Explain, please

[Serious]

I love computers, relish the achievements; AI is extremely cool, and the sky’s the limit in computer science.

We agree here, and I am very glad about it.

I have in mind MS Word and my CPU. I haven’t seen reports of instances where the software like that can modify the physical archetecture of the CPU. I have seen for a long time now software that is self-modifying. But that doesn’t apply to software-to-hardware directionality. From, the information I have and articles I’ve investigated, when one gets to what is strictly and actually happening in man-made cellular automata they don’t show anything like first person conscious choices and pursuits altering third person physical structure and function.

You are in too much of a hurry. I brought up the cellular automata for one reason only, to show that the hardware-software interaction can go both ways. So why not close that particular line of thought? The “program” (software, or even “wetware”) runs on the hardwarde, and they interact in both directions.

IMHO, you’re being obtuse and evasive.

Should we start accusing each other now? I don’t think that will bring us forward.

A concept cannot be proven philosophically, but a proposition can. Philosophy is exactly a game of proving something, philosophical propositions–as any reading of philosophy will show–philosophical propositions like going beyond what the SM can explore to the statement that in all actuality and in every way the conscious mind is nothing but brain activity.

I disagree. Philosophical propostions are merely asserted, but cannot be proven. What epistemological tool would you use to show that a philosophical proposition is true or false?

As I have said, I agree that the proposition is “irrelevant” and “useless” to science and the SM which investigates the physical universe. You seem to be (or even are) saying it’s irrelevant and useless in all actuality and in every way, because you advance materialism/physicalism as a worldview and/or because the SM is the only way to investigate true or false propositions about external reality. These need to be proven to overturn the existing proposition I have been reminding you of.

The only proof is the proof of the pudding. Since the method yields consistent results, it is substantiated (I don’t like the word “proven” in this respect) satisfactorily. Since we agree on this, we can step forward to your hard question.

First, I will accept that the concept of consciousness is very hard, and to my best knowledge it has never even been defined satisfactorily. But that is not a big problem.

But before we can tackle that, there is an even more important problem to ponder: “what is the difference between the ‘original’ and the ‘emulation’?”. Is there a difference between a very good emulation and the real McCoy? This is the crux of the matter. If a computer, or an artifical entity passes the Turing test, on what grounds are we goiung to deny that it has consciousness? I am using the duck-principle here: “if it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, quacks like a duck, tastes like a duck - it is very probably a duck”. (Remember, the Turing test can last as you please. It can involve tricky questions. It can include telling jokes. Whatever you want.) I would venture to say that not all humans would pass this test - especially if you tell a joke to the other “person” (is it a person?) and “it” laughs, and then you demand to explain why was that joke funny?

Think about this philosophical problem: “how to tell apart the original and the very good emulation?”. My answer is: if you cannot, then there is no discernible difference, therefore the question becomes moot and irrelevant. If the “computer” would exhibit human-like behavior, then it would be the equivalent of a human. And since we agree that the computer has no immaterial “soul”, therefore the assumption that the humans have it - becomes an empty, unnecessary proposition.

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

You are in too much of a hurry. I brought up the cellular automata for one reason only, to show that the hardware-software interaction can go both ways. So why not close that particular line of thought? The “program” (software, or even “wetware”) runs on the hardwarde, and they interact in both directions.

Which are you saying? (1) The hardware needs the software and the software needs the hardware, ergo they interact in both directions; or (2) the software can alter the physical architecture of the CPU, as conscious choices and decisions can actually alter brain structure?

(1) is fine but irrelevant. Re (2) I ask you again, are there instances of cellular automata where the software alters the hardware anything like first person conscious choices and pursuits altering third person physical structure and function? If your answer is “no,” we can get off the subject but we have to realize what we have just shown.

Should we start accusing each other now? I don’t think that will bring us forward.

Fair enough. But you need to respond to arguments if this is going to be a real conversation. See conclusion.

I disagree. Philosophical propostions are merely asserted, but cannot be proven. What epistemological tool would you use to show that a philosophical proposition is true or false?

Philosophical propositions cannot be proven scientifically by the SM. If that is what you’re saying, I have no problem with that. But then it seems like you saying here that the SM alone gives valid knowledge about the veracity of true and false statements regarding the external world.

The philosophical tool is reason and evidence as has been the case with philosophy for 2500 years. Let’s go to the next point to develop this.

The only proof is the proof of the pudding. Since the method yields consistent results, it is substantiated (I don’t like the word “proven” in this respect) satisfactorily. Since we agree on this, we can step forward to your hard question.

I agree with this methodological statement for science and no further. But science cannot talk about the soul since it is outside of its method. So, again, for you to claim that the soul doesn’t exist you are by definition going beyond science and the SM.

So let’s do some philosophy as an instance of using reason and evidence. Let’s say someone [not you necessarily] asserts the SM alone yields consistent results about the veracity of true and false statements regarding the external world. The proof is in the pudding: after all the SM has produced the list of accomplishments you gave early in our discussion. The problem is this statement is self-refuting. You claim to know it, but it is not the result of the SM: it does not report an empirical observation about physical/material reality; it cannot be isolated in a lab, produced by controlled scientific experiments, nor derived from an equation describing physical reality. It is either a personal policy statement and cannot make a truth claim on reality or it rests on extra-scientific considerations in which case it is self-refuting.

Or let’s say someone says only empirical statements about reality can be judged for veracity. This statement is also self-refuting since it is not an empirical statement about reality.

There! We did some philosophical thinking using reason and evidence w/o the SM; and I think we both agree that the results are indisputable.

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

First, I will accept that the concept of consciousness is very hard, and to my best knowledge it has never even been defined satisfactorily. But that is not a big problem.

The definition of consciousness is not the hard problem. I gave a definition of the conscious mind and I characterized consciousness. I think we could agree that consciousness is the inner qualitative states of sentience and awareness when we are awake. The hard problem is relating the third person neurological data to the first person data on consciousness as I mentioned and asked you to address several times.

But before we can tackle that, there is an even more important problem to ponder: “what is the difference between the ‘original’ and the ‘emulation’?”. Is there a difference between a very good emulation and the real McCoy? This is the crux of the matter. If a computer, or an artifical entity passes the Turing test, on what grounds are we goiung to deny that it has consciousness? I am using the duck-principle here: “if it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, quacks like a duck, tastes like a duck - it is very probably a duck”. (Remember, the Turing test can last as you please. It can involve tricky questions. It can include telling jokes. Whatever you want.) I would venture to say that not all humans would pass this test - especially if you tell a joke to the other “person” (is it a person?) and “it” laughs, and then you demand to explain why was that joke funny?

Think about this philosophical problem: “how to tell apart the original and the very good emulation?”. My answer is: if you cannot, then there is no discernible difference, therefore the question becomes moot and irrelevant. If the “computer” would exhibit human-like behavior, then it would be the equivalent of a human. And since we agree that the computer has no immaterial “soul”, therefore the assumption that the humans have it - becomes an empty, unnecessary proposition.

Well now, here’s the thing. Three time I have asked you to address yourself to my argument presented to you (Feb. 26,’12, 6:57 pm.) that is directly on topic, given that your initial statement was “the mind is simply the activity of the brain.” You have yet to tackle it. I’ve pretty much already got all the points lined up to answer the above about computers (a related but separate topic), but until you extend to me the courtesy of actually responding to something I took the time to spell out for you, I will wait to respond here. When you do, I’ll be glad to continue the conversation on the very interesting questions on computer programs you pose above. I’ll reproduce my outlining of the hard problem below.

My point is to highlight what needs to be explained and the path an explanation must take and the scope of certain explanations. . . .

• The DATUM to be explained is the mind defined as the complex of cognitional, volitional, perceptual, emotional processes, and qualia in the conscious life of an individual person usually emphasizing rationality. This is inner, first person, observer-dependent.

• The PROCESS involved in the SM investigates extra-mental objects that are third person and observer-independent mechanistically in terms of structure and function.

• PROBLEM: How does one get from these thing-objects that work mechanistically and atomistically to the mind, my mind, as known in life? Once one tells the story of the physical and physiological processes in all possible depth there is still the further fact of inner conscious first-person mental activity in me. (Feb. 26,’12, 6:57 pm.)

How do objective, publically-observable neuronal events or the brain as a whole produce/become inner, first-person conscious mental experience(s)? In other words, how does what happens in the brain become what happens in your mind? (Feb. 24,’12, 3:02 pm.)

 

[Serious]

Which are you saying? (1) The hardware needs the software and the software needs the hardware, ergo they interact in both directions; or (2) the software can alter the physical architecture of the CPU, as conscious choices and decisions can actually alter brain structure?

(1) is fine but irrelevant. Re (2) I ask you again, are there instances of cellular automata where the software alters the hardware anything like first person conscious choices and pursuits altering third person physical structure and function? If your answer is “no,” we can get off the subject but we have to realize what we have just shown.

The answer is “yes”. Maybe you are not familiar with the concept of cellular automata in detail. The simplest form (devloped by E.F. Codd) is a grid (like a graph paper) where each cell is connected to its four neighbors. Each cell can have 8 states (0…7). On each clock tick the cells communicate, they send and receive signals from/to their neighbors. Based upon their internal state and the state of their neighbors, they will change into a new state. This is called the transition function, which can itself change during the procedure. The transition function is both the hardware and the operation system. And it can change, just like the state of the neurons changes as we think and learn. This is pretty technical, but it cannot be helped. The point is that just like in the brain there are new connections, in the computer architecture we have new connections developing.

Philosophical propositions cannot be proven scientifically by the SM. If that is what you’re saying, I have no problem with that. But then it seems like you saying here that the SM alone gives valid knowledge about the veracity of true and false statements regarding the external world.

The phrase “scientific method” is just a misnomer. There is only one method. Observing something, contemplating it, setting up hypotheses, and testing the hypotheses against the reality. And then either accepting that the hypothesis works “well enough” to consider it provisionally true, or it needs further refining or must be discarded. The “truth claims” about reality are always provisional. They are always prone to modification.

The philosophical tool is reason and evidence as has been the case with philosophy for 2500 years. Let’s go to the next point to develop this.

What do you call “evidence”? You assert that there is a “soul”. By the way, I am still NOT saying that there is no soul, I simply say that it is an unnecessary assumption. So what sould we consider evidence for this concept?

So let’s do some philosophy as an instance of using reason and evidence. Let’s say someone [not you necessarily] asserts the SM alone yields consistent results about the veracity of true and false statements regarding the external world. The proof is in the pudding: after all the SM has produced the list of accomplishments you gave early in our discussion. The problem is this statement is self-refuting.

No, it is not self-refuting, because I did not say that there are no other methods. I say that no one has presented any other methods, which could compete. What you said above is incomplete, since you never specified what “evidence” would be. The self-refuting statement would be a logical positivist one: “all the propositions must be verified empirically in order to accept them as true”. (Please observe the universal operator.) But I never said this!

There are innumerable propositions about reality which are not subject to this method, and those propositions do not deal with imaginary concepts and beings. If one says: “I love that person”, then the “love” cannot be measured, but from the behavior of the person we can gauge if that statement was true or false. If one says: “that boulder is heavy”, this statement cannot be decided in a generic fashion, but it can be verified by trying to lift it. Not all propositions can have a “true” or “false” value associated with them.

You claim to know it, but it is not the result of the SM: it does not report an empirical observation about physical/material reality; it cannot be isolated in a lab, produced by controlled scientific experiments, nor derived from an equation describing physical reality.

Exactly, it is an epistemologial statement. There is a fundamental difference between “a proposition about reality” and “a proposition about the propositions about reality”. These two different kinds of statements are confused all the time. I cannot even count how many times this error was committed.

It is either a personal policy statement and cannot make a truth claim on reality or it rests on extra-scientific considerations in which case it is self-refuting.

Why “personal”? It is a basic principle, and it is basic, because it is the only one which yields results.

There! We did some philosophical thinking using reason and evidence w/o the SM; and I think we both agree that the results are indisputable.

Unfortuantely you made the elementary error of confusing “propositions about reality” and “propositions about the propositions about reality” - so this analysis is an example of how NOT attempt to make philosphical thinking. Not to mention that you left out the important part of defining what the word “evidence” means in this context. If evidence means something that is objective, which can be examined by third persons, then you are back at the “scientific” method. If it is not, then what are you talking about?

 

[Serious]

My point is to highlight what needs to be explained and the path an explanation must take and the scope of certain explanations. . . .

• The DATUM to be explained is the mind defined as the complex of cognitional, volitional, perceptual, emotional processes, and qualia in the conscious life of an individual person usually emphasizing rationality. This is inner, first person, observer-dependent.

• The PROCESS involved in the SM investigates extra-mental objects that are third person and observer-independent mechanistically in terms of structure and function.

• PROBLEM: How does one get from these thing-objects that work mechanistically and atomistically to the mind, my mind, as known in life? Once one tells the story of the physical and physiological processes in all possible depth there is still the further fact of inner conscious first-person mental activity in me. (Feb. 26,’12, 6:57 pm.)

How do objective, publically-observable neuronal events or the brain as a whole produce/become inner, first-person conscious mental experience(s)? In other words, how does what happens in the brain become what happens in your mind? (Feb. 24,’12, 3:02 pm.)

I don’t know. At present no one knows. So what? I already explained that this knowledge might be nice, but not necessary to make the concept of “soul” irrelevant. I will not repeat it. Go and read my post about the problem of finding out the difference between the “original” and the “emulation”.

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

The phrase “scientific method” is just a misnomer. There is only one method. Observing something, contemplating it, setting up hypotheses, and testing the hypotheses against the reality. And then either accepting that the hypothesis works “well enough” to consider it provisionally true, or it needs further refining or must be discarded. The “truth claims” about reality are always provisional. They are always prone to modification.

If you’re going to use terms you should not redefine them and then wonder why others don’t use them as you do. Any scientific journal, or introductory college or high school science textbook, plus the National Academy of Sciences and American Association For The Advancement Of Science all define and employ the SM as an empirical, mechanistic, quantifiable investigation of physical reality. And they consciously distinguish it from other legitimate methods. None of them say there is only one method: the empirical method for investigating physical reality.

The SM evolved historically as can be verified in the Cambridge History of Science, vol. 3, Early Modern Science and numerous other works. The reason the SM evolved as it did out of the philosophy of nature is that these philosophers of nature wanted more and more empirical, physical, mechanistic, atomistic, explanations relying on efficient causality with implications for technology. God’s action in the world was not unknowable or inexplicable or meaningless to them. They were usually adept at metaphysical analysis. They just knew the difference between that and empirical, physical, mechanistic, atomistic, explanations; and they chose to explore the latter as well without prejudice to the former—which is perfectly fine.

So when you say “The phrase ‘scientific method’ is just a misnomer. There is only one method.” you are saying here that the one method, the SM, the empirical method for investigating physical reality, is the only method for determining the veracity true and false statements about external reality.

If, then, one is going to broaden the scope of the SM to include true and false statements about all reality (not just physical reality) and/or limit the scope of reality to physical reality, they need to: (1) justify this departure from the common understanding of the SM and justify the epistemology involved in that departure; and (2) justify the limiting of external reality to physical reality.

What do you call “evidence”? You assert that there is a “soul”. By the way, I am still NOT saying that there is no soul, I simply say that it is an unnecessary assumption. So what sould we consider evidence for this concept?

You said that said “the evidence is overwhelming” that “the mind is simply the activity of the brain.” It’s then up to you to make good on this contention that denies the existence of the soul. . . . if you mean it to be more than just a scientific statement. Think about it: why are you not content to say for science the soul is not a possible explanation for the relationship between mind and brain? You seem to want to broaden the scope, but science can’t go further.

I use as evidence the data that has traditionally been used in philosophical investigation including its rational critique. I assumed you were familiar with the history of philosophy. The best statement of it I have found is by a notable philosopher Nicholas Rescher.

“Neither individually nor collectively do we humans begin our cognitive quest empty-handed, equipped with only a tabula rasa. Be it as single individuals or as entire generations, we always begin with a diversified cognitive heritage, falling heir to that great mass of information and misinformation that constitutes the knowledge of our predecessors . . . . What William James called our “funded experience” of the world’s ways—of its nature and our place in it—constitute the data at philosophy’s disposal to accomplish its question-resolving work. These specifically include:
• Common-sense beliefs, common knowledge, and what have been ‘the ordinary convictions of the plain man’ since time immemorial;
• The facts (or purported facts) afforded by the sciences of the day; the views of well-informed experts and authorities;
• The lessons we derive from our dealings with the world in everyday life;
• The received opinions that constitute the world view of the day; views that accord with the ‘spirit of the times’ and the ambient convictions of one’s cultural context;
• Tradition, inherited lore, and ancestral wisdom (including religious tradition);
• The ‘teachings of history’ as best we can discern them.
• matters of determinable empirical fact;
• claims that are self-evident.”
Philosophical Reasoning. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2001, pp. 15-16, 88]

I could separately discuss evidence in support of the traditional conviction that there is a soul in a different branch on this thread, if you like. But that is separate from you proving your point.

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

No, it is not self-refuting, because I did not say that there are no other methods. I say that no one has presented any other methods, which could compete. What you said above is incomplete, since you never specified what “evidence” would be. The self-refuting statement would be a logical positivist one: “all the propositions must be verified empirically in order to accept them as true”. (Please observe the universal operator.) But I never said this!
There are innumerable propositions about reality which are not subject to this method, and those propositions do not deal with imaginary concepts and beings. If one says: “I love that person”, then the “love” cannot be measured, but from the behavior of the person we can gauge if that statement was true or false. If one says: “that boulder is heavy”, this statement cannot be decided in a generic fashion, but it can be verified by trying to lift it. Not all propositions can have a “true” or “false” value associated with them.

First, you are incorrect about the definition of a proposition. A proposition is limited to statements that can be true or false. “Every sentence has meaning, . . . Yet every sentence is not a proposition; only such are propositions as have in them either truth or falsity.” (Aristotle, On Interpretation, 17a3-5)

Secondly, you seem to be operating on the assumption that propositions can only be about the external world. There can be no propositions about life, the emotions, the intellect, the will, or life skills because they can’t be tested by what is in essence the SM. So there is no way to determine the truth of statements like “If you eat too much of something you will experience a surfeit.” “Love is blind.” “Virtue perfects an ability.”

I think I can go along with your observation that “The SM alone can determine the veracity of propositions about the external world” is not self-refuting. However the statement “The SM alone can determine the veracity of propositions” would be, despite its being second intention (props. about props.) as was your example which is essentially identical to my second example in the previous post.

But if you’re going to assert as you do that my original proposition is second intention and so is outside the object of the SM, ergo not self-refuting, on what other basis then do you justify it’s veracity? Are you saying it cannot be true or false. If so, why should one accept it? Are you saying that there are true propositions that are not about external reality? Are you saying there is another method when it comes to determining the veracity of second intentions? What is it? You might say the SM has produced a list of accomplishments; there’s the proof. But that only says the SM produces valid scientific knowledge, which I never disputed.

So, is the set of true propositions about external reality limited to scientific propositions? Is the only exception logical laws, or more?

You “say that no one has presented any other methods, which could compete.” OK so it is your choice to employ only the SM as a matter of personal policy. But how am I thereby in the least rationally compelled to follow that policy and limit myself to its results?

Exactly, it is an epistemologial statement. There is a fundamental difference between “a proposition about reality” and “a proposition about the propositions about reality”. These two different kinds of statements are confused all the time. I cannot even count how many times this error was committed.

Yes I have been aware of this distinction since Philosophy 101. The expression traditionally is intellectual acts of the first versus second intention. The example you gave of a self-refuting proposition was second intention though.

Why “personal”? It is a basic principle, and it is basic, because it is the only one which yields results.

It is the only one that yields empirically-based, physical, mechanistic results, i.e., scientific results/propositions. How do you justify limiting knowledge of propositions about reality to this kind? Why is it more reasonable to do so? If you say “I’m not going to justify it’s truth epistemologically, I just choose to do this,” then your’re making a personal policy statement. And you are free to do so, but it makes no truth claim on me.

Unfortuantely you made the elementary error of confusing “propositions about reality” and “propositions about the propositions about reality” - so this analysis is an example of how NOT attempt to make philosphical thinking. Not to mention that you left out the important part of defining what the word “evidence” means in this context. If evidence means something that is objective, which can be examined by third persons, then you are back at the “scientific” method. If it is not, then what are you talking about?

I made no such error. And I assumed you were familiar with the history of philosophy.
How do you define “objective?” Physical only?

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

I have seen cellular automata working on paper as mathematical and computational models or graphic simulations as on the Wikipedia article, but not altering hard physical architecture. (If you have newer information on this, please pass it on.) And they certainly aren’t anything like a software package altering the physical architecture of a CPU or motherboard; or, even more complicated, conscious choices and decisions altering brain structure.

I don’t know. At present no one knows. So what? I already explained that this knowledge might be nice, but not necessary to make the concept of “soul” irrelevant. I will not repeat it. Go and read my post about the problem of finding out the difference between the “original” and the “emulation”.

Sooo, “irrelevant,” not false. I really don’t care if it’s irelevant to you: I care if you tell me it is false to assert that the soul exists. You said “the evidence is overwhelming” that “the mind is simply the activity of the brain.” If this is more than a scientific statement, it is a denial of the existence of the soul.

If you can’t tell me how “the mind is simply the activity of the brain,” you have not made good on your assertion and you haven’t given me reason here to abandon this conviction.

So let’s see what AI affords us.

But before we can tackle that, there is an even more important problem to ponder: “what is the difference between the ‘original’ and the ‘emulation’?”. Is there a difference between a very good emulation and the real McCoy? This is the crux of the matter. If a computer, or an artifical entity passes the Turing test, on what grounds are we goiung to deny that it has consciousness? I am using the duck-principle here: “if it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, quacks like a duck, tastes like a duck - it is very probably a duck”. (Remember, the Turing test can last as you please. It can involve tricky questions. It can include telling jokes. Whatever you want.) I would venture to say that not all humans would pass this test - especially if you tell a joke to the other “person” (is it a person?) and “it” laughs, and then you demand to explain why was that joke funny?

Think about this philosophical problem: “how to tell apart the original and the very good emulation?”. My answer is: if you cannot, then there is no discernible difference, therefore the question becomes moot and irrelevant. If the “computer” would exhibit human-like behavior, then it would be the equivalent of a human. And since we agree that the computer has no immaterial “soul”, therefore the assumption that the humans have it - becomes an empty, unnecessary proposition.

The word used by the philosophers usually is “simulation.’ And indeed we often hear of computer simulations, not emulations. I will stick with “simulation.” I’ll draw a lot from John R. Searle’s work. He intends to maintain the physicalist natural scientific worldview we have built up and avoid “dualism” [the mental and physical are two mutually exclusive categories] in the subject of the origin of consciousness.

(1) Simulation is not duplication.
Let’s say we write a computer program that follows the whole formal sequence of processes in the body of chemical and neural messages that initiate thirst and even instruct the program to print out at the end “Boy, am I thirsty!” or “Would you give me a drink?” Now would anyone think that we thereby have even the slightest reason to suppose that the computer is literally thirsty? that it has the mental state we have of experiencing thirst?

A computer can simulate the formal properties of the sequence of thirst just as we can simulate hurricanes, rainstorms, five-alarms fires, internal combustion engines, photosynthesis, lactation, or the flow of currency in the euro zone. But no one in his right mind thinks that a computer simulation of a five-alarm fire will burn down the neighborhood, or that a computer simulation of an internal combustion engine will power a car, or that computer simulations of lactation and photosynthesis will produce milk and sugar. Nor would they think a computer program simulation of thirst can produce the mental state of the computer being thirsty.

(2) Computers use syntax, not semantics.
As far as the computer is concerned the symbols don’t symbolize or represent anything. They are just formal counters. The computer attaches no meaning, interpretation, or content to the formal symbols; and as a computer it couldn’t, because if we tried to give the computer an interpretation of its symbols we could only give it more uninterpreted symbols. Computers do not understand a meaning.

(3) Software does not = consciousness.
For your final sentence to have any chance of holding you would have to argue, like the strong AI crowd, that the specific neurophysiology of the brain is irrelevant to the mind nor is any morphology relevant: what counts for consciousness is the computer program as long as it has something to run on. Is this why you are now switching to computers from your original claim that “the mind is simply the activity of the brain”?

In the end AI, for all its advances, no more quacks like human consciousness than an artificial heart quacks like a human heart.

 

[Serious]

I have seen cellular automata working on paper as mathematical and computational models or graphic simulations as on the Wikipedia article, but not altering hard physical architecture. (If you have newer information on this, please pass it on.) And they certainly aren’t anything like a software package altering the physical architecture of a CPU or motherboard; or, even more complicated, conscious choices and decisions altering brain structure.

The architecture is not what you imagine. This is how it looks like:

00000000000000000000000
22222222222222222000000
11111110711111112000000
22222222222222212000000
00000000000000212000000

Each number represents a cell. The “zero” state is stable. The state of 1 is conductive wire, the state 2 is the insulation around the wire, the “package” of “70” is a signal propagating abound the wire… etc… Of course the “hard” physical layer does not change, just like in the human brain the atoms do not change. The configuration is what is changing. In a cellular automaton there is no “CPU”, and there is no “memory”. Every cell participates in the functions of the CPU and also serves as part of the memory. Just like in a brain. You could study the neural networks if you are interested in more details.

Sooo, “irrelevant,” not false. I really don’t care if it’s irelevant to you: I care if you tell me it is false to assert that the soul exists. You said “the evidence is overwhelming” that “the mind is simply the activity of the brain.” If this is more than a scientific statement, it is a denial of the existence of the soul.

Oh, give me a break. I have never seen a coherent definition of the “soul”. Some people say it is an “animating principle”, others say it is the “form”, others insist that the human soul is “immortal”, etc… Also none of these assumptions give the slightest idea, just how does this untouchable, unmeasurable “stuff” interact with the brain. Don’t ask me to invalidate such an undefined concept. The evidence is still overwhelming. Excite the brain electircally and/or chemically and there will be change in the process of how it works. Sever the frontal lobe, and the person’s personality is gone. Minor injuries to the physical structure of the brain will cause disturbancies in its operation. Etc…

If you can’t tell me how “the mind is simply the activity of the brain,” you have not made good on your assertion and you haven’t given me reason here to abandon this conviction.

You are most welcome to believe whatever you want.

So let’s see what AI affords us.

The word used by the philosophers usually is “simulation.’ And indeed we often hear of computer simulations, not emulations. I will stick with “simulation.”

Oh well. My question is: “did Deep Blue simulate a chessplayer, or is it the best chess player in the world?”. Did Watson simulate a Jeopardy chamion, or was Watson THE Jeopardy champion?

(1) Simulation is not duplication.
Let’s say we write a computer program that follows the whole formal sequence of processes in the body of chemical and neural messages that initiate thirst and even instruct the program to print out at the end “Boy, am I thirsty!” or “Would you give me a drink?” Now would anyone think that we thereby have even the slightest reason to suppose that the computer is literally thirsty? that it has the mental state we have of experiencing thirst?

If that computer is made of biological parts, it may very well have “thirst”. But that is not what we are talking about. If an excellent actor “simulates” a bereaved person, how can you tell if he really “simulates” it, or is he really sad? You cannot. In the Turing test you only have the information contained in a conversation. From that you must draw a conclusion: did you talk to someone who really has consciousness, or someone who only simulates consciousness? If you cannot decide based upon the conversation, and later it is revealed to you that you talked to a bunch of silicon chips, what will you do? Eat crow?

(2) Computers use syntax, not semantics.
As far as the computer is concerned the symbols don’t symbolize or represent anything. They are just formal counters.

That is the question. You cannot postulate it as a fact.

(3) Software does not = consciousness.
For your final sentence to have any chance of holding you would have to argue, like the strong AI crowd, that the specific neurophysiology of the brain is irrelevant to the mind nor is any morphology relevant: what counts for consciousness is the computer program as long as it has something to run on.

See above.

In the end AI, for all its advances, no more quacks like human consciousness than an artificial heart quacks like a human heart.

I have to point out that the artifical heart is superior to the human heart. Its arteries will not get clogged. Also you may notice that there is no “natural law” scribbled on it. Another point in its favor.

You could perform a thought experiment. Let’s replace each human cell with a properly engineered artificial cell, one at a time, which will perform exactly as the original one did. Do you think that somewhere in this process the person will become a “zombie”? Lose consciousness? The point is that the underlying physcial architecture does not matter, as long as the “working” is the same.

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

Thanks, this is helpful to understand cellular automata =CA]. (Point me to some reading so I can get more up to speed.)

But this still gets back to the question regardijg which you said you didn’t know the answer: how does third-person data become first person data. CA are entirely third-person processes with causal links that account for the changes even if some steps are (if I understand them correctly) random. They are established to do third-person things, like other technology. So I can see an analogy to atoms’ relation to neurons, but not the analogy to the conscious mind making conscious decisions that alter brain structure and functioning? You haven’t shown that yet re CA. The CA we have are not conscious.

Oh, give me a break. I have never seen a coherent definition of the “soul”. Some people say it is an “animating principle”, others say it is the “form”, others insist that the human soul is “immortal”, etc… Also none of these assumptions give the slightest idea, just how does this untouchable, unmeasurable “stuff” interact with the brain. Don’t ask me to invalidate such an undefined concept. The evidence is still overwhelming. Excite the brain electircally and/or chemically and there will be change in the process of how it works. Sever the frontal lobe, and the person’s personality is gone. Minor injuries to the physical structure of the brain will cause disturbancies in its operation. Etc…

I didn’t ask you. You made the claim, you’ll recall. I’m asking you to make good on it. And so far you haven’t.

I gave a definition of the mind and one of consciousness. You raised no objections. We were starting with those—“mind” was you term. And so far you have not been able to show me the “overwhelming evidence” that “the mind is simply the activity of the brain.” In fact you said neither you nor anybody else knows how third-person data becomes the first-person data.

I never disputed brain-to-consciousness causality. Although it is not as easy and clear-cut as one might think from your description (see sub post). You need to account for consciousness-to-brain causality as well and in additon, and you haven’t . . .admittedly so.

You are most welcome to believe whatever you want.

Thank you, sincerely. But if you challenge it, you need to back it up. So far for the brain and the conscious mind you haven’t.

As far as AI goes, permit me make a proposal at this point.

The arguments you offer are standard from the Strong AI camp. I deal with them frequently in class when we get to the philosophy of mind. The best responses from a strictly natural science and purely naturalistic position I have seen are laid out in detail by John R. Searle in his book The Mystery of Consciousness and partially in an article/review in The New York Review of Books.

In Mystery you can read p. 58 (of 58-63) and much of the Chap. 5 on Dennett (and Hofstadter) who seem to be influential in your thought. (Incidentally, I read Gödel, Escher, and Bach.) Unfortunately the concluding chapter in Searle, the best for our purposes, is not provided. I would recommend buying Mystery to gain an overview of the subject from someone with a strictly scientific worldview and to familiarize yourself with the philosophical lay of the land from his point of view.

The bottom line is that it is far from settled even among those who have no philosophical commitment to immateriality at all that AI has attained consciousness as we possess it.

So, rather than me simply typing out what are essentially his responses to arguments already made and then his responses to attempts at rebuttal already made, etc., what if you read these pieces and then we can save typing and start from the spade work he has already done.

What do you say to my proposal?

There is one procedural thing I would like to address below, however.

(2) Computers use syntax, not semantics.
As far as the computer is concerned the symbols don’t symbolize or represent anything. They are just formal counters. The computer attaches no meaning, interpretation, or content to the formal symbols; and as a computer it couldn’t, because if we tried to give the computer an interpretation of its symbols we could only give it more uninterpreted symbols. Computers do not understand a meaning.
Serious;9037476:

That is the question. You cannot postulate it as a fact.

Actually not. That computers can understand a meaning is your assertion which you need to prove despite the fact that we know their binary basis. We know the bytes are meaningless to the computer because we made the machine process them. And we have seen the history of its development. It is your thesis that if we multiply enough programming levels of meaningless (to the computer) bytes, the final program will somehow constitute, cause, or gain consciousness and the machine or program or both will understand a meaning. It is up to you to trace in detail the path from what we know are meaningless binary-based bytes all the way to the consciousness and semantics you hope to be able to find.

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

Michael W. Eysenck, Principles of Cognitive Psychology, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia, PA: Taylor & Francis Inc., 2001) p. 6-7.
Why is causality so hard to demonstrate?
“What are the limitations of the cognitive neuropsychological approach? First, it is assumed that the cognitive performance of brain damaged patients provides direct evidence of the impact of brain damage on previously normal cognitive systems. However some brain damaged patients may have had somewhat unusual cognitive systems prior to brain damage. In addition, some impact of brain damage on cognitive functioning may be camouflaged because patient’s develop compensatory strategies to help them cope with their brain damage.

Second, the whole cognitive neuropsychological approach is very complex, because there are very often large differences among individuals having broadly similar brain damage. As Banich (1997, p. 55) pointed out, such individuals ‘typically vary widely in age, socioeconomic status and educational background. Prior to brain damage, these individuals may have had diverse life experiences. Afterward, their life experience vary widely too, depending on the type of rehabilitation they receive, their attitudes toward therapy and recovery and their social support network.’

Third, the modular approach may exaggerate the extent to which cognitive functions are localized within the brain (Farah, 1994). As Banich (1997, p. 52) noted: ‘the brain is comprised of about 50 million interconnected neurons. Therefore, even complex cognitive functions for which a modular description seems apt rely on a number of interconnected brain regions or systems.’

[p. 7] Fourth, the study of brain damaged patients can lead to underestimates of the brain areas involved in performing any given cognitive function. The lesion method generally only permits identification of those brain areas of crucial importance to a cognitive function, but not those that may be partially involved.

Fifth, study of brain damaged patients can lead to overestimates of the areas of the brain directly involved in certain aspects of cognitive functioning. This can happen when the brain damaged region contains axons known as fibers of passage, which connect the brain areas crucially involved in performing a certain cognitive function.” (italics in original)

 

[Serious]

Thanks, this is helpful to understand cellular automata =CA]. (Point me to some reading so I can get more up to speed.)

The concept is quite old. John von Neumann contemplated it first, to the best of my knowledge. The title of his book is: “The theory of self-reproducing automata”. E.F. Codd’s book was “Cellular automata”. (Both are very techinal, and Neumann’s book is not easy read at all.) The idea is much more important theoretically, than practically, at least for the time being. But here is something that Codd did: he proved (in a constructive fashion) that in the “cell-space” it is possible to create a “regular” computer (CPU, memory, peripherals) which has one extra capability: it can reporoduce itself. As such this computer emulates (not simulates!) one of the most fundamental aspects of life, self-replication. It is also possible to build-in cwetain randomness into the process, so the offspring will be somewhat different from the “parent”. Of course it is possible to have many such computers in the same cell-space, and they can exchange information with each other (nothing new about that). All this is pure math, not science fiction. If you are interested in a sci-fi short story, I can recommend Stanislaw Lem’s “Non Serviam” (the title is not an accident ).

But this still gets back to the question regardijg which you said you didn’t know the answer: how does third-person data become first person data. CA are entirely third-person processes with causal links that account for the changes even if some steps are (if I understand them correctly) random. They are established to do third-person things, like other technology. So I can see an analogy to atoms’ relation to neurons, but not the analogy to the conscious mind making conscious decisions that alter brain structure and functioning? You haven’t shown that yet re CA. The CA we have are not conscious.

No, it is not. As of today we do not have any computer (artifical entity) that would exhibit consciousness even in the most rudimentary level. I am not surprised. The complexity of even the most complicated super-computer is nowhere close to the complexity of the human brain. So what?

There are many things we cannot explain. We cannot explain what makes water “wet”, when none of its parts are “wet”. The existence of emergent attributes tells us that we cannot reduce the complex entities to the properties of their parts. If you pile up silicon molecules on top of each other, all you will get is large pile of sand. If you pile uranium atoms up, eventually you will reach the critical mass, and the quantitative changes will result in a qualitiative change. Do you really think that there is an immaterial “soul” which makes the water wet? Or that the explosion of the uranium atoms is due to their immaterial “soul”?

According to the working hypothesis the consciousness we experience is an emergent attribute due to the complexity of neural network of the brain. This idea is supported by the more rudimentary level of consciousness we see in lower animals (with simpler minds). It is also supported by the fact, that we can influence the brain, and achieve changes in the mind.

I never disputed brain-to-consciousness causality. Although it is not as easy and clear-cut as one might think from your description (see sub post). You need to account for consciousness-to-brain causality as well and in additon, and you haven’t . . .admittedly so.

Of course we don’t have the exact method. Why is that a problem?

As far as AI goes, permit me make a proposal at this point.
What do you say to my proposal?

As soon as I will be able to get that book, I will. Problem is that these years I am staying in Europe, and it is not easy to get to it.

Actually not. That computers can understand a meaning is your assertion which you need to prove despite the fact that we know their binary basis. We know the bytes are meaningless to the computer because we made the machine process them. And we have seen the history of its development. It is your thesis that if we multiply enough programming levels of meaningless (to the computer) bytes, the final program will somehow constitute, cause, or gain consciousness and the machine or program or both will understand a meaning. It is up to you to trace in detail the path from what we know are meaningless binary-based bytes all the way to the consciousness and semantics you hope to be able to find.

I did not propose to shovel semi-conductors into a huge hole in the ground, and hope that they will magically rearrange themselves if their quantity reaches a certain limit.

As for the concept of “meaning”, it is not that complicated. First, there is no objective meaning. Second, meaning can only be defined in a comunication channel between two entities. If the two entities agree that a word “X” has a meaning of “Y”, then the meaning was established by mutual consent. That process does not even require consciousness. In other words, the “meaning” of a word is described by the written and unwritten rules where the usage of that word is accepted by mutual consent. I could talk to you in a language you do not understand, and all you would hear is gobbledegook, even though to someone who speaks the language, it would carry information.

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

I’ve already covered these things in previous posts except the section on meaning.

Let’s discuss it when you get back to me after reading Searle. Just shoot me a message.

I will be getting back to Europe also this summer. Can’t wait.

 

[Serious]

I’ve already covered these things in previous posts except the section on meaning.

Let’s discuss it when you get back to me after reading Searle. Just shoot me a message.

I will be getting back to Europe also this summer. Can’t wait.

Very well. In the meantime you can ponder the scenario I asked you about: “what will happen if we substitute each neuron in the brain with an equivalent silicon part (one at a time)?”. Will the consciosness somehow “disappear” at a certain point? If so, why, and at what point? I already asked this little thought experiment from numerous people, and none could make an answer. Most simply pretended that the question was not even asked.

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

Very well. In the meantime you can ponder the scenario I asked you about: “what will happen if we substitute each neuron in the brain with an equivalent silicon part (one at a time)?”. Will the consciosness somehow “disappear” at a certain point? If so, why, and at what point? I already asked this little thought experiment from numerous people, and none could make an answer. Most simply pretended that the question was not even asked.

Sure. In the interim let’s consider some of these things.

As for the concept of “meaning”, it is not that complicated. First, there is no objective meaning. Second, meaning can only be defined in a comunication channel between two entities. If the two entities agree that a word “X” has a meaning of “Y”, then the meaning was established by mutual consent. That process does not even require consciousness. In other words, the “meaning” of a word is described by the written and unwritten rules where the usage of that word is accepted by mutual consent. I could talk to you in a language you do not understand, and all you would hear is gobbledegook, even though to someone who speaks the language, it would carry information.

As far as I can see the work being done in hermeneutic philosophy does the most justice to language as we actually find it in life. From that vantage point and from traditional studies in grammar as one of the classic seven liberal arts I would comment as follows.

Everything you said except the last sentence is true of computers, but not human communication as human communication. The last sentence is a very common–and true–observation.

(1) Stipulated equivalence of two random markings or bytes is not what apprehending a meaning is. It is however what goes on in computers. You are right, it does not need consciousness.

(2) Everybody knows that language is conventional, but that is not entirely the same as engineering a stipulated equivalence of markings or sets of markings or bytes.

(3) One apprehends a meaning not when they link two words/glyphs/markings by an equal sign, but when they ascertain mentally what is asserted by a sentence. The definition of a word ultimately resolves not into another single word but into a sentence, a group of words expressing a complete thought. When the complete thought expressed in the words is understood or apprehended one knows its meaning. And that is semantics.

(4) At best you described engineered syntax for software, which is, of course, a true achievement, but is not mentally apprehending a meaning.

(5) In philosophical hermeneutics the fundamental model in human communication is not establishing algebraic equivalence between glyphs, but this: inner word vs. uttered word.
The inner word (verbum interius) concerns the thoughts and feelings within; the conversation within the mind. The uttered word concerns expression.

The utterance is always a “translation,” a transmission, of the mind’s inner thoughts into externalized language. Interpretation (understanding the meaning) involves proceeding in the opposite direction, going inward from externalized language to the inner word of the writer or speaker.

(6) What is “objective meaning?”

Background:
Jean Grodin. Philosophical Hermeneutics. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994.
Hans-Georg Gadamer. Truth and Method. 2nd ed., New York: Continuum, 2000.
H.I. Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity. The University of Wisconsin Press, 1956.
David L. Wagner, ed. The Seven Liberal Arts in the Middle Ages. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1983.

You could perform a thought experiment. Let’s replace each human cell with a properly engineered artificial cell, one at a time, which will perform exactly as the original one did. Do you think that somewhere in this process the person will become a “zombie”? Lose consciousness? The point is that the underlying physcial architecture does not matter, as long as the “working” is the same.

In the meantime you can ponder the scenario I asked you about: “what will happen if we substitute each neuron in the brain with an equivalent silicon part (one at a time)?”. Will the consciosness somehow “disappear” at a certain point? If so, why, and at what point? I already asked this little thought experiment from numerous people, and none could make an answer. Most simply pretended that the question was not even asked.

I would offer several observations.
(7) What is really at issue here is whether the patient would survive this procedure? And the only way to find an answer is experimentally–hopefully on lab animals first.

(8) Scientifically we maintain that carbon-based brain tissue and processes are sufficient for producing consciousness. Are you asking about substituting silicon for carbon in bio-engineered cells? Silicon [28] is over twice as heavy as carbon [12] and although it is tetravalent like carbon it is not as reactive with crucial elements in biological systems and it does not as easily form double or triple covalent bonds which are also necessary. It is hard to say what those different properties would do to brain functioning and our overall physiology to say nothing about whether even a single cell would survive.

 

[Serious]

Everything you said except the last sentence is true of computers, but not human communication as human communication. The last sentence is a very common–and true–observation.

(1) Stipulated equivalence of two random markings or bytes is not what apprehending a meaning is. It is however what goes on in computers. You are right, it does not need consciousness.

(2) Everybody knows that language is conventional, but that is not entirely the same as engineering a stipulated equivalence of markings or sets of markings or bytes.

(3) One apprehends a meaning not when they link two words/glyphs/markings by an equal sign, but when they ascertain mentally what is asserted by a sentence. The definition of a word ultimately resolves not into another single word but into a sentence, a group of words expressing a complete thought. When the complete thought expressed in the words is understood or apprehended one knows its meaning. And that is semantics.

(4) At best you described engineered syntax for software, which is, of course, a true achievement, but is not mentally apprehending a meaning.

(5) In philosophical hermeneutics the fundamental model in human communication is not establishing algebraic equivalence between glyphs, but this: inner word vs. uttered word.
The inner word (verbum interius) concerns the thoughts and feelings within; the conversation within the mind. The uttered word concerns expression.

The utterance is always a “translation,” a transmission, of the mind’s inner thoughts into externalized language. Interpretation (understanding the meaning) involves proceeding in the opposite direction, going inward from externalized language to the inner word of the writer or speaker.

(6) What is “objective meaning?”

Let’s emulate the first conversation between two people who do not have a common language. One of them is English (let’s call him “A”), the other one is French (let’s call him “B”).

A holds up one finger and says: “one”. B looks and answers “doigt”… (the French equivalent of “finger”) Obvious misunderstanding - but only if you speak both languages. However , neither A nor B is aware of the misunderstanding. Then A puts up two fingers and says “two”. At that moment B probably starts to hesitate… anyhow… by mutual trial and error, eventually they come to an agreement and realize that “one” is the equivalent of “un” and “two” is the equivalent of “deux”…

Also we could make a decision and create a private language (again by mutual agreement) and devise a communication “device” which is perfectly clear to us, and has no meaning to anyone else. In other words, the meaning is whatever we decide it is.

I would offer several observations.
(7) What is really at issue here is whether the patient would survive this procedure? And the only way to find an answer is experimentally–hopefully on lab animals first.

(8) Scientifically we maintain that carbon-based brain tissue and processes are sufficient for producing consciousness. Are you asking about substituting silicon for carbon in bio-engineered cells? Silicon [28] is over twice as heavy as carbon [12] and although it is tetravalent like carbon it is not as reactive with crucial elements in biological systems and it does not as easily form double or triple covalent bonds which are also necessary. It is hard to say what those different properties would do to brain functioning and our overall physiology to say nothing about whether even a single cell would survive.

Sorry, this looks like an evastion. When contemplating a thought experiment it is not important that it would be practical. The point is: a neuron is a physical component. It is connected to other neurons, and they exchange information via electro-chemical means (this is why the concept of cellular automata is so important). I am proposing to replace a neuron with a non-organic equivalent, which performs the same task as the neuron did: accepts information, and transmits it. In other words it is the functional equivalent of the neuron.

The question is: do you think that this process will lead to a “zombie”? If, so, at what point will this process lead to the loss of consciousness?

The problem can be reduced to this: “what is the difference between an original and its functional equivalent?”.

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

Let’s emulate the first conversation between two people who do not have a common language. One of them is English (let’s call him “A”), the other one is French (let’s call him “B”).

A holds up one finger and says: “one”. B looks and answers “doigt”… (the French equivalent of “finger”) Obvious misunderstanding - but only if you speak both languages. However , neither A nor B is aware of the misunderstanding. Then A puts up two fingers and says “two”. At that moment B probably starts to hesitate… anyhow… by mutual trial and error, eventually they come to an agreement and realize that “one” is the equivalent of “un” and “two” is the equivalent of “deux”…

Also we could make a decision and create a private language (again by mutual agreement) and devise a communication “device” which is perfectly clear to us, and has no meaning to anyone else. In other words, the meaning is whatever we decide it is.

Except in the language into which we are born or an existing language–all of which affect our view of the world and thought processes and even brain structure and function (see quotes under neuroplasticity).

Sorry, this looks like an evastion. When contemplating a thought experiment it is not important that it would be practical. The point is: a neuron is a physical component. It is connected to other neurons, and they exchange information via electro-chemical means (this is why the concept of cellular automata is so important). I am proposing to replace a neuron with a non-organic equivalent, which performs the same task as the neuron did: accepts information, and transmits it. In other words it is the functional equivalent of the neuron.

The question is: do you think that this process will lead to a “zombie”? If, so, at what point will this process lead to the loss of consciousness?

The problem can be reduced to this: “what is the difference between an original and its functional equivalent?”.

Actually Einstein’s thought experiments have been tested to see if they actually hold.

For something man-made there is no difference. Organisms, however, are a given produced by nature in a way we don’t completely understand. Scientifically speaking, we know that carbon-based brain tissue and processes are sufficient for producing consciousness. It is a natural scientific (even medical) project to find functional equivalents for neural tissue and from the mechanistic physicalistic vantage point of science it would be a legit hypothesis to hold that they in toto can do the job. But from the scientific, realistic, and philosophical point of view we also know there is no way to find out apart from experimental testing. I don’t know what more one can reasonable say.

This is directly on point with the articleNew York Review of Books I gave you.

While you read up, I’ll review some of the points I have made and to that goal take up some of your points left unanswered.

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

I want to be clear from the outset that you understand my position on a few things.
(1) I vigorously affirm the validity of the SM for the empirical, mechanistic, quantifiable investigation of physical reality. And I affirm the validity (even if sometimes temporary) of the resultant scientific knowledge and future scientific research projects–assuming they are conducted ethically–and the hypotheses necessary for them.
(2) I laud, encourage, and often purchase technological advancements especially digital ones including AI projects.
(3) I have no problem with the scientific project of seeking to understand the biological basis and/or correlates of consciousness so long as all of the data including the bidirectional nature of causality re the brain and mind is taken into consideration.

Re CA: “All this is pure math. . .” So, I gather, my observation a while ago was correct: “I have seen cellular automata working on paper as mathematical and computational models or graphic simulations as on the Wikipedia article, but not altering hard physical architecture.”

No, it is not. As of today we do not have any computer (artifical entity) that would exhibit consciousness even in the most rudimentary level. I am not surprised. The complexity of even the most complicated super-computer is nowhere close to the complexity of the human brain. So what?

There is no “so what.” Science and tech can pursue the goal in (3) above all they want: I’m fine with that. And when you said initially “There are some people who fight tooth-and-nail against the idea that the mind is simply the activity of the brain, even though the evidence is overwhelming”, I am fine with your assertion about the mind and brain so long as you say “as far as science is concerned, the mind is . . .” I am also fine with saying “the soul” or also the immateriality of the mind are irrelevant to the SM.

I take issue with the philosophical assertion that therefore, due to the findings of science, the mind is by any measure of understanding, in all actuality and in every way nothing but brain activity and consequently one is rationally compelled to deny the immateriality of the mind. [Let’s call this assertion PA.] The statement is “philosophical” because whether or not the the mind is immaterial is beyond what the SM can pronounce upon.

There are many things we cannot explain. We cannot explain what makes water “wet”, when none of its parts are “wet”. The existence of emergent attributes tells us that we cannot reduce the complex entities to the properties of their parts. If you pile up silicon molecules on top of each other, all you will get is large pile of sand. If you pile uranium atoms up, eventually you will reach the critical mass, and the quantitative changes will result in a qualitiative change. Do you really think that there is an immaterial “soul” which makes the water wet? Or that the explosion of the uranium atoms is due to their immaterial “soul”?

In the western philosophical tradition a soul has not been attributed to inanimate objects, as the word “inanimate” suggests.

As far as the SM goes, which was made to investigates physical objects outside the mind, I am fine with proposing emergentism as a scientific explanation for the phenomenon of consciousness. What else can the SM do?

But philosophically if you are trying to get to PA with it, as I said, the problem with the emergent property argument/analogy is that the thing to be explained, water as we perceive it with the senses, is still an observer-independent, third-person, object outside the mind. Consciousness has an observer-dependent, first-person, inner ontology. What’s demanded of the materialist making the philosophical statement PA is to give a proper accounting of the thing to be explained as it actually is.

According to the working hypothesis the consciousness we experience is an emergent attribute due to the complexity of neural network of the brain. This idea is supported by the more rudimentary level of consciousness we see in lower animals (with simpler minds). It is also supported by the fact, that we can influence the brain, and achieve changes in the mind.

As per (3) above this is a perfectly fine scientific hypothesis.
But to be complete you not only have to consider third person to first causality, but also first person to third person causality, i.e., conscious, first person, choices and decisions affect brain structure and functioning.

I never disputed brain-to-consciousness causality. Although it is not as easy and clear-cut as one might think from your description (see sub post). You need to account for consciousness-to-brain causality as well and in additon, and you haven’t . . .admittedly so.
Serious;9060144:

Of course we don’t have the exact method. Why is that a problem?

Consciousness-to-brain causality is not a problem for science, apart from the standard ones involved in formulating testable hypotheses and devising experimental procedures.

It is a problem for PA because the mechanism of consciousness-to-brain causality has not been demonstrated by the SM and because PA is beyond what the SM can pronounce upon anyway. It is also a problem philosophically because until it is demonstrated the available data for bidirectionality comport the the philosophical conviction of the immateriality of the mind. And therefore you have not shown why one is rationally compelled to abandon this view. I’m not sure it even can be demonstrated given the third person nature of scientific investigation and the first person nature of consciousness.

 

[Serious]

This is directly on point with the New York Review of Books article I gave you.

Just a quick response… the fact that 3 of Lem’s writings are included definitely whet my appetite. Lem was the greatest thinker of the 20th century (in my eyes of course). Do you have any information which ones of the essays of Lem have been included? So far I did not find that information. I definitely will come back with a response to the review.

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

Just a quick response… the fact that 3 of Lem’s writings are included definitely whet my appetite. Lem was the greatest thinker of the 20th century (in my eyes of course). Do you have any information which ones of the essays of Lem have been included? So far I did not find that information. I definitely will come back with a response to the review.

Sure.

“The Princess Ineffabelle” p. 96.
“The Seventh Sally or How Trurl’s Own Perfection Led to No Good” p. 287.
“Non Serviam” p. 296.

Searle’s critique is primarily with Dennett and Hofstadter re the computational model–really software model–of mind. Actually an essay of Searle’s is included in the book.

Also in the review Dennett offers a rebuttal followed by a response from Searle.