Everyone's favourite sin

[Sair]

Not certain this is the correct forum for this post - it may be more suited to philosophy - but as it’s directly related to morality, this seemed an appropriate place for the discussion I wanted to have.

I’ve noticed that many posters to these forums tend to frown upon a consequentialist approach to morality, preferring to believe that moral laws are prescribed by God, and that certain things are wrong just because they’re wrong, or because they offend God - even if they don’t offend any human person.

I, on the other hand, tend towards a pragmatic approach (both literally and philosophically speaking) and I really do think that consequentialism, for all practical purposes, is ultimately the only way we can determine the rightness or wrongness of actions in relation to our common human experience. Our capacities for imagination, rational deliberation and empathy are the tools we use to think ahead and analyse the probable consequences of our actions, both for ourselves and for any others who might be affected.

If we apply this approach to that most well-known and seemingly universal taboo - extramarital sex - we can see that there are in fact a whole raft of reasons for which it can be considered ill-advised. First and most obvious is that sex tends to lead to children, and I don’t think anyone can deny that it’s suboptimal - and often just plain bad - for both parent and child if the child is raised without the support base of a committed relationship based upon trust, affection and cooperation. Such a relationship doesn’t necessarily mean marriage, and although many marriages fall below that ideal, the ideal still remains something we think is worth striving for. In any case, this aspect of extramarital sex has become less of an issue since the invention of reliable methods of contraception - in consequentialist terms, this serves to reduce the number of people affected by the action.

If we go back to the days when women were generally considered the property of men in some form or other (in the West, anyway - I won’t get into the situation in many Middle Eastern nations), and were boxed into the neat little categories of virgin, mother and whore, we find other reasons for considering extramarital sex to be unacceptable. What we also find is the emergence of a rather hideous double standard. Women were expected to keep themselves ‘pure’ and ‘virtuous’ until such time as they could make a good - read socially advantageous - marriage. Upon marriage, they would move from being their father’s possession to their husband’s - and I daresay it must have been very gratifying for a man to think that he was the one and only possesser of his wife (but then again, is it really such a good thing to pander to a man’s ego in such a fashion?) On the other hand, it was tacitly accepted (although officially frowned upon in polite society) for a man to dip his wick, as 'twere, with less virtuous members of the fairer sex - goodness knows, a man has needs - but it was never considered a good idea to marry such a woman, even if she didn’t accept money in return for her sexual favours. After all, how was a man to know that the child of an ‘impure’ woman was his? Heaven forbid he might be duped into bestowing property on another man’s offspring!

But before I turn this into a treatise on the absurdities of patriarchal social arrangements, let’s get back to the subject of sex. Everyone knows that sexual intimacy carries emotional baggage. Even for people who insist that “it’s just sex”, there’s no escaping at least some level of emotional impact. Sex is, after all, the closest you can physically get to another person, and I often wonder why anyone would want to do it without the emotional closeness as well. And there is no denying that the pleasures of sex are immeasurably enhanced when coupled with the pleasure and security of emotional intimacy, so it could be said that those who engage in casual sex are just selling themselves short. But again, marriage is demonstrably not a prerequisite for emotional intimacy.

There are other circumstances in which extramarital sex can be the basis of a wrong action. If we consider the cases of rape and adultery, for example, there seems to be pretty universal agreement, even from a consequentialist point of view, that such actions are demonstrably bad and therefore wrong. But this isn’t because of the sex. Rape is wrong because it is a violation of the victim’s personal autonomy and integrity. Adultery is wrong because it involves a betrayal of trust (at this point I won’t get into the concept of polyamorous or “open” marriages - that’s complicated territory). Sex just happens to be the means by which these wrong actions are committed.

In order to consider extramarital sex to be wrong in and of itself, it’s necessary to believe that it has consequences other than those directly related to human experience. If you believe your body is a sacred vessel that is desecrated by unsanctioned sexual activity, then it follows that sex without the formal marriage is wrong or sinful. If you believe that your body belongs not to you but to a deity, then you might be inclined to think that you need to have that deity’s permission, in the form of marriage, to engage in sex. Why, though, I wonder, is such permission not required for engaging in other body-related activities - like eating, for example, or taking a bath, or having a surgical operation?

So, my conclusion from all this is that a consequentialist position might lead you to think that extramarital sex is unwise in certain circumstances, but it clearly takes religious faith of some kind to believe that it is wrong.

 

[Sailor_Kenshin]

All I know is that pragmatism leads to the death of countless innocent ‘useless eaters.’

 

[slywakka250]

I like the points you make, as for me personally, the consequential and pragmatic motivations is what helps in my attempt to live the faith when it comes to sexual morality. Where I’m at in my faith, I have a very difficult time seeing extramarital sex as wrong itself, by its very nature, but only for its likely consequences and more secular considerations. The extent of my motivation outside of these is the fear of hell, which is a frustrating motivation which makes me fearful and angry at God.

Rape is wrong because it is a violation of the victim’s personal autonomy and integrity. Adultery is wrong because it involves a betrayal of trust

Why is a violation of victim’s personal autonomy wrong?
What’s the big deal with a betrayal of trust?

You seem to think that *these *things are wrong in themselves; it seems clear to me too that you can say reasonably that trust is something valuable, and personal integrity is also something of value. are the statements that “betraying trust is wrong,” and “violating personal autonomy is wrong,” more self-evident than the statement"extramarital sex is wrong." ??

 

[Ocarm]

You seem to think that *these *things are wrong in themselves; it seems clear to me too that you can say reasonably that trust is something valuable, and personal integrity is also something of value. are the statements that “betraying trust is wrong,” and “violating personal autonomy is wrong,” more self-evident than the statement"extramarital sex is wrong." ??

Slywakka makes a very good point. Most ethical models - including those based on theism - risk engaging in a variant on the natural fallacy, which says that x is not intrinsically good, and is only good because it embodies y; when asked to justify why this makes it good, the argument is, because y is intrinsically good. Thus good remains undefined, and the logical case is regressive.

As theists, we hold that the intrinsic good in x is guaranteed because it embodies y, where y is God’s will. That may seem insatisfactory, but is no more so than the argument that x is good because it embodies y, where y is ‘good consequences’.

The problem I have with consequentialism, and also with utilitarianism, situational ethics and most other models that look to concrete determinable results, is that they rely on the use of a moral calculus which enables the observer to determine precisely what the consequences of an action are going to be, and so make an ethical decision. Since no such calculus exists - despite the effforts of many philosophers to provide it- and given that we do not in any event have perfect knowledge of all the variables when we make a decision, it is impossible to judge the ethical outcome of an action in advance by addressing its consequences.

Thus it seems better to me to trust a well-established ethic that has proven itself rather than seek to reinvent moral standards a thousand times every day of our lives. This can, however, become an excuse for ethical laziness, and a refusal to acknowledge that complex issues are not always reducible to a religious black/white answer, which is where (in my humble opinion) religious and other prescriptive ethics sometimes go astray.

 

[Sair]

Slywakka makes a very good point. Most ethical models - including those based on theism - risk engaging in a variant on the natural fallacy, which says that x is not intrinsically good, and is only good because it embodies y; when asked to justify why this makes it good, the argument is, because y is intrinsically good. Thus good remains undefined, and the logical case is regressive.

As theists, we hold that the intrinsic good in x is guaranteed because it embodies y, where y is God’s will. That may seem insatisfactory, but is no more so than the argument that x is good because it embodies y, where y is ‘good consequences’.

The problem I have with consequentialism, and also with utilitarianism, situational ethics and most other models that look to concrete determinable results, is that they rely on the use of a moral calculus which enables the observer to determine precisely what the consequences of an action are going to be, and so make an ethical decision. Since no such calculus exists - despite the effforts of many philosophers to provide it- and given that we do not in any event have perfect knowledge of all the variables when we make a decision, it is impossible to judge the ethical outcome of an action in advance by addressing its consequences.

Thus it seems better to me to trust a well-established ethic that has proven itself rather than seek to reinvent moral standards a thousand times every day of our lives. This can, however, become an excuse for ethical laziness, and a refusal to acknowledge that complex issues are not always reducible to a religious black/white answer, which is where (in my humble opinion) religious and other prescriptive ethics sometimes go astray.

My understanding is that the primary means of making decisions in a utilitarian ethical system - which is consequential - is weighing potential suffering against potential good - which is usually understood as meeting needs and/or affording pleasure. The basic criteria for coming in for ethical consideration are the capacities to suffer and to experience pleasure. This, I think, sets the bar rather lower than those ethical systems which assume that only humans, with their potential to engage in rational and moral decision making, are worthy of ethical consideration. I’ve seen some discussion regarding the distinction between moral agents and moral patients in a given ethical system, but I don’t really know enough in that regard to engage in informed debate over such things.

Having said that, I think there is also a basis for classifying actions according to a consequentialist ethic. There are actions which, according to our observation and experience, invariably cause suffering. Murder, for example, is always an action that will cause suffering to someone - the victim at the very least, and very likely their family and friends as well. The same may be said of any action which wantonly deprives a person of their autonomy without their consent, or an action which betrays their trust - in each case, the subject suffers. We know this based upon our common human experience. In this light, I think it is easy to see the distinction between an act of consensual extramarital sex, for example, and an act of rape. The former can be, in certain circumstances, a source of great pleasure and comfort; the latter can only ever be a source of suffering, at least to the victim.

 

[rwoehmke]

If one cannot understand why committing one of the seven capital sins or violating one of the ten commandments is wrong, one does not have an adequate grasp of the damage these actions have on the human community. As the saying goes "God is not mocked’ and the ultimate wages of sin, any sin, is death and big words and human casuistry will not change that fact.

 

[Sair]

If one cannot understand why committing one of the seven capital sins or violating one of the ten commandments is wrong, one does not have an adequate grasp of the damage these actions have on the human community. As the saying goes "God is not mocked’ and the ultimate wages of sin, any sin, is death and big words and human casuistry will not change that fact.

I suspect that, all other things being equal, lack of belief in or failure to correctly worship the Judeo-Christian God is not something that does actual damage to a human community. Yet if you consider the Ten Commandments, the first three relate to how one must worship God and God alone. If we take the order of the commandments to indicate their relative importance, are we to suppose that failure to worship God is more damaging to human life and community than murder, or theft? As we say in my country, come off it. Whilst I understand that for a person of faith, my failure to worship your God could be gravely offensive, I can’t imagine you’d find it less offensive if I were to commit a violent assault against you. This is where pragmatism and consequentialism come into play - consequences that are observable are consequences that we can rationally (and emotionally, for that matter) judge to be either beneficial, neutral or damaging. As far as a consequentialist ethic is concerned, blasphemy or lack of faith in a god are victimless crimes, and hence not crimes at all.

 

[teachccd]

I suspect that, all other things being equal, lack of belief in or failure to correctly worship the Judeo-Christian God is not something that does actual damage to a human community. Yet if you consider the Ten Commandments, the first three relate to how one must worship God and God alone. If we take the order of the commandments to indicate their relative importance, are we to suppose that failure to worship God is more damaging to human life and community than murder, or theft? As we say in my country, come off it. Whilst I understand that for a person of faith, my failure to worship your God could be gravely offensive, I can’t imagine you’d find it less offensive if I were to commit a violent assault against you. This is where pragmatism and consequentialism come into play - consequences that are observable are consequences that we can rationally (and emotionally, for that matter) judge to be either beneficial, neutral or damaging. As far as a consequentialist ethic is concerned, blasphemy or lack of faith in a god are victimless crimes, and hence not crimes at all.

I will pray for you… teachccd

 

[srlucado]

Everyone’s favourite sin

When I read the title of this thread, I was sure you meant pride.

 

[Sair]

When I read the title of this thread, I was sure you meant pride.

It may be a personal favourite for many, but sexual sins seem to get far more attention!

 

[Sair]

I will pray for you… teachccd

In all seriousness, why?

Is it from a sense of obligation, or do you actually hope to achieve something by it?

 

[teachccd]

In all seriousness, why?

Is it from a sense of obligation, or do you actually hope to achieve something by it?

In all seriousness, I will pray for you…teachccd

 

[rpp]

In all seriousness, why?

Is it from a sense of obligation, or do you actually hope to achieve something by it?

His motives are clear, love for a fellow sinner and a deep concern or your immortal soul. Praying for another person is an act of great charity and love.

As for your original assertion, you are describing a utilitarian philosophy. Utilitarianism is extremely dangerous and has historically been used to justify some of the most heinous actions my many governments and political movements.

All acts that are described as sin do indeed harm people. There is no such thing as a harmless sin. This is not your utilitarian approach. No, rather it is the harm we do to ourselves and possibly others by sin that is part of what offends God. I challenge you to describe something the Church has deemed sinful that does not harm anyone.

 

[Sair]

His motives are clear, love for a fellow sinner and a deep concern or your immortal soul. Praying for another person is an act of great charity and love.

If I were in difficult circumstances, I may well derive emotional comfort from the knowledge that someone was thinking of me - otherwise I see no efficacy inherent in prayer. This is especially so where the option exists to do something actively to support a person, although that’s not always possible. I have a brother who prays that I will return to the Church. Whilst I understand his motives, I do not consider his prayers to be a particular kindness, nor do I expect them to have any effect.

As for your original assertion, you are describing a utilitarian philosophy. Utilitarianism is extremely dangerous and has historically been used to justify some of the most heinous actions my many governments and political movements.

Utilitarianism applied by governments can certainly be dangerous, since it tends not to take into account the extensive harm that can be done to individuals in the name of the ‘greater good’ - to say nothing of the fact that the definition of the ‘greater good’ adopted in such cases (Stalinist Russia and communist China being good examples) can be dubious and often self-serving on the part of the government. However, if we bring this back to an individual scale, a basic form of utilitarianism is what many people use to decide how they will act on a daily basis. We always ought to weigh up the relative good and harm that can result from our actions, and make our decisions accordingly.

All acts that are described as sin do indeed harm people. There is no such thing as a harmless sin. This is not your utilitarian approach. No, rather it is the harm we do to ourselves and possibly others by sin that is part of what offends God. I challenge you to describe something the Church has deemed sinful that does not harm anyone.

I think I already have described examples of actions that are not inherently harmful, but which are deemed sinful by the Church. Consensual extramarital sex does no harm in and of itself - although it can be harmful if it is combined with other factors, such as dishonesty to a spouse or to one’s chosen partner in the act, or lack of proper care to avoid disease or unwanted pregnancy. I described blasphemy as a victimless crime, because it does no actual harm, physical or psychological, to any person - especially if the blasphemer is alone and therefore unlikely to cause offence to any believers in the deity against which she is blaspheming. I imagine you would dispute this on the grounds that it causes spiritual harm to the blasphemer; however, for me to think so would require me to believe in the existence of an immortal soul which is somehow damaged by denigrating a particular deity.

 

[rpp]

If I were in difficult circumstances, I may well derive emotional comfort from the knowledge that someone was thinking of me - otherwise I see no efficacy inherent in prayer. This is especially so where the option exists to do something actively to support a person, although that’s not always possible. I have a brother who prays that I will return to the Church. Whilst I understand his motives, I do not consider his prayers to be a particular kindness, nor do I expect them to have any effect.

Utilitarianism applied by governments can certainly be dangerous, since it tends not to take into account the extensive harm that can be done to individuals in the name of the ‘greater good’ - to say nothing of the fact that the definition of the ‘greater good’ adopted in such cases (Stalinist Russia and communist China being good examples) can be dubious and often self-serving on the part of the government. However, if we bring this back to an individual scale, a basic form of utilitarianism is what many people use to decide how they will act on a daily basis. We always ought to weigh up the relative good and harm that can result from our actions, and make our decisions accordingly.

I think I already have described examples of actions that are not inherently harmful, but which are deemed sinful by the Church. Consensual extramarital sex does no harm in and of itself - although it can be harmful if it is combined with other factors, such as dishonesty to a spouse or to one’s chosen partner in the act, or lack of proper care to avoid disease or unwanted pregnancy. I described blasphemy as a victimless crime, because it does no actual harm, physical or psychological, to any person - especially if the blasphemer is alone and therefore unlikely to cause offence to any believers in the deity against which she is blaspheming. I imagine you would dispute this on the grounds that it causes spiritual harm to the blasphemer; however, for me to think so would require me to believe in the existence of an immortal soul which is somehow damaged by denigrating a particular deity.

Yeah, right. May God grant you the graces you need.