Existence of Good and Evil

[PHSshamrock]

I know there are some pretty smart folks on this blog so working together, philosophers I was hoping we could come up with a proof for the existence of good and evil. Any links to say Thomas Aquinas philosophy etc. are appreciated

 

[Dom_Malquisto]

In short, good comes from God and evil is the negation of good. It can exist because of free will. This is the simplest definition

We can summarize on Plotinus, who talked about what he called “One”. God as a light. If you think of a sphere with light at one end, the opposite side would be in dark. This light can be said as God (good) and that dark as evil, once it departs from one enlightened end.

 

[Prometheus90]

Good and Evil are subjective, and thus do not exist in the sense that you can label things clearly with one term or the other.

Some people or things that are clearly “evil” according to most people, are “good” according to others, or at least themselves. Personally, I try to stay away from these terms.

 

[theblindlead]

ok so i am working on this for my philosophy class but it is bases off the avlin plantiga work god freedom and evil. its pretty long and i haven’t proofread it yet for grammatical errors but overall its a very solid refutation of the logical problem of evil. so here is the first half i don’t have the second half done yet which is more what your looking for but i hope this helps and you actually read it. and the second half should be finished by tomorrow or Thursday if you would like me to post it as well

Introduction
The existence of a supreme being or a God has long been debated. There are countless arguments for the existence of God just as there are many against the existence of a God. Throughout the course of this dialogue, between theists and atheists, not many arguments against the existence of God have had as great an impact upon the debate as the Logical Problem of Evil. The logical problem of evil begins by defining God as omniscient, omnipresent and omnibenevolent. It goes on to state that any God who is omniscient, omnipresent and omnibenevolent would not allow evil to occur. Evil obviously occurs. (Though some have argued that it does not) Therefore God does not exist. The logical problem of evil is an argument that prima facie seems to completely undermine the credibility of any theistic argument. David Hume puts it best when he says, in reference to God “Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Whence then is evil?”
Alvin Plantinga has most eloquently argued against the problem of evil and this paper will be looking into the arguments that he presents against the problem of evil. I will contend that Plantinga not only refutes the Logical Problem of Evil but that he puts the, proverbial, ball back into the court of the atheist.
Logic against the logical problem
Plantinga argues that while many theists would like to have a theodicy, an argument against the logical problem of evil. There really is no need for a theodicy, in the traditional sense. It would be nice to be able to know why there is evil in the world but no matter the reason, there is still no logical contradiction between the logical problem of evil and there being an omniscient, omnipresent, omnibenevolent God. Many philosophers and theologians have postulated reasons for there being evil, such as: it stems from human nature, or that without evil there could be no good, or that some evils are actually good. It is peculiar that theists do not know why there is evil but that in no logical way makes the logical problem of evil stronger. It might make the theist look stupid but it does not make the atheists argument stronger or the belief in a God a worse belief. The atheist must show that there is a logical contradiction between there being an omniscient, omnipresent and omnibenevolent God, and there also being evil in the world.
So is there a logical contradiction? Before this question can be asked a more basic question must be asked, what kind of inconsistency does the theistic viewpoint have, because there are many different kinds of inconsistencies. Is the theistic viewpoint explicitly contradictory, such that theists state a proposition is true (P) and then affirm the opposite (~P).

1. God is all powerful
2. God is all good
3. Evil exists
   The answer to this question is obviously no. The terms are only used once so there is no possibility of the terms being explicitly contradictory. Any atheist that states there is a logical contradiction between there being an omniscient, omnipresent and omnibenevolent God and the fact that there is evil in the world is mistaken. If there is no explicit or formal contradiction between premises 1, 2 and 3 is there another kind of logical contradiction in play.
   Most atheists will not argue that these premises (1, 2 and 3) are explicitly contradictory but rather that they are implicitly contradictory. Implicitly contradictory entails that there is a necessary proposition (S) that is formally (explicitly) contrary to the original proposition (P) if the new necessary proposition (S) is added to the original proposition (P). The necessary propositions that are normally added by atheists are:
   I. A good thing always eliminates evil as far as it can
   II. There are no limits to what an omnipotent being can do

 

[theblindlead]

As stated previously for these two propositions to be added to the original three and prove them explicitly contradictory they are necessarily true. Are these statements necessarily true? In reference to the latter preposition (II), what does the atheist mean when he states that an omnipotent being can do everything? Can this omnipotent being create married bachelors, square circles, or skinny fat people? Most theologians and philosophers hold that God cannot do these things that god must be inside the realm of logic and that God is capable of doing all non-logical things. Certain philosophers such as martin Luther, Descartes and most philosophers inside the Franciscan tradition would argue that God is not bound by the rules of logic. Therefore God is capable of all things whether logical or otherwise. If the problem of evil was presented to an individual who believed that God was no bound by human logic. He is able to shrug off the question and not even consider it, for his belief dictates that God is not inside the box of human logic, therefore can do anything that he wants and have it be true even if it is logically contradictory. What of the former proposition (I), that states that a good thing always eliminates evil as far as it can. Is this necessarily true, or even true at all? No it is incorrect because there could be a person who goes for a run in a national park where very few individuals visit. This individual when he is running has a bolder fall on him and trap his arm against the rock so he is incapable of moving and will die if no one helps him. You are in your tent and you could very easily go and save this individual (you have a saw to cut off his arm) but you are unaware that he is stuck. If (I) were true it would appear that you would forfeit your claim on being a good thing. It is clear that this is not the case therefore (I) is untrue. An atheist might argue that if you did not know about the misfortune of the runner you would have not ability to help him therefore you are morally still ok. Whether or not this objection holds up, the atheist would end up revising his statement to:
Ia. Every good thing always eliminates every evil that it knows about and can eliminate
Now adding this new proposition to the mix does not make the set of 1, 2, 3, II and Ia formally contradictory to make it formally contradictory there would need to be a proposition added that would necessarily state that God is all knowing. If this is added it would make the statement formally contradictory, that is, assuming that (Ia) is necessarily true. Obviously not for example there could be two people running on different sides of the park and they both get crushed by boulders you know about both incidents but only have time to make it to one and save him and the other one will die. You obviously do not forfeit your claim to being a good person in this situation. So we can deduce that (Ia) is false. Another example to prove that (Ia) is false is a huge good is negated by getting rid of a very small evil. An example is a man is going to bring a million dollars to the orphanage before it closes down so it does not close down (for some reason he is on a time constraint and only has five minutes to get there before he can no longer do this great good) but on the way to the orphanage he see a man who is about to receive a terrible hair cut from a barber he know will do a terrible job which will cause the individual getting the hair cut very minor anguish. He according to this definition must stop and make sure the make sure the man does not receive the terrible haircut. Thus proving (Ia) wrong.
The atheist will then present:
Ib. a good being eliminates every evil (E) that it knows about and that it can eliminate without either bringing about a greater evil or eliminating a good state of affairs that outweighs (E)
This new statement gets rid of the second problem with (Ia) but the first one is still a viable option for refuting this new statement. So the two runners are trapped scenario is still viable therefore proving (Ib) false.
Some might argue that (Ia) and (Ib) do not apply to God for one reason or another. These objections really do not matter because for the atheist’s argument to work these principles need to be necessarily true so the objections levied against them, even though they might not apply to god, stand firm because there is at least one situation in which they are false making them unable to be necessarily true. What this tells us is the Athiest might have better luck if he is able to work the properties of omniscience and omnipotence into (I). Making (I) look something like this:
Ic. An omnipotent and omniscient good being eliminates every evil that it can properly eliminate
For arguments sake we will be able assume that (Ic) is correct whether it is or not. So what do we have is:

1. God is all powerful
2. God is all good
   2’ God is Omniscient
3. Evil exists
   II’. There are no non-logical limits to what an omnipotent being can do
   Ic An omnipotent and omniscient good being eliminates every evil that it can properly eliminate
   Now again if this statement is explicitly/formally contradictory then any five of these could deduce the falsity of the sixth, or put simpler any five must entail the falsity of the sixth member for these to be formally contradictory. There is no such contradiction therefore what the atheist must add to get a formal contradiction is:
   III If God is omniscient and omnipotent, then he can properly eliminate every evil state of affairs

 

[theblindlead]

Since (Ic) and (II’) have already been conceded true the last thing that needs to be looked at is the validity of (III). Under what conditions would an omnipotent being be unable to eliminate a certain evil without eliminating a certain good? An example against this premise would be one that a man named Dan would suffer a minor abrasion and a Jeremiah conjunctively would be deliriously happy. These events cannot happen outside each other because they are if and only if statements. It is obviously better for Jeremiah to make it to heaven and Dan have an annoying itch on his arm than for this to have not occurred. Thus proving (III) not necessarily true. Another example is there are certain terrible situation in which more good than bad can come out of them, such as an man in a concentration camp comes up with the idea of how to solve world hunger because of the torcher that he received from being there causing more good than bad to come out of the situation. This example would prove (III) not necessarily true as well.
As has been shown it difficult to find propositions that make the original propositions 1, 2 and 3 formally contradictory and it makes one wonder why atheists do not attempt to find propositions that do work. Atheists are comfortable just asserting that there is a logical contradiction without actually proving that there is one.

 

[theblindlead]

ok the second part will focus on free will and some philosophic terms called transworld depravity, and any possible world. but it does a great job of proving why there is evil in the world. where as my first post just showed that atheists are wrong

 

[JDaniel]

ok the second part will focus on free will and some philosophic terms called transworld depravity, and any possible world. but it does a great job of proving why there is evil in the world. where as my first post just showed that atheists are wrong

Blindlead:

Nice, succinct summary. A few things struck me as I read it. But, for the moment, I would like, if I may, to talk about a related topic that used to be significant but seems to have been swept under a semi-ancient rug.

The topic: is a natural occurrence, by definition, “evil?” I know that there have been lots of definitions bandied about herein, but really, can an unintended, indeterminate, accidental natural act be intrinsically “evil?”

You presented a story about a bolder falling from a mountain that pins a man to the ground, with the potential of killing him if he does not receive timely help. Evil? Why, or, why not?

Well, then, if a bolder falls and crushes a man to death, evil?

Or, a dead leaf falls from a tree and lands on a woman’s head. Evil?

What makes an essentially natural (and usually accidental) action “evil?”

50 years ago, such natural occurrences were rarely considered “evil.” The conflation of natural occurrences with evil-ness came about over the past 50 years, with a fervor. I am not saying that there were not some people who regarded these things as a kind of evil. I am only saying that that conflation was rare. I contend that the conflation of natural acts with evil is self-serving.

The truth more than likely is, that most non-theists don’t put much stock in these arguments - except and unless an unexpected, undesired natural act occurs to them or theirs. A family’s mom, dad, or sibling dies, and some, but not always all, of the progeny will regard that event as “evil.” Then, opportunists conscript it for their purposes.

One can see that the first encounter dealt an emotional blow that many people have felt, at one time or another, in their lives. The second activity was latched onto more for the purpose of convincing the holder of the idea that “a good God, therefore, does not exist.” Habit breeds perfection (well, maybe that’s too strong a word!), and the longer a person indulges a habit, the harder it is to escape. So, I further contend, that non-theism is usually a product of a relatively lately acquired, time-worn habit.

All of this is to say that the propositions pointed out by Plantinga are weak, if in fact they are, because they are tied to emotion. If they are illogical, it is precisely because there is a modicum of sentiment brought to them.

On the other hand, there are plainly evil people out there.

God bless,
jd

 

[PeterGStanley]

How about

Good is creation - we are made in Gods likeness so it is also our desire to create good things that are worth while.

Evil is the destruction of creation - you name it - killing , abortion , addiction (killing the spirit) ,vandalism , etc.

 

[Gorgias]

What makes an essentially natural (and usually accidental) action “evil?”

50 years ago, such natural occurrences were rarely considered “evil.” The conflation of natural occurrences with evil-ness came about over the past 50 years, with a fervor. I am not saying that there were not some people who regarded these things as a kind of evil. I am only saying that that conflation was rare. I contend that the conflation of natural acts with evil is self-serving.

Aquinas considered the notion of “natural evil” – that is, something that is less than perfect justice proceeding from the natural operation of the created world – and concluded (if memory serves) that this is a rational consequence of a world affected by original sin. This “evil”, as perceived, isn’t the effect of a moral agent, per se, but simply the effect of the way that an imperfect world operates.

A non-theist, of course, will ask why the world is imperfect: if God is all-powerful, doesn’t it follow that God has the power to create a perfect universe? The answer, of course, is that God does have this power, but God chose to give preference to free will rather than perfection in creation; when humans, making free will choices and acting upon them, introduced injustice into creation, then imperfection in creation resulted.

Is this a “defect”, then? Is the notion of the presence of free will in a universe created by an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevalent God something that defies logic? A universe without free will, but without the imperfections that proceed from poor free will decisions, would be more perfect, from a sterile, logical point of view; however, it would also be a universe that is devoid of free moral agents. It is the position of theists, I believe, that the introduction of the notion of the presence of moral agents whose choices (and therefore, actions) are not deterministic, also leads necessarily to the possibility of the presence of evil in the universe.

Does it follow, then, that God is not omniscient in that God hasn’t created a world with both free will and the absence of evil? To argue this point, one would have to demonstrate that it’s possible to fully exercise free will and yet not have the opportunity for the exercise of free will to lead to evil. That’s something that remains to be demonstrated satisfactorily, I think…

 

[theblindlead]

Blindlead:

Nice, succinct summary. A few things struck me as I read it. But, for the moment, I would like, if I may, to talk about a related topic that used to be significant but seems to have been swept under a semi-ancient rug.

The topic: is a natural occurrence, by definition, “evil?” I know that there have been lots of definitions bandied about herein, but really, can an unintended, indeterminate, accidental natural act be intrinsically “evil?”

You presented a story about a bolder falling from a mountain that pins a man to the ground, with the potential of killing him if he does not receive timely help. Evil? Why, or, why not?

Well, then, if a bolder falls and crushes a man to death, evil?

Or, a dead leaf falls from a tree and lands on a woman’s head. Evil?

What makes an essentially natural (and usually accidental) action “evil?”

50 years ago, such natural occurrences were rarely considered “evil.” The conflation of natural occurrences with evil-ness came about over the past 50 years, with a fervor. I am not saying that there were not some people who regarded these things as a kind of evil. I am only saying that that conflation was rare. I contend that the conflation of natural acts with evil is self-serving.

The truth more than likely is, that most non-theists don’t put much stock in these arguments - except and unless an unexpected, undesired natural act occurs to them or theirs. A family’s mom, dad, or sibling dies, and some, but not always all, of the progeny will regard that event as “evil.” Then, opportunists conscript it for their purposes.

One can see that the first encounter dealt an emotional blow that many people have felt, at one time or another, in their lives. The second activity was latched onto more for the purpose of convincing the holder of the idea that “a good God, therefore, does not exist.” Habit breeds perfection (well, maybe that’s too strong a word!), and the longer a person indulges a habit, the harder it is to escape. So, I further contend, that non-theism is usually a product of a relatively lately acquired, time-worn habit.

All of this is to say that the propositions pointed out by Plantinga are weak, if in fact they are, because they are tied to emotion. If they are illogical, it is precisely because there is a modicum of sentiment brought to them.

On the other hand, there are plainly evil people out there.

God bless,
jd

ok the bolder falling on someone isn’t evil but the death of the individual would be considered “evil”

and to answer your question about how most of these arguments are week at best. i would agree but they do not have to be strong. all you need is one instance in which it shows that the logic does not hold up and you can no longer say that the certain proposition is necessary.

what i did in my last posts was prove that until atheists can show that there are propositions that hold up against this kind of scrutiny they can no longer use the logical problem of evil as a proof against god but rather they would have to use the evidential problem of evil which is a far weaker argument

i will attempt to post the second half of my paper tonight but it might be tomorrow afternoon sometime.

 

[JDaniel]

ok the bolder falling on someone isn’t evil but the death of the individual would be considered “evil”

BlindLead:

I think you are right in a way. But I wonder, What gives us that egotistical authority?

and to answer your question about how most of these arguments are weak at best. i would agree but they do not have to be strong. all you need is one instance in which it shows that the logic does not hold up and you can no longer say that the certain proposition is necessary.

Let’s see:

1. Men are not God.
2. But, Jesus was a Man and He is God.
3. Therefore, some men are God.

Now, I realize that that wasn’t fair. But, I think you’ll agree that the syllogism as stated does not preclude a logic that maintains that men are not God. But, a more pertinent one might be:

1. Animals are born with one head.

As you have no doubt seen, at fairs and such, there are two-headed animals. Does their existence destroy the logic? Are we not able to conclude that “animals are born with one head?”

what i did in my last posts was prove that until atheists can show that there are propositions that hold up against this kind of scrutiny they can no longer use the logical problem of evil as a proof against god but rather they would have to use the evidential problem of evil which is a far weaker argument

And I am too. I want it to be seen that we humans don’t make the laws of logic any more then we make the laws of nature. Death may well mean that that person will be with God that very day. He’s dead, but, he’s with God. Of course, we don’t know that for sure - but neither do we know that the death of a man is ‘evil’. If he was known to have been baptized and a good Christian man, where’s the evil in his death? Does that make sense?

i will attempt to post the second half of my paper tonight but it might be tomorrow afternoon sometime.

I am eager to read it. I must confess that I have not read any of Feser’s works, but will do so now.

God bless,
jd

 

[theblindlead]

ok so this section is extremely difficult to understand. i attempted to take out all unnecessary information but if for some reason you are not satisfied i wholeheartedly apologize.

Free Will, Any Possible World, Transworld Depravity
So what is the cause of all of the evil in the world, an atheist might ask. To answer this question Plantinga argues what is known as the free will defense. What will be argued in the freewill defense is that there are certain kinds of good that cannot be brought about without permitting evil. These goods while independent from evil cannot be brought about without permitting evil. The kind of freedom that we are discussing is the ability of each person to choose whether or not they will do an action and they are readily able to choose either. So the freedom that we are talking about is freedom in respect to an action. This will be defined as significantly free, or free to make a choice for a morally significant action. Another thing that needs to be clarified about freedom is that for something to be morally significant the action that happens will be morally right or morally wrong depending on whether or not it is done. For example keeping a promise or killing someone would be morally significant actions, whereas choosing between French toast and pancakes would not be a morally significant action. The last things that need to be clarified are the difference between natural evil and moral evil. Moral evil comes from human activities. Natural evil is any other kind of evil. (which may not be the best definition but it works for the purposes of this paper)
Now that we have free will defined we can state a few preliminary things mainly that a world containing significantly free creature is better than a world not containing significantly free creatures. The matter of the fact is that sometimes these significantly free creatures will go wrong and do evil (sin). But this is better than having a world of morally determined creatures.
So what is this section of the paper attempting to do? Well it is attempting to create a proposition that is logically consistent with our previous premises:

1. God is all powerful
2. God is all good
   2’ God is Omniscient
3. Evil exists
   The free will defenses main job is to prove that it is possible that God could not have created (Actualized is a better term, for God does not in speaking “create” possible worlds, he only actualizes possible worlds. He creates the heavens and the earth but he doesn’t create the possible world they come from, he just actualizes the possible worlds.) a universe containing moral good, without creating one that also contained moral evil. So it really comes down to the question was it possible for God to create/actualize any possible world in which he pleased? The simple answer to this question is no, God ca¬¬¬nnot actualize any possible world. Here is an example of a possible world which God could not actualize. This example will be in the future tense for it would seemingly better simulate what God does instead of using a past tense example although there are good examples for both and are equally valid.
   β If S (state of affairs) were to obtain, Dan will freely take the waffles
   β’ If S (state of affairs) were to obtain, Dan will freely reject the waffles
   Only God knows what Dan will choose but that does not mean that God is controlling what Dan is choosing. So God knows that either β or β’ will occur. Let’s assume that β occurs. If this is that case there is a possible world that god could not have created. For we are predicating that the possible and actual worlds are exactly the same up until moment (t). At this moment (t) because the S (state of affairs) are exactly the same in both worlds, it would be impossible for Dan to choose something different under the same state of affairs. This is showing that while God chooses whether or not Dan exists, Dan chooses whether or not he does the action, not God, even though God already knows what Dan will choose.
   Now that it has been shown that God cannot create any possible world we can return to the major question, could God have created a world containing moral good but no moral evil? Again the answer is no it would be impossible for God to do so. The same example will be used as the last time but replace “takes/rejects the waffles” with “kills an innocent human being”
   σ If S (state of affairs) were to obtain, Dan will freely kills an innocent human being
   σ’ If S (state of affairs) were to obtain, Dan will freely kills an innocent human being

 

[theblindlead]

You end up with the same things as last time except with one key difference it is possible for the individual to choose the good in this situation. The theist now seems to have run into a problem with his free will defense. Since it is possible that all human individuals suffer from what is known as transworld depravity, we can say that they actually do. Transworld depravity is defined as: for every world W such that P is significantly free in W and, P does only what is right in W, there is an action A and maximal world segment S’ such that

1. S’ includes A’s being morally significant for P
2. S’ includes P’s being free with respect to A
3. S’ is included in W and includes neither P’s performing A nor P’s refraining from performing A.
   And
4. If S’ were actual, P would go wrong with respect to A.
   Where S’=state of affairs
   Notice how this definition holds up because it does not actually have to be true it just must possible be true that is why this is called the free will defense and not the free will theodicy. All that needs to be shown is that this is a possible option and since everything is logically sound it is no matter how unlikely it is still enough to say that possible all humans suffer from transworld depravity. To simplify the definition of transworld depravity it could just be seen as: A person is transworld depraved if in any possible world in which he is created, he freely performs at least one morally wrong action.
   So to conclude the free will defense these are the things that we have shown to be logically possible for the reason of the occurrence of evil (if not very probable)

1. God is all powerful
2. God is all good
   2’ God is Omniscient
3. Evil exists
4. It was not within God’s power to create a world containing moral good without creating one containing moral evil.
5. God created a world containing moral good
   (5) states that God created a world containing moral good this with (4) states that God created a world that contained moral evil. Since the world contains moral evil it thus must contain evil. So (1), (2) and (2’) are all logically consistent and necessarily asset (3). The major thing that the free will defense hinges on is that (4) and (5) do not need to be known as true they can just be possible true. Since it has been shown that they are possible true it appears that there is no contradiction and the free will defense seems to be vindicated.
   Conclusion
   There are many different things that could still be talked about to attempt to defend the theistic position but what has been shown is quite sufficient to counter an atheist who presents the logical problem of evil. First it was shown that the logical problem of evil was not necessarily true, which lays the burden of proof squarely on the atheist shoulders to provide propositions which are compatible with their argument. Next it was shown that through the use of the freewill defense that it is possible that god could have created a possible world which has evil in it. I would like to finish off my paper with a quote from C.S. Lewis’s book The Case for Christianity “God created things which had free will. That means creatures which can go wrong or right. Some people think they can imagine a creature which was free but had no possibility of going wrong, but I can’t. If a thing is free to be good it’s also free to be bad. And free will is what has made evil possible. Why, then, did God give them free will? Because free will, though it makes evil possible, is also the only thing that makes possible any love or goodness or joy worth having. A world of automata -of creatures that worked like machines- would hardly be worth creating. The happiness which God designs for His higher creatures is the happiness of being freely, voluntarily united to Him and to each other in an ecstasy of love and delight compared with which the most rapturous love between a man and a woman on this earth is mere milk and water. And for that they’ve got to be free. Of course God knew what would happen if they used their freedom the wrong way: apparently, He thought it worth the risk. (…) If God thinks this state of war in the universe a price worth paying for free will -that is, for making a real world in which creatures can do real good or harm and something of real importance can happen, instead of a toy world which only moves when He pulls the strings- then we may take it (that) it is worth paying.”

 

[PHSshamrock]

Perhaps I better re-word my question. How do we know objective good and evil exists, without first knowing that God exists. Can we know this through reason and philosophy? How? (I’m trying to explain the subject to a rather stubborn friend and could use some help)

 

[theblindlead]

Perhaps I better re-word my question. How do we know objective good and evil exists, without first knowing that God exists. Can we know this through reason and philosophy? How? (I’m trying to explain the subject to a rather stubborn friend and could use some help)

the catholic church would state that through natural law we all have the ability to know good from evil, this comes in the form of our conscience. over the course of human history all peoples have had the basically the same morality. I can say with certainty that on culture on earth has ever held in esteem the man who ran away from battle or the serial murder.

i’m not sure if you want to argue that evil is objective or subjective without god but this argument can be used both ways. there are many other ways to do this but this is what i would start with if i was talking to him.

hope this helps if not write back and i’ll give her another go more indepth this time

 

[PHSshamrock]

hope this helps if not write back and i’ll give her another go more indepth this time

More indepth would be great! Thanks!

 

[theblindlead]

i’m assuming that you want something that shows it is impossible to determine morality with out God? and that all true is subjective with out a supreme being. am i correct before i go off on a tangent?

 

[fred_conty]

Here Paul explains how a man knows good and evil.

“When Gentiles who have not the law do by nature what the law requires, they are a law to themselves, even though they do not have the law. They show that what the law requires is written on their hearts . . .” (Rom. 2:14-15a).

Here is what the catechism says about knowing good and evil.

2072 Since they express man’s fundamental duties towards God and towards his neighbor, the Ten Commandments reveal, in their primordial content, grave obligations. They are fundamentally immutable, and they oblige always and everywhere. No one can dispense from them. The Ten Commandments are engraved by God in the human heart.