Evolutionary Cosmology

[Nullasalus]

This certainly means nothing about “game over” for theists (this would be impossible, as the assertion that God exists is not an assertion of natural science, but theological science, and so is not principally testable). I will say, though, that how this turns out will give us a new insight into the nature of God, and may end up throwing out the Kalam argument for God.

This would remove one of St. Thomas Aquinas’ 5 ways.

I find this all interesting, so just to make clear I understand you: Do you mean one of Aquinas’ five ways is done away with if eternal inflation (which I’m guessing means past-eternal, rather than just future-eternal?) is indicated to be true, rather than a first-order phase?

 

[ribozyme]

Noma, what do you think of Susskind’s ideas about string theory? I am interested in your opinion on “string landscape”.

 

[tdgesq]

Physicists, for the most part, are skeptical of theories that produce untestable results. But just because some of the results of chaotic inflation are untestable does not mean that all of them are, and if the testable portions of this theory do turn out to be solid, then people should accept chaotic inflation.

I’m way more interested in this. Why “should” we accept an untestable part of the theory.

 

[trth_skr]

I’m way more interested in this. Why “should” we accept an untestable part of the theory.

Many scientific theories require faith to accept (like heliocentrism/acentrism). Funny that many Catholics are not even willing to consider the Church’s position on some issues (like geocentrism). I guuess we are to modern now. Current opinions appeal more to the modern mind.

Mark Wyatt
www.veritas-catholic.blogspot.com
Scientism is a god. It fidgets in the modern pantheon because of the presence of the True God, who accepts no other gods.

 

[noma]

I’m way more interested in this. Why “should” we accept an untestable part of the theory.

If we limit science only to what is testable, we end up in a positivist mindset. We end up thinking that all that exists, scientifically speaking, is what we can directly test. We cannot postulate what we cannot see.

If scientists held this view, we would not have big bang theory, or biological evolution.

We would not have chemistry (which relies on the postulated electron), and so no biomedical sciences.

No one can see the big bang, as a rule of cosmology (there is a huge light blocking the way. No one can see testable results directly supporting biological evolution of primates. No one would live long enough. No one can see electrons. This is a rule of Quantum Mechanics.

Science is not about what can be seen and directly tested, but about the testable effects of what cannot be seen.

“For what is seen is temporary, but what is not seen is eternal.”

 

[noma]

Noma, what do you think of Susskind’s ideas about string theory? I am interested in your opinion on “string landscape”.

I am not much for the anthropic principle. In my mind it begs the question, and invents a gaps explanation.

Why are things the way they are? Answer: so that we can exist to complain about them!

A nice philosophical answer from Hume. A very vacuous answer, in my mind, for reason.

It strikes me as similar to saying “Well, the teachings of the Church must be infallible” “Why?” “Because they say that they are!”

People need deeper reasons.

 

[ribozyme]

Could you elaborate on what do you think about the evidence for the existence of String Landscape. Also, I want to know why the String Landscape begs the question.

 

[hecd2]

If we limit science only to what is testable, we end up in a positivist mindset. We end up thinking that all that exists, scientifically speaking, is what we can directly test. We cannot postulate what we cannot see.

If scientists held this view, we would not have big bang theory, or biological evolution.

We would not have chemistry (which relies on the postulated electron), and so no biomedical sciences.

No one can see the big bang, as a rule of cosmology (there is a huge light blocking the way. No one can see testable results directly supporting biological evolution of primates. No one would live long enough. No one can see electrons. This is a rule of Quantum Mechanics.

Science is not about what can be seen and directly tested, but about the testable effects of what cannot be seen.

I agree with your definition of science, but I don’t think any sophisticated positivist would claim that all that exists is what we can literally see, although I have observed opponents of positivism set about that strawman with glee.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[hecd2]

I am not much for the anthropic principle. In my mind it begs the question, and invents a gaps explanation.

Why are things the way they are? Answer: so that we can exist to complain about them!

A nice philosophical answer from Hume. A very vacuous answer, in my mind, for reason.

It strikes me as similar to saying “Well, the teachings of the Church must be infallible” “Why?” “Because they say that they are!”

People need deeper reasons.

I don’t think your analogy is apt. The one case is self-referential circular argument that is a plain (and very common) fallacy.

The other case recognises the possibility that the emergence of intelligent life might be low probability, but that the cosmos is an immense place with a vast array of different physical environments and billions of opportunities for life over billions of years. So, while the anthropic principle might not be a deep or satisfactory answer to the ultimate puzzle of existence, it is an excellent rebuttal to fine tuning arguments for Design.

Alec
evolutonpages.com

 

[ribozyme]

But I do think that the anthropic principle relies on multiple chances as it seems that only a small fraction of all possible universes generate life. Indeed that anthropic principle states that to an observer, it would seem that their universe is intelligently designed, when it is merely one of many in the anthropic landscape.

Eternal inflation, if correct, utterly destroys that theistic anthropic argument.

 

[tdgesq]

If we limit science only to what is testable, we end up in a positivist mindset. We end up thinking that all that exists, scientifically speaking, is what we can directly test. We cannot postulate what we cannot see.

If scientists held this view, we would not have big bang theory, or biological evolution.

We would not have chemistry (which relies on the postulated electron), and so no biomedical sciences.

No one can see the big bang, as a rule of cosmology (there is a huge light blocking the way. No one can see testable results directly supporting biological evolution of primates. No one would live long enough. No one can see electrons. This is a rule of Quantum Mechanics.

Science is not about what can be seen and directly tested, but about the testable effects of what cannot be seen.

I agree with most of what you’re saying here. If the standard for existence requires direct observation of the thing itself, then there would be precious little in the universe that we could say we know exists. I also agree that science can draw inferences from what is testable. Even if the thing itself cannot be known by direct observation, we can learn about it’s attributes. Maybe even a whole lot about its attributes to the point that we can say with a high degree of confidence that we know it exists in the way it is expressed. Nor do I object that scientists, based largely upon mathematical constructs and the available data, postulate new and exciting possibilities.

I do object to the insistance of some that science requires the kind of positivism you described and then fail to live by it. All the while chortling that this is the only standard for knowledge, and that the metaphysical and transcendent are meaningless. There are different levels of knowledge - different levels of certainty within science (and other disciplines for that matter). The further away we get from direct testability. The more we rely on inferences, and inferences upon inferences. The more we rely on purely mathematical constructs that are part of a theory. The less confidence we can have that the conclusions drawn are actually the case.

And this is where I am in disagreement. Even if we can infer from inflation that it is future-eternal, the prospect of multiple universes appears to be a purely mathematical prediction (all based on my non-technical understanding of Linde’s papers). Mathematical possibilities do not equal ontological reality. Otherwise, we could say that -24 cows, horses, or whatever actually exist. It does no good to say that some of the parts of a theory have been tested and have not been falsified. Imo, this means nothing for the probability of other untested parts of the theory. This isn’t a case where we see the effects of multiple universes, observe those effects and quantify them, and then come to a conclusion that there is a multiverse.

Finally, I found it very interesting that you said we should accept chaotic inflation if the testable parts pan out. The word “should” implies a moral ought. This much I agree with: knowledge, and this very much includes scientific knowledge, is a good thing. Theories that are untestable and unfalsifiable should stay out of the realm of science. This is exactly why I am skeptical of ID and fine tuning, although I haven’t completely ruled out the fine tuning argument.

 

[Nullasalus]

But I do think that the anthropic principle relies on multiple chances as it seems that only a small fraction of all possible universes generate life. Indeed that anthropic principle states that to an observer, it would seem that their universe is intelligently designed, when it is merely one of many in the anthropic landscape.

Eternal inflation, if correct, utterly destroys that theistic anthropic argument.

And I think eternal inflation, if correct, absolutely backs up theistic claims about eternal life and therefore a particular view of God. After all, it has great potential to circumvent arguments about the ultimate fate of the universe (heat death, etc) being our own fate, and more base, nagging questions about what one would do with eternal life (by showing that the potential for infinite and eternal variation, expansion, and therefore interest/purpose is very real. Non-past-eternal inflation, even moreso, because now we’ve proven that the universe/multiverse had a definite point of creation, and an eternal potentiality and purpose.

And while I’m at it, quantum measurement issues prove the existence of the individual human soul. Why stop when I’m on a roll, eh?

 

[hecd2]

I agree with most of what you’re saying here. If the standard for existence requires direct observation of the thing itself, then there would be precious little in the universe that we could say we know exists. I also agree that science can draw inferences from what is testable. Even if the thing itself cannot be known by direct observation, we can learn about it’s attributes. Maybe even a whole lot about its attributes to the point that we can say with a high degree of confidence that we know it exists in the way it is expressed. Nor do I object that scientists, based largely upon mathematical constructs and the available data, postulate new and exciting possibilities.

I do object to the insistance of some that science requires the kind of positivism you described and then fail to live by it. All the while chortling that this is the only standard for knowledge, and that the metaphysical and transcendent are meaningless. There are different levels of knowledge - different levels of certainty within science (and other disciplines for that matter). The further away we get from direct testability. The more we rely on inferences, and inferences upon inferences. The more we rely on purely mathematical constructs that are part of a theory. The less confidence we can have that the conclusions drawn are actually the case.

I broadly agree with most of what you say here, and enthusiastically agree with some of it. I think that the kind of positivism that denies the existence of anything that is not directly observable is easily refuted (and you and others have done so in this thread).

However, I disagree about one thing and I am curious about something else: you say that knowledge that relies on inference is perfectly valid and you point out that inferential reasoning is a perfectly valid basis for getting scientific knowledge. So far so good. However, you go on to suggest that the more we rely on inference, the less confidence we can have in our conclusions. Let us take the case of the structure of DNA - In 1953, there was no way that Crick, Watson et al could directly look at DNA - they inferred its structure from its Xray diffraction pattern and from other pieces of evidence. Their classic paper, setting out their finding, is brief, confident and contains precise and correct details about the structure. Almost all of the science associated with the DNA transcription machinery and the translational rules from DNA to protein, in which we have huge confidence, is of the same kind. We have directly seen very little of it. (Actually seeing with our eyes relies on other kinds of assumption and inferences). I think that our confidence in a hypothesis is not correlated to the degree with which it is directly observable, but the degree to which we have tested it using directly observable and indirect effects.So much for disagreement.

I am curious about your argument that the fact that we can have confidence in knowledge that is based on inferred reasoning from indirect data supports the possibility of transcendental and metaphysical ontology. Where do you draw the line between inference that leads to scientific knowledge and inference has purely metaphysical consequences. In other words, how do you distinguish between physics and metaphysics?

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[tdgesq]

I think that our confidence in a hypothesis is not correlated to the degree with which it is directly observable, but the degree to which we have tested it using directly observable and indirect effects.So much for disagreement.

I might agree depending upon the hypothesis. I think I said as much in the post above. But we are talking here about an ontological hypothesis relating to the existence of multiple universes. And I think this points out a widespread but erroneous view in the specialized sciences. Direct observation of the thing itself gives me much more reliable information of what it is than observing the effects of the thing (that by definition will be different from the thing itself).

Take the example of dropping a pebble in a pool of water. If we could not observe the rock itself, but only the ripples, we could certainly say some things about the pebble, especially if we dropped it in the water repeatedly. We might be able to extrapolate the mass of the object and get a good idea of it’s shape, etc. We wouldn’t really say we know what a pebble is though. Not like if I was holding it in my hand or observing it under the microscope. And this is just a pebble, not a multiverse.

I am curious about your argument that the fact that we can have confidence in knowledge that is based on inferred reasoning from indirect data supports the possibility of transcendental and metaphysical ontology. Where do you draw the line between inference that leads to scientific knowledge and inference has purely metaphysical consequences. In other words, how do you distinguish between physics and metaphysics?

I actually don’t think I did argue that reasoning from indirect data supports the possibility of the transcendental. I guess I did say though that I’m at least willing to entertain the fine tuning argument. This is a difficult question to answer here for quite a few reasons. Very preliminarily, I don’t think it’s an either or proposition. It would be very difficult (if not impossible) through the scientific method to identify a soul or to identify God, because both of these things are immaterial. The specialized sciences are all about quantifying and measuring things. How do you go about measuring something that is immaterial? I do observe that there is existence though, there is being. Where did it come from? I also have an intellect and seem to have free will, and I can observe people around me that seem to act the same way.

Does this mean that I should tell scientists to stop collecting measurable data about the universe or the human brain? That would be crazy. Those things that can be quantified and measured should be, at least to the extent they lead to an increase in human knowledge. This is a very incomplete answer, because it takes metaphysics and the study of first principles to really make a good argument for things like the existence of God and the human soul.

 

[noma]

And this is where I am in disagreement. Even if we can infer from inflation that it is future-eternal, the prospect of multiple universes appears to be a purely mathematical prediction (all based on my non-technical understanding of Linde’s papers).

It wouldn’t be only mathematical. There would be stronger evidence to suggest eternal inflation. It just won’t be able to directly see eternal inflation.

This will depend on analysis of cosmological constants, and anisotropy data for the CMB. Not just on numbers and their properties.

I am not a positivist. But to reject the existence of things that cannot be seen, even from a scientific standpoint, because they cannot be seen, leads to positivism.

So I suppose I agree with you on basically all counts. Except for your analysis of Linde’s paper.

 

[eliasaph99]

Professor Linde’s ideas make an anthropic universe a certainity; no designer is required to set anthropically acceptable constants. His ideas make our universe a mere byproduct of another universe that has undergone inflation, and when our universe underwent inflation, it creates more universes, and those universes create other universes ad infinitum.

Hi,

Quick background: I’m pursuing a doctorate in applied mathematics at a major university. Although I haven’t stayed up with the literature for years, as a teenager I had a huge interest in cosmology and astronomy. This interest has been reawakened in me recently and I’m pursuing it again. Perhaps my future will take me over into cosmology.

I read the Scientific American article cited by ribozyme and think it is fascinating. If you read the entire article, you will find out that the author does not claim that the universe was eternally preexistent. Here is a quote from that article:

“The situation with the very beginning
is less certain. There is a chance that all
parts of the universe were created simultaneously
in an initial, big bang singularity.
The necessity of this assumption,
however, is no longer obvious.
Furthermore, the total number of inflationary
bubbles on our “cosmic tree”
grows exponentially in time. Therefore,
most bubbles (including our own part of the universe) grow indefinitely far
away from the trunk of this tree. Although
this scenario makes the existence
of the initial big bang almost irrelevant,
for all practical purposes, one
can consider the moment of formation
of each inflationary bubble as a new
“big bang.” From this perspective, inflation
is not a part of the big bang theory,
as we thought 15 years ago. On the
contrary, the big bang is a part of the
inflationary model.”

You note that at the beginning of the quote he specifically references the “very beginning.” By this he means the coming into existence of the first universe which would spawn all the inflationary bubbles in his model. What he is saying later is that, as far as the laws for our section of the universe are concerned, we need only look back as far as when our bubble began to expand.

He does not posit that the entire universe itself existed indefinitely backwards without beginning. There is still a need for a first cause and thus Aquinas’ argument still stands.

Were any scientist to seriously put forth the idea that the universe has always existed, I personally believe that he would rather quickly be ridiculed. Such an argument holds no more weight than the lady of legend who exclaimed “It’s turtles all the way down!”

For those of you who don’t know the story, here it is:

Nobel Prize-winning physicist Stephen Hawking starts his book A Brief History Of Time with an anecdote about a scientist giving a public lecture on the nature of the earth, the solar system, and the galaxy. After his talk, an elderly woman rises from her chair and says “What you have told us is rubbish. The world is really a flat plate supported on the back of a giant tortoise.” “Ah. And what is the tortoise standing on?” asks the scientist. “You’re very clever, young man, very clever,” retorts the old lady. “But it’s turtles all the way down.”

Anyways, that’s my 2 cents!

eliasaph99

 

[ribozyme]

Hi,

Quick background: I’m pursuing a doctorate in applied mathematics at a major university. Although I haven’t stayed up with the literature for years, as a teenager I had a huge interest in cosmology and astronomy. This interest has been reawakened in me recently and I’m pursuing it again. Perhaps my future will take me over into cosmology.

I read the Scientific American article cited by ribozyme and think it is fascinating. If you read the entire article, you will find out that the author does not claim that the universe was eternally preexistent. Here is a quote from that article:

“The situation with the very beginning
is less certain. There is a chance that all
parts of the universe were created simultaneously
in an initial, big bang singularity.
The necessity of this assumption,
however, is no longer obvious.
Furthermore, the total number of inflationary
bubbles on our “cosmic tree”
grows exponentially in time. Therefore,
most bubbles (including our own part of the universe) grow indefinitely far
away from the trunk of this tree. Although
this scenario makes the existence
of the initial big bang almost irrelevant,
for all practical purposes, one
can consider the moment of formation
of each inflationary bubble as a new
“big bang.” From this perspective, inflation
is not a part of the big bang theory,
as we thought 15 years ago. On the
contrary, the big bang is a part of the
inflationary model.”

You note that at the beginning of the quote he specifically references the “very beginning.” By this he means the coming into existence of the first universe which would spawn all the inflationary bubbles in his model. What he is saying later is that, as far as the laws for our section of the universe are concerned, we need only look back as far as when our bubble began to expand.

He does not posit that the entire universe itself existed indefinitely backwards without beginning. There is still a need for a first cause and thus Aquinas’ argument still stands.

Were any scientist to seriously put forth the idea that the universe has always existed, I personally believe that he would rather quickly be ridiculed. Such an argument holds no more weight than the lady of legend who exclaimed “It’s turtles all the way down!”

For those of you who don’t know the story, here it is:

Nobel Prize-winning physicist Stephen Hawking starts his book A Brief History Of Time with an anecdote about a scientist giving a public lecture on the nature of the earth, the solar system, and the galaxy. After his talk, an elderly woman rises from her chair and says “What you have told us is rubbish. The world is really a flat plate supported on the back of a giant tortoise.” “Ah. And what is the tortoise standing on?” asks the scientist. “You’re very clever, young man, very clever,” retorts the old lady. “But it’s turtles all the way down.”

Anyways, that’s my 2 cents!

eliasaph99

Well, you are correct, it seems likely that inflation does require a beginning so it is future eternal. I do not like future eternal inflation, but if you could find some inconsistency in Linde and Guth’s arguments, I am interested.