I have no problem with that. Though I cannot understand what do you mean to have a logical or causal āfirstā among several independent causal chains. A temporal āfirstā could have a meaning, the others do not.
the idea is that each causal chain must have a logically and causally first, uncaused cause.
whether or not those uncaused causes are numerically identical is a further question, as you note.
ateista:
Sounds good to me. Again the existence of at least one uncaused cause does not establish anything special.
depends on what you mean by āspecialā, i guessā¦itās a short logical step from āuncausedā, for example, to ānon-corporealāā¦which may or may not qualify it as āspecialā depending on whether you are or are not imclined to believe that the natural world contains everything that exists.
ateista:
Ok. But since the first cause argument can only establish the existence of at least one such cause, I donāt see how it can be establish the rest - without appealing to faith, sacred books, revelations, etcā¦ Maybe you could explain, if not in this thread, then in another one.
well, as an example, the conclusion of the kalam cosmological argument for a first cause establishes that there cannot have been an actually infinite number of temporal moments preceding this one. but it follows from
that, that the necessary and sufficient conditions for the coming-to-be of the universe could not have existed for all eternity, or else the
universe would have existed for all eternity, which,
ex hypothesi, it hasnāt. but then the first cause (whatever it might be) must have done something like
choose to create the universe, and if
thatās true, then the first cause is in some important way, a
personal being - i.e. a being that is a person (since being able to choose freely is arguably a sufficient condition for personhood).
and, if it can
choose, then it must also be
rationalā¦
as for being singular, the traditional argument is that any first cause must be purely actual, since if it is, at some point, not something that it nonetheless
could be, that would mean that there is some other logically and causally prior cause, which there isnāt. (this is not dissimilar to the argument from perfection: all maximally perfect beings must be numerically identical; if theyāre not, then thereās perfections that they lack - namely the perfections instantiated by the
other beings).
ateista:
I am sorry, if I was peskyā¦ please donāt bother, if you are not interested. This is supposed to be a pleasant conversation about mutually interesting problems, not a chore or obligation. You can always post a short āI am tired of this topicāā¦ and I will not get back to it. And that is a promise.
no, no - you werenāt pesky at all. itās just a matter of a waning interest on my partā¦
iāll go and give it a look at some point, iām sure.