"Except to Save the Mothers Life"

[MilesVitae]

This is exactly what wanting to bring out. In fact I think the analogy works well. It is precisely the same situation, the first man is in the same position as the child, the second man is in the same position as the mother and will die unless the first man is killed. The only difference is that they are fully grown. Being autonomous most certainly doesn’t define your right to life, on the contrary we are morally obliged to protect those who aren’t. Being fully formed most certainly doesn’t define your right to life, and being separate people isn’t relevant since the child is separate, yet dependent on the mother.

What the analogy shows, just like what the Church teaches on euthanasia and abortion, is that the taking of any innocent life is gravely sinful.

Just think of it. Only in a situation where God intends two to die, would the devil ever tempt a person to save one, at the expense of killing the other. Satan has no problem sending a child to heaven provided he makes a murderer in the process.

I think I agree with you that the fact of them being fully grown (or not) is not relevant to the morality of the act.

I think some of the comments which have been made in this discussion are somewhat misleading. The critical criterion is not merely whether the death of the fetus or of the man with the healthy heart is immanent and certain.

The conditions of the principle of double effect are as follows.

1. One must be engaging in an act which not intrinsically immoral.
2. The negative effect(s) must not be a means to the good end.
3. The negative effect must not be* intended*.
4. The negative and positive effects must be proportionate.
5. Directly killing an innocent person is immoral, always, period. Thus, to abort a child in the usual sense is immoral, always. This is different from when the death of the child is a consequence of some otherwise legitimate procedure on the woman. Regardless of the morality of the act, do you at least see the distinction between direct killing, and the death as a consequence?
6. In the situations we are considering, the death of the child per se is not the means by which the woman is saved. It is the medical procedure which is the means to saving the mother - the mother’s life does not result from the child’s death. Rather, the mother’s life results from the medical procedure, AND the child’s death results from the medical procedure.
7. The child’s death is not intended. It is foreseen, but this is not the same as it being intended. Do you see the distinction?
8. The effects are proportionate. Although one life is lost, another is saved.

Let’s use another example. Someone uses a vehicle to drive a bomb away from another group of people, even though he knows the bomb will explode while he is still within the blast radius (thus, killing him).

1. He is not engaged in an intrinsically evil action.
2. His death results from his action, but it is not a means to the good effect which he intends. The lives of those saved do not depend upon his death per se. They depend on an action which results in his death.
3. His death is not intended, although he sees that it is certain to occur.
4. the results are proportionate.

It should also go without saying that there must be no other reasonable means of obtain the good effect.

 

[POJIUJH]

I think I agree with you that the fact of them being fully grown (or not) is not relevant to the morality of the act.

I think some of the comments which have been made in this discussion are somewhat misleading. The critical criterion is not merely whether the death of the fetus or of the man with the healthy heart is immanent and certain.

The conditions of the principle of double effect are as follows.

1. One must be engaging in an act which not intrinsically immoral.
2. The negative effect(s) must not be a means to the good end.
3. The negative effect must not be* intended*.
4. The negative and positive effects must be proportionate.
5. Directly killing an innocent person is immoral, always, period. Thus, to abort a child in the usual sense is immoral, always. This is different from when the death of the child is a consequence of some otherwise legitimate procedure on the woman. Regardless of the morality of the act, do you at least see the distinction between direct killing, and the death as a consequence?
6. In the situations we are considering, the death of the child per se is not the means by which the woman is saved. It is the medical procedure which is the means to saving the mother - the mother’s life does not result from the child’s death. Rather, the mother’s life results from the medical procedure, AND the child’s death results from the medical procedure.
7. The child’s death is not intended. It is foreseen, but this is not the same as it being intended. Do you see the distinction?
8. The effects are proportionate. Although one life is lost, another is saved.

Let’s use another example. Someone uses a vehicle to drive a bomb away from another group of people, even though he knows the bomb will explode while he is still within the blast radius (thus, killing him).

1. He is not engaged in an intrinsically evil action.
2. His death results from his action, but it is not a means to the good effect which he intends. The lives of those saved do not depend upon his death per se. They depend on an action which results in his death.
3. His death is not intended, although he sees that it is certain to occur.
4. the results are proportionate.

It should also go without saying that there must be no other reasonable means of obtain the good effect.

I understand what the principle of double effect has to say about it, I just don’t know if I can trust it. Yes it is indirect, yet if a person knows that say, pulling a joist out of the wall will cause the roof to fall below, thus indirectly killing someone, they would be guilty of their death. In the same way, it blows my mind how certain operations under the principle can be moral yet others aren’t based on the location of the problem, even though the process, cause and effect are the same.

Stopping a murder of course would seem a contradiction to what I just said, and I have been wrecking my brain on this. It at least must be said at least that since it has not been infallibly defined, it could possibly be flawed in some way. Yet it took St Thomas Aquinas to think up this principle, he was and is a genius and in no way am I capable of thinking up a better model.

In any case, all I can tie myself down to so far is this: “killing an innocent person is immoral, always, period”. An unjust aggressor(s), or a dangerous criminal who cannot be locked away safely surely cannot be called innocent, and that’s all I can say. The only exclusion is your word “direct”. Since no matter what the process or instruments, if you have caused an innocent person to die any amount of time than they were supposed to, you have always killed them. We have to think of this in real terms, because it seems a lot of people want to shy away from it, and it only causes me to doubt more that it isn’t hitting other people’s consciences too. We say that it is alright to kill a person in few instances (murderer, dangerous criminal), we must also say, if the principle is correct, that it is alright to kill an unborn baby in certain circumstances if we are to be honest with ourselves.

Hypotheticals are good, but if you can explain it, explain it with regards to third parties, because that’s what abortion is. A person can give his life to save others but the difference between him and an unborn child is that he gives consent where the child cannot, so it can’t be the same situation. Infact one might make the argument that since the mother can only give consent to die, that she must be obligated to protecting a vulnerable child even if it means the death of both.

 

[mharren]

Ok. Obviously I’ve performed abortions, though I haven’t done any electives, just these types in the ER.

To be clear the kind I deal with are almost always incomplete miscarriages. Though I do have women sent up to OB or surgery for things like removal of a baby I’ve confirmed to be dead.

 These are never easy for the patient and their loved ones, including the child that will die. There are some pretty repulsive disregards for the child as person or at the very least an object of sentiment to the mother that goes on in hospitals. 

 I have the power to override the decision of the mother if her life is in imminent danger. I can have most of your civil rights suspended for at least 72 hours with a single form. I can keep you in custody, I can prevent you from accessing your bank accounts, and I can declare you non compos mentis officially or not and I can override your decisions when you're critical. I can do these things and I have. Though usually, I can divert to the next-of-kin. In the case of pregnancy emergencies, the husband. 

 When there is a decision to be made as to whether or not to kill the baby or the mother, because we are deciding murder, If it's up to me I go with the one I think will make it. In many motor vehicle accidents this has been the child and I've killed the mother. Oddly enough *that's* the decision I make most often in trauma. When I kill the baby....it already dead or on it's way out. 

 I see no reason to lose two lives when we have the option of losing just one. If you're holding two people over the side of cliff and your grip is slipping, would you not drop the one that is slipping the most to brace the other? Or would you just drop both? I'm sorry, but I think morally it is far worse to make no decision. 

I know what the church says, but how many of you have had to make this decision? How many of you have had to make any decision about taking a life? 

Speak about it hypothetically all you like, it's good to do so. Talk about cases you know of. But unless you've been the one to decide when there is no right decision, I suggest you be humble about what you assert.

Regards,

• Mharren
  I don't envy the people that make these decisions about their own children.

 

[Marc_Anthony]

I know what the church says, but how many of you have had to make this decision? How many of you have had to make any decision about taking a life?

First of all it sounds like you’re a good person who tries to do your best for everybody involved, and you should be commended for that. I think that what you do for the world is very good and valuable.

But this is a classic argument from emotion. You’re right-the majority of us won’t have to make these types of decisions. And I’m glad I don’t have to. But it’s also true that the direct experiences you’re describing and the emotions of the real people involved doesn’t change the moral gravity of the act.

I can say this easily, of course, because I’m completely detached emotionally-in those situations myself, I’d probably do as you do. But even then, that wouldn’t change the moral gravity of the actions.

 

[mharren]

You’re right. It’s kind of like the Law. Reason without passion.

Sometimes there just is no morally correct decision to be made.

 

[MilesVitae]

I understand what the principle of double effect has to say about it, I just don’t know if I can trust it. Yes it is indirect, yet if a person knows that say, pulling a joist out of the wall will cause the roof to fall below, thus indirectly killing someone, they would be guilty of their death. In the same way, it blows my mind how certain operations under the principle can be moral yet others aren’t based on the location of the problem, even though the process, cause and effect are the same.

Of course, you are right. Causing someone’s death “indirectly” as in the situation you describe could still be murder - certainly it would be murder if the death was intentional. Intention, I think, should remain clearly on the table in these matters (as distinct from foresight).

I suppose there is a true sense in which any time we perform an act which in some way causes the death of a person, we have killed them. But, if we consider the morality of the act merely in those terms, then even self-sacrifice could not be legitimate, since the person who chooses a course of action that leads to their own death can be said to kill themselves.

Stopping a murder of course would seem a contradiction to what I just said, and I have been wrecking my brain on this. It at least must be said at least that since it has not been infallibly defined, it could possibly be flawed in some way. Yet it took St Thomas Aquinas to think up this principle, he was and is a genius and in no way am I capable of thinking up a better model.

Personally, I’ve always had a little trouble clearly understanding Thomas’ justification of self-defense from the principle of double effect - actually, I find it easier to understand the application of the principle to cases like the one’s we’ve been discussing.
As far as it being infallibly defined - I doubt it has been anywhere, but I wonder if there are not many principles Catholic moral theologians use which have not been infallibly defined in any place either.

Continued…

 

[MilesVitae]

…continued.

In any case, all I can tie myself down to so far is this: “killing an innocent person is immoral, always, period”. An unjust aggressor(s), or a dangerous criminal who cannot be locked away safely surely cannot be called innocent, and that’s all I can say. The only exclusion is your word “direct”. Since no matter what the process or instruments, if you have caused an innocent person to die any amount of time than they were supposed to, you have always killed them.

See my response above concerning the fact of killing.

You may be interested in reading the following paragraphs from the Catechism:

2258 “…no one can under any circumstance claim for himself the right to destroy an innocent human being.” [note the inclusion of the term “directly”]

2263 "The legitimate defense of persons and societies is not an exception to the prohibition against the murder of the innocent that constitutes intentional killing. “The act of self-defense can have a double effect: the preservation of one’s own life; and the killing of the aggressor…The one is intended, the other is not.”

2268 “The fifth commandment forbids *direct and intentional *killing as gravely sinful…” [emphasis is their’s. note again the inclusion of the terms direct and intentional]

2269 "The fifth commandment forbids doing anything with the intention of indirectly bringing about a person’s death. The moral law prohibits exposing someone to mortal danger without grave reason [my underlining], as well as refusing assistance to a person in danger…
Unintentional killing is not morally imputable. But one is not exonerated from grave offense if, without proportionate reasons, [underlining mine] he has acted in a way that brings about someone’s death, even without the intention to do so. "

The Catechism does not say merely that we cannot kill. In each of these cases, it makes mention of the directness and/or intentionality of the killing. The most important paragraph, for our discussion, is perhaps 2269. It does not merely say that we may not indirectly bring about a person’s death, but rather that we may not intentionally do so. Further, it seems to me that the clear implication of the last part of that paragraph is that it can be morally permissible for one to act in a way which indirectly brings about a person’s death, if the death is not intended, and if there are proportionately serious reasons for acting in such a way.

We say that it is alright to kill a person in few instances (murderer, dangerous criminal), we must also say, if the principle is correct, that it is alright to kill an unborn baby in certain circumstances if we are to be honest with ourselves.

You mean directly and intentionally kill an unborn baby?

Hypotheticals are good, but if you can explain it, explain it with regards to third parties, because that’s what abortion is. A person can give his life to save others but the difference between him and an unborn child is that he gives consent where the child cannot, so it can’t be the same situation. Infact one might make the argument that since the mother can only give consent to die, that she must be obligated to protecting a vulnerable child even if it means the death of both.

Well, what about in a situation with much less grave negative consequences - where one engages in an act in order to, let’s say, save a person’s life, but this act has the consequence of doing some harm to third person’s property? The harm to the property is a negative consequence and a physical evil to the third party, but even if that person could give consent and doesn’t, or their consent cannot be discovered, wouldn’t such an act be morally legitimate? The principle is the same in the case of some harm to a third party’s health or even in the case of their death, although the effects are admittedly much more grave.

 

[POJIUJH]

You mean directly and intentionally kill an unborn baby?

I mean use the real word “kill”. It’s avoided a lot, which made me think that it is evidence of a persons conflict with conscience.

Well, what about in a situation with much less grave negative consequences - where one engages in an act in order to, let’s say, save a person’s life, but this act has the consequence of doing some harm to third person’s property? The harm to the property is a negative consequence and a physical evil to the third party, but even if that person could give consent and doesn’t, or their consent cannot be discovered, wouldn’t such an act be morally legitimate? The principle is the same in the case of some harm to a third party’s health or even in the case of their death, although the effects are admittedly much more grave.

I see what you mean, only it can be said that the the property owner are themselves morally obligated since a life is greater than his property, whereas there is no obligation for a person to give a heart, for instance, as it would be something done out of goodness rather than obligation. In any case, the repair of the property is still owed even in this case, if it is less morally grave and yet there is a venial cost, would there not be much more of a cost with something much more grave?

Since this is still related, how would my hypothetical of two men a little while ago be answered?

Maybe I’m rabbling, but I will think more about this. Thanks for the replies.

 

[POJIUJH]

…Speak about it hypothetically all you like, it’s good to do so. Talk about cases you know of. But unless you’ve been the one to decide when there is no right decision, I suggest you be humble about what you assert.

Mharren, why do you think I have been unjust in my wanting to understand fully the morality of abortion? It looks as though your knee just jerked. If your conscience is clear there would be no reason for that to happen. I could be wrong about you, but this sort of reaction in other people is what makes me increasingly suspicious about the principle of double effect in this situation.

In any case, my sisters life was almost on the line. I could either have told her that she is obligated to die for the child or she is not, and that is what brought me to seriously question this principle.

You’re right. It’s kind of like the Law. Reason without passion.

Sometimes there just is no morally correct decision to be made.

With all due respect, passion and emotion have absolutely no bearing or power to change what is objectively moral or immoral. We are fallible, the law cannot be, or it wouldn’t be law.

If there is no morally correct decision to be made then there is no decision that can be made. If two people were hanging off a cliff and you put one ounce more strength to one person, you would be valuing their life above the other. If both are certain to die, then it is up to them to give the command to let them go to save the other. Until then the obligation of the person holding them is only to continue doing so, equally.

 

[Marc_Anthony]

You’re right. It’s kind of like the Law. Reason without passion.

Sometimes there just is no morally correct decision to be made.

But there’s always a morally wrong decision.

Much like the dropping of the bomb-not doing so almost certainly would have cost far more lives than it saved. But even though invading isn’t a good action, dropping the bomb was certainly the wrong course of action.

 

[Marc_Anthony]

With all due respect, passion and emotion have absolutely no bearing or power to change what is objectively moral or immoral. We are fallible, the law cannot be, or it wouldn’t be law.

If there is no morally correct decision to be made then there is no decision that can be made. If two people were hanging off a cliff and you put one ounce more strength to one person, you would be valuing their life above the other. If both are certain to die, then it is up to them to give the command to let them go to save the other. Until then the obligation of the person holding them is only to continue doing so, equally.

I would have to agree.

I am trying to speak very carefully about what is naturally a very difficult topic to discuss-and for good reason. I am not trying to condemn you for anything you’ve done-as I said, I think that the work you do is wonderful. But morality is morality, and despite all of this it doesn’t change.

 

[MilesVitae]

I mean use the real word “kill”. It’s avoided a lot, which made me think that it is evidence of a persons conflict with conscience.

Re-reading the original paragraph I was addressing, I think I realize the point of that sentence now - simply, that we are comfortable with saying that we can kill assailants or execute criminals (in certain cases), but we seem uncomfortable with saying we can kill unborn babies, even though there are cases we can. I had read more than was there into that simple sentence when I first quoted it.

As far as using the word “kill” in regards to the unborn and the principle of double effect, I would agree that, in part, some of us (including myself) may shy away sometimes from the word “kill” because it makes us uncomfortable. But, I would also say that, personally, I avoid that word simply because of it’s connotations (at least the connotations it has for me) so as to keep my meaning clear and avoid confusion.
I’ve granted that there is a true sense in which we can say that even in an indirect, unintentional case with proportionate reasons for acting, we can say that one kills another. Usually, however, that is not the significance I attribute to the word “kill.” The connotations which that word has, at least for me, usually suggest a more direct form of killing (always immoral, except perhaps in the case of warfare or execution - I don’t see how the principle of double effect applies to that, and I have trouble seeing how it applies to self-defense), or at least an intentional killing (again, always immoral, even if indirect) - perhaps, at the very least, a morally illicit killing (indirect, unintentional, but foreseen and without proportionate reasons). It doesn’t usually suggest to me merely the loose sense of the word “kill” which I spoke of above (which includes indirect, unintentional killing where one has acted with proportionately grave reason). Because of that, I find the word uncomfortable, and I tend to avoid the word “kill” in the case of double effect in regards to the unborn because it strikes me as incorrect.

I see what you mean, only it can be said that the the property owner are themselves morally obligated since a life is greater than his property, whereas there is no obligation for a person to give a heart, for instance, as it would be something done out of goodness rather than obligation.

As to the obligation of the property holders, sure. As to the obligation (or lack thereof) to allow one’s own death for an equal or great cause…I’m not really sure…
As far as someone giving a heart, though, I would like to comment that it seems to me rather different from the cases of the unborn. In fact, I think someone giving a heart (unless they were already dead) would be considered immoral by the Church - I think it would fall under direct killing, the very object of the act itself is the removal of the heart. In the case of a treatment to the mother which is fatal for the child, one is not directly targeting the unborn. The object of the act is the treatment, the intention (and one of the consequences) is the restoration of the mother’s health (which is not accomplished through the death of the child), and one of the unintended consequences is the death of the child. To me, it seems clearly different, and I have no difficulty in accepting the latter case as a morally legitimate act. It would be quite another story, of course, if one were to actually target and kill the child in someway, even if this were a means to restoring the mother’s health.
Also, I’m not really sure how much consent actually comes into play as a moral criterion. You may be attributing too much to it.

In any case, the repair of the property is still owed even in this case, if it is less morally grave and yet there is a venial cost, would there not be much more of a cost with something much more grave?

I suppose - although I’m uncertain as to whether there really is an obligation to repair the property. But, in any case, it would be impossible to repair the death of the child, so it’s a moot point.

Since this is still related, how would my hypothetical of two men a little while ago be answered?

As I’ve said above.