God destroying something, or God wanting something else beside joy (except for himself)…

 

[VeritasSeeker]

The primary problem with this conception is that the primary means of knowing what is consistent with God’s nature (at least historically) is, in fact, scripture - and according to scripture, God countenances or even actually commits actions which most human moral systems find repugnant, such as genocide, rape, incest, murder, infanticide and so forth. It therefore seems difficult to argue from a monotheistic perspective that such things are objectively wrong, and if we consider them wrong from a subjective perspective, a monotheist could easily claim that our merely human subjective opinions count for nothing against the subjective opinion of an all-powerful god.

Yes, God can only do what is consistent with His nature, and I can only do what is consistent with my nature.
But that does not offer a way out of the ED, becasue it is still the case that whatever God wills, including reape etc. would be justified. The only way out of this would be to claim that it is impossible for God to will such things. But then , this has to be argued for.
Is there any logical contradiction in a God who wills rape or torture?
If there is none, then there is no ‘essentialist divine command theory’, because these command are not essential in that a being who issues different commands can still be God.
If there is something logically contradictory about God willing those things, then morality is not grounded in God, but in the fact that a different morality would lead to a logical contradiction e.g. with God’s perfection. ‘Rape’ e.g. would then be considered an imperfection, but an imperfection can be assessed as such in the absense of God.

Your responses are of the same type, so I will take it as one objection. It is important to separate the epistemic question of morality–viz., “How do we come to know what is consistent with God’s nature?” from the ontological question of morality which asks what morality is grounded in. These questions should not be conflated. Whether or not we have any epistemic access to God’s nature is irrelevant to it being a false dilemma. Euthyphro’s dilemma concerns the ontology of morality and thus the response to it given by Essentialist divine command theorists is a response to the ontological question of morality(a response that presupposes that God exists). Now, in terms of the epistemic question, let me just throw out some ideas. You are correct in saying that scripture does provide one means of knowing what is consistent with God’s nature. Whatever God does is necessarily consistent with his nature. Thus, the commands of God in the Holy Bible is necessarily consistent with his nature if Christianity is true. And there is no problem here. As for the accusation that God commands “Genocide, rape, incest and the like” I would need you to reference me specific examples. If your implicitly referring to God’s command to expel the Canaanites (which is not genocide) you will find your answer in this video: Did God command genocide in the bible? Let me give you another means of knowing what is consistent with God’s nature— viz. natural law. The following argument allows us to know what acts are consistent/ not consistent with Gods nature (i.e., what is good) by virtue of whether or not they are consistent/ not consistent with human nature (bear with me, this will get technical):

	Argument Establishing Natural Law

1. (Fundamental Postulate) A Maximally Great being created us.
2. (Axiom 1) What is good is what corresponds to the nature of a Maximally Great being.
3. (Axiom 2) One should do what is good, and one should not do what is bad. (self-evident)
4. If a maximally great being created us then our human nature is good. (Necessary truth)
5. Therefore, our human nature is good. (1,4)
6. If our human nature is good then it is good for us to act in accordance with our human nature.
7. Therefore, it is good for us to act in accordance with our human nature. (5,6)
8. If it is good for us to act in accordance with our human nature, then it is bad for us to act in disconcordance with our human nature.
9. Therefore, it is bad for us to act in disconcordance with our human nature. (7,8)

 

[VeritasSeeker]

(Continued)

Now let’s derive some practical conclusions from this (you could derive millions of things), here are a few:

1. Smoking is not consistent with human nature.
   A.Our bodies were not made to ingest such harmful chemicals that do nothing but harm us.
2. Therefore, smoking is bad/ immoral.

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1. Bestiality is not consistent with human nature (man was made to have sex with his own species).
2. Therefore, bestiality is bad/ immoral.

---

1. Polygamy is inconsistent with human nature (humans are pair-bonders by nature).
2. Therefore, polygamy is bad/ immoral.

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1. To excel in our rational faculties is consistent with human nature.
2. Education excels our rational faculties.
3. Therefore, education is consistent with human nature.
4. Therefore, education is good/ moral.

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1.To be vegetarian is inconsistent with human nature (man is naturally omnivorous).
2.Therefore, being a vegetarian (when it is not dictated by some medical reason[though I know of none]) is immoral.​

1. Slavery is inconsistent with human nature.
   A.There are no natural rulers among men. There are no equivalents of queen bees(who naturally rule their beehives) among men.
2. Therefore, slavery is bad.
   Just a side note: Yes Christ did tell slaves to obey their masters, but slaves in the 1st century were not slaves in today’s sense of the word. Today they would be called servants.

---

Here is one based more explicitly on reason (just to give you a feel for how comprehensive natural law is!)

1. To reason is to act in accordance with human nature.
2. Whatever is in accordance with reason is in accordance with human nature.
3. The principle of proportionality (i.e., that the principle that punishment should be commensurate to the crime) is in accordance with reason.
4. Therefore, the principal of proportionality is consistent with human nature.
5. Therefore it is good for Judges to punish a criminal with a punishment that is commensurate with his/her crime, and bad for Judges to punish a criminal with a punishment that is not commensurate with his/her crime.

Each of these examples can be comprehensively argued for, but the point is that these are a few examples that demonstrate that in fact, we can come to know what is in accordance with God’s nature from supra-revelatory sources. In fact, most people come to apprehend what is right and wrong through the natural law which is grounded in our human natures. For as the Holy Bible tells us, “For when the Gentiles who do not have the law by nature observe the prescriptions of the law, they are a law for themselves even though they do not have the law. They show that the demands of the law are written in their hearts, while their conscience also bears witness and their conflicting thoughts accuse or even defend them.” (Romans 2:14-15)
So in conclusion, if we have good grounds to think that some action is consistent with human nature, then we have good grounds for thinking that the action is good/ consistent with God’s nature.

As far as I know, the ED is not used as an argument against monotheism or polytheism, but as an argument against God (or gods) being the ground of morality without morality being arbitrary.

Indeed, that is what Socrates used it for. Prior to Socrates posing this dilemma to Euthyphro he gives an objection to the idea that morality is grounded in the wills of the gods —viz., that ‘the gods are at war with themselves.’ The Greek gods were known for disagreeing, so morality can’t be grounded in what they think is good, for what some gods think is good others think is bad. Now this objection obviously doesn’t work against monotheistic faiths because God has only one will, but that is where Euthyphro’s dilemma comes in (though Socrates himself didn’t explicitly use the argument against the idea of a single God grounding morality, this was a later extrapolation).

God bless my friends, I hope I adequately answered your responses!

 

[VeritasSeeker]

Here is one based more explicitly on Reason (just to give you a feel for how comprehensive natural law is!)

 

[tonyrey]

You might as well say it is impossible for God to destroy Himself - which is obviously absurd because He is

Is Creation positive or negative?

Of course God cannot destroy Himself, but that has nothing to do with being a Creator, it has to do with Him being necessary…

You need to explain why being the Creator and being necessary are incompatible…

But there is nothing contradictory in God destroying something, or God wanting something else beside joy (except for himself)…

Destruction is the antithesis of Creation. “wanting something else” is not obviously inconsistent with “wanting joy”…

 

[belorg]

Your responses are of the same type, so I will take it as one objection. It is important to separate the epistemic question of morality–viz., “How do we come to know what is consistent with God’s nature?” from the ontological question of morality which asks what morality is grounded in. These questions should not be conflated.

No, I agree, they shouldn’t, but the question is not, ‘Does God have a certain nature?’ because of course, if God exists He has a certain nature, just as I have a certain nature… The question is, ‘Could God’s nature be (have been) any different?’ And the answer to that question is what matters.

Let me give you another means of knowing what is consistent with God’s nature— viz. natural law. The following argument allows us to know what acts are consistent/ not consistent with Gods nature (i.e., what is good) by virtue of whether or not they are consistent/ not consistent with human nature (bear with me, this will get technical):

  Argument Establishing Natural Law

1. (Fundamental Postulate) A Maximally Great being created us.

OK

1. (Axiom 1) What is good is what corresponds to the nature of a Maximally Great being.

Herein lies the problem., because this presupposes that there is something objectively good or bad and the ‘goodness’ or ‘badness’ is independent of God.
Let me clarify. A maximal great being is omnipotent. But ‘omnipotent’ can be defined without referring to God. An omnipotent being is a being that can do whatever is not logically impossible.
But if you include morality as one of the properties of a maximal great being, that means that whatever morality consists of is maximally great, IOW, if God commands us to love each other, it’s because loving each other is greater than not loving each other, which brings us back to the first horn of the ED.

 

[belorg]

Is Creation positive or negative?

I do not know. But if creation is positive, that means it is objectively positive and its being positive is not grounded in God. If creation is positive, then God created because creation is positive. And we 're back at the first horn of the ED.

You need to explain why being the Creator and being necessary are incompatible…

No, becasue I am not disputing this. You, on the other hand need to explain why a being that is necessary must necesarily create.

Destruction is the antithesis of Creation. “wanting something else” is not obviously inconsistent with “wanting joy”…

No, but what about “wanting some pain” or “some agony” isn’t that antithetical to wanting joy?

 

[tonyrey]

Is Creation positive or negative?

You don’t know if creating something from nothing is positive?

But if creation is positive, that means it is objectively positive and its being positive is not grounded in God.

God is grounded in Himself - as you might expect where the Necessary Being is concerned!

If creation is positive, then God created because creation is positive. And we 're back at the first horn of the ED.

I have already pointed out that God is is positive in every aspect of His Being: existence, development, love, fulfilment and joy.

You need to explain why being the Creator and being necessary are incompatible…

No, because I am not disputing this. You, on the other hand need to explain why a being that is necessary must necessarily create.

I am not God! Nor do I claim to understand how God exists but it stands to reason that He must at the very least be creating Himself; otherwise He wouldn’t be the Necessary Being.

Destruction is the antithesis of Creation. “wanting something else” is not obviously inconsistent with “wanting joy”…

No, but what about “wanting some pain” or “some agony” isn’t that antithetical to wanting joy? I do not know.

God does not want pain to occur but He permits it because it is necessary for the survival, development and fulfilment of sentient beings.

 

[VeritasSeeker]

No, I agree, they shouldn’t, but the question is not, ‘Does God have a certain nature?’ because of course, if God exists He has a certain nature, just as I have a certain nature… The question is, ‘Could God’s nature be (have been) any different?’ And the answer to that question is what matters.

Well, you you guys previously asked " If God’s nature is what grounds morality then how do we know what is good? I.e., how do we know what is in accordance with God’s nature?" That is the objection you two raised in your previous posts and i replied to them. Now you ask If God’s nature could have been any different. The answer is no, God, if he exists, is a necessary being. This can be shown in many ways but it is not pertinent to this discussion, a maximally great being is by definition necessary. In fact most philosophers agree that God’s existence is either necessary or impossible. He could not have been any other way.

Herein lies the problem., because this presupposes that there is something objectively good or bad and the ‘goodness’ or ‘badness’ is independent of God.

What is good is what corresponds to the nature of a Maximally Great being. This premise does not presuppose that goodness or badness is independent of God, in fact it says the opposite. It defines what it is to be good–viz., to correspond to God’s nature. It does say that morality is objective for it grounds goodness in the nature of a Maximally great being, and what could be more objective than that? So I see no problems here and I apologize if I am not understanding your contention. God Bless my friend!

 

[belorg]

Well, you you guys previously asked " If God’s nature is what grounds morality then how do we know what is good? I.e., how do we know what is in accordance with God’s nature?"

Actually, that’s not what I asked.

That is the objection you two raised in your previous posts and i replied to them.

I didn’t raise that objection. You misunderstood me.

Now you ask If God’s nature could have been any different. The answer is no, God, if he exists, is a necessary being. This can be shown in many ways but it is not pertinent to this discussion, a maximally great being is by definition necessary. In fact most philosophers agree that God’s existence is either necessary or impossible. He could not have been any other way.

Most philosophers agree that God is either necessary or impossible, but most philosophers also agree that God has essential as well as contingent properties, so He could have been different in some ways… What you will have to show is that God’s moral nature is essential to Him, but I fear that, if you do so, you will find yourself stuck on the first horn of the Dillemma.

What is good is what corresponds to the nature of a Maximally Great being. This premise does not presuppose that goodness or badness is independent of God, in fact it says the opposite. It defines what it is to be good–viz., to correspond to God’s nature.

If that’s what it says, then you are now on the second horn of the dilemma.

It does say that morality is objective for it grounds goodness in the nature of a Maximally great being, and what could be more objective than that? So I see no problems here and I apologize if I am not understanding your contention. God Bless my friend!

The problem here is that you just keep jumping back and forth from the first to the second horn of the dilemma. You do not really have a solition.

 

[belorg]

You don’t know if creating something from nothing is positive?

That depends on how you define positive.

God is grounded in Himself - as you might expect where the Necessary Being is concerned!

A necessary being is grounded in its necessity, not in Itself.

I have already pointed out that God is is positive in every aspect of His Being: existence, development, love, fulfilment and joy.

I think you are equivocating on the meaning of ‘positive’ here.

I I am not God! Nor do I claim to understand how God exists but it stands to reason that He must at the very least be creating Himself; otherwise He wouldn’t be the Necessary Being.

Necessary beings are uncreated, so they don’t ‘create themselves’

God does not want pain to occur but He permits it because it is necessary for the survival, development and fulfilment of sentient beings.

That may be the case, but then His nature can be such that He thinks it necessary to condo,ne rape, murder, eternal torture etc.