Exists does not equal creates

[lucybeebee]

My brother says that the famous “first cause” proof for the existance of God is incorrect because it equates the word “exists” with “creates” when the meanings of the two words are not the same. How should I answer?

 

[ateista]

My brother says that the famous “first cause” proof for the existance of God is incorrect because it equates the word “exists” with “creates” when the meanings of the two words are not the same. How should I answer?

The reason it is incorrect is that it is based on a fallcy: the fallacy of composition.

It goes something like this: everything we observed has a “cause”, therefore its existence can only be explained by something “outside it”. Therefore the universe also cannot be explained by itself, its existence also needs an outside cause, and we call that cause: “god”.

There are variants of this. Sometimes it is stipulated that everything that has a beginning, must have a cause. Since he universe has a beginning, it also needs an outside cause.

It does not matter, which variant is used, they are all fallacious. The error is the assumption that if all the entities e1, e2, e3,… all have the property “p”, then the collection of these entities also has the property “p”.

And this is not always true. In some instances it is true, in others it is false. One counter-example is sufficient to disprove the **universal validity **of this concept: “all humans have a mother, therefore humanity also has a mother”. Clearly false.

 

[john_doran]

It does not matter, which variant is used, they are all fallacious. The error is the assumption that if all the entities e1, e2, e3,… all have the property “p”, then the collection of these entities also has the property “p”.

And this is not always true. In some instances it is true, in others it is false. One counter-example is sufficient to disprove the **universal validity **of this concept: “all humans have a mother, therefore humanity also has a mother”. Clearly false.

for one thing, the causal principle is not compositional in nature - it is a principle.

for another, so what if compositional arguments are not universally valid? nothing about the first cause argument depends on the universal validity of compositional arguments - if it depends on compisitionality at all, it depends only on the the compositionality of a singular case.

you would have to demonstrate not the (uninteresting) point that some compositional arguments are fallacious, but that the specific compositional argument (allegedly) used in the first cause argument is fallacious.

in the same way, the fact that some compositional reasoning is invalid in no way impugns the validity of:

1. every brick in the wall is stone;
2. therefore the wall is stone.

neither does it impugn the validity of :

1. every thing in the universe is caused;
2. therefore the universe is caused.

if you want to make that case, you’re going to have to make a further argument that the universe is something more than its constituents, perhaps by making an appeal to mereology, or something. but watch out for the (unnecessary) multiplication of entities and ockham’s razor…

 

[john_doran]

My brother says that the famous “first cause” proof for the existance of God is incorrect because it equates the word “exists” with “creates” when the meanings of the two words are not the same. How should I answer?

i would get him to explain more clearly what he means, since, on the face of it, his objection makes no sense…

the first cause argument does not equate “exist” with “create” - it merely argues that everything that changes is caused to change by something else, and that since there cannot be an infinite chain of causes, there must be a first cause that is itself uncaused.

“creation” doesn’t even rear its head in that argument.

 

[ateista]

for one thing, the causal principle is not compositional in nature - it is a principle.

for another, so what if compositional arguments are not universally valid? nothing about the first cause argument depends on the universal validity of compositional arguments - if it depends on compisitionality at all, it depends only on the the compositionality of a singular case.

you would have to demonstrate not the (uninteresting) point that some compositional arguments are fallacious, but that the specific compositional argument (allegedly) used in the first cause argument is fallacious.

in the same way, the fact that some compositional reasoning is invalid in no way impugns the validity of:

1. every brick in the wall is stone;
2. therefore the wall is stone.

neither does it impugn the validity of :

1. every thing in the universe is caused;
2. therefore the universe is caused.

if you want to make that case, you’re going to have to make a further argument that the universe is something more than its constituents, perhaps by making an appeal to mereology, or something. but watch out for the (unnecessary) multiplication of entities and ockham’s razor…

I see it the other way round (not surprisingly). Since the composition is not universally valid, it is the obligation of those who say that it is valid in this particular case to bring up supporting argument for it. Just like as an atheist I don’t have to bring up reasons for my lack of belief…

 

[john_doran]

I see it the other way round (not surprisingly). Since the composition is not universally valid, it is the obligation of those who say that it is valid in this particular case to bring up supporting argument for it. Just like as an atheist I don’t have to bring up reasons for my lack of belief…

1. you make the positive claim that the first cause argument is compositional. prove it.
2. the universe is reducible to its constituents - that is, “the universe” is just the proper name for “every natural object that exists”. my support for the claim consists of: (a) there is no good reason to think otherwise; and thus (b) no good reason to introduce the infinite number of additional entities involved with the mereological claim that the universe ***is ***more than the sum of its parts.

can you prove to me that these arguments are valid?

1. every brick in the wall is stone;
2. therefore the wall is stone.

or

1. every part of the ball is red;
2. therefore the ball is red.

if not, then i assume that you withhold assent with regard to them…

look, something about this post of yours strikes me as more than a little disingenuous - it’s hard for me to believe that you don’t actually think that the first cause argument is (A) compositional, and (B) fallaciously compositional, and thus that you will have to abide by your own proof-requirement…

 

[ateista]

1. you make the positive claim that the first cause argument is compositional. prove it.

I would say it is self-evident: “Since every entity in the universe has a cause outside itself, therefore the universe (a collection of its constituent parts) also **has to have **a cause outside itself.” It is a clear case of composition.

look, something about this post of yours strikes me as more than a little disingenuous - it’s hard for me to believe that you don’t actually think that the first cause argument is (A) compositional, and (B) fallaciously compositional, and thus that you will have to abide by your own proof-requirement…

Whether the universe needs a causal explanation for its existence, or not, is not the question. The question is that from the causal explanation of its parts does not automatically follow that the composed entity also needs a causal explanation. That is the fallacy. Composed entities can have properties that cannot be reduced to the properties of its part.

Of course the whole concept of something “outside” the universe or “before” the universe is nonsensical. Universe is the proper name for everything that exists.

 

[Joyousguard]

ateista;3104449]I would say it is self-evident: “Since every entity in the universe has a cause outside itself, therefore the universe (a collection of its constituent parts) also **has to have **a cause outside itself.” It is a clear case of composition.

I believe the point was that the “fallacy of composition” is not universaly correct and obviosly in error in this case. The error you are making is this: The "fallacy of composition states: “when one infers that something is true of the whole from the fact that it is true of some part of the whole”.
Here is the argument brougth forth by Aquinas (simplified of course):

1.Every finite and contingent being has a cause.
2.Nothing finite and dependent (contingent) can cause itself.
3. A causal chain cannot be of infinite length.
4. Therefore, there must be a first cause; or, there must be
something that is not an effect.

Now, it is proven that ever contingent being has a cause. This is universally true. The universal is made up of of contingent beings, therefore the universe too is a contigent being made up of contingent beings, therefor the universe needs a cause as well.

The objection becomes that even though ever contingent being has a cause that all those contingent beings coming together as a whole dos not necessarily mean that that whole has a cause as well.

Lets look at it this way every contingent being has a cause. God created all those contingent beings. All these contingent beings as a whole are known as the universe. The uiverse was created not from a first cause but as a result of the creating of many contingent beings and the combing of them as a whole. It’s a lot like a pizza. The pizza does not have a cause but rather it is cretaed as a result of the formation o fmany contingent beings, sauce, cheese etc in a certain manner.

Fine the universe was not created by God but every contingent being created by God as a whole created the universe.

 

[ateista]

I believe the point was that the “fallacy of composition” is not universaly correct and obviosly in error in this case. The error you are making is this: The "fallacy of composition states: “when one infers that something is true of the whole from the fact that it is true of some part of the whole”.

Why is that incorrect? That is the fallacy of composition. For some entities and some properties it is true, for others it is not.

Here is the argument brougth forth by Aquinas (simplified of course):

1.Every finite and contingent being has a cause.
2.Nothing finite and dependent (contingent) can cause itself.
3. A causal chain cannot be of infinite length.
4. Therefore, there must be a first cause; or, there must be
something that is not an effect.

1. This is just an unproven and unprovable proposition. We can say that every observed being had a cause. From that it does not follow that every being must have a cause. To assert otherwise is called the fallacy of popular induction (as opposed to the mathematical induction). Example: all the observed swans were white, therefore every swan must be white. Since 1) is incorrect, there is no need to examine the rest.

Now, it is proven that ever contingent being has a cause. This is universally true. The universal is made up of of contingent beings, therefore the universe too is a contigent being made up of contingent beings, therefor the universe needs a cause as well.

See above. It was not proven. And in the second part you just reiterated that from the contingency of the parts follows the contingency of the whole. And this is precisely what needs to be proven.

The objection becomes that even though ever contingent being has a cause that all those contingent beings coming together as a whole dos not necessarily mean that that whole has a cause as well.

Yes, that is the problem.

Lets look at it this way every contingent being has a cause. God created all those contingent beings.

Hold it. This is what is supposed to be the end result. You cannot propose it also as a premise. That would be a circular argument.

 

[Joyousguard]

Why is that incorrect? That is

the fallacy of composition. For some entities and some properties it is true, for others it is not. By the very fact that it is true for all the parts and not just some because it were not true for all the parts then certain things in this world would have to exist without being caused.

1. This is just an unproven and unprovable proposition. We can say that every observed

 

[ateista]

By the very fact that it is true for all the parts and not just some because it were not true for all the parts then certain things in this world would have to exist without being caused.

According to Stephen Hawking new matter comes into existence near a black hole, so this seems to support the concept of uncaused existence.

No, your example is incorrect. Its not that swan is white therfore all swans are white, it’s all swans come from other swans therefore that swan comes from another swan.

It was an example of incorrect induction.

Suppose God did not create the universe but created a whole bunch of stuff that in turn created the universe. The universe was created from matter for without matter the universe does not exist, but that matter had to come from somewhere because the caused university could no tcome into existenc eby itself and we know that nothing can come into existence by itself.

This is precisely what we don’t know.

 

[tdgesq]

According to Stephen Hawking new matter comes into existence near a black hole, so this seems to support the concept of uncaused existence.

Why only near a black hole? It appears to be a necessary condition for the existence of new matter. If it is, then what is the relationship between the black hole and this new matter if not a causal relationship?

 

[ateista]

Why only near a black hole? It appears to be a necessary condition for the existence of new matter. If it is, then what is the relationship between the black hole and this new matter if not a causal relationship?

As I understand (and I may very well be wrong), the appearance of an electron-positron pair is not something that is “caused”, it just happens. Usually they annihilate each other - so no new matter is “created”. But if this event occurs near a black hole, one of them may be absorbed and a new particle remains.

But that may not be a good example. A much better one is the concept of activities stemming from our free will. If our actions are “caused”, then they are not “free” in any sense of the word. If they are truly “free”, then they are uncaused, so we have examples of uncaused events. Therefore the assumption that everything that has a beginning must be caused is simply false.

And that takes the wind out of the sail of the whole “first cause” argument.

 

[john_doran]

I would say it is self-evident: “Since every entity in the universe has a cause outside itself, therefore the universe (a collection of its constituent parts) also **has to have **a cause outside itself.” It is a clear case of composition.

A) that’s not the first cause argument;

B) even if it was, now you have to demonstrate that the compositionality it exhibits is fallacious.

ateista:

Whether the universe needs a causal explanation for its existence, or not, is not the question. The question is that from the causal explanation of its parts does not automatically follow that the composed entity also needs a causal explanation. That is the fallacy. Composed entities can have properties that cannot be reduced to the properties of its part.

but it automatically follows from the fact that every part of the ball is red that the ball is red; why not so for the universe and its (putative) cause?

ateista:

Of course the whole concept of something “outside” the universe or “before” the universe is nonsensical.

true. but so what?

ateista:

Universe is the proper name for everything that exists.

no, it’s not: it’s the proper name for every natural object that exists.

 

[tdgesq]

As I understand (and I may very well be wrong), the appearance of an electron-positron pair is not something that is “caused”, it just happens. Usually they annihilate each other - so no new matter is “created”. But if this event occurs near a black hole, one of them may be absorbed and a new particle remains.

But that may not be a good example.

I agree that is not a good example, but the next one you give seems even worse.

A much better one is the concept of activities stemming from our free will. If our actions are “caused”, then they are not “free” in any sense of the word. If they are truly “free”, then they are uncaused, so we have examples of uncaused events. Therefore the assumption that everything that has a beginning must be caused is simply false.

Who says there is such a thing as free will? If you want to demonstrate an uncaused cause then you need a better argument than that. I contend that all our actions and thoughts are caused. Do you have any evidence that they are not?

 

[ateista]

A) that’s not the first cause argument;

B) even if it was, now you have to demonstrate that the compositionality it exhibits is fallacious.

Are we in a tug of war? The proponents of the first cause make a positive claim. The onus of proof is on them. I merely pointed out that the claim (if for every e1, e2,… there is a property “p”, then the set of (e1, e2,…) also has a property “p”) is in error.

but it automatically follows from the fact that every part of the ball is red that the ball is red; why not so for the universe and its (putative) cause?

It does not “automatically” follow either. It is just true in that particular case.

no, it’s not: it’s the proper name for every natural object that exists.

Are there “unnatural” objects, too? Btw, I posted questions to you in our conversation about “abstract objects”. I hope you find time to reflect on them.

 

[ateista]

Who says there is such a thing as free will? If you want to demonstrate an uncaused cause then you need a better argument than that. I contend that all our actions and thoughts are caused. Do you have any evidence that they are not?

No, I do not. The exisence of free will cannot be proven. It is just a very likely assumption. There are 2 possibilities:

1. There is free will and then there are uncaused events.
2. There is no free will and then our whole justice system, the concept of sin, etc… are all based on an incorrect assumption and thus they are meaningless.

Neither can be proven. Pick your choice.

 

[john_doran]

Are we in a tug of war?

aren’t we always?

ateista:

The proponents of the first cause make a positive claim. The onus of proof is on them. I merely pointed out that the claim (if for every e1, e2,… there is a property “p”, then the set of (e1, e2,…) also has a property “p”) is in error.

then you’re making a positive claim, too: namely that the compositionality of the first cause argument is fallacious. but you have provide no proof for such a claim. i am simply asking for it.

that having been said, the first cause argument does not proceed in the way you describe. this is the first cause argument:

1. anything that changes is caused to change;
2. but there cannot be an infinite regress of causes;
3. therefore there is an uncaused cause.

and the kalam comsmological argument does not resort to composition, either, fallacious or otherwise.

ateista:

It does not “automatically” follow either. It is just true in that particular case.

it automatically follows in that particular case.

but whatever - why does it follow in that case, but not in the case of the example using the universe?

ateista:

Are there “unnatural” objects, too?

yes. if by “un” you mean “super”.

 

[ateista]

aren’t we always?

Yes, we sure are. But it is a most friendly one, and I find it invigorating.

then you’re making a positive claim, too: namely that the compositionality of the first cause argument is fallacious. but you have provide no proof for such a claim. i am simply asking for it.

Looks like I was not clear enough - again. No, I do not claim that in that particular instance it is an incorrect argument. All I am saying is that the universal composition is a fallacy. Whether in this case it is correct or not, is to be investigated.

that having been said, the first cause argument does not proceed in the way you describe. this is the first cause argument:

1. anything that changes is caused to change;
2. but there cannot be an infinite regress of causes;
3. therefore there is an uncaused cause.

Ok, let’s put it in this format. I agree that there are many uncaused causes. But what is the point?

From 1) it does not follow that the cause must be external, nor does it follow that the cause must precede the event. They may be simultaneous.

The problem with 2) that it presupposes that the causes can be mapped onto the positive integers, and thus they can be ordered as first, secind, etc… But that is just an assumption.

yes. if by “un” you mean “super”.

Grammatically, the opposite of “natural” is “unnatural” - which might mean everything that does not appear in nature by themselves. In this sense all the trans-uranium elements are unnatural, and so are our cars, our medications, etc. None of these are “super”-natural.

But if you wish to postulate “super”-natural, then I must wonder why don’t you also postulate “sub”-natural?

 

[john_doran]

Looks like I was not clear enough - again. No, I do not claim that in that particular instance it is an incorrect argument. All I am saying is that the universal composition is a fallacy. Whether in this case it is correct or not, is to be investigated.

fair enough. presumably, though, you must have an inclination one way or the other as to the (in)validity of the compositionality you impute to the first cause argument…

ateista:

From 1) it does not follow that the cause must be external, nor does it follow that the cause must precede the event. They may be simultaneous.

i agree that causes need not be temporally prior to their effects, but they must be causally and logically prior.

the various theistic arguments from causation rely only on the latter kinds of priority.

as an aside, it’s interesting that you recognize the possible simultaneity of causes and effects - i’ve had a number of exchanges with atheists/agnostics who vehemently denied the coherence of such a position.

ateista:

The problem with 2) that it presupposes that the causes can be mapped onto the positive integers, and thus they can be ordered as first, secind, etc… But that is just an assumption.

i’m not sure what you’re getting at here: the number of causes in a causal chain can be neither countably nor uncountably infinite.

ateista:

Grammatically, the opposite of “natural” is “unnatural” - which might mean everything that does not appear in nature by themselves.

don’t look now, but you’re appealing to grammatical structure in language that is independent of use …

ateista:

In this sense all the trans-uranium elements are unnatural, and so are our cars, our medications, etc. None of these are “super”-natural.

But if you wish to postulate “super”-natural, then I must wonder why don’t you also postulate “sub”-natural?

i’m also not sure what you’re getting at here. i mean to exclude from the definition of “universe”, any and all objects/entities that are non-corporeal.

in the alternative, i have no problem stipulating that the universe is everything that exists at a given possible world (planes, trains, the number 7, angels, and god); but then i would also stipulate that the “universe” doesn’t have a cause. which would, of course, do nothing to change the fact that the contingent (and all but one of the necessary) constituents of the universe would still require one…